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HISTORY OF THE
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF

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PART FIVE

WORLD WAR II
8 December 1941 - 2 September 1945

By
BRUCE W. BIDWELL
Colonel, U. S. Army Ret.

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PART FIVE

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I (XLI)	FUNCTIONAL CONFLICT	
II (XLII)	UNPRECEDENTED GROWTH	
III (XLIII)	JOINT (COMBINED) COMMITTEES	
IV (XLIV)	PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE	
V (XLV)	FIELD COLLECTION	
VI (XLVI)	TECHNICAL (SCIENTIFIC) INTELLIGENCE . .	
VII (XLVII)	INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION	
VIII (XLVIII)	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	
IX (XLIX)	TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS	
X (L)	HISTORICAL BRANCH	
XI (LI)	COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES	
XII (LII)	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	

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Chapter I

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Despite the fact that for the past two years the War Department had been expanding progressively both in size and functional activity, the sudden advent of World War II found it woefully organized to undertake an efficient direction of the impending global operations. The distinguished military authorities who had fostered its reorganization during the early part of the preceding period had designed it in the image of their own World War I experience to conduct a massive one-front war mostly on the ground. They had further contemplated that it would be practicable for the Chief of Staff to serve as Army Commander in the field, taking sufficient key personnel from the War Plans Division along with him to form the nucleus of a General Headquarters. * Although the full application

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* Nelson, op. cit., p. 317.

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of this original mobilization concept had been more or less compromised in 1940, through the establishment of a separate General Headquarters in Washington with instructions to be prepared "to perform normal theatre of operations functions if required," * the War

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* Biennial Report of Chief of Staff, 1939-41, p. 13. GHQ did not actually begin to perform planning and operational functions until 1 Jul 41.

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Department was still confronted with a large number of important organizational problems demanding an effective solution before the war could be vigorously prosecuted to the limit. One of the most troublesome of these problems was how best to insure that the War Department General Staff (WDGS) might remain reasonably limited in total size and yet manage to execute its required supervisory and coordinating functions without becoming too much involved in operational activities.

MID had never been able to conform strictly to the ideal concept of a general staff division being essentially a planning and policy group while not engaging in any actual operations. Even in peacetime, the sensitive nature of many of its assigned responsibilities had regularly required that it should possess an authoritative control over field personnel who were occupied in collecting foreign information, for example officers assigned to the military attache system. Similarly, with the advantages of centralizing the departmental counterintelligence effort appearing both numerous and persuasive, the agency had chosen to assume direct control of all such operations on the home front during World War I and to a certain extent thereafter. It was thus already by far the largest of the general staff divisions in numerical strength and would undoubtedly continue to remain so just as long as it was permitted to perform this widely accepted combination of general staff and operational-type duties.

A major project for reorganizing the War Department had been under active consideration within the War Plans Division for some time

prior to Pearl Harbor and shortly following that event was placed in the hands of a high-level reorganization committee headed by Maj. Gen. (later General) Joseph T. McNarney. On 31 January 1942, this committee forwarded a memorandum to the Chief of Staff which not only proposed the immediate formation of a Ground Force, Air Force, and Service Command for the Army but also strongly recommended the deletion of all "operating activities of the General Staff." With particular reference to MID, it merely included a terse and rather confusing statement to the effect that "G-2 will be reorganized. Intelligence Branch remains in WDGS. Remainder becomes Military Intelligence Operations." *

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* Nelson, op. cit., pp. 347-49, Gen McNarney's memo is reproduced in full on p. 349 (Chart 10).

After having been duly approved in turn by the Chief of Staff, Secretary of War and the President, this proposed reorganization was formally authorized under an Executive Order dated 28 February 1942. *

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* EO 9082, 28 Feb 42, by virtue of the President's existing war powers and his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the Army.

Even before that time, however, an executive committee, also headed by General McNarney, had been appointed in the War Department for the express purpose of "coordinating and preparing the necessary directives to put the reorganization into effect." * Pending further instructions

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* See: Nelson, op. cit., p. 356. G-2 member of this committee

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was Lt Col (later Brig Gen) C. Y. Banfill, Chief of the Plans and Training Branch.

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and an indicated revision of regulations, therefore, the new organization could be announced to the Army on 2 March 1942, with an effective date prescribed for one week later. *

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* WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42; see also: MID 320, 2 Mar 42 (5 Feb 42). Records of the ACofS G-2, DRB, TAG.

Under the new situation, MID was still charged "in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff relating to the collection, evaluation and dissemination of military information." This standard declaration was qualified, though, by the statement that a "Military Intelligence Service, under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, MID, WDGS, will operate and administer the service of the collection, compilation and dissemination of military intelligence." Moreover, the total authorized strength of MID proper was fixed at 16 officers and 10 civilian personnel or enlisted clerks. * Presumably it

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* Nelson, op. cit., pp. 373, 376 and 390.

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was now intended that the ACofS G-2, WDGS, should retain his full responsibility for evaluating military information, more or less share the collection and dissemination functions with a new military intelligence service commander, but divorce himself completely from all operational and administrative duties.

The reorganization committee had manifestly been obsessed from

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the start with the idea of diverting the bulk of all operational activities and reforming it into a policy and planning group only. There were, of course, important historical precedents favoring such a course of action. On the other hand, the extraordinary contradiction in the position taken by this committee becomes apparent when it is realized that the key members also strongly supported a proposition to clarify the status of the Chief of Staff so he could operate as a real military commander instead of merely functioning as head of the JCS under the Secretary of War. If he was going to direct the actual conduct of the war, his own staff would quite obviously have to become deeply involved in operational matters.

Recognizing this crippling incongruity in their reorganization plan, the committee hoped to minimize the attendant difficulties by redesignating the War Plans Division to be an Operations Division and concentrating all operational activities within it. Although this move might work out in a satisfactory manner for the G-1, G-3 and G-4 divisions because they controlled administrative, technical or special staff sections which could operate for them, it failed to provide a positive system for furnishing the Chief of Staff with adequate intelligence information upon which to base his required command decisions. Accordingly, either the new Operations Division would have to develop a duplicate military intelligence service or some way found for MID to continue performing this vital function as it always had done in the past.

Despite the serious handicaps posed by this quandary, the

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reorganization committee was determined to pursue its twin objectives of reducing the total size of the WDGS and eliminating all operational activities therein except those executed by the Operations Division. It felt that the ACofS G-2, WDGS, could successfully manage to separate his general staff and operating functions in accomplishing the former as before but fulfilling the latter solely through a dissociated military intelligence service. This despite an explicit warning on the subject from Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee, who had recently replaced Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles as the ACofS G-2, WDGS,* that such a solution would not be feasible.

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* About to conclude a four year tour of duty in London as the MA to Great Britain and Ireland, Gen Lee had been directed to investigate and personally report upon the question of whether or not big bomber operations by the British against Germany were producing satisfactory results. Arriving in New York City on temporary duty the day after Pearl Harbor, he was retained in the United States to be first appointed Acting ACofS G-2, WDGS, effective 19 Dec 41 and then The ACofS G-2, WDGS, on 30 Jan 42. "History of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the G-2 Secretariat" (S), 7 Dec 41 - 2 Sep 45, G-2 314.7, undated (30 Oct 42), p. 1. ACSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as "Hist G-2 Office and Secretariat" (S). See also: WD OPI, Press Branch, Raymond Eliot Lee, O-2666, through Jun 45.

By way of compromise, he even suggested that certain members of the MID staff should be allowed to retain at least a titular control over major branches formed within the new operating

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agency. * General McNarney, however, remained unimpressed by this

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* "A History of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 Dec 41 - 2 Sep 45" (S), prepared in 1946, CSGID 314.7 (30 Oct 42), p. 11. ACSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as: "MID Hist Wa 11" (S).

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proposition and proceeded to direct the creation of a Military Intelligence Service (MIS) along the lines he had originally envisaged.

From the viewpoint of reducing the actual size of the WDGS, creation of this new MIS turned out to be a striking success. Although MID had previously comprised almost fifty percent of the officer and nearly sixty percent of the civilian personnel or enlisted clerk strength thereof, it was now the smallest division of the organization with just 26 persons assigned. In contrast, by 30 April 1942, the semi-independent MIS already carried a strength of 342 officers and 1005 civilian personnel or enlisted clerks and was growing at a rapid rate, while the entire WDGS proper only consisted of 177 officers and 297 civilian personnel or enlisted clerks. *

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* Nelson, op. cit., p. 390.

The chief fault of the 9 March reorganization from the military intelligence standpoint was that it simply would not work. It had been absurd to believe that by merely prefixing the phrase "policies concerning" in front of the various missions assigned to the ACofS G-2, WDGS,*

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* See: Ibid., p. 363 (Chart 12).

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they might be truly altered to any substantial degree. His primary function was still to provide the Chief of Staff and other key governmental officials with appropriate intelligence for reaching the necessary decisions in the conduct of the war. He could neither delegate this function to anyone else nor even partially separate himself from any of the numerous responsibilities it entailed. Furthermore, since intelligence of that type is normally presented in the form of a military estimate it could only be submitted after carefully considering all available information from every possible source. With these estimates not only expressing his own interpretive judgement but also utilizing the total intelligence production system, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, had to remain intimately and constantly aware of their full implications. The Chief of MIS could thus never really become anything more than a Deputy ACofS G-2, WDGS, regardless of organization charts or edicts from higher authority.

Due to the fact that administration constitutes an accepted basic function of command, the reorganization committee likewise should have known better than to suppose the ACofS G-2, WDGS, might be properly divested of any of his principal administrative duties. For instance, the American military attaches stationed abroad continued to remain under his command and were habitually required to perform many important missions not connected with the collection of foreign military information. Since the ACofS G-2, WDGS, was held directly responsible for the execution of these various tasks, he could never permit the Chief of MIS to take over complete administration of the military attache

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system or turn it into [illegible] a military intelligence collection agency. Similarly, [illegible] of the [illegible] always [illegible] upon appropriations, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, had to retain a personal cognizance over such significant fiscal matters as budgets, expenditure control, overseas allowances, confidential vouchers etc.

Orders being orders, however, MIS was duly established and organized generally along the same lines as the previous MID to consist of four main subordinate groups representing Administration, Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Operations, plus separate Military Attache and Foreign Liaison Offices. * Most fortunately it was

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* "MID Hist WW II" (S), chart approved 14 Mar 42, inserted between pp. 10 and 11.

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allowed to remain in close physical proximity to the ACofS G-2, WDGS, offices, so that few changes took place in the actual operations particularly at the working level. Besides, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Hayes A. Kroner, former head of the Intelligence Group of MID, was chosen to be the new Chief, MIS.

Of the 16 officers now assigned to MID proper, 12 were earmarked to comprise a Policy Staff for use by the ACofS G-2, WDGS, but with their exact duties remaining largely undefined. Commonly known as the "twelve apostles," it was intended that they should function in a true general staff capacity and handle only such matters as were directly concerned with formulating plans and policies bearing upon the military intelligence field. They were thus not supposed to become mixed up in any way

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with the production of intelligence. The group first met on 9 March 1942 and right away there was considerable confusion in respect to the precise tasks they should undertake to perform. More or less regular meetings of the same nature were then held until 31 December 1942. * By that date, the officers involved were so busy doing their day to day work for the ACofS WDGS G-2, that such meetings were no longer either practicable or productive. There was a war going on and not much time at hand for long range planning or pure general staff thinking, while the demands for coordinating current operations had increased by leaps and bounds.

* Ibid., pp. 250-55.

Toward the latter part of March 1942, it became necessary for General Lee to go on detached service and later to take an extended sick leave because of his failing health. * During this interval,

* See: MID 201, Raymond E. Lee, Central Rec Depot, Ft. Holabird, Md.

Maj. Gen. George V. Strong of OPD was detailed to MID on a part time basis and Colonel Kroner, Chief of MIS, temporarily designated to be the Deputy ACofS G-2, WDGS. Hence, although General Strong did not officially replace General Lee as the ACofS G-2, WDGS until 5 May 1942, he was in actual charge of the departmental intelligence agency for more than a month before that formal assignment date. *

* "History of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2

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and the G-2 Secretariat," (S), 7 Dec 42 - 2 Feb 43, G-2 311.67, undated (30 Oct 42), p. 4. ACofS Rec Sec.

Possessing one of the most keenly incisive minds in the Army, and a wealth of previous general staff experience both within MID and the War Plans Division, * it did not take General Strong long to

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* See: WD OPI, Press Branch, George Veazey Strong, up to date as of 22 Feb 44. Some of the highlights of General Strong's impressive military career prior to this ACofS G-2 appointment seem particularly illuminating, as follows:

1904-07: As a Cavalry officer, served in operations against the Ute Indians.

1908: Stationed in the Philippines and participated in an engagement against the Moros.

1908-11: American Military Attache in Tokyo.

1918-19: Numerous responsible staff assignments in France with the AEF.

1920-22: Professor of Law at USMA.

1924: Graduated from the Army War College.

1924-28: Duty in the War Plans Div, during which time and shortly thereafter he acted as Technical and Military Advisor to the Secy of State at the International Disarmament Conferences held in Geneva, Switzerland.

1937-38: Chief of Intelligence Group, MID, WDGS.

1938-40: Chief of War Plans Div, WDGS.

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recognize there should be "some basic changes in connection with the organization set up by Circular 59." Accordingly, on 9 June 1942, he submitted a memorandum to the Chief of Staff calling attention to the fact that in order to evaluate properly the information received by the departmental military intelligence organization, his MID staff officers had to be just as much concerned with operational duties as were the officers assigned to the Operations Division. Since it was not practicable to separate policy determination from actual operations for MID, he recommended that:

(1) The designation of MIS as a War Department agency in accordance with paragraph 4-b, Circular 59, be discontinued and that service be integrated into G-2.

(2) The General Staff Group, as such, in G-2 be abolished and that the officers now composing that group be placed as and where needed in groups and sections of G-2. *

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* Memo, ACofS G-2 for CofS, 9 Jun 42, MID 320, 9 Jun 42 (5 Feb 42). Records of the ACofS G-2, DRB, TAG.

General Strong was a firm believer in the time-honored principle that higher authority should give subordinates a definite mission to perform and then allocate available resources for accomplishing the mission but then leave it strictly up to the subordinates themselves how best to organize their respective means to produce maximum results. When he was unable to secure official approval for doing away with the MIS, * therefore, he proceeded to ignore the philosophy behind Circular

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* Ibid. The disapproval in this case was "By Order of the

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Secretary of War, Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, by O. L. Nelson, Lt Col G. S. C. Asst. Sec. W.D.G.S."

59 by gradually merging it with MID. This was achieved mainly through issuing a succession of G-2 orders which all tended to advance his own organizational ideas, for example; creating an enlarged and more representative Evaluation Board to report directly to the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and placing several administrative activities under the personal supervision of the MID Executive Officer. *

* "MID Hist WW II" (S), p. 20.

By April 1943, with this centralization trend still continuing, the current MID organization chart closely resembled those of the pre-Circular 59 era and only alluded to MIS within the title box describing the duties for the Deputy ACofS G-2, WDGS. * Five months later, the ultimate

* Ibid., org chart, 17 Apr 43, inserted between pp. 25 and 26.

along these lines was finally reached, when a similar chart was published and distributed to "all Divisions of the General Staff and the three major Commands" * but a companion one was put into limited circulation

* Ibid., p. 30.

bearing the heading "For Use in Military Intelligence Division Only." *

* Ibid., org chart, approved 22 Sep 43, inserted between pp. 30 and 31.

13

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The first chart was completely disregarded in MID, while the latter, containing no mention of AIC whatsoever, was followed. Actually, however, this device merely served to confirm an existing situation because MIS had been functioning only as a paper organization for some time.

The annulment of the provisions of Circular 59 by the ACofS G-2, WDGS, did not, of course, pass unnoticed among the departmental officials who had originally prepared that far-reaching directive. It remained their fixed opinion that "organizationally G-2 was a mongrel with many uncertain strains mixed in and not always recognizable." *

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* Quoted from: Nelson, op. cit., p. 526.

Although this statement was probably intended to constitute a severe criticism, it did contain an implied admission that the entire subject was in reality a most complicated one. Fortuitously for these same officials General Strong's tour of duty as ACofS G-2, WDGS, had now come to a close, so, effective 21 February 1944, Maj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, AAF, was appointed to replace him. * Two weeks before this anticipated

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* See: Dept of Defense, OPI, Press Branch, Maj Gen Clayton Lawrence Bissell, USAF. For the past five months, General Bissell had been acting as the Asst Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence at Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D. C. He was a graduate of both the Command and General Staff School (1933) and Army War College (1934) but had never before served in MID.

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ment, a high-level committee headed by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and including General Marshall, Admiral King, Admiral Leahy and Brig. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, had been formed by the Secretary of War to study and recommend organizational improvements in G-2." * To

* Memo for JCofS G-2, by direction of the Deputy CofS, signed O. L. Nelson, Brig Gen GSC, Asst Deputy CofS, 7 Feb 42 SWD 320, 7 Feb 42 (5 Feb 42). Records of the JCofS G-2, NAB, RG. General Smith was the WD Representative with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

assist this committee in the detailed performance of its assigned tasks, a board of officers was likewise announced consisting of: Brig. Gen. E. D. Cooke, MID; Col. John H. Stutesman, GSC; Lt. Col. F. C. Brigham, OCS; Capt. Jerome Hubbard, OCS, and Mr. George Schwarzwalder from the Bureau of the Budget. *

* Ibid. None of these officers were experienced in military intelligence matters but Mr. Schwarzwalder had previously worked with the Schurman reorganization committee "in making intelligence and security studies." See Nelson, op. cit., p. 526.

While it was a foregone conclusion that this working committee would choose to recommend the re-creation of MIS, its members diligently studied the fundamental problems involved over a period of approximately one month. They were even optimistic enough to feel that there could be some valid comparison made between departmental

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military intelligence procedures and those utilized by national news publications, so they paid personal visits to the The New York Times and Time Magazine establishments. In this connection, General Nelson subsequently claimed that "valuable suggestions resulted" from these trips and they "played a part in determining some of the recommended changes." * The latter may well have been the case, since many of

* Nelson, op. cit., p. 527.

the recommended changes were certainly not new in concept. The "Report on Reorganization," as submitted by the McCloy Committee on 24 April 1944, thus not only directed the reinstitution of a separate MIS and G-2 Policy Staff for MID but also dictated a radical revision of the intelligence processing methods currently in use therein. The intended goal of this system was to alter the traditional status of the research analysts by superimposing over them a group of so-called "Specialists," who were:

> charged with converting information into military intelligence. They must be selected on their ability to perform this task, without regard to rank or precedent. Each Specialist is responsible to the Director of Intelligence [of MIS] for the production of usable military intelligence in the designated field of intelligence activity, study or analysis assigned. These activities or fields of study, however, must be all-inclusive, and not merely geographic in scope ... . These Specialists will tell the receiving Supervisor what information they need in order to accomplish their task, and also will call upon the Chief of Research to supplement and assist them in their work. These Specialists should rely upon the Research department for routine work and must not become involved in minutia; however, they should anticipate and prognosticate future events, as well as furnish current intelligence. *

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* "MID Report on Reorganization," 24 Apr 44, G.C.&S-2 24 Apr 44 (2 May 44), Tab A (S). Records of the ACofS G-2, Lab, TAG.

Aside from the fact that it would be practically impossible to procure the necessary qualified personnel to fill these new Specialist positions, especially with the War Department right in the midst of preparing for a decisive move in the European war, * there were

* The reorganization was ordered to commence on 29 May 44 but because of critical space, labor and security problems, the planned unit displacements had to be staggered over a considerable period of time. The coming of D Day for the invasion of Normandy, therefore, found the departmental military intelligence agency just barely able to operate, with most of its personnel still occupied in carrying out their movement instructions as previously scheduled.

innumerable reasons why this imposed MID reorganization would not work. Nevertheless, because it had the strong personal backing of the Assistant Secretary of War, Deputy Chief of Staff and recently appointed ACofS G-2, (WDGS), every possible effort was made to force it to succeed. The former chiefs of the geographic branches, being the best qualified officers available for such assignment, were thus called upon to become German, Japanese, Russian, British, French, European Neutral (Balkan), Islamic (Middle Eastern), Western Hemisphere and Domestic Specialists, * and Brig. Gen. R. A. Osmun, the

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* "General History of the Military Intelligence Service, 1941-1945" (S), Specialist Unit (C), Series Two, III, MID 314.7 Undated (30 Oct 45), p. 13. ACSI Rec Sec. This multi-volume compilation of information and documents on the World War II period was prepared in compliance with an ACofS (G-2, WDGS) memo dated 8 Oct 45, supplemented by another memo 76-A of 6 Nov 45. Hereafter cited as: "Hist MIS" (S), with series and volume number also shown whenever given.

new Chief of MIS, opened a determined campaign aimed at not only improving the over-all performance of his complex organization but also developing it into a real departmental "show window." *

* See: "Improvements As A Result of Reorganization," MID G-2, 18 Oct 44 (2 May 44), Tab Chief MIS, Conf 7 Jul 44 and Ltr 12 Aug 44. ACSI Rec Sec.

Hardly had the nine initial Specialists been named, however, than it became clearly evident that huge gaps still existed in the world-wide coverage, with such important intelligence producing areas as the Iberian Peninsula, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Baltic States, India and so on, receiving little or no consideration at all. To remedy this glaring deficiency, each of these neglected areas was hastily assigned to one of the Specialists who happened to have a proximate interest thereto, thus serving to emphasize the essential geographic character of the new system regardless of its announced aims. Since

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the Reorganization Committee had specifically directed that the "extreme compartmentation" in the Branch be eliminated and substituted by research along functional (military, political, economic etc.) lines instead of geographic, * an inoperable dilemma was

* "MID Report On Reorganization," 24 Apr 44, 020.6-2 24 Apr 44 (2 May 44), Tab B (S). ACSI Rec Sec.

created. The MID researchers were now organized functionally while the corresponding Specialists, who remained completely dependent upon these same researchers for needed information, operated on a geographical basis. The net result was that the Specialists were soon compelled to perform a considerable amount of research on their own, which was exactly what the reorganizers had been trying to prevent in the first place.

The reorganizing committee also decided that MID was bogged down in a time-consuming effort to process a tremendous mass of "useless material." They wished, therefore, to free the Specialists from "the necessity of reading all available intelligence" so these key officers would become "intelligent rather than encyclopedic." *

* Ibid.

This proved to be the worst kind of wishful thinking because the only person capable of determining whether or not some particular item of information was really useless had to be the expert on the subject with the full picture at his disposal. What might seem to comprise a worthless item to the uninitiated could well furnish the final link

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in a puzzle uncovering some vital military secret, for instance another Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, the intelligence process must always include the burdensome task of separating the wheat from the chaff and there can never be any short cut or easy road to success in this matter. With the individual researcher having to read everything available on his assigned specialty, he obviously can neither be substituted for nor divided into two different parts, as was directed by the reorganizers in the early summer of 1944.

During August 1944, when the ACofS G-2, WDGS, requested the Chief, MIS, to submit his opinion regarding the recent reorganization, General Osmun felt constrained to report that "the new system was slow and cumbersome." In explaining this serious fault, he further declared, as follows:

> Typical of this problem is the misplacing on the chart of the reorganization, among others, of the Specialists. The Specialists have no part in the procurement of information. They are G-2's advisors on the critical problems of the world; theirs is a General Staff function. They should be responsible directly to G-2, without the intervention of headquarters concerned largely with the procurement or dissemination of information. The present system encourages frequent delay, confusion, repetition of orders and unnecessary friction ... *

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* See: "Hist MIS" (S), Series Two, III, Specialist Unit (C), p. 18.

The best evidence, however, relative to the eventual success or failure of the Specialist system should come from the highly respected and carefully selected officers who were detailed to perform on that particular duty themselves. Accordingly, in writing their own official

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history, they summarized the entire subject in the following unfavorable terms:

> It can be seen that the original plan for the Specialists was far from perfect; that the feeble efforts made to adapt the set-up to meet the existing situation fail to respond to changing world conditions never really reached the core of the trouble which was fundamental: that the Specialists were held responsible for results, whereas under the organization they had little or no authority over the means of producing the required results; and that from the point of view of timeliness of intelligence the organization was a total failure. *

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* Ibid., pp. 17-18.

Except for certain minor adjustments made shortly after VE Day in order to concentrate more upon Japan, the system of producing intelligence which was established for the departmental agency in June 1944, continued to remain in force until the end of the war. It had been imposed on MID from above by authorities who believed they were fully conversant with the complicated problems involved but actually were not. They thus chose to tamper with a highly sensitive and delicate mechanism during the peak of its wartime effort and to enforce a strict compliance with their own preconceived ideas on how it should run. It would have been much better for all concerned if these authorities had delved more thoroughly into prior history on the subject, in order to learn that there were no ready or simple answers concerning the major questions presented. Almost every conceivable type of organization had already been tried, with the existing one having at least demonstrated it was workable if not perfect in every possible respect. Experimenting with it was scarcely a task for outsiders to undertake, especially at

such an untimely moment, regardless of any praiseworthy intentions that they may have entertained.

Twice during World War II, therefore, persistent attempts were made by higher authority to compel the ACofS G-2, WDGS, to divorce his so-called operational from general staff type duties and perform the former exclusively through an adjacent but semi-independent intelligence service. Both attempts were apparently dictated by a strong desire on the part of these same authorities to reduce the over-all size of the WDGS, coupled with their fixed opinion that this move would actually increase the efficiency of the departmental military intelligence organization. The first of these attempts was effectively nullified by General Strong, who, because of his broad experience in such matters, promptly recognized that the directed functional division would not be practicable. With reference to the second attempt, the official History of the Military Intelligence Service reveals the following pertinent conclusion:

> The reorganization of G-2, which took place in 1944, separated Intelligence from G-2 on paper. The purpose of this separation was to reduce the strength of the Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff. G-2 became a policy-making office, while the production of Intelligence was delegated to the Chief, Military Intelligence Service operating under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In practice, the operation of MIS did not coincide with the written directives. The Chief, MIS was never delegated the authority contemplated in the reorganization. Experience is conclusive that the ACofS G-2 was obliged, from a practical point of view, to operate MIS, Washington, as an integral part of his office. The conclusion is clear, namely, that the creation of a Chief, MIS with the functions assigned him was a poor organizational arrangement and served only to effect a needless bottleneck, hindering rather than facilitating the transaction of business. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Series One, General, pp. 5-6.

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The departmental military intelligence agency was not only faced with these upsetting organizational conflicts during World War II but also called upon to govern a huge internal expansion which commenced immediately after Pearl Harbor and soon came to be reflected in many different directions. The stresses and strains occasioned by this rapid acceleration were so important that they appear to warrant a special examination.

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CHAPTER II

UNPRECEDENTED GROWTH

Unlike the deplorable situation which existed in April 1917, the sudden opening of World War II for the United States at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, found the departmental military intelligence agency operating as a going concern. During the previous two years there had already been a marked expansion within the agency in practically every respect. Even so, the abrupt changeover from pre-war to actual combat conditions was noticeably characterized by functional increases not only along traditional lines but also in several new and largely unanticipated directions. Most of these innovations stemmed from the fact that World War II was truly global in nature, thus requiring much closer inter-Allied and Army-Navy collaboration than ever before as well as full consideration of a fast developing strategic air arm of major significance. It seems scarcely surprising, therefore, with these fundamental alterations added to the consequences of a vast Army expansion, that MID was promptly called upon to extend its intelligence commitments measurably and continued to grow in leaps and bounds.

This unprecedented MID expansion was naturally accompanied by many organizational and administrative difficulties. Personnel procurement became such a formidable problem that established qualification standards had to be lowered repeatedly in order to satisfy the mounting needs. Moreover, the demand for information was so great throughout the United States Government that it soon caused the creation of a vast

UNCLASSIFIED

number of new intelligence agencies, and this in turn posed co-ordination problems of overwhelming proportions. Military intelligence groups directly subordinate to the War Department, both within the United States and overseas theaters, likewise proceeded to multiply so rapidly that it was almost impossible to keep track of them. The swift advances achieved by the enemy in the conduct of scientific warfare and development of new weapons called for placing heavy emphasis upon technical intelligence activities but this merely served to aggravate an unsatisfactory personnel procurement situation because technical experts remained in extremely short supply. In the face of all these numerous and varied pressures MID not only had to expand without delay but also accomplish this difficult feat under the severe handicaps of wartime conditions. Hence it thus appears readily understandable that much of the early expansion was accompanied by a considerable amount of organizational and administrative confusion.

With reference to actual personnel strength, this MID expansion was at first instituted on a broadly inclusive basis so that all the main functional groups of the agency and its field offices were given more or less proportional increases. As soon as certain individual functions commenced to claim a special interest, however, this relatively impartial but non-selective system had to give way to the more compelling requirements of emergency demands. For example, during the latter part of 1944, there was an unforeseen need for a large number of technical intelligence personnel to operate closely

behind our advancing military forces in the field. Since this call extended well beyond any currently available means and it was not practicable at that time to secure additional officers, the exigency was met chiefly by hiring more civilians. The over-all strength trend for MID, including MIS, from 1939 to the end of the war, therefore, becomes plainly discernible through the following table:

Year	Officers in Washington	Civilians in Washington	Officers in the field	Civilians in the field	Total
1938	20	48	50	73	191
1939	22	68	65	75	230
1940	28	167	95	88	378
1941	200	656	119	120	1096
1942	509	1106	197	231	2043
1943	449	1079	247	273	2048
1944	581	1009	280	618	2468
1945	575	931	247	776	2529 *

* "MID Hist WW II" (S), p. 330. These figures were gathered in 1946 by an MID historian from a wide variety of available sources and, since there were no weekly strength reports filed in the Personnel Branch before 1943, they may disagree somewhat with those of other similar estimates. The totals given probably represent average strengths over each year rather than maximum strengths, although this fact is not definitely stated.

There were, of course, corresponding increases in the matter of funds appropriated for military intelligence use during this same period. Even though Congress had been comparatively generous with such funds for the two fiscal years preceding Pearl Harbor, MID

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[illegible] appeared to the point where they covered all previous expenditures. On [illegible] December 1941, a total of $[illegible] still remained unobligated for FY 1942 under the title of "Miscellaneous Expenses, Military Intelligence Activities, Army," * but

* "Hist MIS" (S), Finance Branch, series four, III, p. 3. In an effort to hide the true magnitude of these intelligence funds, Congress decided to adopt the practice of appropriating them along with nine other departmental activities under the separate title of "Contingencies of the Army." This was a very optimistic procedure, [illegible] in view of the fact that hearings on these same appropriations were habitually published as unclassified documents.

this amount had to be immediately augmented by a supplemental appropriation of $239,000. Less than four months later, another allotment amounting to $1,343,000 was again added, which brought the grand total authorized for FY 1942 up to $2,222,000. This turned out to be only a small beginning, however, as ~~will be~~ is seen from the following tabulation:

Fiscal Year	Total Appropriations
1940	$ 155,000
1941	[illegible]
1942	2,[illegible]
1943	8,335,000
1944	13,[illegible]
1945	8,[illegible]
1946	7,[illegible] *

* Ibid., p. 2. These totals include all the regular funds

appropriated for military intelligence purposes but there were also other smaller allocations made from special funds. Furthermore, MID was able to utilize ordinary War Department appropriations in covering its normal expenditures for military pay, travel, supplies, office rent, hire of civilians, etc.

Many of the functional requirements behind this precipitate MID expansion came into being immediately after Pearl Harbor and continued to gather momentum as the war progressed. While they will all be discussed in greater detail during subsequent chapters, several of them do serve pointedly to illustrate the ever-increasing demands of wartime intelligence operations. An excellent example of this type of pressure occurred in connection with the censorship responsibilities that suddenly descended upon the War Department. Regarding this particular development, it should be recalled that early in 1941, a Joint Army-Navy Board had prepared a specific plan for censoring international communications to and from the United States in the event of war. This anticipatory plan, which charged the Army with censorship control over postal and landline communications under a civilian Director of Censorship, had been duly approved by the President, so portions of it were ordered into effect by the Secretary of War on 8 December 1941. The President then directed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to take temporary charge of the entire national censorship effort * and,

* A Report on the Office of Censorship ("United States

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Governmental History Reports on War Administration," Series I Washington, 1957, pp. 3-4. Cable and radio censorship were started under Navy supervision at once.

based upon an authorization from him, the Army initiated limited postal censorship effective 13 December 1941. * Shortly thereafter,

* See: Ltr (S), Maj Gen W. Preston Corderman to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief, Military History, 22 Oct 57. Author's File.

when Congress passed the First War Powers Act * to provide, among

* 55 Stat 838, 18 Dec 41.

other things, requisite legal authority for upholding wartime censorship, the President formally created an Office of Censorship and designated Mr. Byron Price to be its Director. *

* EO 8985, 19 Dec 41.

Although the ACofS G-2, WDGS, had taken several preliminary steps before Pearl Harbor in seeking to prepare the departmental intelligence agency for possible wartime censorship duties, * there

* Such as; publishing a basic field manual (FM 30-25) on military censorship, sending selected officers to Bermuda in order to study British censorship methods at first hand and opening an informal course of instruction at Clarendon, Va. [illegible] relative to censorship matters.

UNCLASSIFIED

were only about 75 partially trained MI Reserve Officers available for that type of assignment on 7 December 1941 and the Censorship Section of the Information Control Branch, MID, consisted of just 2 officers. It took nearly seven months to procure and train another like increment of 75 Reserve Officers, while the number of officers engaged in censorship activities within the War Department increased to 10. These particular accomplishments, though, fell far short of fulfilling estimated censorship personnel requirements for the near future, which even then were considered to be as follows:

a. Additional officers for Censorship Branch - 25.
b. Officers for Port of Embarkation indoctrination program - 10.
c. Instructors for Military Censorship School - 15.
d. Officers to supervise overseas Base Censorship activities - 75.
e. Officers to act as Base Censors overseas - 2,300. *

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* "Activities of the War Department during World War II, History of Military Censorship" (C), CSGID 314.7, undated (30 Oct 42), pp. 4 and 27-28. ACSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as: "Hist Mil Censorship" (C). The current BFM 30-25 specified that only commissioned officers could perform military censorship but, when this restriction was found to be patently impracticable, a succeeding field manual authorized the full use of warrant officers for such duty and, in certain special cases, enlisted personnel.

A large majority of the earlier trained censorship officers were promptly given key positions in the national Office of Censorship, to operate under Col. (later Maj. Gen.) W. Preston Corderman, the Chief Postal Censor. During the latter part of 1942, however, in accordance

UNCLASSIFIED

with an announced policy that all officers on duty with civilian governmental agencies should be withdrawn, most of this group of nearly 150 experienced specialists were returned to the War Department for reassignment. This was a conclusive turning point in helping to solve the critical officer procurement problem because these officers eventually formed the "nucleus of every important military and later civil censorship activity both at home and overseas." *

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* Ibid., p. 28.

On 15 October 1942, a Military Censorship School was belatedly activated at Fort Washington, Maryland, to be administered in close coordination with an existing Adjutant General's School but with MID reserving an effective control over the selection, instruction, and assignment of censorship personnel. It was likewise soon found necessary to establish a Deputy Censorship Office in London for the principal purpose of keeping the War Department informed concerning Allied censorship plans, particularly in regard to occupied or liberated territories. *

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* Ibid., pp. 41-43 and 69.

Hardly had this new program gotten under way than the fact became painfully apparent that it would still fail to satisfy the ever-growing demand for trained censorship officers, especially overseas. Since second lieutenants were already needed in large numbers, action was successfully taken to create a Military Censorship Officer Candidate School (OCS), with a total of 484 officers being ultimately gained from that fertile procurement source. Finally, by May 1943, it was possible to form an MID "Officer

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

pool for Censorship Personnel," which could provide some measure of flexibility for the total program and serve as a ready reserve to meet future eventualities. Effective 10 February 1944, after MID had directly supervised the procurement and training of approximately 1,750 censorship officers, responsibility for conducting further activities of such nature was transferred to the Army Service Forces. *

Ibid., pp. 30-32 and 60-70.

This same type of marked expansion was also occurring in respect to several other MID counterintelligence activities. As early as October 1941, many operational functions connected with security investigations had been shifted to the Provost Marshal General's Office but MID continued to insist on maintaining sole control over any investigations that tended to disclose evidence of subversion or disloyalty. Besides, the departmental agency still held primary responsibility for producing domestic intelligence, supervising defense plant security, safeguarding military information, executing especially sensitive security assignments and representing the War Department on all boards or committees concerned with counterintelligence matters. MID thus continued to remained deeply involved in both general staff and operational duties bearing upon the entire counterintelligence field.

On 7 December 1941, the principal means available to the United States Army for performing security investigations was provided by a Corps of Intelligence Police. This Corps, originally formed of non-commissioned officers selected for that specific purpose in World War I, had almost

UNCLASSIFIED

lost its separate identity and dwindled down to practically nothing during most of the peacetime period. When the President declared a limited state of national emergency in 1939, the remnant of this earlier organization commenced to experience a full scale rebirth. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, therefore, it not only carried an authorized strength of 513 enlisted men but also had once more become very active in security investigative work. This personnel allotment was immediately doubled following the outbreak of the war and six days later orders were issued forming the organization into a Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), effective 1 January 1942.* Moreover, in view of such significant developments as the establishment of martial law in Hawaii, creation of an Eastern and a Western Defense Command within the United States, and immense increase in the number of higher Army headquarters, it was clearly evident that a further expansion would soon be needed if the Corps was to perform its assigned tasks in any satisfactory manner.*

* Ltr, AGO to all major commands, 13 Dec 41, AG 320.2 (12 Dec 41). DMB, TAG.

* Despite CIC protests, a pre-Pearl Harbor plan was carried out on 15 Dec 42, which transferred 90 agents to the FBI. This left the actual strength of the CIC, as of 22 Dec 42, at 303 men. See Comments on Ch II (C), 10 Oct 57, Lt Col F. K. Jordan, AIC. Author's file.

UNCLASSIFIED

MID was intimately connected with the rapid wartime growth of this CIC and at first all officers chosen for duty in the new organization had to be cleared through the ACofS G-2, WDGS. Similarly, although a Chief CIC had been duly designated with headquarters at Baltimore, Md., * there was still a CIC Section functioning in MID because the ACofS G-2, WDGS remained responsible for preparing plans and establishing policies pertaining thereto. Plans were thus drawn up and approved not only setting the total strength of the Corps at 543 officers and 4,431 enlisted men but also specifying that standard CIC detachments would be allocated to each headquarters in the field down through the division. * The procurement and training of these CIC personnel promptly became of important interest to MID, while the agency continued to utilize its own CIC units for a wide variety of investigative purposes throughout the rest of the wartime period.

MID did not at any time desire to relinquish its intimate supervisory responsibilities for the CIC * but was gradually

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* The first Chief CIC was Maj (later Col) Garland H. Williams, an MI-Reserve Officer who had been a US Treasury Dept Agent in civil life. See: AG 201 (Field File) Williams, Garland H., O-197956, Treasury Dept Press Memo. DRB, TAG.

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* CIC School "Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II" (Fort Holabird, Md., undated), pp. 5-6. Hereafter cited as: "CIC School Text, WW II."

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* See: Ltr (C), AC [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible], subj [illegible] Intelligence Activities, G-2 [illegible], 14 Jun 43 ([illegible] Nov 43). [illegible]

forced to do so by higher authority. In [illegible], the power to initiate CIC personnel investigations was decentralized to the Service Commands and these [illegible] were granted authority to transfer CIC agents and clerks of the lower grades. MID, however, retained a strict control over the assignment and transfer of special agents, promotions from the rank of agent to special agent, as well as all matters connected with the assignment or transfer of commissioned CIC officers. * On the other hand,

* "CIC School Text, WW II," p. 9.

effective 15 June 1943, the following operational functions, currently being performed by the Counterintelligence Group of MID (MIS), were voluntarily turned over to the Military District of Washington (MDW):

a. Washington Branch Office, CIC.
b. Counter subversive system in War Department headquarters.
c. Security of Military Information Regulations and Inspections in Washington, D. C. and vicinity.
d. Determination of and reporting on the general social, economic and subversive trends in Washington, D. C. and vicinity.
e. Control of investigation and distribution of subversive personnel in the War Department and in the M.D.W. *

* Memo (C), ACofS G-2 for CofS, 8 Jun 43, approved as amended by G. L. Nelson, Col GSC, Asst to Deputy CofS, MID 321.19,

G-2 WDGS. (6 Jun 43). AG 1 Jan Dec.

In November 1943, based upon a detailed survey recently made for him by the Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff decided to direct the following actions:

(1) Two changes in basic policy:

(a) The Counter Intelligence Corps was to be utilized, with certain limited exceptions, in theaters of operations.
(b) Personnel of the Corps were to be released from War Department overhead assignments, distributed on a T/O basis, with G-2 exercising no command functions over the Corps.

(2) Three specific continuing responsibilities relative to the Counter Intelligence Corps charged to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department:

(a) The establishment of policies and over-all supervision of counterintelligence activities.
(b) Coordination of the procurement and shipment of Counter Intelligence Corps units.
(c) The administration of specialized training prior to assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to theaters of operations.

(3) Certain specific actions relative to the Counter Intelligence Corps:

(a) The Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, and the Counter Intelligence Corps Staging Area were to be eliminated. *

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* "CIC School Text, WW II," pp. 7-8.

Accordingly, on 14 December 1943, although it was carefully reiterated that the ACofS G-2, WDGS, remained charged with exercising "general staff supervision over counterintelligence policies and activities throughout the military establishment," all zone of

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interior counterintelligence functions, other than those specifically excepted by War Department authority, were assigned to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, effective 1 January 1944. The investigative functions hitherto performed separately by the Counter Intelligence Corps and Provost Marshal General were also ordered "consolidated and performed by a single staff agency under each service command." * Immediately thereafter, the

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* WD Cir 324, 14 Dec 43. These consolidated staff agencies were later designated as the Security and Intelligence Division for each service command.

Commanding General, Army Service Forces, chose to redistribute his newly acquired functional responsibilities along the following lines:

> Supervision of all investigative functions and activities transferred by the War Department Circular [324], including the maintenance of liaison with the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, on these matters, is made the responsibility of the Provost Marshal General. Supervision of all other functions and activities transferred by the War Department Circular is made the responsibility of the Intelligence Division, Headquarters, Army Service Forces. *

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* ASF Cir 149, 14 Dec 43.

In theory MID had thus been shorn of all its CIC command responsibilities and was now limited solely to the execution of general staff functions within the counterintelligence field. Nevertheless, because the departmental agency was still called upon to "supervise" Army counterintelligence activities,

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"coordinate" the procurement and shipment of CIC units for overseas, and "administer" specialized training for CIC personnel, this directed goal remained completely unattainable. By abolishing the CIC Headquarters and transferring personnel of the CIC Section of MID (MIS) to the Army Service Forces, though the new arrangement had actually deprived the ACofS C-2 of the two operating groups which were designed to perform these necessary counterintelligence tasks for him. The net result was that MID eventually had to acquire additional personnel for handling certain security missions and continued to be directly involved in many CIC matters, not only in establishing policies but also in fulfilling a considerable number of operational-type duties.

Another example of how difficult it became to confine MID counterintelligence activities strictly to planning and policy making, witness the futile efforts of higher authority to divorce the agency from its traditional visa and passport review functions. On 14 November 1941, the President had issued a formal proclamation aimed at controlling more closely controlling the travel of both citizens and aliens to and from the United States by withholding their passports or visas whenever such travel appeared contrary to the national interest. * Based upon the terms of this presidential

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* 55 Stat 1696. This proclamation was in addition to the provisions of a similar one issued during WW I.

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order, the Secretary of State created an Inter-Departmental

UNCLASSIFIED

Visa Review Committee and MID [illegible] as usual furnished the required War Department representation thereon. *

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* See: Dept of State, [illegible] Regulations Affecting the Control of Persons Entering and Leaving the United States (Washington, 1942), pp. 35-43. Besides the Dept of State and War Dept, there were also representatives on this review committee from the Navy Dept, FBI, and Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Dept of Justice.

MID already possessed a valuable information file covering individuals who might fall under this undesirable travel category, derived originally from World War I operations but extended considerably ~~measurably~~ through ~~because of~~ more recent investigative activities. The national security officials were in full agreement that it was essential to search this MID file, as well as those under ONI, FBI and State Department jurisdiction, before reaching a final decision on any questionable travel case. Not with standing ~~Nevertheless,~~ the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office of the War Department remained determined to abolish this MID counterintelligence function entirely, except for permitting ordinary liaison with the State Department in visa and passport control matters. On 14 January 1943, therefore, the Secretary of War was persuaded to inform the Secretary of State that MID intended to turn over to the FBI all information it had received prior to 1 January 1940 concerning American citizens who were not directly connected with the military establishment or possessed of a predominantly foreign background.

UNCLASSIFIED

While questions relating to Army members of the Armed Forces, or civilians functioning with the military establishment would still be available, the Secretary of State was asked to comment upon the desirability of relieving Army personnel from the Inter-Departmental Committee in order to make them available for "duties more directly connected with the war effort." *

* Ltr, Secy War to Secy State, 14 Jan 43, MID C20.G-2 CI, 7 Feb 44 (25 Jul 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

In answering this more or less exploratory letter from Mr. Stimson, Mr. Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, replied that as long as the travel control effort of his department was not in any way impaired, he could raise no objection to the indicated transfer of MID information records. He did, however, feel most strongly that the work being performed by the Inter-Departmental Committee was "very vital to the war effort" and he wished it to continue in its present form if at all possible. *

* Ltr, Secy State to Secy War, 3 Mar 43, MID C20.G-2 CI, 7 Feb 44 (28 Jul 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

A year later, with these MID visa and passport review activities growing constantly, Mr. Stimson was again prevailed upon to renew his same request for the relief of Army officers from the Inter-Departmental Committee, this time "in the interest of economy of personnel." * Even though Mr. Cordell Hull repeated the hope

* Ltr, Secy War to Secy State, 15 Feb 44, MID C20.G-2 CI,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

15 Feb 44 (23 Jul 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

that their "important work could go on unchanged," * pressure in

* Ltr, Secy State to Secy War, 13 Mar 44, MID 020.C-2 CI, 15 Feb 44 (23 Jul 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

the matter persisted against MID from above. Finally, during March 1944, the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group, MID (MIS), found it necessary to emphasize the rather telling point that War Department membership in the Inter-Departmental Visa Review Committee stemmed directly from the Presidential Proclamation of 14 November 1941, so it would take action by the Chief Executive before the situation could be materially altered. * Faced with this impasse

* Memo (C), Col L. R. Forney to Brig Gen Elliot D. Cooke and Cooke to Forney, 18 Mar 44; MID 020.C-2 CI, 18 Mar 44 (23 Jul 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Mr. Stimson subsequently chose to notify Mr. Hull that the War Department agreed with the "present procedures" * and MID (MIS)

* Ltr, Secy War to Secy State, 5 May 44, MID 020.C-2 CI, 5 May 44 (23 Jul 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

continued to perform its regular visa and passport control activities for the remainder of the wartime period.

There were other similar MID functions which also kept right on expanding despite the efforts of higher authority. Although

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the formation of a Bureau of Public Relations (BPR) within the War Department shortly before Pearl Harbor had succeeded in divesting the intelligence agency of the bulk of its earlier public relations duties, the ACofS, G-2, remained officially charged with safeguarding military information. MID thus continued to maintain a very close relationship with the BPR and was often called upon to review contemplated press or radio releases from the security standpoint prior to their issuance. Likewise, on 13 June 1942, when the President created an Office of War Information (OWI) in the Office of Emergency Management under Mr. Elmer Davis, * it became necessary for the agency to establish intimate

* EO 9182, 13 Jun 42. See also: OWI, United States Government Manual (First Ed; Washington, 1945), pp. 88-90.

liaison with that office and to represent the War Department on an OWI Security Advisory Board formed for the chief purpose of advising federal agencies other than the War and Navy Departments relative to security of information matters. MID personnel were frequently consulted concerning security clearances for documents prepared by these associated agencies whenever it was felt the content might contain classified military information. * This

* "History of the Security Branch, G-2," (C), MID 314.7, Undated (30 Oct 42), pp. 5-6. ACSI Rec Sec.

activity, falling clearly beyond the planning or policy field,

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[illegible] for [illegible] as the war progressed.

The one [illegible] counterintelligence responsibility which seems to have been successfully decentralized, at least the operational phases thereof, had to do with compiling information on individuals employed at industrial plants [illegible] classified war contracts. Historically, in coordination with ONI and the FBI, this had been an accepted function of the departmental military intelligence agency. After December 1943, when all counterintelligence operations within the zone of interior were ordered transferred to the Provost Marshal General, this particular responsibility stayed firmly fixed in its new situation. * MID, however, continued to

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* See: memo for File (C), Maj Kenneth K. Kirwan, MID, 16 Jan 44, MID 020.G-2 CI, 16 Feb 44 (26 Jul 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

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exercise general staff supervision over the defense plant security program from the War Department standpoint.

With the United States Army scheduled to expand as rapidly as possible under the impetus of a general mobilization, training naturally became an essential problem for the War Department authorities to solve. While the traditional disputes between the ~~G-2~~ G-3 and ~~G-3~~ G-2 officials with reference to their respective intelligence training responsibilities had not been fully settled by 7 December 1941, the pendulum had recently swung more to the side of the latter [illegible] so that MID was charged with the "coordination and supervision of all military intelligence activities in the Army." * On the other

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* "History of Training Branch, 7 Dec 41 - 2 Sep 45" (S), MID 314.7, Undated (30 Oct 42), Tab H. ASSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as: "Hist Tr Br WW II" (S).

hand, following the important Army reorganization of March 1942, which served to introduce Headquarters AGF, AAF and SOS (ASF) as major training factors, the ACofS G-2 was merely held responsible for establishing "policies concerning intelligence training." * It

* See: Nelson, op. cit., pp. 362-63 (Chart 12).

soon became obvious, though, that MID (MIS) would not only have to maintain some measure of direct staff control over intelligence training matters but also actively supervise the training of military intelligence specialists for the United States Army. Hence, when new Army Regulations were issued four months later, they charged MID specifically with the "preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of ... intelligence training." *

* AR 10-15, 13 Jun 42.

There was no general intelligence training center in existence at the outbreak of the war. Although the departmental intelligence authorities had repeatedly urged the formation of such a facility, notably right after World War I, their efforts had always come to naught in view of the widely accepted theory that training was a

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basic function of command and should be concentrated under each unit commander rather than split up into separate responsibilities. To overcome this serious handicap, the ACofS G-2, had gone ahead as best he could before Pearl Harbor by arranging for the establishment of a wide variety of specialized intelligence schools both in Washington and throughout the Corps Areas and overseas commands. One of the most consequential of these early institutions was a language school activated at the Presidio of San Francisco on 1 November 1941, for the purpose of developing badly needed Japanese translators and interpreters.*

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* Memo (C), Acting ACofS G-2 to TAG, 19 Jun 41, MID 381 (14 Jul 42) and "Hist Tr Br WW II" (S), p. 9. ACSI Rec Sec. This school was placed under the Fourth Army for administration but otherwise the ACofS G-2, reserved full control. Originally commanded by Maj (later Brig Gen and Deputy ACofS G-2) John Weckerling, it carried an initial class of nearly 90 students who were for the most part American citizens of Japanese ancestry (Nisei). See: Ltr, Brig Gen John Weckerling, USA Ret, to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist, 8 Nov 57. Author's file.

Despite these praiseworthy but rather modest advance steps, the sudden arrival of World War II found the United States Army practically devoid of military intelligence specialists of almost every type and with the requirements for such personnel rising daily. The limited facilities available for the Japanese Language School

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(MISLS) at the Presidio of San Francisco soon became completely inadequate to satisfy the increased demands of the wartime training program. On 25 May 1942, therefore, the school was transferred to Camp Savage, Minnesota and reestablished as an integral part of the training section of MID (MIS). A new and greatly expanded course of instruction was then started with an opening class of 200 enlisted students, all but seven of them being carefully chosen Niseis. Effective 16 August 1944, in order to enjoy better year-round accommodations, the school was again moved, this time to Fort Snelling, Minn. Accordingly, by September 1945, MISLS was able to graduate a total of 604 officers and 4,227 enlisted men, who were mostly utilized in forming Japanese interpreter-interrogator-translator teams for overseas duty. In addition to training these regular linguistic teams, the school also performed the following closely related missions:

1. Trained a large number of individual linguists for special intelligence assignment.

2. Organized a separate section to train selected personnel in radio monitor and intercept work, as well as for voice broadcast in connection with the dissemination of propaganda.

3. Supervised a subsidiary Army Language School at the University of Michigan, to provide necessary preliminary instruction for certain personnel before their subsequent assignment to MISLS.

4. Commenced a limited course of instruction in the Chinese language. *

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* "Hist Tr Br WD II" (S), pp. 10-11.

It took the departmental intelligence authorities nearly six months after Pearl Harbor to obtain official approval for forming any sort of a military intelligence training center and even then the project was originally authorized only on a restricted basis. The need for training a large number of prisoner of war interrogators without delay seems to have been fully appreciated but, on 4 January 1942, when the Commanding General, MIS, requested permission to start this type of training at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the ACofS G-2, countered with a much broader plan designed also to develop photo interpreters and combat intelligence specialists. The MIS authorities, in turn, objected to this functional enlargement largely on the grounds that combat intelligence training was the commander's responsibility and could be better accomplished within unit schools. * The ACofS G-2, then decided

* Ibid., p. 6.

to query Colonel Donovan, the U.S. Coordinator of Information (COI), for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not his organization might be willing to operate a school for prisoner of war interrogators. He agreed that the idea was feasible but both the ACofS G-3 and Chief of Ord, proceeded to register a strong disapproval in the matter by declaring that such a facility should remain under military rather than civilian direction. The ACofS G-2, thus took

advantage of this golden opportunity to secure appropriate authority for activating a Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, effective 15 June 1942, in place of the proposed MII school. *

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* Ibid., p. 7 and Tab B.

Col. (later Brig. Gen.) C. V. Bonfill, Chief of the Training Branch, MID (WDC), was appointed to be the first commandant of this newly-created MITC and plans were laid to start operations on 25 July 1942, with an initial class of 30 officer students attending a course of 8 weeks duration. The approved curriculum was limited mainly to instruction in techniques for interrogating prisoners of war, interpreting, translating, and the interpretation of aerial photographs. No extra language instruction was contemplated because the students were to be selected on the basis of proven linguistic abilities in the foreign languages as desired. During October 1942, based upon observations made of this first experimental course, the ACofS G-2 directed that the curriculum should be enlarged to include needed instruction in terrain study, signal communications, staff duties, counterintelligence within the theater of operations, enemy armies, and the use of allied and enemy small arms. This action promptly brought forth a formal note of protest from the Commanding General, AGF, who requested a personal conference with the ACofS G-2 in order to clarify their respective responsibilities for intelligence training. Such a meeting was

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duly kept the two following agreements reached:

(1) G-2, WDGS, controls policy and retains supervision of military intelligence training.

(2) G-2, WDGS, concentrates at MITC all specialized military intelligence training to meet the needs of active theaters of operations in accordance with requirements of operations.

(3) Commanding General, ASF, concentrates on combat intelligence and counterintelligence training within its tactical units. *

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* Ibid., p. 7 and Tab Q.

In addition to its primary instructional functions, MITC gradually acquired a number of miscellaneous responsibilities, such as conducting experiments to determine new methods of intelligence procedures, maintaining a complete intelligence library, and procuring, storing, issuing and shipping investigative equipment. Furthermore, on 29 August 1944, the center was charged with the training of all CIC personnel. During the total war period, therefore, MITC managed to graduate "over 19,000 students," including "linguists, order of battle specialists, CIC personnel, photo interpreters, ASF Mobile Intelligence Training Units, general intelligence personnel and other specialists" as required. *

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* Ibid., pp. 7-9 and Tab S.

The critical problem of providing badly needed Chinese and Russian linguists for theater use was eventually alleviated by letting contracts to selected American universities. Although MID (WDGS) could exercise only the broadest sort of staff supervision over this type of training, it was held responsible for

pleading the over-all program, as well as for procuring and assigning the military students involved. Results of this novel effort were essentially, as follows:

1. Chinese language training, conducted at the University of California (officers) and Yale University (enlisted men), produced a total of 750 graduates between December 1944 and the end of the war.

2. Russian language training, conducted at the University of Indiana and Cornell University for both officers and enlisted men, produced a total of 300 graduates between May 1945 and February 1946. *

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* Ibid., pp. 11-13. MIB experienced great difficulty at all times in procuring a sufficient number of qualified students to fill existing vacancies in the Russian language classes.

MIB not only expanded functionally during World War II but also geographically. While branch offices had already been established prior to Pearl Harbor in New York City (8 July 1940), New Orleans (17 April 1941) and San Francisco (31 July 1941), they were regarded by the departmental intelligence authorities more or less as local liaison groups. Following the outbreak of the war, however, they commenced to grow rapidly both in size and functional importance. This was especially true of the New York Branch, which ultimately attained a total strength of 12 officers and 65 civilian analysts, clerks and messengers. During January 1943, this branch even established a temporary sub-office in Chicago for the purpose of examining material contributing to several/ certain foreign intelligence studies. The

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[illegible] Branch [illegible] its activities considerably when the war against Japan began to pick up an added momentum but the New Orleans Branch, having turned out to be comparatively non-productive, was transferred to the Southern Defense Command, effective 2 February 1943. *

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* "Hist MIS" (3), Branch Offices, series five, p. 4. ACSI Rec Sec.

In 1942, with the east coast of South America and the Caribbean area remaining vulnerable to German attack and Japan still capable of launching a surprise raid against the Panama Canal, heavy emphasis was being placed upon South American intelligence by all the governmental agencies concerned. On 7 April 1942, therefore, the ACofS G-2, [illegible], found it desirable to open a branch office in Miami, Florida, mainly to facilitate the MID foreign liaison mission through rendering assistance to the numerous high ranking Latin American and other military personalities who were utilizing the Miami port of entry or exit. Since this new office operated under the Fourth Service Command for administration, it was further called upon to participate in a large number of typical service command counterintelligence activities, such as plant security investigations, special surveillance missions and immigration screening, and to maintain a very close relationship with the local ONI, FBI, and State Department officials engaged in like endeavors. *

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* Ibid., p. 3.

That Miami Branch Office was just one manifestation of the grave concern being felt by the MID authorities in regard to South American intelligence matters. With national anxiety centered on security of the Panama Canal right after Pearl Harbor, the ACofS G-2, [illegible] accompanied by key officers from the Latin American Section of the Intelligence Branch, paid a hurried visit to the Canal Zone for the avowed purpose of improving intelligence coverage within that vital area. Steps were then promptly taken to establish a field office (FOMIS) at Quarry Heights under MID (MIS) control, so as to insure that important intelligence messages from American military attaches in contiguous Latin American countries would be immediately transmitted to the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.* During May 1942,

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* "Hist MIS" (S), American Intelligence Service, series two, II, pp. 5-6. ACSI Rec Sec.

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in view of the added size and functional extension of the Latin American Section, MIS, it was reformed into an American Hemisphere Intelligence Command. One month later the word "hemisphere" was dropped from that noticeably awkward title and the organization became the American Intelligence Command (AIC). In February 1943, however, the name was again changed to the American Intelligence Service (AIS).*

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* Ibid., p. 2. The first Chief of AIC was Col (later Brig Gen) B. Townsend Heard.

The new AIC soon developed into a huge semi-independent military

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Intelligence Agency and outgrew its allotted floor space in Washington, D. C. Because the command was actually charged with the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence pertaining to its assigned area, it was even for a time authorized direct communication with the American military attaches and mission chiefs stationed in Central and South America, including Mexico. During August 1942, therefore, plans were laid to move the AIC to Florida, where it could develop under more favorable conditions and operate in close proximity to the majority of its primary intelligence interests. By 16 September 1942, the unit was officially established at the Shoremede Hotel in Miami Beach, with only a small liaison force left behind in MID (MIS) to assist the flow of information back and forth between the two separated agencies. *

* Ibid., p. 6.

On 1 December 1942, in addition to FOMIS, the AIC opened another field office (SIFFO) at Recife, Brazil, for the purpose of providing the same type of ready intelligence service to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces South Atlantic. * It also estab-

* Ibid., p. 6 and Tab J. It is not generally realized that by the end of April 1942, besides the large United States Army and Army Air Force garrisons in Panama (50,686) and Puerto Rico (26,510), there was a total of 14,603 such personnel distributed throughout 21 different localities in South and Central America.

Moreover, these figures do not include any military attache or mission personnel. See: Ibid., Tab K.

established a special MIC (MIS) training school and operated its own radio station within the Miami Beach area. * The agency eventually

* Ibid., Tab B.

carried a total authorized strength of 456 persons, including 98 officers, 140 civilians and 218 enlisted men, * but as soon as

* Ibid., p. 12a. Fifteen of the officers were WAC's.

departmental interest in South American intelligence started to wane and shift to more active combat theaters, it experienced an abrupt change. Effective 27 June 1944, with the exception of its Communications Branch, the entire organization was brought back to Washington and reintegrated into various elements of MIS. At the same time, all personnel and equipment of the former Communications Branch were transferred to field agencies under direct control of the Chief Signal Officer, United States Army. *

* Ibid., p. 7.

From this striking array of cumulative evidence, it thus becomes plainly apparent that the departmental military intelligence agency not only embarked upon an enormous expansion immediately following Pearl Harbor but also proceeded to grow without major interruption right up until the end of the wartime period. Although

the agency did increase greatly in size, the most noteworthy feature of this huge expansion was a marked functional enlargement, which, in turn, caused a sharp rise in operational-type activities as performed by its own subordinate and directly associated intelligence units. This, despite the fact that higher authority had remained firmly determined to limit all such MID activities or at least charge them against some element not considered a regular part of the WDGS.

Still unmentioned is the significant role played by MID in the development of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff intelligence structure during the early days of World War II, which ~~will~~ now to be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

JOINT (ARMY-NAVY) CHIEFS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did not come into being as the result of any single executive order or specific military decision. Moreover, it had no official charter, nor were its precise duties ever formally defined during the World War II period. * While several of its

* See: Vernon E. Davis, Organizational Development in HISTORY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), I, passim. Since this authoritative work is based upon official JCS records and generously footnoted, it will be treated herein as a primary source. During June 1943, the JCS did submit a proposed charter to the President, which included a carefully considered list of assigned functions, but the Chief Executive felt its issuance at that particular time would be "superfluous." See: Ibid., pp. 659-62.

adopted activities stemmed directly from those performed by an earlier Joint (Army-Navy) Board, the new organization developed essentially from agreement reached between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the ARCADIA Conference held in Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor. * One of the principal terms of this

* The ARCADIA Conference was convened on 22 Dec 41, with the final military meeting taking place on 14 Jan 42.

agreement served to create a supreme Anglo-American military body, known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), for the stated purpose of undertaking strategic direction of the war. It thus became immediately necessary for an appropriate group of United States military authorities to meet with corresponding representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was already at hand. *

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* Davis, op. cit., I, pp. 271-72.

When the CCS assembled for its first meeting on 23 January 1942, the United States was logically represented by Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations; General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief United States Fleet, and Lieut. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. * Mainly for convenience,

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* Ibid., p. 277. British officers attending this same meeting were Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Admiral Sir Charles Little, Lieut Gen Sir Colville Wemyss and an RAF group captain acting temporarily for Air Marshal A. T. Harris.

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this official group was soon being referred to as the "Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff." In March 1942, upon the departure of Admiral Stark for a new command, the two separate posts of Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, were combined in the person of Admiral King, who then proceeded to function as the sole Navy representative on the JCS for the remainder of the war. * Approximately four months later

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* Ibid., pp. 273 and 351. During this same month Lieut Gen Arnold became designated as Commanding General of the Army Air Forces but was not promoted to General (temporary) until 19 Mar 43.

Admiral William D. Leahy, former United States Ambassador to France (Vichy), was appointed by the President to be Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and added to the JCS as its senior and presiding member. * This action thus served to fix the JCS membership

* See: William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York, 1950), pp. 96-97.

for the rest of the wartime period.

The possibility of forming an intelligence committee to operate under the CCS had been duly anticipated by the ARCADIA conferees and submitted to the Combined Staff Planners (CPS) for examination and report. At the initial CPS meeting, held on 25 January 1942, the British planners pointed out that there was a definite need for such a committee in order to furnish the CCS with properly evaluated information based upon the total intelligence resources of both nations. In accordance with the established organizational pattern, they recommended creation of a Combined Intelligence Committee (CIC) embracing representatives from the Joint Intelligence Committee of the British Joint Staff mission in Washington plus a parallel United States joint intelligence committee. These representatives could then meet and compare views so as to produce agreed intelligence "appreciations" for CCS use. The British planners further declared that their own joint

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Intelligence Committee, in accordance with reflecting the composition of its parent Bombay Group, would not only include members of the three military services but also representatives from the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. *

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* Davis, op. cit., III, pp. 390-91.

As previously described, there was already an American Joint Intelligence Committee authorized at this time under the Joint (Army-Navy) Board. Consisting of two Army, one Army Air Force and two Navy officers detailed on special duty from MID and OAI, it had not become truly operative until 11 December 1941. * Besides, being primarily a

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* The original chairman of this Joint Board Intelligence Committee was Col (later Brig Gen) Louis J. Fortier of MID. See: Ltr, Brig Gen Louis J. Fortier, USA Ret, to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist, 14 Oct 57. Author's file.

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working level group, its assigned personnel lacked sufficient official status to balance British representation on the proposed RIC. It was plainly apparent, therefore, that some sort of an adjustment would have to be made in the American intelligence situation aimed at providing a more suitable group of authorities to function within the new CCS organization.

There was at first considerable resistance in the War Department General Staff to the idea of granting regular membership on any joint military intelligence committee to representatives of a civilian governmental agency, such as the State Department. The feeling was that

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accredited liaison officers from those agencies ought to suffice. Notwithstanding, the eventual plan as presented to the British by the Joint Staff Planners (JPS) on 30 January 1942, chose to define a new American Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) "composed of Directors of the Intelligence Services of the Army and Navy, and in addition representatives of the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare and the Coordinator of Information." The JPS also recommended the formation of "a full time working committee of the American J.I.C. composed of the members of the now existing Army-Navy J.I.C., with State Department, Economic Defense and C.O.I. representatives," so that this subordinate agency could continue to publish a daily intelligence summary and "work in close cooperation with the British J.I.C. in Washington."*

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* Davis, op. cit., pp. 391-93.

These United States proposals were discussed in detail during the next CPS meetings held on 2 February 1942 and approved with slight changes only. Eight days later, the CCS formally agreed with the recommendations of their planners on this same subject by accepting the following "terms of reference for Combined Intelligence," which not only established the CIC but also, in essence, constituted a basic directive:

> . . . 2. The primary assumption is that there is to be mutual exchange of (a) the intelligence necessary to plan for combined operations with the British; (b) intelligence of the enemy in all areas, not only on higher levels, but in all echelons to include Military Attaches and observers.
>
> 3. The American Joint Intelligence Committee will be composed of the Directors of the Intelligence Services of the Army and Navy, and in addition appropriate representatives of the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare and the Coordinator of Information. This Committee will be co-equal

with, and on a status of mutual exchange with, the Joint Planning Committee, in the service of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. A full time working committee of the American J.S.C. composed of the members of the now existing American J.S.C., with State Department, Economic Defence and C.O.I. representatives, will continue their present duties and will work in close cooperation with the British J.I.C. in Washington.

5. The Joint Intelligence Committee will freely exchange pertinent information concerning war operations. Acting as a Combined Intelligence Committee, they will prepare Combined Intelligence Estimates (Appreciations) and otherwise serve the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. In the field a close Liaison will be maintained between American and British Intelligence organizations in order to ensure a mutual interchange of intelligence information.

7. In matters of Counter Intelligence to combat subversive activities, espionage, etc., the Intelligence Services of the two Powers will continue their present activities, but wherever appropriate the Services will cooperate, through the individual Joint Intelligence Committee, with the Combined Intelligence Committee. *

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* Directive (S), CCS to Combined Intelligence, 11 Feb 42, CCS 23/1 (Ref CCS 14th Meeting, Item 4). Records of the JCS.

As it actually turned out the Combined Intelligence Committee found it necessary to hold just one meeting during 1942, for the special purpose of discussing its own directive, and never did become noticeably active in any but broad policy matters. This was chiefly due to the fact that favorable procedures were already in force, wherein representatives of the two national groups could meet regularly at the working level as a Combined Intelligence Sub-Committee (CISC) and produce whatever authoritative intelligence studies might be required. * In this way the American military

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* Davis, op. cit., II, p. 413.

intelligence effort promptly achieved an intimate association with the British intelligence personnel stationed in Washington, who were already receiving a substantial amount of enemy information from their own superiors in London.

These significant developments with reference to combined intelligence were naturally accompanied by several important changes in the American system for handling joint intelligence. Since the original Joint Intelligence Committee established under the Joint (Army-Navy) Board had been found unsuitable for direct translation into the JCS in the form of a JIC, the official relationship evolving between the older board and new JCS might well be expected to provide a major factor in influencing such changes. With the same authorities continuing to head the two separate bodies and a joint secretariat detailed to serve both of them simultaneously, however, this relationship problem failed to materialize. Accordingly, on 27 February 1942, action was initiated by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Army Air Force to have the JCS devise a formal directive for the "Joint U.S. Intelligence Committee" which had been previously accepted by the CIC. While discussing this particular subject, the JCS first took note that the existing Joint Intelligence Committee was a Joint Board agency but then went ahead to recognize the new JIC as an integral part of the JCS organization. In view of this expedient decision, an administrative memorandum was

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circulated within the Secretariat announcing that "All JIC papers now are indep. of Joint Board." * Likewise, the Joint Intelligence Committee

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* Ibid., I, p. 344.

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of the Joint Board, after being reorganized in conformity with its opposite British group, merely commenced to function as a Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JISC) for the more senior JIC. *

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* Ibid., II, p. 415. The basic working level team for joint intelligence under the Joint Board had been up to this time: Col (later Brig Gen) Louis J. Fortier, USA; Col (later Brig Gen) Vincent J. Meloy, USA (Air Corps) and Cmdr (later Rear Adm) James H. Foskett, USN; assisted on a part time basis by Mr. Stanley Hornbeck, of the State Dept, and Mr. Charles D. Rayner, Board of Economic Warfare. Analysis. When the JIC received its official charter, the Navy recalled Capt J. W. Ogan from retirement to become Chairman of the newly designated JISC. See: Ltr, Brig Gen Louis J. Fortier, USA Ret, to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist, 14 Oct 57. Author's file.

The JIC held an opening meeting on 5 March 1942, although the JCS did not get around to approving a general directive for its guidance until four several days later. Having been formed to act in the dual capacity of principal intelligence adviser for the JCS and authoritative group to represent the United States in combined military intelligence matters, it was then given the rather misleading mission of preparing "such

special information and intelligence studies as may be required by higher authorities or as may be indicated by the situation, and to prepare daily joint summaries." * made up only of key intelligence

* See: JIC 3/D (S), "General Directive from Joint U.S. Chiefs," 11 Mar 42, CCS 334 (3-20-42). Records of the JCS.

officials, the committee itself was not capable in any sense of functioning as an operational body and still had to rely entirely upon the organized intelligence agencies for producing intelligence estimates and summaries, with these regular agencies acting either individually or jointly through the JISC. The original membership of the JIC was, as follows:

Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence (Chairman).
Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Adolph E. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.
Colonel William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information.
Colonel R. B. Lord, Chief of Operations, Board of Economic Warfare. *

* Davis, op. cit., II, p. 444. Secretary for both the JIC and JISC was Maj. Ludwell L. Montague, USA, formerly of MID. (later col.)

The JIC did prove to be of distinct value in resolving intelligence policy questions and representing the United States viewpoint within the CIC but it was persistently ignored by the Joint Staff Planners (JPS) in the conduct of strategic war planning. This same failure, of course, had constituted a major bone of contention for many years with respect to both the War and Navy Department staff systems. In defending such neglect, the JPS now claimed that the JIC was producing too many intelligence

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studies which were not directly pertinent to the war plans being considered and of little important interest to the immediate future. *

* JIC 24th Meeting (S), 30 Jul 42 and Memo for JCS (S), "Subjects of Joint Intelligence Committee Papers," 31 Jul 42; CCS 334 (2-20-42). Records of the JCS.

Although the JCS managed to smooth over that particular dispute, *

* Memo, JCS to JIC (S), "Subjects of Joint Intelligence Committee Papers," 1 Aug 42, CCS 334 (2-20-42). Records of the JCS.

the JIC members were soon given an excellent opportunity to present their side of the case to a Committee on War Planning Agencies (CWPA) created by the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff to study the desirability of changing the organization and procedures of the JCS. * Reporting to this CWPA on

* Davis, op. cit., II, pp. 590-92.

the scope of its assigned directive, the JIC stated that it appeared broad enough to cover any service needed by the JCS but was markedly silent in regard to the vital subject of coordination among the different JCS supporting agencies. While it remained axiomatic that joint planning should be based upon joint intelligence, the JIC had been unable to contribute effectively to the war planning activities of the JCS because there was a decided lack of "mutual exchange" between the JPS and JIC. The intelligence officials had thus received neither clear requests from the JPS for required information nor suitable advance knowledge of

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intended operations. *

* Ibid., pp. 613-14.

The CAC was evidently impressed by these complaints from the departmental military intelligence authorities and submitted to the JCS that the JIC "has not functioned as contemplated, largely because it has been ignored by the Joint Planning agencies." To explain this serious deficiency, the committee then added the following highly critical but timely observation:

> It appears that the lack of coordination has been due to a failure to appreciate the ability of the J.I.C. staff and a fear of disclosing operational plans to the staff. Both reasons probably flow from the presence of civilians among the staff members. This distrust is more a characteristic of the military mind than a justified suspicion of the individual, and may flow from an assumption that a civilian representative is more loyal to his parent organization than to the military. In any case, the presence of civilian experts on the Joint Intelligence Committee is considered necessary for the proper evaluation of political and economic matters. The elimination of civilian membership on the committee or its staff is not proposed. Confidence in the civilian members cannot be inspired by directives, but must be developed by experience. The charters for the Joint Staff Planners and Joint War Plans Committee provide for coordination with the Joint Intelligence Committee in connection with the preparation of war plans. *

* Ibid., p. 629. A most commendable statement of basic principal but the ultimate security record of several civilian agencies of the government, as it came to be slowly unfolded over the post-war period, lends striking credence to this pronounced lack of confidence exhibited by the military authorities in World War II.

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The new JIC charter, which was finally accepted by the JCS effective 10 May 1943, contained few functional changes but did include a procedural directive for the committee to "maintain close liaison with the planning and policy formulating agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It also placed another member on the committee in the person of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Army Air Forces, and listed three main missions for the JIC, as follows:

a. Furnish intelligence for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.

b. Make written reports or oral presentations as requested.

c. Publish intelligence summaries as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *

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* See: JCS 202/15/D, "Joint Intelligence Committee Charter," 10 May 43, Records of the JCS.

With the JCS now starting to utilize the JIC more along the lines of an advisory intelligence body, demands on the JISC as a working group for that committee were soon greatly increased. Similarly, since the new JIC charter had declared the committee would be "assisted by a permanent joint intelligence staff," the name of the JISC was changed to Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) and it was thoroughly reorganized. A senior team was appointed to supervise the effort of the full group and handle tasks of a global nature, while two area specialist teams were established, one for Europe and the other for the Far East. On 26 May 1944, the JCS finally presented a formal charter to the JIS,

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fixing the membership of that key subcommittee at three officers each from MID, ONI and A-2, plus single members detailed from the State Department, OSS and Foreign Economic Administration (successor to the Office of Economic Warfare). *

* Davis, op. cit., II, pp. 767-70. The Board of Economic Warfare had been terminated and replaced by a new Office of Economic Warfare, effective 15 Jul 43.

Although the prompt creation of JIC had served to fulfill JCS requirements for foreign intelligence and necessary guidance in intelligence policy matters, it was poorly designed to operate effectively within the companion counterintelligence field. This defect became apparent early in August 1942, when the JCS approved an American invasion of North Africa (TORCH) for the near future. The ACofS G-2, thus felt it necessary to advise the JCS that it was "highly important that proper safeguards be established at once to prevent the operation being betrayed in advance by uncoordinated intelligence activities, within the affected areas, of the several U.S. Government departments and agencies now in the field (State, War, Navy, OSS, BEW, OWI.)" * To accomplish this, he recommended that all such activities should be placed directly under the Supreme Commander for TORCH, assisted by "a central intelligence control set up in Washington and integrated with similar control established

* OSS agents were even then acting as "Control Officers" for an American supply program being carried out in French Northwest Africa.

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in London." He himself could exercise the Washington control but in so-doing would need competent authority for reaching into the activities of civilian as well as military agencies of the government. *

* Davis, on. cit., II, pp. 492-93.

This G-2 proposal was immediately forwarded to the TORCH Commander, Lieut. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, for consideration and comment. While agreeing emphatically that intelligence, propaganda, political warfare and subversive activities bearing upon the impending operation should be rigidly controlled, he believed the requisite authority might better be vested jointly with JIC in Washington and a parallel British Intelligence Committee in London. For this special purpose, these agencies could then become practically extensions of his own military staff and submit all plans for intelligence operations to him for prior approval before their execution by any of the numerous agencies involved. *

* Ibid., pp. 493-94.

The JCS was at first strongly inclined to favor General Eisenhower's personal recommendations on this subject but complications soon arose. For instance JIC held no authoritative control over American propaganda or subversive activities, and OWI, the chief propaganda agency of the United States Government, was not even represented on that military committee. Besides, OWI had been granted its independent status by virtue of an Executive Order, so it would probably take Presidential action to modify the existing situation within the difficult propaganda field.

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There was also a mounting feeling among the departmental intelligence officials along the lines that the newly proposed functions conflicted with the fundamental character of the JIC and it might be better from a security standpoint if the BAD members thereof were denied any access whatsoever to the precious TORCH secret. *

* Ibid., pp. 494-96.

Several different plans were then advanced by various elements of the JCS organization in an attempt to solve this perplexing problem, with the JCS members themselves seemingly torn between taking full advantage of the broad composition of the JIC to achieve more favorable coordination, against a fixed desire to restrict knowledge of the TORCH operation essentially to military personnel. Hence, on 21 August 1942, therefore, Admiral King introduced and vigorously supported a scheme which had been devised by his Navy planner to establish a new JCS group in the form of a "Security Command." This command would consist solely of Army and Navy officers, probably drawn from the JIC, and "clothed with authority to guide outside agencies in a way that their activities would not operate to compromise military operations." *

* Ibid., p. 500.

After considerable debate and consequent revision of the original Navy plan, the JCS eventually chose to define a new committee composed of one senior officer each from the Army and Navy, and designated as "Security Control." Functioning under JPS guidance but with appropriate

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assistance from the JIC, it was authorized to arrange missions in support of TORCH to the regular intelligence services and other interested agencies of the United States Government, as well as coordinate such activities with corresponding British officials through the Supreme Commander in London. On the other hand, any actual control that it might wish to assume over civilian agencies of the United States Government would have to depend entirely upon requests for cooperation backed up by the wartime prestige of the military high command. In submitting these requests, the committee was cautioned to deal only with one or two persons on the very highest level in each civilian agency and to supply them with an absolute minimum of information regarding the military operation at hand. Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and Capt. George C. Dyer, USN, were then appointed to head the committee, which was soon being referred to in official communications as Joint Security Control (JSC).*

* Ibid., pp. 500-02.

Although this JSC had been created chiefly for the purpose of handling TORCH security matters, it continued to perform similar missions for all major operations during the rest of the war period. * Effective

* The enduring character of JSC was confirmed by the JCS on 3 Nov 42.

9 December 1942, in order to achieve a more even balance between the Army and Navy for the committee, Admiral King ordered Rear Adm. Harold C. Train, Director of Naval Intelligence, to succeed Captain Dyer as the

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Senior Navy representative thereon. At the same time, in view of General Marshall's growing concern over information reaching the public about military deception measures being employed by the armed forces, JSC was granted additional authority to veto any War or Navy Department publicity which might threaten to jeopardize future operations or disclose any operational procedures. *

* Davis, op. cit., II, p. 665.

General Strong remained of the opinion that the constantly increasing duties of the JSC could be carried out much more efficiently if the committee was placed under the full-time direction of an independent general or admiral, rather than merely comprising an extra task for the ACofS G-2, WDGS and the Chief of ONI to perform jointly. He further felt that it should first be completely accepted as an operational agency and then granted sufficient power in-order to make security control an automatic process without prior reference to the JCS. While the JCS members agreed with the basic precept of having a more or less automatic security control, they feared that the JSC might turn into a typical police state organization and hesitated to bestow too much authority on the committee. In March 1943, therefore, they thus decreed that its present executive direction should continue but be limited to recommending specific security steps for adoption either by the JCS or the two service departments. After these steps had been finally agreed upon, the committee could then effect "periodic incidental inspections" for the purpose of reporting observed failures in compliance. Additionally, the A-2 Office of the Army Air Force was for the first time authorized a regular membership in the JSC. *

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* Ibid., pp. 691-92.

Two years later, a more formal revision of the JCS charter, set the composition of that top security committee officially at one Army officer, one AAF officer and not more than two representatives of the Navy. The main functions assigned to it were also spelled out in greater detail, with its accepted duties pertaining to the regulation of deceptive measures and diversionary plans for the armed forces receiving an added emphasis. The JSC thus continued to contribute materially to the over-all counterintelligence effort of the armed forces during the progress of World War II. Unlike JIC, though, it did not at any time function as part of the CCS organization.

There was another JCS committee established on the same JIC-JSC level, which not only held important intelligence implications but also became extremely active over much of the wartime period. This was the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC). Its devious development and controversial relationship with other governmental agencies occupied in the same field were so complicated, however, that it appears to merit special examination under a separate chapter.

Based upon the provisions of its own charter, the JIC chose to form a number of subordinate intelligence committees. While most of them turned out to be only temporary in character, they all rendered timely assistance to the total military intelligence program. Listed in chronological order of formation, these various JIC subcommittees were as follows:

Weekly Summary Editorial Board (February 1943).
[illegible] Committee (August 1943).
German Manpower Subcommittee (August 1943).
Joint Committee on Disclosure of Technical Information (October 1943).
Topographical Subcommittee (November 1943).
Publications Review Subcommittee (January 1944).
Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board (August 1944).
Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (October 1944).
Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (June 1945). *

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* JIC Memo for Information No 173, "Evolution of the J.I.C. Charter," 17 Aug 45, CCS 334 JIC (12-19-42) Sec 3. Records of the JCS. A Deputy JIC was also created but it does not seem ever to have been truly active. See: Directive (S), "Deputy Joint Intelligence Committee," undated, in CCS JIC (12-19-42) Sec 1. Records of the JCS.

MID provided key representatives on each of these JIC subcommittees, usually in the form of technical specialists who were called upon to perform [illegible] assignment in addition to their normal duties. Although the more significant of these subcommittees will be further described during subsequent chapters, it becomes desirable at this time to mention briefly their initial organization and respective missions.

In January 1943, the JCS directed JIC to publish a weekly summary "high-lighting the military, political, economic, and psychological situation and emphasizing trends affecting current operations or pointing toward counteraction." To facilitate the conduct of this new task, the committee created a representative "Weekly Summary Editorial Board" and charged it with assembling pertinent data for the project as needed.

When difficulties were encountered in obtaining suitable data from the individual agencies and then putting it into satisfactory final form, the board was established on a firmer basis through the appointment of a regular editor and detail by name of certain officers for duty thereon.*

* See: JIC 76/5, "Special Subordinate Committees of the Joint Intelligence Committee," 23 Feb 44, CCS 334 JIC (12-19-42) Sec 1, Records of the JCS.

At this time, the senior member of the Weekly Summary Editorial Board was Lt. Col. DeForest Van Slyck of A-2, while the G-2 representative was Capt. P. J. McCloskey from the Planning and Strategy Group of MID. The board was finally discontinued during June 1945, in compliance with a drive to reduce the number of subordinate agencies functioning under the JCS.

Since oil resources comprise one of the controlling factors in the ability of any nation to wage war, there had been a so-called enemy oil committee operating informally in Washington for some time even before the formation of JIC. The chairman of this early group was Mr. Charles B. Rayner of the Board of Economic Warfare,* it being

* Mr Rayner was detailed to the State Dept as an acting petroleum advisor in Dec 43 and continued to remain a key governmental figure within that highly specialized field for the rest of the wartime period. See: Biographic Register of the Department of State, September 1, 1944, Department of State Publication 2326, p. 179.

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broadly representative of petroleum experts from both the American and British Governments. On 1 September 1943, in order to give the group more official standing, JIC adopted it as one of its own special subordinate committees.* The committee not only proved to be of valuable

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* Memo for Secty JCS, "Establishment of the Enemy Oil Committee as a special subordinate committee of the J.I.C." 1 Sep 43, CCS 463.7 Axis (12-12-42) Sec 1. Records of the JCS.

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assistance in advising the JIC but also in directly informing individual military intelligence personnel on foreign petroleum matters for use in producing their needed numerous summaries and estimates.

The original MID member of the Enemy Oil Committee was Dr. Harold G. Carlson, who was a European specialist. When the unit was later divided into a main committee and two subcommittees, one for the Far East and the other for Europe, Dr. Carlson was logically assigned to the latter subcommittee. Capt. Robert R. Munoz then became the MID representative on the main committee and Mr. Alexander Lury joined the Far Eastern Subcommittee. The Office of the Quartermaster General also held full membership in all three of these oil committees, which were not dissolved until June 1945.*

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* See: JIC 76/7, "Subordinate Committees of the Joint Intelligence Committee," 29 Apr 44, CCS 334 JIC (12-19-42) Sec 1. Records of the JCS.

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[illegible] a German Manpower Subcommittee during August 1943, in an attempt to achieve a realistic consideration of German manpower problems stemming from recently reported heavy Axis casualties and at the same time develop a more accurate enemy order of battle for the European Theater. Lasting only until May 1944, it initially operated under the chairmanship of Col. C. C. Blakeney of JIS and included regular members from MID, OSS, Office of Economic Warfare and Office of the Surgeon General, USA. The MID representative [illegible] was Col. J. R. Lovell, Chief of the Order of Battle Section, MIS. *

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* See: JIC 73d Meeting (S), 27 Aug 43, CCS 334 JIC (7-9-42). Records of the JCS.

The Joint Committee on Disclosure of Technical Information, as organized in October 1943, actually constituted the U.S. membership on a Combined (CIC) Subcommittee resulting from an urgent CCS directive to determine "what items of technical information should be disclosed by the British and U.S. Governments to the U.S.S.R. and other nations." During December 1943, therefore, this subcommittee proceeded to draw up a list of certain categories of such information which were releasable to the U.S.S.R. on a reciprocal basis but recommended strongly against furnishing that Allied country with any items still in the "experimental, developmental or laboratory stage." * Because it was performing a

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* See: JIC 76/1, "Subordinate Committees of the Joint Intelligence Committee," 29 Apr 44, CCS 334 JIC (12-19-42) Sec 1 and JCS 527/1 (S), 12 Dec 43, CCS 350.05 USSR (3-10-43) Sec 2, Records of the JCS.

counterintelligence function, the AUS member of this JIC subcommittee, Col. F. G. Davis, really represented Joint Security Control. Also included were appropriate specialists from the Joint Committee on New Weapons, ACofS G-4 WDGS, COMINCH, Bureau of Aeronautics and Joint Communications Board.*

* CIC 23/1 (S), "Disclosure of Technical Information to the U.S.S.R." 16 Nov 43, CCS 350.05 USSR (3-10-43) Sec 2, Records of the JCS. An Army Air Force member was later added to this subcommittee and the ACofS G-4 representative replaced by one from the Army Service Forces.

The Topographical Subcommittee of JIC not only fulfilled a critical need when it was first organized during November 1943 but also kept right on growing in importance as the war progressed. It consisted of one technically qualified officer designated by each of the following authorities:

a. Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, WDGS.
b. Director of Naval Intelligence.
c. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence.
d. Director of Strategic Services.
e. Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army.*

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= JIC 76/5 "Special Subordinate Committee of the Joint Intelligence" (revised) 23 Feb 43, CCS 334 JIC (12-19-42) Sec 1. Records of the JCS.

The primary mission of the Topographical Subcommittee was to assist JIC in coordinating "the reproduction of topographical and other static intelligence studies, maps and charts for military planning and operational use." It accomplished this very important task largely by establishing priorities and deadlines for that type of work after consultation with the Joint Staff Planners. Except in cases of major policy, it could implement its own agreed upon decisions and was authorized to maintain direct liaison with both the British Inter-Service Topographical Department in London and the Allied Geographical Section of the Southwest Pacific Theater. *

* Ibid.

Needs of the war against Japan for maps and photography proved to be far different from those required by the European war. Besides, tremendous distances were involved in flying photo aircraft over Far Eastern targets and there were five separate combat theaters located around the perimeter of the Japanese Empire, all be serving to pose coordination problems of extremely difficult proportions. Early in 1943, therefore, the JCS instructed JIC to prepare a joint plan for the "mapping and photographing of Japan and approaches thereto" and an approved plan to

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JIC 76/5 "Special Subordinate Committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee" 23 Feb 43, CCS 334 JIC (12-19-42) Sec 1. Records of the JCS.

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[illegible] this purpose [illegible] April 1944, with JIC designated as the responsible agency to carry it out. The ensuing operations not only enjoyed a favorable cooperation between the Army and Navy for Far East mapping but also received active support from the 20th Air Force, which was at that time functioning under direct control of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, in Washington. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Map and Photographic Branch, series three, II, Sec 3, pp. 16-17. The mentioned JCS directive was presented to JIC in JCS 765/2.

A Publications Review Subcommittee was formed early in 1944 to meet a mounting demand for the elimination of widespread duplication and excesses in connection with the huge number of reports being published separately by the two departmental military intelligence agencies. It was informally constituted and never received an official JIC directive. Probably its most useful contribution to the wartime intelligence effort lay in applying constant pressure to both MID and ONI for them to get together and initiate their required publications on a joint basis whenever possible. *

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* See: JIC 86/9 (C), "Proposed Termination of Publications Review Subcommittee," 20 Feb 46, CCS 319.1 (1-20-43) Sec 1. Records of the JCS.

Although performing a noticeably similar function, the Joint

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Intelligence Study Publishing Board (JISPB) was of much more eventual significance than the Publication Review Subcommittee. The original JIRA resulted from a series of meetings held during November 1942, wherein a selected group of MID and ONI officials had been directed to study a proposed unification plan as recently suggested by Admiral King to General Marshall. While the conferees were unable to make any appreciable headway in solving the troublesome merger problem, they did manage to reach a solid agreement that the two agencies should prepare an extensive set of Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS). They further recommended the creation of a Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board in order to "coordinate, supervise, edit and promulgate" these studies. *

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* "Hist MID WW II" (S), pp. 211-13.

Work on this badly needed JANIS program was started without delay and, on 27 April 1943, the ACofS G-2, Director of Naval Intelligence and Director, Office of Strategic Services, signed a memorandum in concert authorizing the formation of a JISPB composed of three representatives [illegible] centers on full-time duty to attend its consequent development. * By

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* See: JIC 76/9, 12 Jul 43, Memorandum (Annex B to Appendix A), "Directive on Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies," 1 Jul 43, CCS 334 JIC (12-19-42) Sec 2, Records of the JCS.

August 1944, the Board had been expanded to include members appointed

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by the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, and Chief of Engineers, United States Army. It was then taken over by the JIC and given an official charter which provided among other things that the board should operate under the "general direction" of the Joint Topographical Subcommittee.* Arrangements were also concluded with an

* JIC 76/11, "Basic Directive for the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board (JISPB)," 24 Aug 44, CCS 334 JIC (12-19-42) Sec 2, Records of the JCS. Col George W. Bicknell of MID was Chairman of the JISPB at this time and Lt Col George H. Kountz, likewise from MID, was its Secretary.

opposite British group occupied in making similar surveys so as to insure a much closer cooperation between the two Allied agencies. Even though many of the scheduled JANIS studies could not be completed before the war's end, the project was a most worthwhile one and JISPB manifestly performed an important service in advancing the over-all military intelligence effort.

During the fall of 1944, with the Allied forces already commencing to close in against Germany and liberate large areas of previous Axis-held territory, it became expedient for the CCS to order the formation in London of a Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS) under the CIC. Fully representative of all American and British governmental agencies engaged in intelligence activities, this subcommittee was charged with the following mission:

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To receive, approve and coordinate all requests for intelligence of military or political significance which will become available as Allied forces advance in the area of the authority of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SCAEF), exclusive of the combat intelligence which SCAEF would normally seek, . . .*

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* CCS 533/1 (S), "Establishment of a Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee," 15 Aug 44, CCS 334 Comb. Int. Prior. Cmte. (6-12-44) Sec 2. Records of the JCS. Chairman of this CIC subcommittee was Brig Gen T. J. Betts of SHAEF, formerly of MID, while the ACofS G-2 was directly represented thereon by Col Carnes B. Lee, Asst MA in London.

Establishment of this CIOS in London soon caused the creation of two new JIC subcommittees in Washington. The first of these, which was appointed on 30 October 1944, came to be known as the Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC). In addition to including officers detailed from each of the agencies holding regular JIC membership, there were also representatives assigned from the Foreign Economic Administration, War Production Board and Office of Scientific Research and Development. The main function of TIIC was to coordinate, approve and process all American requests for intelligence investigations within European liberated or conquered enemy territory and forward these requests to the CIOS in London for final action. *

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* Directive, "Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee," 30 Oct 44, CCS 334 Comb. Intel. Prior. Cmte. (6-12-44) Sec 2. Records of the JCS.

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In December 1944, SHAEF notified the War Department that it might be desirable for the United States to devise a suitable program aimed at more thoroughly exploiting knowledge held by German scientists and technicians, not only to act as an aid during the war against Japan but also to prevent the Germans from building another dangerous war machine in the future. A letter to this same effect was subsequently submitted direct to the Chief of Staff by Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Chief of the Army Service Forces. * These two communications eventually led to the establishment, effective 30 June 1945, of a Joint Intelligence Objective Agency (JIOA) as replacement for the existing TIIC. Under the supervision of a military director and civilian deputy director, both appointed by the JIC, this new committee was originally made up of representatives from the following governmental bodies:

(1) Member agencies of the J.I.C.
(2) Department of the Treasury.
(3) Department of Justice.
(4) Department of Commerce.
(5) Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.
(6) War Production Board.
(7) Office of Scientific Research and Development. *

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* "The PAPERCLIP Project: Its Concept, Implementation and Control" (S), MID 314.7 G-2, undated (30 Oct 42), p. 1. ACSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as "Hist PAPERCLIP" (S).

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* Directive, "Joint Intelligence Objective Agency," 30 Jun 45, CCS 334 CIPC (6-12-44) Sec 5, Records of the JCS. An amended charter, issued in Sep 45, further provided for accepting JIOA

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"Advisors" from the Departments of Interior and Agriculture.

At first the JIC was called upon to function essentially along the same lines as the earlier FIC in approving and processing American requests for special intelligence examinations of areas under allied military control in Europe. The Secretary of War and Secretary of State, however, in coordination with the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff, had recently approved a separate project (Overcast) for the purpose of bringing a limited quota of 350 German scientists to the United States in order to exploit their respective technical knowledge and abilities. During September 1945, therefore, when this special project came under official JCS cognizance, the JIC was instructed to establish an interim procedure on a short-time basis for coordinating the prompt procurement and advantageous exploitation of these German scientists pending the formulation of a governmental policy pertaining thereto. JIC logically chose to handle this matter through the JIOA, so that subcommittee soon became the joint group directly concerned with supervising the entire [illegible] exploitation program. Similarly, JIB was designated to be the operating agency for implementing it. *

* "List PAPERCLIP" (S), p. 2. In Nov 45, due to a security compromise, the code name covering this operation was changed from OVERCAST to PAPERCLIP.

Besides the creation of these various subcommittees in Washington, JIC was also involved in preparing a model JCS directive for the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Collection Agencies (JICAs) as organized within

most of the major theaters to collect and evaluate military intelligence obtainable therefrom. Although these JICA's were actually theater agencies, the JCS felt they could be operated more successfully on a joint basis and eventually decided to take over official supervision of their intelligence gathering activities in the field.

The North African invasion had already shown that as soon as an area was taken over by a theater commander the flow of intelligence to Washington tended to diminish at an alarming rate. This was chiefly due to the fact that the theater intelligence organizations naturally remained much more interested in acquiring combat intelligence than information needed by the departmental agencies back home. To overcome this acknowledged deficiency, an agreement was reached with General Eisenhower's Headquarters, effective 26 January 1943, authorizing the formation of an intelligence collection agency in Algiers under the joint control of MID and ONI. Four months later, when the territory ascribed to this original agency was expanded to include all of North Africa, it became formally designated as the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency North Africa (JICANA). Likewise, on 23 April 1943, another JICA (JIC/ME) was established for the Middle East Theater. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Foreign Branch, series two, II, Sec 2, Appendix A, p. 1. ACSI Rec Sec. By direction of the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff, OSS was subsequently made a "collaborative member" of these JICA's.

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In August 1943, the JCS formally approved operation of this joint collection project on a worldwide basis and issued a standard directive applicable to all JICAs both present and future. It was further specified that no additional JICAs could be established without prior authority from the JCS. * A third JICA was then formed to function

* Directive, "Joint U.S. Army-Navy Intelligence Collection Agencies (J.I.C.A.'s)," 5 Aug 43, CCS 334 JICA (2-17-43). Records of the JCS.

within the China-Burma-India Theater and, on 27 April 1945, a final JICA was approved for the China Theater. To facilitate the prompt review and dissemination of all intelligence reports emanating from these JICA sources, a separate reception center (JIARC) was established in the Main Navy building for processing them. This center, which operated its own JICA Officer Messenger Service, turned out to be of considerable assistance in speeding the flow of classified material back and forth between Washington and the overseas installations. These *

* "Hist MIS" (S), Foreign Branch, series two, II, Sec 2, Appendix A, pp. 1-2. ACSI Rec Sec.

It thus becomes plainly apparent that the World War II development of attempting to attain a suitable coordination of effort by organizing representative committees at successive levels of direction was a most significant one for military intelligence. The new system not only assured a more positive and continuous coordination among the host of agencies

concerned but also served to present a united front in intelligence matters to our principal wartime allies. It likewise helped to uncover and minimize the crippling effects of inter-agency rivalry which had so often handicapped the success of American intelligence endeavors in the past. From these particular standpoints, therefore, the joint and combined committee structures as evolved were patently both valid and necessary.

Nevertheless, there are a number of serious disadvantages in any organization which seeks to control operations through committees. In the first place it always remains most difficult to arrive at the best possible solution to a given problem because committees normally lean toward compromise. Moreover, form and procedure may be permitted to gain such an exaggerated importance that they commence to take precedence over actual substance of the problem itself. When these inherent faults are multiplied by the addition of several different committee layers, the system soon becomes so complicated it cannot yield decisive action in an emergency. For intelligence, as in all military operations, the latter characteristic can have truly disastrous results.

One of the most notable consequences of this new committee system for the departmental military intelligence agency was to increase greatly the demands on its personnel resources. Since each key MID official was habitually called upon to function in the twin capacity of an agency member and a joint committee representative, additional officers were needed in almost every major category. Furthermore, even though final coordination arrangements could sometimes be concluded at committee meetings,

the requirements for maintaining regular liaison with other intelligence agencies of the government were never lessened in the least. Hence the joint and combined committee structures as adopted played an important role in the previously described enormous expansion of MID and contributed measurably to the fact that military intelligence operations kept growing more complex at every turn. This latter trait seems well illustrated in the next chapter, which covers the progress of the departmental intelligence agency with reference to the highly involved psychological warfare effort undertaken by the United States Government during World War II.

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CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The United States Army first became formally engaged in psychological warfare during World War I, with the two main directive agencies being represented by the Psychologic Subsection of M.I. 2 in Washington and the Propaganda Subsection of G-2, GHQ, in France. The Washington unit, which operated in close collaboration with the national (Creel) Committee on Public Information, not only prepared psychological reports and estimates but also maintained a continuous survey of German propaganda for the purpose of determining its underlying objectives. The A.E.F. unit, under Capt. Heber Blankenhorn, effectively distributed American propaganda in Europe, mostly in the form of leaflets delivered over their respective targets by airplane, drifting balloon or artillery shell.

Although this early Army venture into the complex field of psychological warfare was attended by several worthwhile indications of success, it was further marked with a series of jurisdictional disputes between the military and civilian information officials concerned. At the same time, its favorable development was often severely handicapped through an exhibited lack of understanding and sympathy on the part of higher authority. These disturbing wartime experiences obviously should have formed the basis for further study in government circles of the entire subject, so as to assure that the same mistakes might never again be repeated. Inexcusably, however, the field of

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psychological warfare remained almost completely neglected over the preceding years both by the civilian agencies involved and within the War Department itself.

It was not until after the Germans had demonstrated the intense scope and potential of psychological warfare during their amazingly successful drive to the west in 1939-40, that a few farsighted American officials began to evince any deep concern in the matter. With this eye opening example before them, they soon became strongly fifth-column, subversion and propaganda conscious to the extent that most of the governmental information agencies started independently to prepare studies and plans on these subjects. Unfortunately, since this new development had not been properly anticipated, there were no means at hand for coordinating a competitive effort of such nature.

While the Office of Government Reports, established under Lowell Mellett as part of the Presidential Executive Office on 8 September 1939, * was more or less concerned with foreign propaganda, the first

* EO 8248, 8 Sep 39.

true psychological warfare agency of the United States Government proved to be Nelson Rockefeller's "Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics." Originally formed in August 1940 and later redesignated as the "Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs" (CIAA), this organization was outwardly charged with insuring suitable coordination of the activities of the Government relative to Hemisphere defense. * In reality it was

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* Donald M. Rowland, History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs ("United States Government History Reports on War Administration" [Washington, 1947]), p. 7.

First created as a subordinate body of the Council of National Defense, this office, as the CIAA, was subsequently placed under the Executive Office of the President by EO 8840, 30 Jul 41.

designed to combat Axis economic penetration and propaganda within the Latin American area. It thus became increasingly active in a number of typical psychological warfare operations along the following lines:

1. Improving American news service to Latin America.

2. Obtaining surveys on opinions and attitudes to the southward.

3. Coordinating motion picture and newsreel activities for Spanish audiences.

4. Organizing and subsidizing private committees of local pro-U.S. citizens in major South American cities. *

* Ibid., passim.

Restricted as it was to Latin American affairs, the CIAA could hardly expect to remain long dominant in the tempting field of psychological warfare. The State Department, mainly through an existing Division of Cultural Relations, commenced to expand its foreign information program, while the Office of Civilian Defense, under Fiorello LaGuardia * likewise proceeded to claim an important

* EO 8757, 20 May 41.

UNCLASSIFIED

interest in national propaganda work. Similarly, the Office of Facts and Figures, established in October 1941 with Archibald MacLeish in charge, * felt the urge to prepare extensive studies bearing upon foreign propaganda. For some time the Department of Justice had been maintaining a propaganda analysis of American foreign language publications and the Federal Communications Commission was already monitoring foreign broadcasts for public use. Coupled with the fact that every important governmental agency had its own public relations unit or information bureau, the situation patently demanded appropriate coordination measures without further delay. On 11 July 1941, therefore, the President chose to appoint Col. (later Maj. Gen.) William J. Donovan as Coordinator for Information (COI) for the United States Government and assign him the following basic mission:

> . . . to collect and analyze all information and data which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government. *

* Federal Register, July 1941, VI, pp. 3422-23.

This pre-war directive to the COI was noticeably both broad and indefinite. It not only authorized the new agency to enter into the secret intelligence field but also indicated a number of possible psychological warfare activities. During the few remaining months

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before Pearl Harbor, therefore, the CII rapidly evolved in the form of a vague combination of central intelligence, subversion and propaganda [illegible], based upon the enthusiastic personal views of Colonel Donovan's chief advisers. For example, after accepting a thesis that short-wave radio broadcasts should constitute the vital strategic weapon in furthering an American psychological effort, immediate steps were taken to organize a Foreign Information Service (FIS) in New York City under Robert E. Sherwood * for the stated purpose of concentrating

* See Historical Reports on War Administration in THE UNITED STATES AT WAR (Washington, 1946), pp. 70-72. FIS began actual operations on 25 Aug 41, with Capt James Roosevelt, USMCR, still residing at the White House, designated to be its liaison officer to other departments and agencies of the government.

on that type of endeavor. Since the CIAA was concurrently expanding its own psychological warfare operations throughout the Latin American sphere, jurisdictional disputes between that agency and this new FIS, as well as with the State Department, seemed plainly predictable.

Having been gravely neglectful of psychological warfare for much of the peacetime period, the War Department General Staff became abruptly aware of its serious military implications when the Germans swept across Western Europe with such unsuspected ease in 1939-40. Even then, the reaction to these extraordinary operations largely took the form of devising plans for countering enemy subversion or sabotage within the United States Army itself. The first substantial contribution

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to the use of psychological warfare as an offensive [illegible] late in 1940, when Maj. (later Brig. Gen.) P. E. Hobbett, Chief of the Plans and Training Branch of MID, prepared a field manual on propaganda to guide American military operations in that relatively unexplored field. This manual was officially approved on 31 December 1940, but, due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter presented, it could receive neither official sanction nor further appropriate distribution. It must be remembered that the word "propaganda" was at that time a highly invidious one and the War Department did not dare to admit any plans for adopting such an underhand means even in the pursuance of purely military objectives.

With the MID authorities becoming more favorably psychological warfare minded and the subject commencing to receive a welcome amount of attention at the higher military schools, there were still scant signs of any real concern over the matter within the War Department General Staff as a whole. Nevertheless, early in June 1941, Mr. John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, after having discussed the subject with the ACofS G-2, expressed an authoritative desire for MID to organize a small group of carefully selected officers to:

> study the psychology of our own people and forces, of those in neutral countries, and of hostile or enemy-controlled countries; to determine the effect of propaganda or of proposed operations on that psychology. *

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* See: MID 321.10 G-2 SSC (C), 16 Jun 41 (6-16-41). Records of WDGS, National Archives.

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Based upon this internal directive, a Special Study Group (SSG) was created in MID on 25 June 1941, with Lt. Col. (later Col.) Percy G. Black named to be the officer in charge. Because he had recently returned from a tour of duty as Assistant Military Attache in Berlin, Colonel Black was thoroughly conversant with the painstaking studies that had been accomplished by the German military authorities concerning psychological factors prior to launching their successful operations in western Europe. He soon felt it necessary, therefore, to warn the departmental authorities that unless they promptly embarked upon a comparable series of studies and more readily accepted the full significance of the psychological element in modern warfare, the results might be disastrous. * He likewise believed that the new SSG should

* Ibid.

not only constitute the WDGS advisor on publicity, propaganda and psychological warfare policies but also furnish an appendix for each WPD war plan in analyzing expected enemy reactions thereto and assisting the American commanders to exploit them. *

* Memo (C), G-2 Exec to Secy WDGS, 26 Jun 41, MID 321.19 G-2 SSG, 26 Jun 41 (6-16-41), Records of WDGS, National Archives.

The SSG was faced from the start with a number of most difficult problems requiring solution before it could carry out its assigned mission. The first of these had to do with the procurement of qualified military and civilian personnel capable of preparing needed psychological studies.

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for guidance in this unfamiliar matter, Colonel Black turned to Dr. James Rowland Angell, former President of Yale University but now with the National Broadcasting Company, who suggested he should enlist the services of one or two prominent psychologists from the academic field, supplemented by several selected men with practical experience in psychological research and public relations work. Dr. Angell then went on to mention several outstanding individuals falling under these particular categories. *

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* "An Official History of the Propaganda Branch to September 1945," (S), AHD 314.7, Undated (30 Oct 42), p. 12. ACSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as "Hist Prop Br" (S).

In following up Dr. Angell's recommendations, Colonel Black shortly came in contact with Prof. Edwin R. Guthrie, head of the Department of Psychology, University of Washington, and was greatly impressed by the thorough knowledge and practical grasp he held on psychological subjects. Accordingly, the SSO Chief arranged to have him temporarily detailed as a Special Consultant for the Secretary of War and, on 14 July 1941, appointed to become "Chief Consultant Psychologist, General Staff, G-2." This capable official then continued to function as Colonel Black's principal civilian assistant in SSO until 26 July 1942, when he was transferred to OWI. *

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* Ibid., Pg. 37.

Likewise Additionally The SSO Chief also proceeded to interview a large number of other key personalities currently engaged in psychological and public

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information activities. * As a result, he was eventually able to draw

* Ibid., p. 14. The number and caliber of those authorities consulted by Colonel Black during this preliminary period read like a veritable Who's Who on the subject. A few of them were: Mr. Guy C. Hickock of the Council of National Defense, Dr. Claude Robinson of Opinion Research Corp, Prof. Arthur Upham Pope of the Committee for National Morale, Dr. Leonard Carmichael of the Civil Service Commission and Dr. C. C. Brigham of Princeton University.

upon a very distinguished panel of professional psychological experts who signified that they were willing to act in an advisory capacity for the new military agency. He further succeeded in securing official approval to form certain members of this group into a regular "Advisory Committee" and requested them to gather in Washington commencing 21 July 1941, for the purpose of discussing future SSO progress. This conference, which was opened with addresses by Mr. McCloy and General Miles, included representatives from MID, WPD, BPR, AGO and Morale Branch of the War Department. Its deliberations thus produced a most comprehensive final report containing specific recommendations for SSO on such important matters as personnel, organization, secrecy, psychological emphasis and relations with other staff agencies. *

* Ibid., pp. 29-34. This final report was signed "E. R. Guthrie for the Committee."

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The main trouble encountered by Bunkley in determining the precise boundaries which should apply to its over-all efforts. Since there was no accepted official definition of psychological warfare, it seemed at first glance that the field might be almost limitless. The question immediately arose, as to whether the assigned mission ought to be interpreted in a narrow sense and work of the group restricted generally to propaganda, or adjudged more freely. If the latter course was adopted there would then be numerous other activities feasible under the broad term of psychological warfare, such as subversion, sabotage, deception and all manner of secret intelligence operations. On the other hand, with the nation technically at peace, it was recognized that any SSG endeavors along covert lines would have to be strictly confined to the planning or discussion stage, especially as other MID elements were normally charged with conducting most of them.

Colonel Black remained fully aware that there was already a very confusing overlap of both military and civilian agencies competing within the propaganda field. Although the ACofS G-2, WDGS, held responsible for the security of military information, DPR was now supposed to keep the public properly informed regarding Army activities, while a new departmental Morale Branch was becoming more and more interested in information pertaining to psychological factors. Additionally, there was a Coordinator of Information for the United States Government and the CIAA was in the midst of executing a psychological program pointed toward Latin America. In his final analysis, therefore, Colonel Black decided that the SSG should function essentially as a policy and coordinating group

for military psychology by furnishing needed advice to the high command and other governmental agencies on psychological reactions which might be expected in light of events occurring either at home or abroad. *

* Ibid., pp. 26-27.

Militating directly against Colonel Black's decision in this fundamental matter was the exaggerated cloak of secrecy that had been thrown around SSU from its inception. Principally due to security considerations the group was thus forced to acquire office space away from WDD proper * and take every possible step to conceal the fact it even existed.

* SSU was first quartered in an empty classroom obtained from George Washington University. More suitable office space was secured by Sep 41 in the Dupont Circle Apartments but six months later the agency was again forced to move to a new location at 1436 "K" St. NW. It eventually reached the Pentagon Building during the last week of Jun 42. See: Ibid., pp. 22 and 35-36.

Under these unfavorable conditions the agency could neither become truly active in day to day staff work nor develop any adequate coordination procedures. Moreover, WPD flatly refused to acknowledge the SSU war planning ambitions by instructing their liaison officer to report on all SSU activities observed but not reveal any WPD plan or point of view to the psychological warfare personnel. Although some degree of satisfactory liaison was ultimately achieved with most of

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the other [illegible] staff agencies, as well as with the CIAA, it continued to remain [illegible] ineffective for the COI. * In September

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* The ACofS G-2 had recently been instructed by the Secretary of War to function as sole departmental authority for dealing with the COI. See: MID COI, 12 Nov 41. Records of WDGS, National Archives.

1941, Colonel Black paid a personal visit to Colonel Donovan for the express purpose of discussing the proper relationship which should exist between the two psychological warfare groups. The only concrete result of this exchange, however, appears to have been the adopted practice of sending a SSG representative to the inter-departmental meetings held daily under auspices of the Washington News Division of COI (FIS). *

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* E. P. Lilly, "History of Psychological Warfare," (S), sec. II, ch. I, pp. 77-79. JCS Historical Sec.

The sudden advent of the war found the departmental psychological warfare effort still in an embryonic state and noticeably on the defensive. While the Japanese sneak attack against Oahu did serve to solidify public opinion as to the desirability of the United States entering into the world conflict, it also brought several difficult security of military information problems promptly to the fore. Thus, whenever SSG attempted to exercise any authoritative control over information programs prepared by civilian agencies of the government or to coordinate such plans from the military viewpoint, it invariably

UNCLASSIFIED

ran into stiff resistance. At the same time, SSU was becoming increasingly active in a large number of psychological warfare projects of its own, featured by a detailed analysis of Axis propaganda aimed at devising appropriate counter-propaganda and providing suitable psychological warfare material for offensive use. * It was apparent that the whole

* "Hist Prop Br" (S), p. 62.

situation stood badly in need of another thorough review, not only to protect the security of military information but also to help promote a maximum psychological warfare effort for the nation.

At first the military high command showed little or no interest in the psychological aspects of the war. This lack of concern had been earlier demonstrated as early as following the ARGENTIA Conference in August 1941, when members of the Joint Board reacted negatively to several British proposals advanced on the subject. Thus, since the combined grand strategy agreed upon during the post-Pearl Harbor ARCADIA Conference contained only a brief mention of "wearing down German resistance through air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda." * The

* Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. I, ch. III, pp. 9-14.

rapid march of Allied reverses in the field, however, soon forced a much closer examination of all psychological warfare factors both by the WDGS and JCS.

On As early as 16 December 1941, Brig. Gen. John Magruder, U.S.

Special observer in Chungking reported that Japanese propaganda was gravely weakening Chinese morale and requested the establishment of an American program designed to combat it. Shortly thereafter, General MacArthur also appealed for a more positive propaganda effort in order to encourage the Philippine people and stimulate their active resistance to the Japanese invaders. * This latter request caused SSG

* Manila had just been declared an open city and the American forces were in the process of being concentrated on Bataan.

and FIS to join hands in achieving one of the most remarkable psychological feats of the entire war, when, without any prior arrangements, the two agencies succeeded in having President Roosevelt's historic freedom pledge to the Philippine people published in a Manila "extra" less than four hours after the message had first arrived in Washington. *

* Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. II, pp. 52-56.

The initial American attempt at leaflet warfare during World War II also turned out to be a high-pressure affair. On 31 January 1942, the War Department received an urgent plea from General MacArthur's Headquarters for the immediate preparation and dispatch of fitting propaganda leaflets to overcome the effects of Japanese leaflets recently distributed throughout the Philippine Islands. * FIS managed to prepare

* "Hist Prop Br" (S), pp. 93-94. A personal cable from Gen MacArthur on this same subject reached Gen Marshall the following day.

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and print these leaflets within three days, while the Chief of Staff simultaneously urged in persuading the Chief of Staff to grant a precious space allotment of 560 pounds for their shipment by air. The leaflets were then actually dropped over Cebu and Mindanao early in February 1942, with subsequent reports indicating they had made a most profound impression upon the Philippine populace. *

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* Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. II, ch. II, p. 64.

There were other significant developments tending to bring psychological warfare forcibly to the attention of the military high command. During mid-December 1941, Col. W. P. Scobey, Secretary of the Joint Board, forwarded to WPD a study he had independently authored on the subject of "Employment of Stratagem to Accomplish Surprise." In this study he so they observed that the United States Army had traditionally emphasized the negative side of achieving surprise at the expense of concentrating upon more productive means such as propaganda and psychological factors. Although the WPD officials themselves remained notably unimpressed by his thought provoking arguments, the study did received the enthusiastic support of Mr. McCloy and was duly forwarded to the Chief of Staff without comment. *

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* Ibid., sec. I, ch. III, pp. 14-15.

During this the same period Colonel Donovan was taking full advantage of his direct access to the White House in striving to gain presidential support for a FIS-sponsored propaganda campaign designed to

UNCLASSIFIED

counteract recent Axis victories by committing the Japanese to a series of unattainable military objectives. While the President displayed keen personal interest in this unorthodox plan, he judiciously suggested that Colonel Donovan should first talk it over with General Marshall and Admiral King. SOS was then provided with an excellent opportunity to register a strong objection to the whole idea but the United States Chiefs of Staff chose to pass it on to the British Chiefs of Staff for study and comment. This action did succeed, however, in arresting its further progress. *

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* Ibid., pp. 74-77.

It had already become clearly evident to General Miles that Colonel Donovan's diverse activities within the psychological warfare field ought to be more closely integrated with the over-all military intelligence effort. * In January 1942, therefore, when the COI was coordinating an

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* On 28 Jan 42, apparently due to Col Donovan's influence, the WD proposed to Gen MacArthur that Brig Gen Theodore Roosevelt, former Governor General of the Philippines, should be utilized to inspire pro-American feeling among the guerrilla groups being formed in the Philippine area, but Nothing came of it. See: Ibid., sec II, ch. I, p. 63.

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elaborate plan for sabotage in Japanese-occupied China, he seized upon this convenient development to recommend to the Chief of Staff that:

> some agency of the War Department having the responsibility for decision on active operations be charged with coordinating Colonel Donovan's plan in this field and in that of military

UNCLASSIFIED

propaganda, and that steps be taken to tie Colonel Donovan's office into the high command of the Army and Navy. *

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* "Hist Prop Br" (S), p. 121

Although this particular COI plan for sabotage in China was promptly disapproved, first by General Stillwell and then by General Marshall, the ACofS G-2 recommendation of the ACofS G-2, WDGS, along the lines that better inter-agency coordination should be attained in such matters continued to remain under active consideration. Accordingly, on 1 February 1942, therefore, a special Army-Navy committee was formed for the announced purpose of examining further into the subject. It was composed of the following four officers:

Cmdr. George C. Dyer, COMINCH
Lt. Cmdr. John L. Riheldaffer, ONI
Col. Percy G. Black, MID
Col. W. P. Scobey, WPD *

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* Ibid., p. 122.

This special committee called for the creation of a joint psychological warfare group under the JCS in order to control and coordinate "all operations of governmental agencies handling subversive activities and propaganda in all overseas territory." It also attempted to perform the sorely needed task of officially delimiting the term "psychological warfare." The term was not to include "all forms of activities and operations, outside of organized military action, calculated to cause a deterioration of the enemies' morale and military effectiveness, or to improve the morale and position of non-belligerent countries toward the United States." *

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* See: JCS "Psychological Warfare" (S), 8 Feb 42, CCS 385 (2-8-42) sec.1. Records of the JCS.

Premised strictly from the military viewpoint, this bold approach to the intricate psychological warfare problem was plainly intended to give the JCS an authoritative control over the entire national effort within that controversial field. Although there is no indication that the civilian agencies involved were ever consulted, the Joint Staff Planners chose to agree substantially with the findings of the Special Army-Navy Committee and recommended that a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) should be established, not only to "initiate, formulate, and develop psychological warfare plans" but also:

> under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee to coordinate psychological warfare of other U.S. governmental agencies and to collaborate with interested nations to the end that all psychological warfare is in accord with approved strategy. *

* Ibid. The chief revision made by JCS with reference to these committee recommendations was aimed at protecting the independence of theater commanders in the conduct of their own psychological warfare operations.

This far-reaching proposal was duly approved by the JCS and the JPWC held its first meeting on 18 March 1942, with an original membership as follows:

Col. Percy G. Black, MAD
Col. Oscar N. Solbert, MID
Lt. Cmdr. A. Hacomb, USN
Lt. Cmdr. Charles Moran, USN
Capt. H. J. Redfield, USN
Col. W. P. Scobey, MID *

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* Wilist Prop Br" (S), p. 124. Capt Redfield and Col Scobey were appointed to represent the Joint Strategic Committee of the JCS. Lt. Col E. E. Partridge shortly replaced Col Scobey and, on 20 May 42, Lt Cmdr Frank J. Courtney relieved Lt Cmdr Hacomb.

Several other more or less unrelated psychological warfare matters now appear to warrant particular mention. For instance, in connection with the important MID reorganization which occurred early in March 1942, the name of the SSG was changed to Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) and the unit placed under the new MIS. At the same time it was granted some measure of relief from its more stringent security restrictions. * During the

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* Ibid., p. 35.

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discussions that led up to creation of the JWC, the significant issue had been raised in regard to whether primary general staff responsibility for psychological warfare activities should rest with the ACofS G-2, WDGS, or be given to the Chief, WPD (OPD), WDGS, the controlling factor in the ultimate final decision for them to remain under the ACofS G-2, WDGS, was occasioned mostly by the fact that the WPD (OPD) authorities still considered these activities a comparatively unimportant phase of modern

UNCLASSIFIED

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warfare and they also did not wish to increase the size of their own division materially in personnel strength. * Lilly was thus called upon

* Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. II, ch. II, p. 60 and Cline, op. cit., p. 82.

to execute a number of true operational functions despite persistent demands from the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office that the departmental intelligence agency should relinquish all activities of such nature without further delay. Lastly, early in April 1942, Colonel Black, who had been guiding the departmental psychological warfare group so diligently through its formative period was replaced as head of PWB by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Oscar N. Solbert. * In accomplishing his difficult

* Col Solbert, MA in Copenhagen and London during World War I, had recently been employed by the Eastman Kodak Co in the capacity of a public relations expert. One of Gen Lee's first acts upon taking over MID was to arrange for him to receive a direct AUS commission and be assigned as Chief of the Planning Section, SSO. See "Hist Prop Br" (S), p. 47.

military tasks, Colonel Black had apparently trod on the toes of too many influential civilian officials occupied along similar lines. *

* Ibid., p. 102. Col Black remained on duty with MID (MIS) until Jul 42, when he was appointed to be the ACofS G-2 for Headquarters, Western Task Force in Tydal.

Although the new JPWC became promptly active in psychological warfare matters, its future was beclouded from the start by a lack of any genuine control over civilian agencies engaged in like work. For example, COI held its original authority through an Executive Order, while COI (FIS) under the aggressive direction of Mr. Sherwood kept growing more and more independent as the war progressed. There were also several other powerful governmental agencies involved, such as the State Department and CIAA. As a matter of fact, the entire psychological wargare effort was so beset with personal rivalries and ambitions that the President himself soon had to intervene again for once more the express purpose of overhauling it.

The main questions at issue then were whether basic direction of the national propaganda program should remain with the civilian or military authorities and how psychological warfare activities of the government might best be integrated into the planned military strategy. In view of the political climate of the day it was a foregone conclusion that the first question would eventually be decided in favor of the civilian officials. For the second, however, it seemed equally obvious that the JCS in wartime should retain some sort of an effectual review over all psychological warfare operations conducted by the United States Government. The President thus attempted to resolve the two closely related problems generally along these judicial lines.

On 13 June 1942, an Executive Order established the Office of War Information (OWI) as part of the Office of Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President and under the directorship of

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[illegible] This [illegible] the previous Office of Facts and Figures, and Office of Government Reports [illegible] also the FIS from COI. It was given full power to formulate a national information program both at home and abroad, except for the [illegible] exclusive of the United States and Canada, the excepted area being reserved for COI. Furthermore, it was granted definite authority to coordinate the informational activities of all other Federal departments and agencies in order to assure an accurate and consistent flow of war information to the American public and world at large. * While it was

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* EO 9182, 13 Jun 42.

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manifestly meant for OWI to comprise the dominant governmental group in propaganda outside of Latin America, there was no statement included within its charter to cover the relationship that should apply between the civilian and military authorities on psychological warfare matters. *

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* For political reasons, the words "propaganda" or "psychological warfare" were nowhere mentioned in this important EO. See: Ltr (S), H. D. Kahn to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, OCMH, 6 Nov 57. Author's file.

This major defect soon caused serious friction and hampered the proper development of a well coordinated national psychological warfare effort.

In addition to the establishment of OWI, the President 3195 issued a military order creating an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) from the remaining elements of COI, with Colonel Donovan still in charge but now placed

under the jurisdiction of the JCS. * Since these [illegible] elements were

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* Federal Register, 16 June 1942, pp. 4469-70. This order stemmed directly from personal negotiations between Col Donovan and Brig Gen (later Lt Gen) Walter Bedell Smith, Secretary of the JCS. An agreed draft on the subject was submitted to the JCS without any prior reference to the JPWC or JPC. See: Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. I. ch. III, pp. 38-46.

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already committed to a number of covert operations bearing upon such matters as sabotage, subversion and deception, the problem immediately arose as to how this new OSS could be absorbed into the current JCS structure and at the same time properly suitably coordinated with the regular departmental military intelligence organizations.

Even though the presidential order had failed to mention either the JPWC or PWB of MID (MIS), Mr. Davis planned for both of these units to be properly represented in a Committee on War Information Policy sponsored by OWI. As originally envisaged this committee could have provided a gratifying amount of coordination among the many civilian and military agencies engaged in propaganda activities but it passed out of existence after holding only three meetings. * Shortly before

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* "Hist Prop Br" (S), p. 163 and Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. II, ch. III, pp. 62-64.

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that event, however, Colonel Solbert had written to Mr. Davis asserting

it would be a grave error for the national propaganda effort to remain completely divorced from military strategy and recommending the assignment of a military staff to the Committee on War Information Policy for required guidance. This proposal was then carefully nocified within the Overseas Branch of OWI so as to end up in the form of an official request on the War and Navy Departments for the detail of two officers each to assist in preparing its own weekly directives. * The net result was that

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* Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. II, ch. III, pp. 65-66.

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during mid-July 1942, Colonel Solbert, along with a sizable group of key PWB personnel, was transferred to OWI for duty with the Overseas Branch and Lt. Col. (later Col.) Charles C. Blakeney replaced Colonel Solbert as Chief of PWB. *

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* Col Solbert became Chairman of an Overseas Operations and Intelligence Board, on which sat representatives from State, Navy, OSS, JPWC and the British political warfare Executive. It was not long, however, before he met the same fate as Col Black. Having incurred the personal displeasure of both Mr. Sherwood and Mr. James P. Warburg, Chief of the Overseas Branch, he was suddenly recalled from duty with OWI and, on 10 Dec 42, appointed MA to the Allied Governments in Exile, in London.

One of the first steps taken by the JCS in connection with integrating the new OSS into psychological warfare operations was to reorganize JPWC and formally designate Colonel Donovan to be its Chairman.

UNCLASSIFIED

At the same time, since the committee proper continued to include only highly placed representatives from MID, ONI and OPD, a parallel working group was likewise appointed, also under Colonel Donovan, composed of the following specialists:

Hon. William J. Donovan, Chairman
Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN
Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney, AAF
Lt. Cmdr. Charles Moran, RN
Maj. J. K. Woolnough, WPD (OPD)
Dr. James G. Rogers, OSS *

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* Wilist Prop Br^n (S), p. 161. A JPWC Advisory Committee, consisting of representatives from ONI, CIAA, State Dept and the Board of Economic Warfare, was similarly created.

The functional status of OSS, as well as the relationship it should hold to the regular departmental military intelligence agencies, soon developed into hotly disputed questions. Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and Chairman of JIC, maintained that the JPWC should exercise a firm control over all OSS operations in order to guarantee that its operations would not infringe upon the general field of military intelligence. Furthermore, he was fully supported in this contention by the corresponding ONI authorities. It was even brought out that Colonel Donovan had recently concluded a detailed agreement with the British covering the entire field of psychological warfare without any previous consultation with the JPWC. * The departmental

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* Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. II, ch. III, pp. 121-22. Nevertheless, the President and Joint Chiefs of Staff members were apparently aware of these high-level negotiations.

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military intelligence officials, however, felt that the OSS should be established as a coordinate agency on the same level as MID and ONI, and placed under the close supervision of either the JIC or JPWC. Colonel Donovan, on the other hand, believed his agency ought to remain an autonomous unit and report only to the JCS.

The extensive ramifications of this bitter dispute finally reached such major proportions that the JCS decided to turn the matter over to the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff with instructions for them to contrive some sort of a satisfactory settlement regardless of obstacles. General McNarney considered the best solution lay in deemphasizing OSS operations within the general intelligence field while granting that agency complete control of policy and planning for psychological warfare under the JIC. This proposition sounded fine on the surface but it ignored the essential fact that the term "psychological warfare" was still officially undefined, yet would obviously have to cover both the dissemination of propaganda and the execution of secret intelligence missions. Continued difficulties for OSS with the civilian propaganda organizations of the government, as well as with the regular departmental military intelligence agencies, were thus clearly presaged. Notwithstanding, on 23 December 1942, the JCS not only adopted a directive to OSS along these recommended lines but also ordered the complete abolishment of the JPWC. * One week later, thereby

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* Ibid., sec. I, ch. III, pp. 111-20.

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in conforming to this newly established policy, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, dissolved the P&B of MID (MIS). *

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* "Hist Prop Br" (S), p. 145.

Having accomplished this decisive action, the JCS optimistically thought that the disturbing psychological warfare problem was now a thing of the past. In reality, though, the demands of the departmental military intelligence agencies remained largely unsatisfied and the conflict between OSS and OWI, along with other civilian information groups, had merely been intensified. Because OWI continued to claim an overriding authority for the national propaganda effort, the President soon found it necessary to issue another Executive Order on the subject. *

* EO 9312, 9 Mar 43. This order, first drafted on presidential request by Gen Strong, initially called for the transfer of OSS to the War Dept. After a lengthy discussion in the JCS, however, this controversial provision was eliminated. See: Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. I, ch. IV, pp. 15-21.

Widely heralded as an OWI victory over the military, the new order restated the primary authority of OWI in all phases of disseminating governmental information, except for Latin America, but further directed that in areas of actual or potential military importance its activities should be coordinated with the Army and Navy, and then approved by the JCS. While it left the general field of psychological warfare as uncertainly delimited as before, it did result in the JCS accepting a more restrictive definition of such warfare to include "all measures, except propaganda, taken to enforce our will upon the

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enemy by means of other than military action, as may be applied in support of actual or planned military operations." *

* See: JCS 155/7/D (S), "Functions of the Office of Strategic Services," 4 Apr 43, CCS 385 (2-6-42) sec. I, pt. 5. Records of the JCS. Since the word "propaganda" itself could still be interpreted in many different ways, this latest effort to define psychological warfare was, really, of little practical use.

By this time, most of the psychological warfare activities had shifted to the combat theaters where authority of the theater commanders reigned supreme and favorable coordination procedures were already in force. * This altered emphasis not only tended to free the JCS from its

* These activities were accomplished for Europe principally through the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF, commanded by Brig Gen (later Maj Gen) Robert A. McClure, USA. He had been relieved as the MA in London on 12 Sep 42 to become Intelligence Officer at Allied Force Headquarters before TORCH, and then moved to North Africa during Dec 42 to be Chief of the Information and Censorship Section, AFHQ, which eventually developed a large Psychological Warfare Branch for the Mediterranean Theater under Col H. B. Hazeltine, USA. See: "Hist Prop Br" (S), pp. 218-19.

more pressing problems of that nature but also aided materially in the establishment of a workable liaison system between the military high command and OWI. The fact became increasingly evident, however, that it had

been a great mistake to abolish the PWB of MID because the War Department stood badly in need of a psychological warfare group to handle the multitude of questions constantly arising on the subject. Oddly enough, the drive to restore an agency of such type came chiefly from outside MID being led by Col H. D. Kehm of OPD, Army Liaison Officer of the JCS with OWI and CIAA.

For several months Colonel Kehm, with important support from Mr. McCloy, had been laboring on behalf of filling the existing void within the departmental organization by creating a "propaganda branch" in both in the WDGS and Air Staff. * He further felt that all propaganda

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* A Propaganda Branch, under Col W. C. Bentley, was later formed in the Air Staff as part of A-2. It was shortly abolished, however, when the Office of the Deputy CofS and the AF Management Branch agreed that the action represented a needless duplication of work already being performed by MID. See: Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. I, ch. IV, pp. 91-94.

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activities should be kept completely separate from those involving deception or security control. Even though the main stimulus behind Colonel Kehm's effort came from OPD, he finally chose to recommend placing the new agency under the ACofS G-2 rather than Chief of OPD, WDGS. Upon learning of this particular aspect of the plan, General Strong registered a strenuous objection and pointed out that the operational-type duties required of the unit would call more logically for an assignment to OPD instead of MID. * With the OPD officials remaining

* "Hist Prop Br" (S), pp. 226-27.

solidly opposed to taking on this additional propaganda "headache," the Chief of Staff decided to approve the reestablishment of a Propaganda Branch in MID, effective 23 November 1943. * Headed by Lt. Col.

* Lilly, op. cit., (S), sec. I, ch. IV, p. 66.

John B. Stanley, who also took over as Army member of the JCS Liaison with OWI and CIAA, it was given the following mission to perform:

a. Be responsible for the coordination of all propaganda functions for the War Department.

b. Be responsible for the preparation and dissemination of propaganda items for the use of OWI, CIAA, and other nonmilitary and quasi-military organizations.

c. Advise the ACofS G-2 on all propaganda problems presented by Commanding Officers of overseas theaters.

d. Advise and coordinate War Department action on all propaganda matters brought before the JCS or CCS.

e. Process all OWI and CIAA propaganda plans through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

f. Coordinate its activities with the similar Branch in the Navy Department.

g. Coordinate its activities with the State Department and other interested agencies of the government. *

* "Hist Prop Br" (S), Appendix "C", pp. 3-4. The reference to "quasi-military organizations" was apparently meant for OSS.

Except for a subsequent transfer of its Research and Analysis

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Section to the Sociological Branch of MIS, the Propaganda branch then continued in being without major change for the rest of the wartime period. Such fundamental questions as the proper relationship which should exist between MID and OSS, or the degree of control, if any, that the military ought to exercise over civilian information agencies of the government were still unanswered. Even though the general psychological warfare situation was thus far from perfect, most of the military personnel directly concerned demonstrated a praiseworthy determination to make things work as best they could regardless of difficulties encountered. The principal handicap was undoubtedly derived from the fact that the key terms "psychological warfare" and "propaganda" were never adequately defined nor practically delimited, so the various authorities involved remained free to could interpret them in whatever light they was deemed most favorable to their own individual interests. Nevertheless, the several departmental psychological warfare groups functioning under the ACofS G-2, WDGS, did accomplish a wide variety of consequential tasks, which seems amply substantiated by a partial list of their that type of World War II activities selected more or less at random from official history of the period, as follows:

Completed a planning survey on United States Army morale which influenced the establishment of and was later adopted by the departmental Morale Branch.

Actively collaborated in the preparation of a pamphlet covering German psychological warfare that was published by the Committee for National Morale.

Furnished officer students for both the British Politico-Military

Intelligence Training Center at Cambridge, England, and Subversive Operations and Espionage School near Brownsville, Canada.

Provided regular membership in an important Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of foreign publications.

Maintained a detailed digest and analysis of American and foreign propaganda in order to publish a daily report pertaining thereto.

Attempted to develop a practical evaluation technique aimed at predicting morale trends and estimating internal pressures within foreign countries as generated by wartime or occupation conditions.

Devised a special form for MIS to describe "group structures" in its reporting on foreign countries and critical areas.

Developed a generally accepted psychological approach for use during the conduct of prisoner of war interrogations.

Prepared special radio broadcasts designed to weaken the morale of enemy military groups considered vulnerable to such propaganda.

Distributed a vast number of multi-lingual propaganda leaflets, surrender passes etc. throughout the theaters and also issued a companion manual which included necessary instructions for dropping leaflet material and coordinating that type of activity with actual operations in the field.

Took an active interest in the proposed issuance of a special Chinese Nationalist stamp commemorating the fifth anniversary of resistance to Japanese aggression.

Pushed the preparation of an over-all psychological warfare plan against Japan. Although this particular plan was never formally adopted by the JPWC, because of PIS opposition, it did provide an effective basis

CLASSIFIED

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for continuing discussions on the subject and thus served to keep the military viewpoint alive.

Initiated an officially approved "Flare Pistol Project," to produce a large number of especially designed and packaged automatic pistols, with required ammunition, for arming resistance groups in occupied territory.

Published a tentative "Training Manual/Combat Propaganda Company" which resulted in the activation of an experimental 1st Combat Propaganda Company at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, on 23 September 1942. Similar units were subsequently utilized in Africa, Italy and ETO, with noteworthy indications of success.

Arranged for a combined Propaganda Branch-OWI team to visit numerous prisoner of war camps in the United States and record over 1000 propaganda messages from German POW's for use in psychological warfare operations.

Furnished regular guidance in psychological warfare matters to OPD, CAD, SPA, AAF and other agencies of the War Department needing expert advice along that these lines.

Supervised the detailed preparation of a number of special or country propaganda plans for the JCS and CCS, such as the "Plan for Inducement to Surrender of Japanese Forces" and "Occupied China."

Issued daily "flash" reports regarding German and Japanese propaganda that were habitually utilized by the ACofS G-2 when during his briefings for the Chief of Staff.

Contributed measurably to the highly classified CROSSBOW project attempting to keep abreast of latest German achievements in secret weapons.

Participated in a secret War Department Planning Board originally sponsored by the National Defense Research Committee for the purpose of studying the tactical use of sound to produce confusion in and deteriorate morale among enemy forces during combat.

Developed psychological warfare themes for and actually prepared the leaflets dropped in Japan relative to the atom bomb attack on Hiroshima, as well as Russian entrance into the war.

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CHAPTER V

FIELD COLLECTION

The principal group engaged in collecting foreign information for the departmental intelligence agency during peacetime normally comprises the American military attaches and formally designated military observers. Under wartime conditions, the predominant role played in this respect by these officers tends to diminish and gradually shift to other more productive groups, such as theater headquarters, undercover organizations and special field collection units. This change is due not only to the fact that the key military attache offices in hostile countries are then closed but also to added emphasis being placed upon combat intelligence. Defeating the actual enemy thus becomes the primary and immediate task, rather than the earlier mission of preparing for future eventualities. Nevertheless, military attaches and observers continue to perform an essential function in connection with the overall collection effort during war as well as peace.

On 7 December 1941, the military attache system of MID consisted of 129 officers stationed in 52 different foreign localities. Included among those officers were 18 fully accredited military observers assigned to Egypt, French Equatorial Africa (Dakar), Gibraltar, Gold Coast, India, Iraq, Java, Malaya, Surinam, and the U.S.S.R. (Far East). * The entire system

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* See: "Annex to Organization Chart, General Staff (G-2)," 5 Dec 41, MID 321.19 G-2, ACSI Rec Sec.

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was being administered through a Military Attache Section which formed part of the Administrative Branch of MID and carried an authorized strength of only six officers and nine civilian employees. * The same

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Foreign Branch, series two, pt. 2, sec. 2, p. 11. Chief of the Military Attache Section at that time was Lt Col J. S. Winslow.

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section also exercised a large measure of executive control over the several United States Army training missions already established in Latin America. On the other hand, the Intelligence Branch of MID was authorized to deal directly with the military attaches and observers in all matters bearing upon their collection or reporting duties. Given This divided responsibility often caused considerable friction between the two basic branches but, because the channels of coordination remained comparatively simple, the ACofS G-2, WPG, was able to supervise personally the broad conduct of his military attache system and to act as a final arbiter in settling its major disputes.

On 9 March 1942, when the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office forced the creation of a MIS within MID, the Military Attache Section was elevated to branch status and moved into this new agency. An additional headquarters was thereby placed between the ACofS G-2, WPG, and his military attaches in the field, with this awkward arrangement continuing for the rest of the wartime period. The change further failed to modify in any important degree the persistent argument between the administrative and intelligence problems authorities over who should possess superior authority for operating the military attache system. At the same time,

the ACofS G-2, could never be truly divorced from his fundamental responsibilities relating to the military attaches as he was still their military commander and had to call on them regularly to perform many other important duties besides just collecting foreign information.

Since the Military Attache Branch, later named the Foreign Branch, was the accepted medium of communication between MID (MIS) and most intelligence groups in the field, it soon became intimately concerned with the growth of the overseas collection effort. This tie appears to have been officially recognized in April 1943, when the Collection Branch of MIS was enlarged and changed into a so-called Collection Unit, because since the Foreign Branch was transferred assigned to this new unit. Similarly, it was charged with "developing new sources of intelligence abroad and assisting the geographic branches in the collection of vital information." * With

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* Ibid., p. 28.

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particular reference to these collection activities, therefore, some of the more significant developments pertaining to the Military Attache (Foreign) Branch during World War II were as follows:

1. There was a decided increase in the number of air officers assigned to the military attache system and corresponding expansion of the air collection effort. For example, early in 1942, the entire system included only 12 Assistant Military Attaches for Air, each having a crew chief and one airplane of assorted type. By 1 December 1945, however, these same totals had grown to 46 Military Air Attaches *

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* The position of Military Air Attache was formally agreed upon

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In 1943, following a Joint G-2, A-2, ONI, State Dept conference on the subject. His protocol status was also fixed at the same level but immediately following that of the Military and Naval Attache. Likewise, if the senior Army officer at any post happened to be an air officer, he would then carry both the titles of Military and Military Air Attache. See: Ibid., p. 17.

and Assistants stationed in 38 different countries, plus 39 enlisted crew members and 33 more modern airplanes. *

* Ibid., pp. 17-18.

2. Right after Pearl Harbor the military intelligence effort within the Western Hemisphere became of marked concern to the War Department in view of security of the Panama Canal. To cope with this critical problem, the Military Attache organization for Latin America was promptly expanded and each Military Attache instructed to organize a confidential collection net among "American citizens of unquestioned loyalty and good repute now residing in their country." * This ambitious

* Ltr (S), Chief Mil Attache Sec to Mil Attaches, 9 Apr 42, MID 350.09 Int 4-9-42 (8-14-41). Records of ACofS G-2, DRB TAG. The original impetus behind this idea came from Gen Miles who, on 9 Dec 41, had received orders from the Secy of War to proceed to Panama, South America and Central America for the purpose of investigating "certain intelligence matters." See: Ltr (C), Miles (from Caracas) to ACofS G-2, 27 Dec 41, MID 350.09 Int 12-27-41

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(8-11-41). Records of ACofS G-2, DMB T.G. Also "History of the Office of the ACofS G-2 and Secretariat," (S), p. 2, G-2 314.7 Undated (30 Oct 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

enterprise soon ran into direct conflict with the FBI because that agency had previously been granted requisite authority by the President to establish a Special Intelligence Service (SIS) throughout the Western Hemisphere. *

* See: Memo (C) "F.D.R." to Atty Gen, Under Secy State, Col Donovan, MID and ONI, 30 Dec 41, MID 310.11 30 Dec 41 (5 Aug 41). Records of ACofS G-2, DMB T.G. This same presidential directive also represented a continual bone of contention between the FBI and COI (OSS).

As a result, during November 1942, the Directors of MID, ONI and FBI finally got together and executed an official pact designed to limit intelligence operations on the part of the American military attaches therein essentially to the following fields:

a. Collection of military information needed by the armed forces.

b. All matters of an intelligence nature, including espionage, sabotage and subversion, involving U.S. Army personnel.

c. Procurement of information concerning espionage, sabotage and subversion within U.S. military establishments, and in areas controlled, directed, operated or of interest to the U.S. military establishment.

d. Cooperating with and rendering assistance to ONI and FBI whenever practicable but only upon receipt of a specific request to do so from appropriate authority. *

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* Agreement (S), signed Strong, Train and Hoover, 25 Nov 42 G-2 and SPD 310.11, 25 Nov 42 (5 Aug 41). Records of JCofS G-2, and SPD.

3. Even though the United States Army officers assigned to training missions in Latin America had been strictly enjoined from performing any intelligence work, * they often chose to pass on to

* Ibid., p. 18.

their companion military attache personnel certain items of information encountered which might hold some intelligence value. This informal arrangement thus served noticeably to increase the collection coverage within these particular countries.

4. The historic conflict in regard to the precise relationship which should obtain between a Chief of Diplomatic Mission and his Military Attache in submitting intelligence reports on political and economic matters to Washington kept recurring at regular intervals throughout the war. The State Department felt that the military attaches ought to be stringently restrained from this type of reporting, while the MID officials continued to insist they should receive undiluted comments from their own representatives concerning major political events or important economic trends. After a lengthy series of interdepartmental discussions, an agreement was reached and announced on 3 May 1944, as follows:

". . . The State and War Departments have agreed that in the event the Chief of Mission does not concur in a Military Attache's

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report, the Chief of Mission has neither the right to censor the report nor to withhold its transmission, but he is entirely free to fully and adversely comment thereon if he so desires. In the latter event, the Military Attache should arrange to include with the transmission of his report a copy of the comments of the Chief of Mission. *

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* MID Circular Ltr 24 (C), Chief Collection Unit to all MA's 3 May 44, MID (MIS) Ch1.221, 3 May 44. Records of ACofS G-2, WDGS YA3. Although this decision served ostensibly to solve the problem, the MA's naturally hesitated to bring any important disagreement with their own Chief of Mission out into the open. An "eyes only" letter addressed to the ACofS G-2, WDGS, or Chief, MIS often promised a more expedient solution, so that privilege was always provided for in the standing instructions issued to MA's.

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5. At a high level conference held in the Secretary of War's Office during the summer of 1943, it was decided to assign Col. William H. Adams, Chief of the Military Attache Branch, MIS, the special mission of developing an organization to collect enemy information on bacteriological and biological warfare. While it was realized that a successful venture of this sensitive nature would have to include various theater intelligence groups, the prevailing opinion was it should be conducted primarily through the military attache system. Due to the high security classification applicable to such activities, knowledge within MIS even of the very existence of the net was at first restricted only to Colonel Adams and his personal secretary. In the field, however, the operations were fully coordinated with those being carried out along parallel lines by the British. * On 30 December 1943, when

30

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* Ibid., pp. 21 and 23.

Brig. Gen. Stephen G. Henry, Chief of the New Developments Division of the War Department received an appointment to become coordinator for all activities "with respect to rockets, chemical warfare matters, bacteriological warfare and their countermeasures," Col. C. P. Nicholas of MID was assigned to work with him for the express purpose of providing up to date military intelligence on these specialized subjects. *

* Ltr (S), Sec Gen Staff to OSS, 30 Dec 43, MID 350.09, 30 Dec 43 (14 Jul 43). Records of ACofS G-2, DRB TAG.

Several additional officers were then, of necessity, permitted to share in the closely held secret.

6. A "Standing Instructions of Military Attaches (SIMA)," with an accompanying "Index Guide for Military Information," had been issued by MID in October 1939 and revised just prior to Pearl Harbor. Since most of the directives and administrative provisions of this key document were altered by the sudden advent of the war, it stood badly in need of another thorough revision. On 21 March 1944, the Deputy ACofS G-2 belatedly established a representative committee, headed by Col. William D. Hohenthal of MIS, to study "our present Military Attache System and submit recommendations on needed changes in SIMA." * This group proceeded

* "Hist MIS" (S), Foreign Branch, series two, pt. 2, sec. 2, p. 67.

UNCLASSIFIED

to rewrite the existing publication in the form of a proposed "Standing Instructions for Military Intelligence Service (SIMIS)," which was duly promptly approved. At the same time, it was also considered advisable to dissociate the "Index Guide for Military Information" from the administrative instructions included in SIMIS and to issue this index as a separate document under the new title of "Basic Intelligence Directive (BID)." After extensive amendment and clarification, the latter publication thus became an authoritative guide for all military intelligence reporting from the field for the remainder of the wartime period. *

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* Ibid., pp. 23-24.

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7. The Military Attache Branch was further charged with securing foreign press material and abstracting intelligence therefrom for MID (MIS) use. To assist in accomplishing this collection mission, it maintained a very complete microfilm library of such material and represented MID on an Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications (IDC) which had been created by Presidential order following Pearl Harbor. The branch not only served as a clearing house for all Army requests to obtain foreign publications but also took whatever steps were indicated in attempting to acquire them. Ordinary enemy publications from Europe could usually be secured through special arrangements made by the American Military Attache in neutral Lisbon but the procurement of corresponding Japanese material always posed much greater difficulties. Notwithstanding, the branch did manage to obtain some copies of the Japan Orient and Manchukuo Yearbook during the height of hostilities

132

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and these publications turned out to be of tremendous value in drawing up early occupation plans when the Japanese first expressed a desire to surrender. *

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* Ibid., pp. 24-25.

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6. It was mostly pressure from the Military Attache Branch that resulted in the timely formation of the earlier described JICA's, which were designed to increase the intelligence collection effort within overseas theaters from the departmental standpoint. The negotiations to accomplish this action were initially conducted at General Eisenhower's Headquarters in Algiers by a group of officers from MID and G2I during January 1943. On 5 August 1943, after JICANA and JICAME had already been established, the entire JICA organization was taken over and accepted on a world-wide basis by the JCS. The JICA's then grew rapidly into full-scale field intelligence agencies with branches located throughout their respective theater areas, in order to perform the following major tasks:

a. To collect, collate, screen and transmit to Washington all information, exclusive of combat intelligence, within the Theater which is desired by the War and Navy Department.

b. To coordinate, subject to directions of the Theater Commander, the activities of all American agencies in the Theater, in so far as those activities are concerned with the collection of military and naval intelligence, to eliminate duplication of effort and insure adequate security.

c. To provide lateral dissemination of pertinent intelligence among the various agencies, military and civil, within the Theater. *

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* Ibid., Appendix A, pp. 1-2. The Military Attache Branch also

played a responsible role in establishing the Joint Intelligence Army Reception Agency (JIARC) in Washington, which operated its own officer messenger service.

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9. As a logical outgrowth of the special function given the Chief of the Military Attache Branch to develop an organization for collecting information on enemy bacteriological and biological warfare, it soon became desirable to recommend the creation of another field intelligence group capable of investigating all types of enemy scientific progress. Accordingly, on 25 September 1943, General Strong forwarded a plan to the Chief of Staff, previously concurred in by Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves, Director of the MANHATTAN Project, proposing that a select group of civilian scientists and military personnel should proceed without delay to Italy for such purpose. The plan was promptly approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Secretary of War, with the Navy Department also authorized to participate in it. Effective 26 November 1943, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Boris T. Pash, former Chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,* was named to head the new unit.

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* While acting in this regular capacity but under specific direction from the ACofS G-2, WDGS, Col Pash had also been conducting the crucial counterintelligence effort for the DSM (MANHATTAN) Engineer Project within the Fourth Army and Eighth Service Command Areas. In many cases this had to be accomplished without the knowledge or assistance of even his own superiors. See: Ltr (S), Maj Gen L. R. Groves to Lt Col Boris T. Pash, 6 Apr 44, MID 201 Pash, Boris T. (Lt Col). ACSI Rec Sec.

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From this modest beginning, the renowned ALSOS Mission came into being. It was the first American field collection agency of a purely scientific intelligence nature and held unique implications for the future. *

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* Ibid., Appendix B, p. 2. Operations of this ALSOS Mission will be discussed in detail during a succeeding chapter on technical (scientific) intelligence.

At its peak in July 1945, the Foreign Branch of MID (MIS) consisted of 10 officers, 1 non-commissioned officer and 22 civilian employees. *

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* Ibid., pp. 184-85.

This was an increase in all categories over those of the immediate post-Pearl Harbor period but scarcely a surprising one in view of the large number of field personnel involved. During that same month, for example, illustration, the branch was called upon to control directly the following overseas personnel who were ~~mostly~~ occupied for the most part in performing military intelligence functions:

	Officers (incl WAC)	WO	EM and EW	Civilians	Totals
Grand Total	245	50	102	343	740
Military Attache Offices (42)	186	44	64	327	621
Military Observer & Liaison Offices (4)	10	5	3	13	31
JICA Offices					
JICANA (North Africa)	14	0	9	3	26
JICACIB (China-India-Burma)	13	0	14	0	27
JICAME (Mediterranean)	8	0	2	0	10

AAGS Mission	7	0	3	0	10
Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission	8	0	2	0	10 *

* Ibid., pp. 190-91. The only Latin American training mission still operating under MID (MIS) at this time was the Army portion of the Joint Defense Commission in Brazil.

The question of whether or not it was necessary or desirable for MID to establish branch offices in the United States had always been controversial. One school of thought consistently held that all intelligence operations at home should be conducted by the appropriate area or service command, with MID exercising required WDGS supervision over them chiefly through the separate G-2 channel of communication. While this theory could often be applied favorably to domestic intelligence operations, it failed to satisfy departmental demands for the collection of foreign information that was regularly available at principal ports of entry and in key metropolitan centers, as follows:

> . . . vast files of trade data, maps and related data, records of financial transactions, engineering reports, travel diaries and field notes of scientists, and other similar items existing in these centers. The materials could not or would not be shipped to Washington for processing. They could not be properly exploited in their present location without adequate and competent guidance furnished by MID and determined by foreseeable intelligence needs. *

* "Hist MIS" (S), Branch Offices, series five, undated, p. 1.

Bearing this type of collection in mind, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, had already

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directed the opening of MID branch offices in New York, San Francisco and New Orleans even before Pearl Harbor. Only the first two of these offices, however, proved to be productive, so the New Orleans branch was gradually reduced in strength and finally transferred to the Southern Defense Command, effective 2 February 1943. On the other hand, both the New York and San Francisco Branches proceeded to expand rapidly in point of size and functional activity as the war progressed. Since they had been specifically ordered not to engage in any counterintelligence activities, emphasis was habitually placed upon the collection of foreign intelligence in line with their official instructions "to establish direct liaison with such business firms or individuals as may be of use to MID in the procurement of information from abroad." * Additionally,

* Ibid., p. 2.

on 1 August 1941, at the request of the Air Corps, the New York Branch was given the special mission of producing target objective folders, first for Europe and then later for Japan. This activity, coupled with the fact that there were a number of other governmental branch offices situated within the New York City area, from the Army Map Service, ONI, OSS, SIS (FBI), etc., contributed substantially to the comparatively large size of the New York Branch during World War II. It ultimately held a total strength of 12 officers and 65 civilian employees, plus 7 security guards and 1 chauffeur detailed from the Second Service Command. *

* Ibid., p. 5.

UNCLASSIFIED

From 1 September 1940 to 17 February 1943, the New York Branch was commanded by Col. F. D. Sharp, who was then succeeded by Lt. Col. (later Col.) B. L. Barlow. * It was fully equipped with an extensive foreign

* Col Sharp was ordered to North Africa at his own request in Feb 43, for the purpose of forming the initial JICA. See: "History of the New York Office" (C), I, Undated, MID 320 N.Y. Office (14 Jan 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

map collection, reference library, teletype to MID, photostat and photographic facilities, drafting room, and private interview accommodations. The branch thus succeeded in building up a most comprehensive file covering 14,000 different source of information contacts, as well as an impressive number of target objective folders in varying detail for the Air Corps. During the period from January to March 1943, it even established a sub-office in Chicago, under Lt. Col. Charles A. Drake, to exploit "a large volume of unique source material" and thereby developed some 4,000 additional contacts. The New York Branch was closed on 31 December 1944, with the Second Service Command assuming its residual functions and occupying a considerable portion of the office space it had formerly-utilized. *

* "Hist MIS" (S), Branch Offices, series five, undated, p. 5.

never nearly as large as the companion office in New York, * the

* It reached a maximum strength of 8 officers and 8 civilians in April 1944.

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San Francisco Branch, commanded by Col. A. F. Harding, nonetheless played an important role in the collection of foreign information for MID use. Its effort was at first devoted mainly to interviewing the numerous evacuees from Asia and the Pacific who arrived in the port of San Francisco during the early war period. Later on this emphasis was shifted to "business firms, educational institutions and individuals possessing special knowledge of value to MID." Commencing in January 1944, the branch was instructed to concentrate exclusively on seeking information about Japan, China and the Pacific Islands, so as to further directly the progress of our planned offensive against the Japanese homeland. Since both the Army Map Service and OSS had opened branch offices in the same building, the closest type of cooperation with these associated groups could always be attained. It also became a fixed policy to seek an intimate coordination with the numerous naval intelligence groups operating throughout the San Francisco Bay region. The MID branch thus managed to submit a total of 2,102 full reports and 1,320 special intelligence items before 30 June 1944, when it was discontinued and the Ninth Service Command took over its remaining duties. *

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* Ibid., p. 4.

The Miami Branch Office, not to be confused with the American Intelligence Command (AIC), was formed on 7 April 1942, with Col. Charles G. Kettler in charge. Although essentially a foreign liaison unit, it often had occasion to interview foreign visitors for

UNCLASSIFIED

intelligence purposes and always worked in full collaboration with the FBI in such matters. Because the branch was administered through the Fourth Service Command, it soon became involved in several counter-intelligence activities connected with the Miami port of entry. It carried a maximum strength of 12 officers, 11 enlisted persons and 9 civilian employees during early 1944, and was the only MID branch office to continue in operation after the conclusion of World War II. *

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* Ibid., p. 3. Col Gordon S. Arness assumed command of the Miami Branch effective 5 Oct 45, when Col Kettler reverted to his previous retired status.

The fact became increasingly apparent that this restricted system of MID branch offices was tending to neglect a considerable number of important commercial centers within the United States which were potentially valuable from the standpoint of furnishing foreign information. Accordingly, on 4 March 1944, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, addressed a formal request to the Director of Intelligence, ASF, for his assistance in gathering "foreign positive intelligence" throughout the United States and Northwest Service Command, excluding only the Military District of Washington, Metropolitan Area of New York City, Miami County in Florida and San Francisco Bay District. * Plans for an expanded collection effort along these centralized

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* Ltr (C), TAG to CG ASF (Attn: Director of Intelligence), 4 Mar 44, AG 350.09 (3 Mar 44) OB-S-B. DRB TAG. The Florida exception presumably should have been listed as Dade County instead of Miami County.

UNCLASSIFIED

lines, however, were soon upset by the imposed MID (MIS) reorganization of 1944, that resulted among other things in the transfer of domestic intelligence functions from the WDGS to Headquarters of the three major troop commands. With the Intelligence Division, ASF, then given direct responsibility for collecting foreign information in the United States, the following coordination steps had to be hastily undertaken without further delay:

1. A series of regional conferences held in New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Miami during April and May 1944, under auspices of the Intelligence Division, ASF, to orient representatives from appropriate Service Command and Port of Embarkation units regarding their new duties.

2. Two indoctrination courses conducted in Washington, D. C. for key Service Command and Port of Embarkation personnel, to explain Intelligence Division, ASF, requirements bearing upon the collection of foreign positive and technical information.

3. Prompt distribution to all ASF field agencies of necessary collection aids and guides received from MID (MIS), such as basic intelligence directives, instructional pamphlets, forms for submitting reports, etc.

4. Preparation and issuance by 31 August 1944, of an ASF Manual (M801) covering the "Collection of Foreign and Technical Positive Intelligence in the United States," to provide complete information on the subject for all concerned. *

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* "History of the Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces" (S), ch. IV, pp. 4-5 and Appendix 5-6, Gen Ref Off AGRO OCMH. Hereafter cited as "Hist ASF" (S).

The main field collection element of MID (MIS) for the Western

Hemisphere was the American Intelligence Command (AIC) * located at

* This command was later given several different official designations but for convenience and clarity it will be referred to from now on as the AIC. See: Ibid., American Intelligence Service, Series two, vol. II, pt. 6, p. 2.

Miami Beach, Florida. The AIC was actually much more than that because it not only performed this important collection mission but also was charged with evaluating and disseminating finished intelligence. It even received a specific directive "to combat Axis subversive activities within the Latin American sphere," which made it truly operational. * During

* Ibid., p. 2 and Tab G. The term "Latin America" as commonly used in MID is admittedly non-definitive. Nevertheless, for simplicity, the same practice will be followed herein, with the term intended to denote Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean area and all of South America.

early 1942, the military intelligence authorities had considered such decentralization essential in order to shorten the time element needed for handling information concerned with security of the Panama Canal. Moreover, there was insufficient office space available in Washington after Pearl Harbor to accommodate any greatly expanded Latin American Section of the Intelligence Group, MID (MIS), as planned. * The semi-independent

* Ibid., pp. 5-7.

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AIC thus quickly grew into a miniature departmental intelligence agency on its own, while functioning both in the role of a processing unit and operating command.

Shortly before the AIC was moved from Washington to Miami Beach in September 1942, it opened a "field office" (FOMIS) at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, under the direct supervision of the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command. This was done so as to insure the immediate receipt by that commander of vital information sent from military attaches in contiguous Latin American countries and to facilitate the inspection of an "augmented coverage system" recently organized for the same area. Likewise, since MID personnel were being dispatched at regular intervals to Rio de Janeiro in order to question repatriates debarking from the liner Gripsholm and the Axis threat against Dakar was mounting daily, it soon became desirable to establish a similar AIC Field Office (SI [illegible]) at Recife, Brazil, effective 1 December 1942. These two sub-offices then remained in operation until August 1943, when their duties were turned over respectively to the G-2, Caribbean Defense Command and A-2, United States Air Forces in South America. *

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* Ibid., p. 6.

During most of its wartime existence, the AIC was commanded by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) R. Townsend Heard. It was eventually allotted a total authorized strength of 456 persons, including 98 officers, 218 enlisted men or women, and 140 civilians. * The command was at first organized

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* Ibid., p. 12a. Fifteen of the officers were WAC's.

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into five functional groups designated as the Analysis, Special Intelligence, Air Surveillance, Communications, and Foreign Liaison branches. Except for the latter branch, which was abolished early in 1943, these same divisions of work responsibility continued to remain plainly identifiable despite an unusually large number of directed reorganizations. *

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* Ibid., p. 5. All the administrative personnel were subsequently grouped together into one large Administrative Branch.

In addition to disseminating intelligence through special studies, estimates and surveys, the AIC published a weekly "Summary of Information" and a monthly "Report on Latin American Matters Affecting War Department Interests." It not only maintained its own liaison service both in Washington and the Miami area but also felt fully qualified to enter into official agreements with other governmental agencies on Latin American collection matters. * Besides the numerous American military personnel

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* Ibid., pp. 16-18. An elaborate plan calling for joint AIC-CIAA action with reference to Latin American collection came under active consideration during 1942 but was finally abandoned. As a substitute, AIC agreed to detail a full time liaison officer with CIAA in the hope of achieving better coordination of effort between the two related agencies.

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stationed in Latin America and the War Department itself, AIC utilized the following "other important sources of information" to support its extensive intelligence effort:

State Department	Censorship Agencies
Navy Department	Pan American Union
FBI	Department of Agriculture
CIAA	Tariff Commission
Commerce Department	MID Branch Offices
OSS	Press and Periodicals (both foreign and domestic)
FCA (HEW)	Federal Communications Commission *

* Ibid., pp. 14-15.

The central core of AIC for producing Latin American intelligence was its American Branch, which was organized on a geographic basis and included most of the research analysts allocated to the command. Because the AIC was authorized to communicate directly in intelligence matters with all field personnel stationed throughout the Latin American area, this branch not only issued collection instructions but also evaluated information derived therefrom. * Finished intelligence was disseminated

* For a brief period during 1943, AIC was given complete control over all activities of MID (MIS) field personnel stationed in Latin America. This authority was revoked effective 11 Nov 43, however, with the direct correspondence privilege being retained but modified to the extent that AIC was required to send a copy of each request it made for information from the field to the Collection Unit back in Washington. See: Ibid., p. 7.

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mostly in the form of strategic surveys, special studies, periodic reports and estimates of the situation. On 1 September 1943, when AIC coverage was enlarged by adding the United States proper, Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland, Labrador, St. Pierre, Miquelon and Greenland, the American Branch was renamed the Latin American Branch, so as to distinguish it from a newly created North American Branch. * Nevertheless, it continued to

* Ibid. Even though the main office of this new North American Branch promptly joined the AIC at Miami Beach, for administrative convenience the entire unit remained assigned to MID in Washington.

comprise the chief key intelligence production element of AIC. One of its last major studies, delivered to OPD just three days before "D" Day in Normandy, was concerned with the complex subject of post-war military establishments in Latin America. After first summarizing all available information on the armed forces currently at hand within that significant important area, the study then recommended the most suitable organization and equipment for each of them in order to promote future hemisphere defense. *

* Ibid., p. 3.

The basic counterintelligence unit of AIC was the Special Intelligence Branch, designed "to combat Axis subversive activities within the Latin American sphere." To accomplish this broad security mission, the branch not only collaborated very closely with other governmental groups engaged along similar lines but also prepared periodic reports describing the detailed subversive situation in Latin America. It distributed these reports

to a large number of interested agencies both in the United States and the field. *

* Ibid., Tab T.

The Air Surveillance Section of AIC was originally charged with executing such operational-type duties as the supervision, coordination and inspection of air activities under AIC jurisdiction. In view of the grave concern being felt about security of the Panama Canal, these activities reached an understandable peak during early 1942. The section was thus soon called upon to organize and govern a centralized air warning system aimed at providing effective communication between the AIC and Caribbean Defense Command, as well as with the many cooperating United States agencies occupied in Canal Zone defense. When a Latin American Air Branch was formed in January 1943, this air surveillance unit became a part of it. While still continuing to supervise the air warning system, emphasis was gradually shifted to the production of Latin American air intelligence. For this reason, the new branch was authorized direct control over the collection activities of all the Assistant Military Attaches and Observers for Air stationed in Central or South America. *

* "Hist AIC" (S), Intelligence Group (Air Unit), series two, vol. II, pt. 4, Latin American Air Branch, pp. 1-3.

The Communications Branch not only performed a major administrative function by operating the AIC Message Center but also participated fully in intelligence production. Its Telecommunications Section also maintained an up to date file of call signs, location, frequency, times of transmission

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etc., on all regular radio stations within the Latin American area and was habitually consulted regarding such matters by the other AIC elements as well as numerous outside governmental agencies. Likewise, it was often requested to evaluate foreign telecommunications information for these same two groups. *

* Ibid., American Intelligence Service, series two, vol II, pt. 6, Tab D.

The most interesting element of the Communications Branch was its Clandestine Section, which was formed "to intercept transmissions and locate clandestine radio stations operating in Latin America." This section developed a "Hemisphere, Clandestine Radio Locator Net" based upon an operational agreement jointly reached by two AIB, ONI, CIAA, FBI and the State Department. The agreement specified in general that the Navy would furnish necessary technical equipment for such a net, Army the personnel, CIAA the money, and State Department whatever diplomatic assistance might be required. Hence fifty selected enlisted men were promptly transferred from the Army Signal Security Agency to AIC and, after receiving some additional special training, organized into teams of from three to five men each. They were then sent out to various Latin American countries for the purpose of installing and operating secret intercept and direction finding stations. * At the same time, the Federal

* Ibid. Preliminary arrangements in support of this exceptional project had already been completed through the appropriate American Military Attaches, with the enlisted men involved not only required to enter

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their respectively assigned countries to civilians but also to wear civilian clothes during the entire period of service therein.

Communications Commission was also prevailed upon to "loan" seven expert radio operators to FBI for a like assignment. *

* Ibid. These FCC operators were paid by the Army through the use of confidential intelligence funds.

Centered about a main FBI station in Miami, the radio intercept and locator net developed by the Clandestine Section of the Communications Branch eventually included the following listening posts:

Merida, Mexico	all Mexican operators
Bogota, Columbia	5 enlisted men
Callao, Peru	4 enlisted men
Quito, Ecuador	5 enlisted men
Quintero, Chile	3 enlisted men
Montevideo, Uruguay	3 enlisted men
Belo Horizonte, Brazil	5 enlisted men
Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic	5 enlisted men
Quarry Heights, Canal Zone	cooperating U.S. Army station
Cuba	cooperating station, manned by U.S. Army & Navy personnel

* Ibid. The Cuban station, apparently built with American financial assistance for cover, failed to furnish "any material of particular value."

This unique organization managed to locate and monitor a most welcome number of undercover radio stations throughout Latin America. It thus could provided important assistance in connection with accomplishing the AIC counter-intelligence mission, as well as a large amount of useful information to the Coast Guard for anti-submarine defense. In addition to copying coded traffic transmitted to and from all key South American stations, it was able to exercise close surveillance over a clandestine enemy circuit known to be operating between Madagascar and Berlin. *

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* Ibid.

The formation of AIC during the early stages of World War II constituted a bold experiment in decentralizing field collection responsibilities for a limited geographic area, while at the same time attempting to devise a satisfactory arrangement whereby all operational intelligence activities within that particular area might be consolidated under a single commander. Although such decentralization turned out to be rather costly both in money and personnel, it did produce a concentration of effort which served to increase markedly the total amount of pertinent information made available, thereafter. It also shortened considerably the time element involved in conducting necessary intelligence operations because they enjoyed such unity of command. As long as security of the Panama Canal remained at stake the expense factor could be more or less ignored but even these favorable circumstances failed to help solve the difficult problem of effectively separating operational-type activities from the rest of the intelligence process. As a matter of fact, The problem it was merely transferred to Miami Beach from Washington on a smaller scale.

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Another novel organization which proved to be of invaluable assistance to the wartime intelligence effort was called the Foreign Industrial Intelligence Section. Started in August 1942 and favorably developed under the guiding spirit of Mr. Adolph D. Strenger, an ex-German business man, it consisted at first of a panel of approximately 50 volunteer consultants who had been leading industrialists, engineers, scientists, financiers etc. in some 13 different foreign countries but were now residents of the United States. Owing to their unique background of experience, they remained in a most excellent position to render competent advice on matters pertaining to enemy-held areas, especially the location of key industrial, utility and transportation facilities. Originally sponsored by the Conservation Branch, Production Division, ASF, for furnishing information mostly to the War Production Board, the service was transferred to the Intelligence Division, ASF, during July 1943. As the Foreign Industrial Information Branch of that division, it promptly expanded its list of consultants to reach a total of 300 persons and could thus represent more industries or commodities in supplying information to a

* Mr. Strenger fled from his native Berlin in 1939 because of the Jewish persecution and became a Czechoslovakian citizen. Arriving in the US during Aug 1940, he was accepted as being an expert on German war industry and named by the Director of Intelligence, ASF, to act in the capacity of civilian liaison for work projects assigned to other industrial intelligence consultants living within the New York City area. He was later involved in a bitter dispute over these supervisory responsibilities with Mr. Alfred N. Bergman, Director of the International Group, Army Industrial College, but emerged therefrom fully vindicated. See: File (C), HID 211 Consultants, 29 Jan 44 (27 Mar 43). Records of ACofS G-2, DRB TAG.

great many governmental agencies. Since its activities were so often applicable to the military intelligence field and the War Department stood in constant need of information bearing upon Axis production potential, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, (General Strong) arranged for the entire service to become a part of MID (MIS) effective 15 November 1943.* Thereafter, all

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* "Hist ASF (S), ch. IV, pp. 1-3 and Appendix 4.

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requests for consultation with or written reports from this panel of experts were handled through the Collection Unit, MIS.*

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* See: WD Memo W600-44, Foreign Consultants, 14 Jan 44.

During any period of hostilities the interrogation of prisoners of war furnishes a most fruitful source of information for military intelligence agencies. It soon became desirable, therefore, for MID to establish suitable interrogation centers in the United States to collect ~~this type of~~ such information directly. The initial impetus behind this development actually came from the Navy, when the Secretary of the Navy notified the Secretary of War, on 18 December 1942, that an "Interrogation Center" had been formed by ONI and requested the War Department to provide a similar center or centers in accordance with the current Joint Army-Navy agreement calling for naval prisoners to be held by the Navy only until their proper transfer to Army custody might be accomplished.*

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Report of the Activities of Two Agencies of the CPW Branch, no series or volume number, pp. 1-2.

Although custody of prisoners of war in the Army remained a fixed Provost

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Marshal General responsibility, questioning them for intelligence purposes remained an accepted G-2 function. In commenting upon the Secretary of the Navy's letter, therefore, the ACofS G-2 recommended to the Chief of Staff that the Provost Marshal General should be instructed to "consult with G-2 and ONI as to the proper location of two interrogation centers, one on the East Coast and one on the West Coast" and also to bend every possible effort toward utilizing "facilities already constructed." After this general concept had been officially approved, steps were taken without further delay to obtain specific authority for activating two such centers. On 15 May 1942, with the Acting Secretary of Interior granting the War Department permission to use the Fort Hunt, Virginia, national park area for "war purposes," this former Army post was selected to be the location for an East Coast interrogation center and then made ready for actual operations by 30 July 1942. * A site for the West Coast center

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* Ibid., p. 5. For security reasons, the official address of this interrogation center was prescribed as merely PO Box 1142, Alexandria, Va.

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was subsequently chosen at Byron Hot Springs, near the town of Tracy, California, with this installation becoming operational during December 1942. *

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* Ibid., pp. 72-73.

The original plan was to install MID officers in command of these two interrogation centers and to detail whatever intelligence personnel might

be required from MID (MIS). This solution violated an existing regulation, however, which called for a dual field force-service command system at all Army stations within the United States. The eventual result was that in April 1943, the two centers were placed under direct control of the Chief, MIS, War Department, as exempted stations and this status continued for the rest of the wartime period.* Col. Daniel W. Kent then became the first

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* Ibid., pp. 12-18.

MIS commanding officer at both centers, serving in that capacity for Fort Hunt from 1 July to 21 October 1942, and at Tracy from 5 November 1942 to 7 February 1945.*

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* Ibid., p. 19.

Meanwhile, an Interrogation Branch, later renamed the Prisoner of War Branch, had been formed in MIS during April 1942, with Col. Cateaby ap C. Jones designated to be the branch chief. Under the wholesale reorganization of June 1944, it was considerably enlarged from a functional standpoint and re-created in the form of a Captured Personnel and Materials (CPM) Branch. At the same time, Colonel Jones was assigned to the G-2 Policy Staff, while Col. Russell H. Sweet, his former Executive Officer and for a brief interval the commander at Fort Hunt, took over as chief of the new branch.* Despite

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* Ibid., p. 10.

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its broadened title, the CPM Branch was never importantly concerned with evaluating captured enemy "materials" and only accomplished that type of

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action for the comparatively few papers or documents it happened to find on the persons of men being processed for interrogation. *

* Ibid., p. 59.

The Interrogation Centers themselves were not large installations, having been deliberately designed to accommodate only a small number of POW's at any one time. * Nearby internment camps were thus normally

* Although modeled after those already in use by the British, our centers contained several additional refinements over them because the British had been forced to convert "old mansions" for the such purpose. See: Ltr (S), Col Catesby ap C. Jones to Chief Hil Hist, 18 Oct 57. Author's file.

utilized for holding most of the POW's until they could be subjected to more concentrated examination, which might include such supplementary measures as wire-tap monitoring and exposure to stool pigeons. Under ordinary conditions the POW's selected to undergo this special interrogation were chosen on the basis of their indicated regional or technical qualifications coupled with certain desired military experiences but they were sometimes picked in view of their previous activities in civilian life. Best results were usually attained if they could be screened at disembarkation ports immediately upon arriving in the United States and before coming into contact with the old-timers at the regular internment camps. *

* Ibid., pp. 27-31.

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On 3 September 1943, both of the MIS Interrogation Centers were limited to an authorized strength of 41 officers and 61 enlisted men. There was not only a definite need for an increased number of expert interrogators, psychologists and translators but also a larger clerical force to handle the volume of reports being submitted. Moreover, the ultramodern listening devices that had recently been installed required constant repair and maintenance. * Regardless of these handicaps, however, the

* Ibid., pp. 8-9. The given strength figures do not include any of the attached Navy personnel.

resultant operations proved to be numerically impressive, with the Fort Hunt Center processing a total of 3,349 POW's and preparing 4,762 "Interrogating Officer Reports" prior to August 1945. * Similarly, the Tracy

* Ibid., pp. 51-52.

unit interrogated 252 German and 2,113 Japanese POW's at the center proper, while forwarding 2,061 reports. * Much of the information obtained from

* Ibid., pp. 76-78. Tracy personnel additionally interrogated a considerable number of Japanese POW's who were confined at Letterman General Hospital, Camp Stoneman and Angel Island, Calif.

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[illegible] on the German Snorkel and Acoustic Torpedo, as well as important data bearing upon the Siegfried Line, English Channel defenses, V-1 and V-2 launching sites, poison gas plants, biological warfare, Alps Bastion and concentration camps. *

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* Ltr (S), Col Calvert ap C. Jones to Chief Mil Hist, 18 Oct 57. Author's file.

The most intriguing activity of the POW (CPM) Branch lay in its active supervision of the so-called MIS-X program. This project was initiated on 2 September 1942, when the ACofS G-2 submitted a memorandum to the Chief of Staff requesting authority to establish, in coordination with the Army Air Forces, a special section designed to execute the following tasks:

a. To coordinate provision of assistance and information pertaining to evasion of capture and escape methods to American Army personnel in theaters of operations.

b. To supervise training of selected key personnel in accomplishing this purpose.

c. To supervise and coordinate collection, evaluation and dissemination of information from American prisoners of war in all theaters, and to develop the means of communication therefor. *

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* Memo (S), ACofS G-2 for CofS, 2 Sep 42, MID 904 (9-2-42). Records of ACofS G-2, DRB TAG.

This G-2 proposal received official approval on 6 October 1942 but, due to personnel procurement difficulties, the new section could not be

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formed in MIS until 29 December 1942. It was then granted an authorized strength of 61 officers and 28 enlisted men, and organized under the CPW Branch into five functional sub-sections, as follows:

1. Interrogation - to interview and submit reports on returned evaders, escapers and repatriates from enemy or enemy-occupied territory.

2. Correspondence - to develop and utilize secret codes in letters and radio broadcasts for communicating with American prisoners of war.

3. P.W. Camps - to collect all available information about the locations of or conditions in camps holding American Prisoners of War and then distribute periodic bulletins on these subjects to appropriate government agencies, as well as to the Red Cross.

4. Training - to train Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers for briefing personnel of their own services in approved methods of survival, evasion and escape. Also, to inform them of the rights of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.

5. Technical - to procure evasion and escape aids, and distribute them as required. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Report of the Activities of Two Agencies of the CPW Branch, pp. 82-83.

Although the detailed application of this MIS-X project was gradually shifted to corresponding units organized within the theaters of operation, direction of the over-all program by the CPW Branch in Washington not only turned out to be an enormous undertaking but also was attended by several noteworthy indications of success. This despite the fact that most of the work was entirely new for the departmental agency and demanded ventures

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into hitherto uncharted fields of activity. While the results were well worthwhile from the viewpoint of intelligence collection alone, the program was primarily an operational one. As such, it became fully integrated with British efforts along the same lines and called for the closest possible coordination with Allied censorship groups. Some idea of the vast coverage attempted and huge amount of equipment involved may be gained from selected statements included in the final MIS-X report prepared shortly after the end of the war, as follows:

1. A total of 1465 escapees and evaders, representing 39 different localities, were questioned by personnel of the Interview Sub-Section from November 1943 through July 1945. Likewise, between VE Day and VJ Day, 919 American or Allied repatriates returning from 17 different German POW camps were interviewed.

2. The Correspondence Sub-Section reported a total of 9,696 "actual Code Users" among the Americans being held in German POW camps, without any observable signs of suspicion on the part of the German counterintelligence authorities other than making routine tests for secret ink. Results from Japanese POW camps in this same respect, however, were practically nil.

3. The P.W. Camp Sub-Section published a regular series of bi-monthly reports covering the location, POW strength and general conditions of all known enemy POW camps. It further prepared a number of special studies on these same camps, which remained of important use to the United States Government both during and right after the war.

4. The Training Sub-Section conducted a series of courses in escape

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and evasion methods at all Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Force intelligence schools. It also trained 400 selected American officers to brief personnel of their own services regarding these twin subjects, so that a grand total of 1,144,320 military personnel received such briefings over the full wartime period.

5. The Technical Sub-Section designed, procured and tested many different kinds of escape and evasion materials, including such varied items as survival kits, large-scale maps and charts, signal mirrors, local currency chits, basic language booklets, flag shoulder patches, pocket compasses, moisture proof matches, hacksaw blades, tropical medicines etc. Some measure of the speed and magnitude of this equipment effort can be seen from the fact that MIS-X was able to issue a total of 257,191 complete survival kits of three major types in the first eight months of its early existence. *

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* See: Ibid., pp. 82-122.

During the latter part of 1942, representatives of the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and Director of Military Intelligence, British Army, held a series of conferences in London to devise a more favorable system for exploiting captured Axis documents and to correct the marked differences which had been appearing in American and British enemy order of battle estimates ever since Pearl Harbor. The chief result was an agreement between the two national agencies that they should work together on a fully integrated basis in attempting to solve these closely related intelligence problems. * Hence,

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Research Unit, series two, vol III, pt. 3, pp. 6-8.

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Often referred to as the "Strong-Davidson Agreement."

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effective 1 May 1943, the ACofS G-2 directed the formation in MIS of a War Department-War Office Research Section to include both a London Branch and a Washington Branch located at Fort Hunt, Virginia.* This section was

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* See: Memo for Record (S), Group I Policy Staff, 24 Nov 44, MID 386.3 Germany, 24 Nov 44 (29 Jun 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

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soon redesignated as the Military Intelligence Research Section (MIRS) and promptly developed into a positive means for assuring American-British cooperation in the preparation of key estimates of enemy strength. During September 1944, it was further deemed advisable to establish a separate Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section (PACMIRS) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, to translate and study captured Japanese documents for the same general purpose.*

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* "Hist MIS (S), Research Unit, series two, vol III, pt. 3, Tab J. The Washington Branch of MIRS was also moved to Camp Ritchie, effective 13 Jun 45.

The London Branch of MIRS, which reached a maximum strength of 81 persons in mid-December 1944, 55 of them being American, was utilized primarily to execute "short-range" or operational exploitation of captured Axis documents.* In contrast, the Washington Branch was designed more

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* Ibid., pp. 15 and 30. There were a number of Polish military personnel assigned to the British contingent of MIRS London.

160

to accomplish a "long-range" or strategic exploitation of such documents. It was thus granted an authorized strength of 25 persons, plus 1 British liaison officer, and charged with training replacement personnel for the London group. MIRS not only produced a large number of comprehensive booklets and studies covering a wide variety of German military matters but also disseminated them directly to appropriate intelligence agencies and headquarters in the field. * PACMIRS, working in close conjunction

* Ibid., Tab I, pp. 27-28.

with both the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JICPOA) in Hawaii, performed a similar mission for captured Japanese documents. It likewise functioned as a combined operation, having with a total of 22 British officers and 17 British enlisted men attached to joining its staff by August 1945. *

* Ibid., Tab J and Foreword.

The question of how best to supervise this far flung and ever-expanding intelligence collection effort soon became a hotly disputed subject. When MIS was first formed in March 1942, responsibility for issuing collection directives to all field personnel, including military attaches and observers, rested principally with the geographic sub-sections of the Intelligence Group. On 29 November 1942, under the succeeding MID (MIS) reorganization, a so-called Collection Branch was formed as part of the Dissemination Group but its activities remained strictly limited to

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requisitioning information from the field services "what was nothing." Two months later, with this divided system causing noticeable confusion, the Collection Branch was transferred to the Executive Office of the Intelligence Group and given sole responsibility for discovering new sources of information. The geographic branches of the Intelligence Group that continued to prepare and issue most of the regular collection directives to the field. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Supervisor of Source Control, series three, pt. 2, ch. II, pp. 1-3.

In April 1943, an unsuccessful attempt was made to concentrate both the administrative and intelligence functions bearing upon field personnel within a single Collection Unit assigned to the Intelligence Group of MIS. This solution failed mainly because the ACofS G-2, himself, was unable to abdicate his inherent command responsibilities over the military attaches and observers. Nevertheless, under the MID (MIS) reorganization imposed by the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office during May 1944, a Source Control Unit was created for the avowed purpose of controlling and administering "all sources under the jurisdiction of the Military Intelligence Service concerned with the collection of intelligence information." This new unit was then organized into six main sub-divisions, as follows:

Foreign Branch	Map and Photo Branch
Washington Liaison Branch	Special Branch
Captured Personnel and Material Branch	Security Branch *

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* Ibid., pp. 3-6 (ch. II) and 1-2 (ch. III). The Special Branch, rather than the Source Control Unit itself, was still charged with handling communications intelligence activities.

This latest attempt at centralizing the entire MID (MIS) collection effort under one head might have developed in a more favorable manner if it had not been mixed up with the broader problem of trying to divorce the ACofS G-2 from all his administrative responsibilities. Accordingly, there had to be some sort of a practical compromise worked out in order to distinguish between the intelligence collection activities of the Supervisor of Source Control and the administrative duties executed by the Foreign Branch for field personnel, even though the latter unit technically remained still a part of MIS. Furthermore, it soon became plainly apparent that it would not be feasible for the ACofS G-2 to delegate his general staff responsibilities concerning counterintelligence operations to the Chief of MIS, so the Security Branch of the Source Control Unit reverted back to MID. Except for these two changes, however, the Supervisor of Source Control system continued to function without major alteration for the rest of the war. *

* Ibid., ch. III, p. 3.

The most consequential step taken by the Supervisor of Source Control to improve the MID (MIS) field collection effort occurred in October 1944, when he sponsored the inception of a War Department Intelligence Collection

Committee (MICC) which eventually came to be regarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the primary coordinating agency for all military intelligence requirements in such matters. This MICC, chaired by the Supervisor of Source Control himself, was composed of representative officers detailed from MIS, plus two officers each appointed by the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces; Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence; and ACofS G-2, Army Ground Forces. On 9 June 1945, it was formally given the following mission:

(1) Prepare plans for the collection of all intelligence information required for use of the War Department agencies or for the production of War Department intelligence.

(2) Make all necessary provisions for the collection of such information to include:

(a) Preparing War Department directives describing the needed information in detail.

(b) Making recommendation for provision of additional collecting agencies when the need for same appears. (However, existing agencies will be used to the maximum). *

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* Ibid., ch. III, pp. 4-5 and Annex VIII.

It thus remains manifest that one of the most significant military intelligence developments during World War II was a tremendous expansion in field collection activities directly controlled or supervised by the departmental agency. The impetus behind this extensive drive was admittedly a highly commendable one, in that it stemmed from a sound urge to uncover and then exploit new sources of information for Army use. On the

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other hand, because the ensuing operations became so far-reaching and complex, they seem served measurably to aggravate the basic organizational problems which had confronted MID for so many years in the past. These important problems, therefore, continued to remain essentially unresolved. A parallel aspect of the same type of difficulties also took place in connection with the growing field of technical and scientific intelligence, to be discussed in detail during the next chapter.

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CHAPTER VI

TECHNICAL (SCIENTIFIC) INTELLIGENCE

Like so many of the expressions commonly adopted for military intelligence usage, the term "technical intelligence" remains neither strictly conclusive nor exactly determinate. It is often utilized to denote intelligence covering foreign military developments largely in point of weapons or equipment but this limited meaning may be extended to include all activities of foreign armed forces performing functions analagous to those of the United States Army technical services. *

* See: SR 320-5-1, Aug 50, p. 236. Technical services during World War II were regularly performed for the Army by the Engineer, Ordnance, Signal, Transportation, Quartermaster, Medical and Chemical Corps. The Air Corps likewise provided a technical service for the Army Air Force.

The broader definition thus often impinges upon and sometimes even overlaps several other accepted classes of military intelligence, such as "scientific," "geographic," "combat," "communications," etc. Nevertheless, it appears to be best suited for the purposes of this particular discussion.

Regardless of difficulties in terminology, technical intelligence has always constituted a primary responsibility for the departmental military intelligence agency to discharge. Unfortunately, during much

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of the peacetime period following World War I, the responsibility was seriously neglected. This was due more to personnel and fund shortages than to any failure on the part of the various ACofS G-2's, in recognizing the true importance of the subject. By September 1940, therefore, when the pre-Pearl Harbor expansion of the Army finally got fully got under-way, positive steps were taken to remedy the acknowledged deficiency. One of the most consequential of these steps was the issuance of an official directive to the "Chiefs of All Arms and Services" for them to establish and maintain an intelligence section within their respective organizations, designed "to receive, collate and pass on to MID requests for information wanted by the using agencies of each arm or service and to disseminate to these agencies information obtained from MID." * Hence, prior to the start of

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* Copy f/w 350.05, 8-11-41 (8-16-40), Tab "E". Records of ACofS G-2, DMB TAG.

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the war, there was at least some semblance of a favorable organization available within the War Department which could assist MID in executing its traditional technical intelligence mission.

The sudden advent of World War II naturally forced a number of fundamental changes in the current technical intelligence situation. For example, it could now be concentrated almost exclusively upon enemy armed forces rather than attempting to cover all foreign forces of any military significance. On the other hand, it would have to undergo an immediate expansion in every other respect and develop an entirely new field collection system. With our own forces multiplying at a very

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rapid rate and the complexities of command increasing in direct proportion thereto, the problem of coordination soon threatened to become overwhelming. Prompt steps to counter a growing tendency toward duplication and confusion of effort were thus plainly indicated.

The first major alteration in the post-Pearl Harbor technical intelligence system stemmed from the War Department and Army reorganization of 9 March 1942, which not only created the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces and Services of Supply (Army Service Forces) but also placed all chiefs of the technical services under direct command of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces. While Headquarters, AGF and AAF were both correctly already provided with appropriate staff organizations for handling technical intelligence matters, the new Headquarters, ASF, was not. Its activities along such lines, therefore, continued to remain mostly decentralized among the numerous staff divisions of the technical services even though they were now operating as part of the ASF. Accordingly, with the ACofS G-2, WDGS, still held responsible for supervising military intelligence throughout the United States Army, the subject of technical intelligence received very little, if any, added attention at Headquarters, ASF, except from a few individual officers of the technical services who took it upon themselves to do so.* accomplish it.*

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* "Hist ASF," ch. II, p. 2.

That some type of an intelligence agency would have to be formed in Headquarters, ASF, soon became obvious. There were definite requirements connected with domestic intelligence and security operations, as well as

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an apparent need for coordinating technical intelligence activities. Effective 20 April 1943, therefore, a Security and Intelligence Division was created under the Chief of Administrative Services, with Col. James H. Hoover appointed to be its Director. Shortly afterwards, this original agency was renamed the Intelligence Division and made an integral part of the Office of the Commanding General. * It was then assigned the following

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* Ibid., pp. 2-3. The Intelligence Division was later ordered to report to the Commanding General only through a newly-appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands.

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mission:

a. To exercise staff supervision and coordination over all intelligence activities that are the concern of the Army Service Forces.

b. To keep the Commanding General and interested staff divisions and agencies of the Army Service Forces informed of all matters of concern to the Army Service Forces, especially technical intelligence relating to supply.

c. To maintain contact and exchange information with other military intelligence agencies.

d. In collaboration with the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, War Department General Staff, to collect, evaluate and disseminate information affecting the Army Service Forces.

e. To disseminate information of a technical nature received from overseas United States Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies.

f. To inspect the adequacy of and compliance with, security of military information and intelligence plans and procedures within Headquarters, Army Service Forces, including technical services. *

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* Ibid., Appendix, ch. II.

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In the meantime, MIS had been taking a number of significant steps designed to improve its own capabilities within the technical intelligence field. The most important of these were the formation of two PW Interrogation Centers, a Military Intelligence Research Section with branches in London and Washington, and an initial Joint Intelligence Collection Agency for North Africa. Although technical intelligence was not being considered organizationally as a separate subject, scientific intelligence bearing upon chemical or bacteriological warfare was already receiving this special treatment. Coordination problems, however, were commencing to assume tremendous proportions, while demands for information on enemy technical developments kept increasing daily. Furthermore, because the evaluation of captured enemy weapons and equipment comprised a primary objective for all theater intelligence agencies, there was a marked tendency on the part of these field groups to withhold such materiel rather than release it to higher echelons for necessary essential long-range exploitation.

With so many different major commands and services involved, it gradually became apparent that the wartime technical intelligence effort could no longer be controlled directly by MID (MIS) but would have to be decentralized. Since most of the needed information was overseas and the combat theaters were well organized to process it for local use, *

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* See: "Technical Intelligence Operations in the ETO," 350.05 Tech ETO, DRL TAG and "Technical Intelligence, Organization and Functions," Headquarters USA SOS SW Pacific Area, appended to "History of Technical Intelligence Organization," (C), Office Chief of Ordnance.

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the answer seemed to lie in dispatching representative groups of technical specialists to examine captured material and documents nearer the source.

Although the original impetus behind the program eventually adopted for decentralizing the technical intelligence effort came from the Ordnance Department, it continued to receive full MID (MIS) support at all times. Early in 1942, Ordnance observer groups composed of especially selected and highly trained officers and enlisted personnel were sent over to the major combat theaters, with the assigned mission of collecting samples of enemy equipment plus any data connected therewith for prompt transmission to an Ordnance Intelligence Unit functioning under the Technical Division of the Office, Chief of Ordnance. This unit would then analyze, process, and disseminate the resultant information not only to serve its own Technical Division but also other interested agencies of the War Department and United States Army. * Precious time could thus be saved and a much more

* "History of Technical Intelligence Organization," (C), Tab Publicity. Office, Chief of Ordnance. See also: Constance McLoughlin Green, Harry C. Thompson and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War in US ARMY WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), pp. 261-67.

intimate
closer relationship established between the technical experts in the field and the numerous intelligence users back home.

It was not long before there was a bewildering array of technical observer groups, teams, boards, missions, etc., from the major commands, Army schools and technical services operating throughout the combat

theaters. Additionally, the departmental intelligence agencies, as well as the theater G-2 units themselves, were constantly expanding their own field collection activities in order to satisfy the mounting needs for more and better technical intelligence. These factors soon combined to cause an alarming amount of overlap in functional responsibility and duplication of effort. Finally, during March 1944, the Commanding General, ASF, took belated action to bring some sort of order out of the attendant chaos by directing the formation of regular Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams (EEIS's) on a suitably representative basis from among the technical services. He also forwarded identical letters to each of the theater commanders to inform them along the following lines:

1. These teams are to be attached to the theater only upon concurrence of the theater commander concerned and will not operate independent of theater control.

2. Embracing qualified specialists from the various technical services, they have been carefully designed to assist the theater commander in securing captured equipment and assuring the flow of such material to the United States based upon existing training directives.

3. While the team personnel remain charged against the authorized strength of their own respective Chief of Technical Service, it is not intended that this will interfere in any way with theater control over them.

4. The teams ought to be given an opportunity to question prisoners of war having special knowledge of certain enemy weapons and equipment. Likewise, arrangements should be made for them to cooperate fully with naval or Allied personnel performing on similar technical intelligence missions. #

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theaters. Additionally, the departmental intelligence agencies, as well as the theater G-2 units themselves, were constantly expanding their own field collection activities in order to satisfy the mounting needs for more and better technical intelligence. These factors soon combined to cause an alarming amount of overlap in functional responsibility and duplication of effort. Finally, during March 1944, the Commanding General, ASF, took belated action to bring some sort of order out of the attendant chaos by directing the formation of regular Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams (EEIS's) on a suitably representative basis from among the technical services. He also forwarded identical letters to each of the theater commanders to inform them along the following lines:

1. These teams are to be attached to the theater only upon concurrence of the theater commander concerned and will not operate independent of theater control.

2. Embracing qualified specialists from the various technical services, they have been carefully designed to assist the theater commander in securing captured equipment and assuring the flow of such material to the United States based upon existing training directives.

3. While the team personnel remain charged against the authorized strength of their own respective Chief of Technical Service, it is not intended that this will interfere in any way with theater control over them.

4. The teams ought to be given an opportunity to question prisoners of war having special knowledge of certain enemy weapons and equipment. Likewise, arrangements should be made for them to cooperate fully with naval or Allied personnel performing on similar technical intelligence missions. #

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* Ltr, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 14 Mar 44, in "History of Technical Intelligence, SW and W Pacific Areas," II, and Ltr, ASF MID to Chiefs of Supply Services, 22 Apr 44, Tab Circulars and Orders, "History of Technical Intelligence Organization" (C). Office Chief of Ordnance.

MID (MIS), of course, still remained actively interested in all forms of technical intelligence and continued to receive a steady flow of that type of information from its regular sources in the field. The chief problem had now become one of devising satisfactory methods for insuring a proper exchange of technical intelligence and adequate dissemination procedures among the multitude of agencies differently involved. Such helpful measures as encouraging both formal and informal liaison, establishing broadly representative reading panels and appointing special technical committees were taken but they only served to minimize the growing complications. Since the lines of responsibility under the new system had been so obscurely drawn, considerable doubt existed even within MID (MIS) itself as to what portion of the total effort the departmental agency should cover. This uncertainty was especially true in the case of the subordinate elements that were originally previously charged with performing duties of a technical intelligence nature.

An excellent example of such lack of precise functional delineation seems provided by the MID Air Section, which had been created shortly before Pearl Harbor to handle all Air Corps intelligence matters for the departmental agency. In February 1942, just prior to the Army reorganization

establishing the Army Air Forces, that section consisted of 9 officers, 8 civilian analysts and 7 clerk-stenographers, and was generally held responsible for the "collection, maintenance, development, evaluation and dissemination of foreign air intelligence." * Although this mission

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* "Hist AIS" (S), Air Unit, pp. 1-2.

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plainly clearly called for a direct involvement in technical intelligence matters, the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Army Air Forces, proceeded to develop a large organization of his own for the same purpose. The Air Section of MID [illegible] tended to become mainly a statistical group in preparing special studies on the strength, performance, characteristics, personnel, production, etc., of foreign air forces. With much of this work also being duplicated by the Army Air Force, grave doubts soon arose as to exactly where the MID Air Unit should fit into the technical intelligence picture. Thus, hence the following revealing statement appeared under "Conclusions" in the official history of that particular unit for the period from March 1940 to May 1944: "The mission of the Air Unit, G-2 was not clearly defined. Several attempts were made to obtain a clear delineation of the duties of the Air Unit from those of the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Army Air Forces, but such a directive was never issued." *

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* Ibid., p. 9.

The Map and Photo (Geographic) Branch of MID (MIS) likewise ran into serious difficult functional problems with reference to its technical intelligence activities. Under current existing Army regulations, the operational aspects

of mapping and photography had recently been decentralized to appropriate agencies of the Army Air Forces, Corps of Engineers and Signal Corps, so in theory the ACofS G-2, was merely responsible for preparing plans and policies concerned therewith. * Logically, therefore, the Map and Photo

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Maps and Photographs Branch, series three, pt. 2, sec. 3, pp. 3-4.

Branch should have constituted essentially a research or planning unit, while furnishing policy representation on the many combined, joint and governmental committees dealing with cartographic, topographic, geographic and photographic subjects. Although it normally did perform these general staff functions, the branch was also became deeply involved in several technical intelligence projects of an operational nature.

During early 1942 there was a concerted campaign in progress to secure from every possible source photographs that might yield pertinent military information. At the same time, Similarly, a sizable amount of enemy motion picture film had been acquired through alien property seizure and the Army Air Forces was busily engaged in building up a comprehensive collection of aerial photographs having an intelligence interest. Since these and other comparable activities were continually expanding, it appeared desirable to execute a formal agreement among the interested military agencies for the purpose of clarifying the future handling of all photographic material. This agreement, dated 1 September 1942, specified that MIB (MIS) should "exercise general supervision over photography, including procurement, filing, indexing, reproduction and distribution," with the Army Air Forces, Army Map Service and Corps of Engineers performing certain other functions as prescribed. *

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* Ibid., Appendix A, Exhibit 6.

The Map and Photo Branch then promptly embarked upon a program designed to emphasize the development of an "Aerial Photographic Catalog of the World" and a large "Photo Interpretation Report Library."* Within the

* Ibid., pp. 12-13 and Appendix A, Illustrations. The latter project was undertaken upon the advice of "Sqdn Leader Ballard," a RAF officer who served on temporary duty with MID (MIS) during Jan 43. He further arranged for the British Air Ministry to send over copies of all current photo interpretation reports so that the new MID (MIS) library would enjoy a good start.

field of photo procurement, the branch also organized a First Photo Procurement Detachment, which was attached to the G-2 Section of ETO for "staff direction" but in reality operated with the British Air Ministry at Medmenham, England, to select aerial negatives and photo interpreter reports for MID (MIS) use. When this experiment proved successful, two more Photo Procurement Detachments were duly activated and assigned respectively to the China-Burma-India and Pacific Ocean Area theaters.*

* Ibid., pp. 13 and 15.

It became plainly evident after Pearl Harbor that the available Army map coverage was grossly inadequate to support the effective prosecution of a global war, especially for the South and Southwest Pacific areas. MID and the Corps of Engineers, therefore, jointly

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undertook to conduct an exhaustive search of all possible sources aimed at collecting additional maps and map information of potential intelligence value. While much of the material obtained in this manner turned out to be completely useless, several exceptional items were acquired from institutional and scientific libraries. Accordingly, the Map and Photo Branch was held responsible for the controlled distribution or loan of these precious documents to other planning agencies of the United States Government, as required. *

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* Ibid., p. 18.

On 12 May 1942, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Herbert B. Loper, Chief of the Intelligence Branch, Office Chief of Engineers and Col. (later Brigadier) H. Hotine, Geographical Section, General Staff, British War Office, concluded an American-British technical agreement which, among other things, divided the world into areas of "mapping responsibility" applicable to each country. * This division of responsibility was based

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* Ibid., Appendix A, Exhibit 23. Commonly known as the Loper-Hotine Agreement, it continued to remain in force even after the termination of World War II.

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primarily upon such considerations as the quality of available source material, degree of national interest and likelihood of participation in military operations for each given area. It not only facilitated the favorable exchange of maps between the two participating countries but also greatly stimulated a global mapping program. *

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* Ibid., p. 19.

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Since neither the Office of the Chief of Engineers nor the Army Map Service were located in the Pentagon, the Map and Photo Branch had to function more or less as a "map depot" for distributing maps within MID (MIS) proper and to other sections of the WDGS. This meant keeping a large collection of maps regularly at hand. The branch was also further able to institute a system whereby all incoming intelligence reports containing any sort of map or topographical information would be routed without delay to its Geographic Section for immediate examination and evaluation. Material derived in this manner was then catalogued by Map Library personnel and listed on a monthly accession bulletin, so as to become promptly available to all interested parties either for reference or photographic reproduction. The branch thus stood ready during the summer of 1944 to satisfy the enormous demand for maps, photos and photo interpretation advice resulting from the Allied invasion of Normandy. Moreover, when a large amount of enemy motion picture film was seized in connection with the liberation of occupied territory, it proceeded to establish a joint MID (MIS)-Signal Corps "Enemy Film Program" of major proportions.

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* Ibid., pp. 20-21, 23 and 27.

That the lines of responsibility between MID (MIS) and the various technical services during World War II for technical intelligence were not properly drawn remains apparent. It must not be presumed, however, that the departmental agency lacked any important or legitimate interest in such activities. There was truly a basic variation in intelligence approach, with a most fitting description of

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of this subtle difference was presented in the official history of Desk M-3 (Weapons and Equipment), Military Research Section, MIS, as follows:

> While it might appear, on the surface, that the functions of Desk M-3 largely overlapped or duplicated those of the intelligence branches of the Ordnance Department and other technical agencies in the Army Service Forces, such was actually not the case. . . . It should be clearly understood that whereas MIS was interested in enemy material only to the extent that a study of it might aid in the research and development of our own equipment, the interest of MIS was primarily in the significance of enemy weapons and equipment in relation to the enemy's ability to wage war. Thus a particular new enemy gun might be of no interest to the Ordnance Department because its individual features were well known . . . but at the same time a study of the weapon by MIS, including considerations of its tactical employment, its adaptability to the terrain in the theater of operations, and the ability of the enemy to manufacture it, had an important bearing on both overall and local capabilities of the enemy and on the operations of our own forces. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Military Research Section, series two, pt. 3, Tab 8, sec 5, Appendix D, III, p. 1.

No better illustration of this fundamental point may be found than through an examination of the "nameplate analysis" project, which undoubtedly comprised one of the outstanding military intelligence feats of World War II. This project had its inception during January 1942 when the first Japanese airplane crashed in Australia, an event considered of major intelligence importance since it could give the Allied technical experts an anxiously awaited opportunity to evaluate the plane's performance, characteristics, weapons and equipment. Due to the demonstrated foresight of the part of Pilot Officer (later Wing Commander) N. B. Tindale of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), who was quick to recognize the intelligence worth of nameplate data, it actually turned out to be much more than that. The

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nameplates to collected from that particular plane that formed the necessary start in a continuing study at Headquarters, Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, eventually to furnish an invaluable guide for estimating Japanese aircraft production and many other closely related subjects. *

* "Hist AAF" (S), Air Industry Section, series two, vol. III, pt. 3, sec. 6, Tab 8, p. 2. Wing Commander Tindale, an experienced scientific researcher in civil life, had lived in Japan for 11 years prior to World War I and was proficient in the Japanese language.

The initial digest of factory data based upon captured manufacturer's nameplates was issued during October 1942. In February 1943, after Wing Commander Tindale himself had finally managed to break down the deceptive numbering system utilized by the Japanese to conceal their real production rates, a manual was published giving approved collection methods and instructions for the introduction of all such material into proper intelligence channels. Meanwhile, with United States Army and Navy personnel having already joined the original RAAF section working on the project, special teams were organized on a combined basis to gather additional nameplates in the field. JICPOA also soon created a nameplate analysis unit of its own at Pearl Harbor and the Foreign Economic Administration established a similar group back in Washington. It was not long, therefore, before a considerable amount of duplication of effort was observable in connection with the entire program. *

* Ibid., p. 3.

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In July 1944, hoping to achieve a more satisfactory coordination among the participating intelligence groups, the JIS assigned primary responsibility for the nameplate and serial number analysis project to the ACofS G-2, WDGS. All key personnel and files were then transferred to the departmental intelligence agency and an Air Industry Section was formed under the Military Branch of MIS. This new section, which functioned both as a joint and Allied (SWPA) unit, included Lieutenant Commander Tindale as its deputy chief. By August 1945, a total of 35,000 plates had been translated and analyzed, and over 100 different reports produced. These reports, resting mainly upon intelligence derived from the nameplates themselves but also supported by whatever additional sources of information were at hand, covered the following diverse matters for Japan:

1. Aircraft production.
2. Detailed studies of particular plane types.
3. Component shortages.
4. Relative importance of principal aircraft assembly and engine plants.
5. Analysis of existing plant floor areas.
6. Estimates of combat aircraft life.
7. Assessment of plant damage on plane production by bombing.
8. Newly discovered plants.
9. Latest plane types. *

* Ibid., p. 12. It should be realized that a single Japanese fighter plane contained approximately 150 different nameplates, while a twin engine bomber carried more than twice that number.

because the information they could reveal was much greater than merely a simple mathematical calculation of production rates.

This noteworthy project patently fell within the field of technical intelligence but it would never have evolved from activities on the part of the technical services alone. As so aptly stated in the quoted MIS history, when personnel of these services investigate captured enemy materiel they are chiefly concerned with evaluating its specific technical characteristics for their own use, rather than thinking in terms of any broad intelligence analysis derivable therefrom. This latter consideration remains the fixed responsibility of the departmental military intelligence agency, a responsibility of such important implications that it can neither be neglected nor even successfully duitably decentralized.

As mentioned earlier, the terms "technical intelligence" and "scientific intelligence" often overlap each other, with the latter classification being generally reserved for information bearing upon the capabilities of foreign nations to wage war through the use of highly advanced technological means or methods. Security requirements likewise serve to separate these two companion fields, since activities connected with seeking data on foreign scientific progress normally demand an absolute maximum of security protection. This particular factor had been recognized by the intelligence authorities early in 1943, when the Chief of the Foreign Branch, MIS, was made solely responsible for organizing a special net to collect information about enemy research and experiments in bacteriological or biological warfare. Moreover, the departmental officials performing scientific intelligence missions were strongly opposed to lumping their operations under technical intelligence because they felt the action would tend to

discourage a full appreciation of the crucial importance of keeping constantly abreast of the latest developments in all scientific matters. *

* See: Ltrs (2), Col C. P. Nicholas, USA, 14 Nov 57 and Col Boris T. Pash, USA Ret, 16 Dec 57; to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist. Author's file.

Prior to 1943 there had been little specific concentration in MID upon the more scientific aspects of modern warfare. During April of that year, however, the Chief of the Special Branch was assigned an added functional responsibility for handling "operational implementations of radar and radio counter-measures policies." What that actually meant was anybody's guess but it did point toward a more thorough effort to determine recent enemy advances within the field of electronics. Although this was already being accomplished in a fragmentary manner by the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Signal Security Agency, A-2 and Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War, as well as by several other MID branches, the situation stood badly in need of further coordination. Two officers with a scientific background, therefore, who had been serving in the Counterintelligence Group, were transferred to the Special Branch for the announced purpose of forming the nucleus of an Electronics Section therein. They were officially charged with producing intelligence pertaining to "electronic devices used by enemy armed forces, including radar counter-measures." *

* "MID Hist WW II" (8), p. 166.

UNCLASSIFIED

By the latter part of 1943, when the Allied intelligence agencies commenced to receive a torrent of disquieting reports concerned with German secret weapon activities along the Channel coast, MID (MIS) was able to prepare a number of pertinent summaries bearing upon that sensitive subject, even though no proper procedures had as yet been developed to handle such matters on a separate basis. To fill this serious void, the Secretary of War, effective 29 December 1943, directed the formation of an ad hoc committee under the departmental new Developments Division in order to evaluate the nature and capabilities of enemy secret weapons and to recommend immediate counter-measures. Three weeks later, with this new committee having been given a more formal status by order of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Col. C. P. Nichols of MID was designated to be its chairman. It not only included appropriate technical representatives from ASF, OPD, AAF, and MID (MIS) but also regularly appointed liaison officers from OPD, A-2, AAF and the Signal Corps. *

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* "War Department Crossbow Committee" (C), Project 2528a, 3 Oct 45, p. 1 and Tab B. ACSI Rec Sec.

Given the code name of CROSSBOW, this important intelligence committee promptly started to receive and process all information regarding German secret weapon installations along the Channel coast obtainable either from American or Allied sources. At the same time, steps were carefully taken to avoid the slightest danger of its activities infringing in any way upon operations of the established intelligence agencies, so that the committee duties became narrowed down to making "scientific

evaluations beyond the capabilities of AAS, and to the study of counter-measures." * Organized into two main groups, one to accomplish required

* Ltr (S), Col C. P. Nicholas to Maj Gen Richard W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist, 14 Nov 57, p. 5. Author's file.

interpretations and the other to consider countermeasures, it managed to secure the full time services of three outstanding civilian scientists from the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) for assistance in technical analysis. These scientists and their specialized fields were Dr. A. L. Loomis (physics), Dr. Roger Adams (chemistry) and Dr. H. P. Robertson (cosmology), with the last-named being called upon to maintain direct liaison between the Washington unit and the British Air Ministry in London. Additional scientific consultants were utilized whenever further advice appeared necessary and panels of representative specialists were often formed on short notice to weigh promising items of information. * The committee was

* Ibid., p. 2.

thus able "to evaluate the threat and recommend counter-measures" approximately one month before the first German V-1 missile landed in England on the night of 12-13 June 1944. It also could arrange for the release of the VT proximity fuse and a number of newly developed radar sets (SCR 584) from JCS-imposed security restrictions, in order to contribute materially to the "high success of anti-aircraft fire achieved during V-1 missile defense." *

* "War Department CROSSBOW Committee" (C), Project 2528a, 3 Oct 45,

UNCLASSIFIED

p. 2. Add the Sec.

The CROSSBOW Committee was dissolved right after the German missile attacks against England actually commenced. Since it had been deliberately designed not to interfere with normal operations of the departmental intelligence agency, no hiatus occurred in the collection, evaluation and dissemination of scientific intelligence within MED (MIS). Nevertheless, the absence of an authoritative scientific evaluation service was severely felt and there seemed to be a distinct need for a small group of qualified intelligence personnel capable of dealing with all phases of the rapidly increasing enemy capabilities to wage war through the use of advanced technological developments. As a result, a Scientific Branch was finally formed in MIS during the latter part of June 1944, with Lt. Col. Merillat Moses, who had been in charge of the CROSSBOW Order of Battle Room, selected to be its chief. The existing Electronics Section of the Special Branch was then moved into this new unit, while a Chemical and Biological Warfare Section, originally composed only of Maj. John H. O'Donovan, was also created. One month later, Maj. Alfred L. Abbitt was designated to head up a New Weapons Section and from then on the internal structure of the Scientific Branch remained fixed. *

* "MED Hist WW II" (S), p. 165. The name of the New Weapons Section was shortly changed to the Physics Section.

Because suitable personnel were extremely difficult to procure, the MIS Scientific Branch never developed into a very large unit. At its peak, during May 1945, the branch reached a total strength of 21 persons,

UNCLASSIFIED

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including 16 officers, 2 enlisted men and 3 civilian clerks, with the bulk of this strength carried by the Electronics Section. Although most of the electronics and physics specialists were eventually able to attend a military radar school, either in the United States or England, they had been chosen on the whole according to some indicated scientific background in civil life. Operating as they were largely within unexplored intelligence fields, preliminary or even on-the-job training was seldom practicable. They always remained free, however, to consult with acknowledged experts assigned to the technical services and other appropriate organizations of the government, when confronted with analytical problems falling beyond their own scientific capabilities. *

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* "Wartime Operations of the Military Intelligence Service-German-Scientific Branch," (S), Project #2300-5, 23 Jul 45, pp. 4-5. ACSI Hec Sec. The Scientific Branch did not really become properly staffed to perform its wartime mission until just a few months before the end of hostilities.

The Electronics Section of the Scientific Branch devoted its principal attention to the war against Japan. This was due mainly to the fact that the British, aided by American radar specialists stationed in ETO, were fully capable of effecting "complete coverage of the German war and issue comprehensive reports, to which little could be added." Since Japanese electronic capabilities remained more or less neglected, the departmental intelligence authorities felt the limited MID (MIS) group should stress that particular phase of the scientific intelligence effort.

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The same section likewise provided G-2 membership on the Radar and Countermeasures Committee of both the Joint and Combined Communications Board, and worked in close conjunction with personnel of a Joint Electronics Information Agency established to collect and coordinate all intelligence of such nature. In executing its assigned responsibility for "implementing radio and radar countermeasures," the Electronics Section trained and directed the activation of a radar jamming unit which first functioned in the Aleutian Islands and then later in the Mediterranean Theater with conspicuous success. * Two officers of the section were

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* Ibid., pp. 5-6.

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also given a special mission related to the evaluation of Japanese free balloons from the intelligence standpoint when these missiles began to fall on American territory during December 1944. *

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* "MIS Hist WW II" (S), p. 168.

The Chemical and Biological Warfare Section of the Scientific Branch was designed to "receive, process, collate and compile data on enemy CW and BW material and enemy capabilities and intentions." It thus commented upon all available information of that type and prepared timely reports on ~~both~~ such subjects as the occasion arose. * Of especial interest is the

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* "Wartime Operations of the Military Intelligence Service-German-Scientific Branch," (S), Project #2300-5, 23 Jul 45, p. 5. ACSI Rec Sec.

UNCLASSIFIED

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fact that this well-informed group believed Japan was in no position at the time of its surrender to engage in gas warfare either extensively or effectively but the use of toxic smoke on the initiative of local unit commanders had been under repeated and serious consideration. Similarly, although no specific instances of the use of BW agents against American troops were reported or any BW munitions ever captured, the Japanese might well have decided to attempt a distribution of BW agents by free balloon if the war had continued. Several documents were also collected which contained references to the possible use of BW for sabotage purposes. *

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* "MID Hist WW II" (S), p. 171.

The primary mission of the New Weapons (Physics) Section of the Scientific Branch was to produce intelligence bearing upon enemy weapons of a radically different nature. It never consisted of more than two officers and, because it was established after the German missile attacks against England had become an operational matter, the section mostly evaluated Japanese developments along the same lines. However, it did present a daily briefing to selected MID (MIS) personnel covering the current progress of German guided missile attacks. A specific conclusion was finally reached to the effect that the Japanese remained incapable of producing radio-controlled missiles but were energetically attempting to develop a rocket-accelerated piloted aircraft bomb of suicide type which sooner or later might be available for combat use. *

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* Ibid.

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The crowning governmental achievement in connection with scientific intelligence during World War II was undoubtedly the timely formation of and continued support rendered to a so-called ALSOS Mission.* This col-

* The letters ALSOS merely represented a cover designation, carelessly chosen because they translated in Greek to the word "groves."

lection task force was jointly conceived in September 1943, by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, ACofS G-2, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the OSRD, and Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, Chief of the MANHATTAN Project. The original plan had been to organize a picked group of military and civilian scientific personnel for dispatch to southern Italy, so they would be readily available to interrogate Italian scientists and examine captured technical documents upon the anticipated early Allied occupation of Rome. A project of this type was duly approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff, with the Navy Department also authorized to participate in it. Accordingly, effective 26 November 1943, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Boris T. Pash, received an appointment to become Chief of Mission for the group and additional personnel were assigned, as follows:

Lt. Col. William P. Allis, ASF
Lt. Cmdr. Bruce S. Old, Navy Dept
Dr. John R. Johnson, OSRD
Dr. James B. Fisk, OSRD
Capt. W. B. Stanard, AUS (Adm. Officer) *

* "Final Report of ALSOS Mission" (C), G-2 314.7, 10 Dec 45 (30 Oct 42), Tab A1, pp. 2-4. ACSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as "ALSOS Report" (C). Two officers and two enlisted interpreters, plus four attached CIC agents, also operated with this first group.

UNCLASSIFIED

The ALSOS Mission opened its first field headquarters at Naples on 17 December 1943. Its members then spent approximately six weeks questioning the few Italian scientists who were available within the limited occupation zone, while assisting the theater intelligence authorities in the examination of captured technical documents. By the latter part of February 1944, when it had become apparent that no important scientific information could be secured in southern Italy, especially information about Axis atomic bomb development, and since the fall of Rome had not yet transpired, * the group

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* Allied troops did not enter Rome until 4 Jun 44.

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was ordered back to Washington. Even though the immediate results were disappointing, the experiment did serve to demonstrate the fact that the technical services already possessed competent intelligence teams operating within the combat theaters to satisfy their own special purposes but there was a definite need for qualified personnel to obtain and evaluate scientific information on a much higher level. *

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* Ibid., pp. 4-6.

In view of this pointed finding, the departmental research and intelligence officials strongly recommended that the ALSOS Mission should be redesigned and placed on a permanent basis in order to follow right behind the combat elements during the planned invasion of western Europe. With that idea gaining official approval from the Secretary of War on 4 April 1944, the way was thus cleared for reorganizing the entire project and forming an advisory committee to direct a more favorable scientific

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intelligence effort in the field. This ALSOS Advisory Committee was actually composed of the ACofS G-2, (WDC) Chief of ONI, Commanding General ASF and Director of OSRD, but these authorities promptly named the following deputies to represent them in accomplishing detailed supervision of the mission work:

Col. C. P. Nicholas, MID
Capt. (USN) W. A. Heard, ONI
Col. E. W. Gruhn, ASF
Dr. Alan T. Waterman, OSRD *

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* Lincoln R. Thiesmeyer and John F. Burchard, Combat Scientists in SCIENCE IN WORLD WAR II (Boston, 1947), p. 165. This series, prepared under authority granted by Drs. Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, Alfred N. Richards and Karl T. Compton, all prominent figures in wartime research and development for the United States Government, was apparently intended to represent an unclassified history of OSRD.

Under the new arrangement, Colonel Pash continued to remain as Chief of ALSOS, while an additional position was created in the form of a civilian Scientific Chief who would be a permanent member of the Mission and take over direct control of all its scientific activities. Selected to fill this responsible post was the internationally prominent nuclear physicist, Dr. Samuel A. Goudsmit, on leave from the University of Michigan faculty and currently engaged in radar work at the Radiation Laboratory of M.I.T. He had been chosen for the assignment not only in light of his recognized professional qualifications but also because he was not involved in production of the atomic bomb. If captured, therefore, no secrets of that

102

vital nature could be priced out of him. Besides, as a former citizen of Holland and Leyden University graduate, he enjoyed a notably wide acquaintance among prominent European scientists, knew their individual specialties and spoke their respective languages.*

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* Samuel A. Goudsmit, ALSOS (New York, 1947), p. 15.

During the month of May 1944, Colonel Pash remained fully occupied in guiding the planned ALSOS expansion and conducting negotiations in London relative to administrative support. It was finally decided that the Mission should be attached to the Office of the ACofS G-2, ETO, for supply and administration but, since the unit did not hold any authorized tables of personnel or equipment, future difficulties along such lines seemed definitely indicated. There was also the severe handicap of having to operate under a very high security classification, so the true nature of ALSOS activities could be disclosed only to a few top ranking commanders in the field. Notwithstanding, the mission eventually stood ready to follow up the invasion forces with representative scientific intelligence teams whenever suitable opportunity and favorable targets were presented.*

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* "ALSOS Report" (C), Tab A1, pp. 7-9. The ACofS G-2, ETO, at this time was Col C. Bryan Conrad.

Meanwhile, with Allied troops now preparing to enter Rome, Colonel Pash hurriedly returned to Naples. Reaching the Italian capital shortly after its delayed fall, he proceeded to question three leading Italian scientists in

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the hope of obtaining information on this nuclear research. This work, however, was abruptly interrupted by the start of the Normandy invasion, so it became imperative for him to return at once to London. Maj. R. C. Ham of MID was then ordered to Rome for the express purpose of officially reopening the Mediterranean ALSOS office. Without any detailed scientific background, this capable officer managed to carry on alone in Italy until September 1944, when he was joined by Maj. R. A. Fisher, AC, a physicist on loan from Northwestern University. Following the successful Allied landing in southern France and subsequent rapid advance to the north, this Mediterranean group eventually rejoined the main mission in Paris. *

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* Ibid., pp. 9-10. See also: Goudsmit, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

Although Dr. Goudsmit and the ALSOS representatives from the MANHATTAN Project continued to feel the cardinal task of the mission should be to determine German capabilities for producing an atom bomb, the directive assigned to the group in reality was much broader than that. The unit was actually called upon "to secure all available intelligence on enemy scientific research and development, particularly with reference to military application." * On the other hand, because it was manifestly

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* "ALSOS Report" (C), Attached Ltr of Transmittal, Chief ALSOS to Chief MIS, 10 Dec 45, par. 3.

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impossible for a group of such small size to cover the total field of German science, its investigations became more or less automatically restricted to the following major subjects:

a. [illegible]
b. Bacteriological Warfare.
c. Organization of Army Scientific Research.
d. Aeronautical Research.
e. Proximity Fuzes.
f. German Research Facilities for Guided Missiles.
g. The Speer Ministry's Interest in Research.
h. Chemical Research.
i. Metallurgical Research.
j. Shale Oil Development.
k. Miscellaneous Intelligence. *

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* Ibid., Tab B, p. 2.

The initial stages of the cross-channel invasion failed to uncover any appropriate ALSOS targets but, early in August, upon collapse of the German defenses in Normandy and Brittany, it appeared likely that the Allies would soon liberate the town of Rennes. Since the University of Rennes might provide some valuable scientific information, the first mission group landed in France on 9 August 1944 and moved immediately to Rennes. At the university, Colonel Pash questioned two prominent faculty members and succeeded in securing a number of documents concerned with scientific activities currently underway in other French institutions, as well as several recent German physics and chemistry publications of important intelligence interest. He also made contact with Brig. Gen. E. L. Sibert, ACofS G-2, 12th Army Group, and completed arrangements for an advance ALSOS team to enter Paris along with the forward combat troops. This was considered of extreme importance because Dr. Frederic Joliot-Curie, the eminent French scientist and Nobel prize winner, could be expected to furnish the first tangible clues leading toward an accurate appraisal of German

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progress in atomic warfare. *

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* Info., p. 11. This advance ALSOS team was permitted to join Gen LeClerc's French 2nd Armored Div and thus could claim a valid claim for being the first American unit to enter Paris. It was composed of Col Pash, Maj. H. K. Calvert from the MANHATTAN Project Liaison Office in London and two CIC Special Agents, Gerald L. Beatson and Nathaniel W. Leonard.

Dr. Goudsmit, accompanied by the other scientific members of ALSOS, reached Paris on 27 August 1944, and two days later a main headquarters was established there at 2 Place de L'Opera. In addition to the Advance Team and Scientific Chief, key personnel of this original group were, as follows:

Dr. T. K. Sherwood (Chemistry and Chemical Engineering)
Dr. Wallace R. Brode (Chemistry and Infra-red Devices)
Dr. William Boyer (Chemistry and Chemical Engineering)
Dr. Clarence H. Richman (Guided Missiles)
Col. Martin B. Chittick (Chemical Warfare)
Col. Emerick Kutschke (Deputy Director, WD New Developments Div)
Lt. Col. R. H. Ranger (Signal Equipment)
Lt. Col. E. V. Foran (Shale Oil Development)
Capt. William J. Cromartie (Biological Warfare)
Capt. (USN) H. A. Schade (Senior Naval Representative)
Capt. (USN) W. P. Roop (Aeronautical Matters) *

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* Ibid., passim. ALSOS moved into the US Navy Headquarters building at 9 Rue Pronbourg, Paris, on 25 Sep 44.

Although Professor Joliot-Curie proved to be most cooperative, it was clearly evident that he knew little or nothing about the scientific

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research and development taking place within Germany itself. Nevertheless, the Paris area did contribute a number of valuable clues in that direction and they were diligently exploited. Rewarding targets were likewise investigated at Brussels, Antwerp, Toulouse, Marseilles, Eupen and Eindhoven by a succession of special teams operating under the personal command of Colonel Pash. These early ALSOS activities were executed in a remarkably speedy and aggressive manner, traits which continued to characterize all subsequent operations of the Mission.*

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* Ibid., pp. 12-16 and Goudsmit, op. cit., passim.

The most promising circumstance development during November 1944, was the possibility that Strasbourg might fall into American hands in the near future. Not only was the University of Strasbourg a prime target for the nuclear physicists but almost every other scientific group held important leads pointing directly toward the general Strasbourg area. The city was entered by an advance mission unit from Paris on 25 November 1944, while shells were still falling and the military situation remained badly confused. Notwithstanding, target sites were quickly secured, along with seven German physicists and chemists who had gone in hiding. Since this Strasbourg operation turned out to be the most fruitful of the entire ALSOS effort, it becomes desirable to list some of the more significant results stemming therefrom, as follows:

1. A document was obtained which revealed revealing that the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, headed by the famous atom physicist, Dr. Werner Heisenberg, had recently been evacuated from Berlin to the small village

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of Hechingen south of Stuttgart. Similarly, a letter addressed to Heisenberg described exactly what problems the Strasbourg group had been working on and several other communications referred specifically to uranium research. Another letter mentioned the fact that "large scale experiments" were being performed at an Army proving ground in the vicinity of Berlin, while seized correspondence further disclosed the Germans had unsuccessfully attempted to separate U-235 and were now centering their main attention on the construction of an uranium pile. Although the prominent theoretical physicist, Professor Von Weizsäcker had made good his escape, it was already becoming increasingly clear that the enemy would not be able to produce an atomic bomb for a considerable period of time to come. *

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* Goudsmit, op. cit., ch. VI.

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2. Prof. Eugene Haagen, ranking German virus expert, also eluded capture but left behind him a mass of clinical and documentary evidence which afforded the ALSOS bacteriological warfare specialists an excellent insight into latest German developments of that particular nature. Moreover, August Hirt, Professor of Anatomy and official SS representative at the University of Strasbourg, was found to have been furnishing Dr. Haagen with concentration camp victims for human experimental purposes. *

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* Ibid., pp. 73-75.

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3. U. S. Navy personnel attached to the mission were able to conduct a thorough investigation of important research work on torpedos being performed at the Bugatti-Trippel plant near Strasbourg. Likewise, Capt. (USN)

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H. P. Roop, naval member of ALSOS, accompanied by Mr. Henry J. E. Reid, engineer in charge of the Langley Field Laboratories of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, managed to complete a detailed study of jet engine progress at the Nathis plant of the Junkers organization. *

* "ALSOS Report"(C), Tab A1, pp. 20-21.

4. With evidence continuing to pour in from numerous field teams that the area was furnishing a wealth of scientific information for military intelligence use, an ALSOS Advance Base was established at Strasbourg on 30 November 1944, to facilitate the thorough exploitation of all available targets. *

* Ibid., pp. 22-23.

Despite these notable successes, the Strasbourg operation did serve to emphasize one basic fault in the existing ALSOS organization. Under the original plan it had been envisioned that only the Scientific Chief should become a permanent member of the scientific group and the Office of Field Service, OSRD, would then order appropriate experts to join the Mission whenever favorable targets were presented. Experience soon showed, however, that this system was unworkable because these selected scientists never happened to be on hand at the time they were most needed. Even after they did arrived, their respective superiors in Washington kept exerting strong pressure for them to be returned to regular duty despite the fact that the ALSOS task might still remain unfinished. Right after the fall of Strasbourg, for example, only Dr. Goudsmit and one other qualified physicist, Dr. Fred A. C. Wardenburg, were

immediately available to inform [illegible] question of German progress in nuclear warfare. [illegible] requests from the Scientific Chief himself, authority was eventually granted for Drs. Walter P. Colby, Carl A. Brown, Charles P. Smyth, and Gerard B. Kuiper, all highly regarded American scientists who were proficient in the German language, to be assigned to the mission on a full-time basis. *

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* Ibid., Tab B, pp. 2-3. Dr. Charles P. Smyth was a brother of the author of the famous Smyth Report, considered in many circles as having been prematurely revealing. During March 1945, OSRD also detailed Dr. E. C. Kemble to be Deputy Scientific Chief for ALSOS, hoping to lighten the heavy load on Dr. Goudsmit in the evaluation of captured German documents.

Strasbourg further pointed directly toward the necessity of keeping operational ALSOS units close enough to the front so they could promptly cover targets appearing within the combat area. Hence, throughout mid-winter 1944-45, therefore, active liaison was maintained not only with Headquarters SHAEF and ETO in Paris but also with Headquarters of the 21st Army Group (Montgomery) at Brussels, 12th Army Group (Bradley) at Verdun and 6th Army Group (Devers) at Vitel. Accordingly, as soon as the 12th Army Group commenced to prepare for a drive across the Rhine, it was found desirable to establish a second ALSOS advance base in Aachen, effective 25 February 1945. When German resistance along the west bank of the Rhine suddenly collapsed shortly thereafter, ALSOS personnel were thus able to investigate targets in the two important university cities of Cologne and Bonn without delay.

UNCLASSIFIED

Similarly, plans were soon coordinated with the 6th Army Group so that Colonel Pash could lead a "spearhead" group into Ludwigshaven on 22 March 1945, which enabled ALSOS scientists to start a general investigation of the huge I.G. Farben Industries plant and laboratories by the following day. *

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* Ibid., pp. 25-28. The Aachen advance base was moved to Gottingen on 20 Apr 45.

The next indicated major objective was undamaged Heidelberg, where the physics laboratory of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research under "Germany's foremost nuclear experimenter," Dr. Walter Bothe, was located. * Learning that an American Infantry Battalion had just secured

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* Goudsmit, op. cit., p. 77.

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the main part of that key city, Colonel Pash decided to risk an unescorted dash from Mannheim to Heidelberg accompanied by Drs. Wardenburg and T. Hogeness, the latter being a qualified consultant attached to ALSOS from the MANHATTAN Project. This bold move was successful and the group reached the Institute on the afternoon of 29 March 1945, with the scientific personnel commencing immediately to examine captured equipment and documents. They were then joined by Dr. Goudsmit and several additional scientific members of the Mission. At the same time, a new operational advance unit, known as "Lightning A," was concentrated some three miles from the center of town, while ALSOS rear headquarters was displaced forward from Paris to Heidelberg. * Although Professor Bothe proved perfectly willing to

201

* "ALSOS Report" (C), Tab A1, pp. 28-29. See also Ltr (S), Col Boris T. Pash, USA Ret, 16 Dec 57, to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist. Author's file.

demonstrate his cyclotron to the Scientific Chief and discuss many important research problems, he flatly refused to talk about any German war work as long as his country was an active belligerent. *

* Goudsmit, op. cit., pp. 78-80. Dr. Bothe presented quite a personal problem to Dr. Goudsmit because he was "an old acquaintance and colleague" and his "superior as a physicist."

Since the German defenses were now crumbling fast, it was not necessary for the ALSOS scientific personnel to tarry long in Heidelberg. They knew there was an experimental uranium pile laboratory located at Stadtilm in Thuringia to the north and a secret nuclear laboratory, operated by members of the Heisenberg group, at Hechingen in Wurttemberg to the south. The first of these targets opened up right away and, although the atomic pile was captured intact, it turned out to be a very small enterprise indeed. To make matters worse, the two key scientists in charge, Professors Diebner and Gerlach, had recently departed, taking along with them most of the material being used for uranium research. *

* Ibid., pp. 87-89. These two scientists and their nuclear materials were later seized in Munich by Maj Ham.

There was one more phase of German atomic bomb development still

UNCLASSIFIED

Russian activities because Strasbourg had revealed that attempts were being made to obtain pure U-235 by means of the centrifuge method at Celle, in the vicinity of Hanover. Since an advance group from Aachen under Major Fisher was already preparing to enter nearby Gottingen, the reported location of a principal office of the Reich Research Council, he was quickly informed about this possible target at Celle. * Investigation of the

* Ibid., pp. 92-94.

centrifuge project showed that it was only on an experimental scale but the Gottingen area did produce a large amount of valuable information. The Reich Research Council, Nazi counterpart of our own OSRD, had recently evacuated its regional branch to the adjoining village of Lindau, so Major Fisher's unit was able to capture Prof. Werner Osenberg, Chief of the Council Planning Board, along with most of his secret files. Unfortunately, however, there were now far too many different Allied agencies involved in the total scientific intelligence effort. Upon the insistence of Dr. Victor Frankel of the Scientific Advisory Section, G-2, SHAEF, and against Dr. Goudsmit's personal recommendation, it was decided to send all the Osenberg employees and records to Paris for further examination. This caused a serious delay, with the move alone along mixing up the records to such an extent that they could not be effectively exploited until after the end of the war. *

* "ALSOS Report" (C), Tab A1, pp. 31-34. A SHAEF Scientific Advisory Section had been created in an attempt to achieve some measure of co-ordination among the multitude of Allied agencies engaged in technical (scientific) intelligence activities on the continent. Some of the

more important of these agencies were: the Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC), of JCS, OSS, ALSOS, Navy Technical Mission Europe, British Bombing Research Mission, US Strategic Bombing Survey, and numerous technical organizations sponsored by the ASF and USAF. Dr. Goudsmit himself was a member of this SHAEF Committee. See: Thiesmeyer and Burchard, op. cit., pp. 174-78.

A fitting climax to these wartime ALSOS activities occurred during the latter part of April 1945, when Colonel Pash led a mobile task force organized under the 6th Army Group into southwest Germany for the specific purpose of seizing enemy scientific personnel, equipment and documents within the Hechingen area. Plans had previously been prepared to execute this indicated mission through a combined parachute-ground operation utilizing support elements from the Seventh Army and 13th Airborne Division, First Allied Airborne Army. With the rapidly changing tactical situation eliminating any need for the air drop, however, a special task force was hastily formed based upon the ALSOS "Lightning A" advance unit consisting of 14 U.S. officers, 7 British officers, 5 expert consultants, 8 CIC agents and 15 enlisted men, reinforced by an attached 1269th Combat Engineer Battalion (less Company "B"). *

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* "ALSOS Report" (C), Tab A1, pp. 37-38. See also: Ltr (S), Col Boris T. Pash, USA Ret, 16 Dec 57, to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist. Author's file. Col Pash was attached to Headquarters, 6th Army Group, and formally designated as the Commanding Officer, Special Task Force, for this particular operation. Although Brig Gen Eugene L. Harrison, ACofS G-2, 6th Army Group, accompanied the

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task force during its subsequent operations, he did so only under the status of "General Lovett's personal representative."

Despite frequent encounters with the enemy, this special task force managed to secure all assigned targets by 25 April 1945. In addition to numerous secret files and a sizable amount of nuclear material, it captured two prominent members of the Heisenberg research group, Professors Wirtz and Von Weizsäcker, along with the aging Prof. Otto Hahn original discoverer of uranium fission. While Dr. Heisenberg himself could not at first be found, he was eventually rounded up and turned over to the Heidelberg Base on 4 May 1945. Thence, even though the mission continued to operate at full speed for several months after the cessation of hostilities four days later, its main objectives had been successfully completed. *

* "ALSOS Report" (C), Tab A1, pp. 37-40.

ALSOS was terminated in ETO by direction of the ACofS G-2, WDGS, effective 15 November 1945, * but a "final deactivation of the Mil Scientific (ALSOS)

* Ibid., p. 48.

Mission" was not accomplished until 13 December 1945. *

* See: Memo 87, Ib, WDGS, 26 Dec 45, Mil 300.6 (1945). ACSI Rec Sec.

ALSOS not only proved to be an outstandingly successful wartime experiment but also was unique in American military intelligence annals. Moreover, it forcefully demonstrated that military and civilian scientific personnel could work together in the field on a cooperative basis so as to

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achieve favorable results. While the primary goal had been to find out whether or not the Germans possessed capable of constructing an atom bomb, which was correctly answered in the negative, this fact should not be permitted to hide its many other useful accomplishments. A total of 22 separate intelligence operations were planned and executed, with over 400 scientific reports submitted. The Mission further performed a number of important special assignments under most difficult conditions, such as securing plans and specifications for the ports of Antwerp and Bordeaux, and recovering the international radium standards that had been removed from Paris by the Germans. * In point of actual strength it never developed

* Ibid., Attached Ltr of Transmittal, Chief ALSOS to Chief MIS, 10 Dec 45, par. 6, 10 and 12.

into a very large group, reaching a peak of 102 persons shortly before the German surrender. Its remarkable record must be credited principally to the exceptional abilities and leadership displayed both by Colonel Pash and Dr. Goudsmit, coupled with the strong support it regularly received from MID and the Advisory Committee in Washington. ALSOS truly represented a major milestone in the military intelligence effort during World War II.

Elaborate plans were also made to form scientific intelligence groups similar to the ALSOS Mission for Japan and China. These additional projects failed to materialize mainly because of an inopportune dearth of top-grade American scientists possessing a thorough knowledge of oriental customs and either the Japanese or Chinese language. Nevertheless, during July 1945, Dr. Don Leet, eminent seismologist from Harvard University and a former

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Assistant of Japan, was selected by OMD to be the scientific intelligence consultant at Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC). Functioning directly under Brig. Gen. E. R. Thorpe, Deputy ACofS G-2 and Chief CIC, AFPAC, he arrived in Manila just in time to guide the final preparation of a project aimed at introducing scientific intelligence teams into Japan along with the initial occupation troops. This anticipatory action thus assured the prompt exploitation of all key scientific targets within that country right after V-J Day. *

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* Thiesmeyer and Burchard, op. cit., pp. 179-80.

It remains plainly evident, therefore, that the total technical intelligence effort during World War II was in reality an enormous undertaking. Starting out on a comparatively modest scale along traditional lines, the effort proceeded to gather momentum until it soon encompassed all the military technical services as well as most research agencies of the United States Government. Furthermore, it constantly reached into higher fields of scientific endeavor so that the military and civilian technical experts eventually finally found themselves working together side by side within the combat zone seeking a full determination of enemy capabilities for adapting latest scientific developments to modern warfare. Even though the effort was beset with numerous coordination difficulties and conflicts in functional responsibility, it did turn out to be markedly productive and contributed measurably to the eventual ultimate allied victory.

MID played an active and significant part in every phase of this complicated technical intelligence effort. With so many divergent groups

[illegible], it [illegible] for the [illegible] military intelligence agency to assume a more positive role in attempting to achieve some degree of effective coordination among them. It likewise seemed natural for the agency to take prompt steps to fill critical voids appearing in the program, even though they might demand some form of operational activity. It may thus be hoped that the varied experiences gained during the conduct of this vast technical intelligence effort will be advantageously applied in the future and help to eliminate or at least reduce the serious confusion which characterized much of its early existence during World War II.

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CHAPTER VII

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

The art of producing military intelligence is often said to consist of three basic steps, namely; collection, evaluation and dissemination. While this simplification remains essentially true, the three processes have never been easy to delimit in an organizational sense. Sometimes all three of them are performed by a single individual or unit but, in other cases, several different individuals or units may be called upon to collect, evaluate and disseminate the same information in turn. Likewise, more than one individual or unit may become separately involved in executing any one of the three major processes. For example, information can be collected either within the field or by a researcher in Washington and then evaluated successively by a number of individuals or units before it is considered ready for final dissemination. Even the act of dissemination itself can cover a wide range or combination of various means and methods, depending mainly upon the nature of the intelligence being presented.

Regardless of these organizational complexities, the production of foreign intelligence in the departmental agency has always been more or less concentrated under one relatively large unit holding a majority of the research analysts. Although the names given to this particular unit have varied from time to time and its assigned responsibilities regarding collection and dissemination seldom stayed fixed, it

has normally served as chief reliance for the Army in processing the huge mass of information regularly at hand. It thus comprises the very heart of intelligence production relating to the vital foreign field.

The duties of the research analysts within the military intelligence organization must be clearly understood. They are the acknowledged experts for any given area or specialty and actually produce most of the studies, surveys, summaries, etc., concerned therewith. Besides engaging in constant research, they peruse all incoming reports bearing upon their respective responsibilities, note each significant item and see that the reports are filed in accordance with a current intelligence index. Since the bulk of available information on any particular area or subject continues to remain a part of their own personal cognizance, they form an indispensible group for initiating intelligence production and interpreting whatever information has been received. It becomes apparent, therefore, that in view of the specialized nature of their work they can never be easily or quickly reorganized but this fact seems to have been consistently ignored by higher authority during World War II.

Prior to Pearl Harbor, with MID still a comparatively small agency and the time element involved in intelligence production not usually of an overriding interest, most of the research analysts were assigned to the I&S Intelligence Branch on a geographical basis. Similarly, personnel of this key branch were often authorized to supervise the collection of foreign information in the field and even prepare the resultant intelligence for final dissemination as required. Functioning directly under

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the ACofS G-2, WDGS, there was an intimate relationship established between the heads of the production units and officials involved in making intelligence estimates or policy determinations, as well as those conducting related operational activities. Individual researchers were further able to maintain informal liaison with corresponding personnel in other agencies of the government who might render assistance when appropriate. Nevertheless, noticeable defects were already commencing to appear in this MID production organization, due mostly to the marked inflexibility of a geographic approach to the difficult problem of intelligence specialization.

The sudden advent of global war and consequent rapid expansion in all categories of military activities soon brought about an organizational crisis for MID, especially with reference to the Intelligence Branch. Satisfactory coordination procedures were much more difficult to contrive devise and there was an acute shortage of experienced research analysts. To complicate matters, the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office promptly embarked upon a crusade aimed at reducing the total size of the WDGS through transferring all operational activities either to Special Staff sections or Commands in the appropriate field commands.—This threatened to upset the efficient production of military intelligence because MID had no suitable special staff section to turn to in relinquishing its so-called operational functions. Moreover, just as long as the ACofS G-2, WDGS, remained charged with collecting, evaluating and disseminating military intelligence, he could never be properly divorced from any of his fundamental responsibilities relative thereto. Despite strenuous objections advanced by an authoritative panel of experienced intelligence officials, however, a Committee

UNCLASSIFIED

for War Department General Staff Reorganization under General Kellarney, the Deputy Chief of Staff, officially recommended that MID should be reorganized along such lines. *

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* "Hist G-2 Office and Secretariat" (S), pp. 2-3. The indicated panel of military intelligence officials was composed of Brig Gen Raymond E. Lee, recently assigned as the new ACofS G-2, WDGS, plus Cols Hayes B. Kroner and C. Y. Banfill.

Effective 9 March 1942, in conjunction with a general reorganization of the War Department General Staff, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, the ACofS G-2 was directed to form a Military Intelligence Service (MIS) separate and distinct from MID "to operate and administer the service of the collection, compilation and dissemination of military intelligence." At the same time, the ACofS G-2 was also required to perform "those duties in the War Department General Staff relating to the collection, evaluation and dissemination of military information." *

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* WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42.

While this obvious contradiction plainly foreshadowed future difficulties, the accepted goal of the reorganization was to consolidate all operational intelligence activities within the new MIS and leave the MID remnant free to pursue duties strictly of a general staff nature. The principal trouble

with their dictated solution was that these two types of activities were in many instances so closely interwoven it became practically impossible to dissociate one from the other.

The new MIS was plainly intended to be much more than an expanded and semi-independent Intelligence Branch. In attempting to make it into a fully inclusive production unit, the service was not only given the total foreign intelligence mission but also the former Counterintelligence Branch in its entirety. It was even assigned certain executive functions pertaining to military attaches, foreign liaison, psychological warfare, training and administration. With the ACofS G-2, WDGS, unable to delegate either his inherent counterintelligence duties or command responsibilities bearing upon military attaches, training and administration, this radical departure was doomed from the start. On 5 May 1942, therefore, shortly after Maj. Gen. George V. Strong took over as the ACofS G-2, WDGS, he submitted an official memorandum to the Chief of Staff asking for permission to abolish it. When this request was disapproved, he simply decided to ignore the directed organization and from then on MIS existed largely in the form of a paper unit for the official record until the end of his tour of duty in February 1944. *

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* "Hist G-2 Office and Secretariat" (S), pp. 4-6.

Under the imposed March 1942 reorganization, the earlier Intelligence Branch of MID was redesignated the Intelligence Group of MIS. While this action caused few changes in the functions and operations applicable to the unit as a whole, it did provide a convenient opportunity for

213

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

altering its internal organization. Accordingly, the geographic character of the main subordinate sections was retained but, in keeping with a recently adopted OPD organization, they were adjusted along theater lines and renamed the Atlantic, African and Mediterranean, Asiatic, Pacific, Caribbean and Latin American, and China Theater Sections. A small Situation and Planning Branch was also created to provide necessary centralized review and direction over these theater units. At the same time, in order to satisfy the ever-growing demand for more and better foreign air intelligence, each of the new sections was split into two distinct parts, one designed to handle air and the other ground intelligence matters. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), General History of the Military Intelligence Service, Appendix B, Chart, 14 Mar 42.

During January 1943, after this particular solution had failed to accomplish the intended results, a single Air Group was established with the subordinate sections thereof still organized geographically. *

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* Ibid., Chart dated 8 Jan 43.

Although the geographic approach to intelligence specialization continued to exhibit a number of serious faults, as long as the war was being fought on a theater basis and most of the research analysts had been developed in the form of area experts, it appeared neither feasible nor desirable to nullify the system to any material degree at least for the present. On the other hand, there were constant pressures tending to force it into a compromise. These pressures stemmed chiefly from the

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mounting need for emphasizing certain individual phases of intelligence production, plus the fact that functional specialists were much more readily available than research analysts trained along broad geographic lines. Such matters, therefore, as Order of Battle, Who's Who, Technical Intelligence, Map and Photo, and Communications Intelligence soon grew into separate fields of endeavor. Special collection and dissemination units were also formed, thus withdrawing the research personnel from active participation in those two phases of the intelligence process. Even though this greater specialization was often advantageous from its own limited standpoint, the combination of two different organizational systems, functional versus geographical, working side by side within the departmental agency proved to be most disturbing and added measurably to the difficulties encountered in achieving a satisfactory coordination of effort for the entire system.

As the war progressed and MIS was forced to expand both in point of size and complexity, the organizational problem for intelligence production finally reached overwhelming proportions. * Reorganization soon became

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* MIS reached a peak in authorized military strength on 6 Oct 44, when it was allotted 1512 officers, 51 warrant officers and 2083 enlisted men. Only 606 of these officers and none of the warrant officers or enlisted men, however, were on duty within the Military District of Washington (excluding Fort Hunt). See: "List MIS" (S), Personnel Branch, Tab C. Maximum MIS strength in civilian personnel occurred during Apr 44, when a total of 1162 was authorized. See: Monthly WDGS Rpt (C), Authorization and Strengths for Personnel Operating in Z/I Establishment, 30 Apr 44. Office of the Army Comptroller.

215

the order of the day, with the trend toward functional specialization observably increasing at the expense of geographic delineation. Because of the theater character of the war, it was still deemed impracticable to do away with the latter system completely but, on 25 January 1943, the Chief of MIS chose to declare that:

> b. In the organization of G-2 - MIS, emphasis is placed on the production and dissemination of intelligence on a functional basis. The primary objective is to provide the best possible means and methods for the collection, compilation, evaluation and interpretation of military information and for the dissemination of intelligence. Emphasis is further placed on responsibility for service and coordination thereof rather than on command.
>
> c. Lateral cooperation by all echelons under the coordination and control of the Chiefs of Groups is the keynote of MIS. All internal organizations will provide for smooth functioning and supervision thereof; prompt handling of information and expeditious reports, studies or memoranda thereon. Required throughout G-2 - MIS is regular and early impulse forcing prompt action on matters, whether formally or informally referred. *

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* Ibid., General History of the Military Intelligence Service, Appendix B, Copy of Memo No. 18, 25 Jan 43.

This was certainly an excellent goal to pursue but much easier said than done, especially as nobody seemed really satisfied with the production organization that had grown up during the more than two years following Pearl Harbor. It was not only too complicated but also severely handicapped by the artificial separation imposed between AGO and MIS from above. Finally, in September 1943, General Strong decided to take decisive action and ordered a brand new organization based upon the current production system but doing away entirely with the MIS concept. Since that

agency continued to enjoy an official status, however, the chart announcing the true organization had to be marked "For Use Within MID only."*

* Ibid., Chart, 22 Sep 43.

Although this non-MIS organization for intelligence production only remained in being approximately six months, it seems worthy of special attention since it represented the considered action of the military intelligence authorities themselves after two years of war experience and without any outside influence. It was still a compromise between purely functional and geographical systems but, because they operated independently only at the lower level, there was apparently no significant conflict. The former Chief of MIS thus became a Deputy ACofS G-2 for Intelligence and was charged with supervising five main subordinate units designated as the Planning and Strategy Group, Collection Group, Order of Battle Branch, Prisoner of War Branch and Theater Group. The Theater Group was in turn broken down into an American Unit, European Unit, Pacific Unit, Dissemination Unit, Intelligence Liaison Section and Foreign Press Section. While undoubtedly far from perfect, this production organization was at least characterized by a certain amount of clarity and simplicity.

Meanwhile the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office was merely awaiting the end of General Strong's tour of duty in order to restore MIS and alter the existing intelligence production system. Accordingly, on 7 February 1944, the day after General Strong's departure, Brig. Gen. Otto Nelson, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, published a directive calling for a detailed study

and recommendations regarding all "to obtain maximum concentration on those functions most productive of the war effort." Tasked to perform this complicated task were representatives from the Inspector Generals' Department, Operations Division, Statistics and Personnel branches of OCS, and Bureau of the Budget. Final determination in the matter would then be made by Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, Maj. Gen. John P. Smith of OSS, Maj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, the new ACofS G-2, [illegible], and General Nelson himself. * As previously described, the resultant

* "Hist G-2 Office and Secretariat" (S), p. 6.

reorganization was actually derived from a brief but intensive investigation of MID (MIS) carried out under the personal supervision of Brig. Gen. E. D. Cooke, ICD.

This second dictated reorganization, which took place during the month of June 1944, not only reestablished the MIS but also introduced a completely new concept of military intelligence production. It did away entirely with the geographic system insofar as the research sections were concerned by transforming them into functional units designated as Military, Topographic, Political, Economic, Sociological, Scientific and Who's Who. At the same time, it superimposed directly over these functional units a group of individual officer "Specialists" who were intended to operate along geographical lines in the guise of German, Japanese, Western Hemisphere, Domestic etc., production experts. * This inconsistent

* "Hist MIS" (S), General History of the Military Intelligence Service, Appendix B, Chart, 24 Apr 44.

situation could hardly be expected to work out in a satisfactory manner

and it never did. As a matter of fact, even the specialist theory itself was soon found wanting in practical application due to the unattainable demands it constantly made on the officers assigned to that responsible duty. *

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* Ibid., History of the Specialists, series two, III, pt. 1, pp. 1-5.

In forcing this new production system upon MID, the reorganizers had expressed a strong feeling that the departmental agency was bogged down in a time-consuming effort devoted to processing an immense mass of useless material. Although it certainly remained true that a great deal of the information flowing into the agency did turn out to be of no value, the only persons qualified to reach this specific conclusion were the research analysts specializing in the particular subject involved. The experience of Pearl Harbor alone should have been enough to convince the reorganizers of this basic fact, when certain items of collected information appeared to be either fantastic or immaterial but actually held the key to an enemy capability which was later adopted against the United States with disastrous surprise. Thus, all information received by the departmental intelligence agency regardless of source must be most carefully checked and interpreted before being discarded, even though this burdensome task may well call for processing a huge amount of worthless material.

The whole idea of attempting to change the production system in the midst of a major war and against the expressed wishes of experienced military intelligence authorities was patently ill-advised. The reorganizers

themselves admitted they were groping in the dark and plainly held an insufficient background in the devious complexities of the total subject. The new system studiously ignored the important factor that most of the available research analysts had been trained on a geographic basis, so it would be extremely difficult to develop another comparable group under normal conditions and practically impossible during wartime. Moreover, by directing the creation of functional research units to serve the production system, the reorganizers demonstrated a fatal lack of appreciation that the very same type of organization had already been tried during World War I with unsatisfactory results. It still remained just as difficult as ever to determine whether or not some particular item of information fell within a military, political, economic or sociological category, since these wide fields of human endeavor were now completely interrelated. While such a functional separation might look fine on an organization chart, these standard classifications were in reality so overlapping they would undoubtedly continue to generate a great deal of duplication and confusion in performance of the military intelligence process.

Despite these serious handicaps, the new MID-MIS organization did accomplish several worthwhile and progressive improvements in the intelligence production system, the most outstanding of these being one that was long overdue. Even with the lesson of Pearl Harbor before them, the departmental authorities had stubbornly resisted the dire necessity to integrate successfully all information obtained from communications intelligence activities into the regular production effort. They had thus chosen to maintain a Special Branch for the express purpose of handling such

information which, because of stringent security regulations, could only be shared with a very select few of the top production officials. This meant that the rest of the research personnel were ordinarily left in the dark as to what information was additionally available on their respective specialties from communications intelligence sources. Yet these same research personnel were held responsible for producing the bulk of intelligence disseminated by the departmental agency.

Under the June 1944 reorganization, this notably disadvantageous arrangement was resolved in favor of a much fuller distribution of communications intelligence information within MIS. The Special Branch was abolished and its personnel transferred into the new functional research units where they could work right along with the other analysts. While communication intelligence material still needed special handling and could not be given to all the regular researchers, the general effect of this innovation was to assure a more accurate correlation and evaluation of the total information available. Furthermore, it was often found practicable to disseminate the complete intelligence on a wider basis through concealing its true source under the pretense of making logical deductions from less secret material. * If action along these particular lines had been

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* "MID Hist WW II," pp. 143-44.

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taken prior to Pearl Harbor, the chances are that the ensuing disaster might well have been averted or at least minimized.

Another favorable step directed by the reorganizers was to establish an Intelligence Library for use as a central filing agency by all the research

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units. This not only proved to be much more convenient in the long run but also tended to develop better coordination procedures. At the moment, however, it called for breaking up the old files and starting new ones during a most critical phase of the war, right after the start of the Normandy invasion. *

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* Ibid., pp. 142-43.

The basic character of the June 1944 reorganization for MID (MIS) remained generally unchanged during the rest of the wartime period but it was not long before General Bissell had to accept some essential adjustments in it. For example, by December 1944, it had become clearly apparent that the ACofS G-2, WDGS, could not properly delegate his inherent counterintelligence policy and coordination responsibilities to the Chief of MIS, so a small Security Branch was reconstituted within MID proper. Similarly, since the reorganization had at first only vaguely defined the geographic areas applicable to each of the officer Specialists, their number, soon increased from five to nine and they were granted a sizable staff of assistants. In August 1944, Col. Ivan D. Yeaton, the Russian Specialist was further designated to act as "Coordinator of Specialists." Even then, there was still a great deal of confusion among them regarding their specific areas of assignment, while important segments of the world continued to receive little expert attention. The individually capable Specialists strove to carry on as best they could but with OPD organized on a theater basis and their own MIS researchers operating along functional lines, the crippling contradictions of the new system were just too much for them. *

* "Hist MIS" (S), History of the Specialists, series two, III, part 1, passim. Effective 11 May 45, after the German surrender, the total number of Specialists was cut back to five.

Because of the marked trend toward reorganization and ever-changing aspects of the war itself, it becomes exceedingly difficult to follow the detailed development of each individual research unit connected with the production of military intelligence for MID (MIS) during World War II. Nevertheless, it does seem essential to a proper understanding of the production process to delve into that intricate subject at least for illustrative purposes. The Southwest Pacific Branch of the Far Eastern Unit has been selected to undergo this type of examination, since it was neither one of the larger nor smaller of the numerous research groups and its organizational progress remained on the whole comparatively simple.

When MIS was first formed in March 1942, the existing Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch, MID, was merely renamed the Far Eastern Branch of MIS. At this particular time, it included five geographic sections covering Japan-Manchuria, China, Southern Asia, Pacific, and Southwest Pacific areas. Shortly afterwards it was redesignated as the Far Eastern Group, while its subordinate sections were elevated to branch status.* Col. H. W. Pettigrew was the group chief and continued

* "Hist MIS" (S), History of the Far Eastern Unit, series two, II, pt. 1, p. 2.

223

to serve in that same capacity until February 1944. He was then ordered to join the US Military Mission in Moscow for the primary purpose of initiating an exchange of intelligence on the Far East with the Red Army General Staff.*

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* See: Ltr, Col E. W. Pettigrew, USA Ret, to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist, 11 Oct 57. Author's file.

The Southwest Pacific Branch of the Far Eastern Group was altered organizationally on or about 10 October 1942, to parallel a corresponding theater unit in OPD and to promote an intimate working relationship with the G-2 Section of Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. It then consisted of 4 officers, 5 research analysts and 2 clerks, and was divided into three sections aimed at providing necessary specialization in intelligence production for the Philippines, East Indies and Australia-New Guinea Sectors. All the assigned researchers and most of the officers possessed an intimate knowledge of their respective areas and were fairly fluent in the languages applicable thereto. Col. J. K. Evans, the branch chief, thus felt that his unit should accomplish the following specific tasks:

1. The preparation of combat (except air), economic and political estimates and special studies on the area for the ACofS G-2, OPD and JIC as requested.

2. The furnishing of lecturers on the Far East for MIS orientation and instruction courses as requested.

3. The maintenance of effective liaison with other branches of the Far Eastern Unit, other branches of MIS, and other divisions of the War Department and government agencies at all levels.

4. The furnishing of information to OPD as requested or spontaneously via the Chief of Branch or Branch members.

5. The maintenance of continuous estimates of the situation where Allied forces are in contact with the enemy, including a running account of current operations.

6. Daily contact with officers of the Air Group, ONI (via two-way liaison officers) and personnel of the Situation Room of the Dissemination Branch in the maintenance of maps and the interpretations of information used.

7. The advising, checking and informing of personnel of the Publications Section of the Dissemination Branch and the Training and Liaison Section, MIS, for publications, training manuals and language projects.

8. The writing of a daily and monthly theater summary on countries within the area of responsibility, with those already published to be maintained current.

9. The writing and publishing of strategic surveys on countries within the area of responsibility, with those already published to be maintained current.

10. Each section of the Branch to be charged with:

a. Keeping complete Index Guide file of all available information and sources of information of subjects for geographic areas including military, political, economic, sociological and geographic aspects; and the data to consist of reports, pictures, maps, place name files, newspaper clippings, et. al. to be gathered from all available sources, including interviews with returned personnel or those having specific knowledge of certain areas as well as from close contact with government agencies such as ONI, OSS, BEW, State, Interior, CAA and OWI.

b. Writing strategic surveys as requested by OPD and maintaining each one current.

c. The evaluation and decision on dissemination of FA, MO, MIS or Branch reports or summaries on areas, together with the professional supervision and guidance of those sources on the collection of information.

d. Fulfilling spot requests from OPD, MIS and other agencies on the current situation and background material. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), History of the Far Eastern Unit, series two, II, pp. 1-2.

This allocability list of the many different intelligence functions being performed during the fall of 1942 by the Southwest Pacific Branch of the far eastern group furnishes a valuable insight into several previously mentioned matters. In the first place, with historic land, sea and air battles occurring daily within its assigned area of specialization, a unit of that limited size was obviously none too large to accomplish the important work it had to do. The comparative simplicity of a geographic approach to research specialization likewise became plainly apparent, in that the branch was fully capable of producing all types of intelligence (except air) on its given area, as well as preparing this intelligence for dissemination either directly or via some other appointed agency. There was, therefore, never any question in regard to where incoming information bearing upon the Southwest Pacific should be routed and the lines of production responsibility remained firmly fixed. The chief problem was to achieve an adequate coordination of effort with associated units functioning in the same manner for either companion or adjacent areas. This could easily be accomplished whenever the parent group and corresponding outside units were also geographically organized but it was always made much more difficult if any part of the production system had been changed to obtain a functional concentration. Such concentration had recently taken place in the case of air intelligence and was about to happen for Order of Battle and Who's Who.

The matter of achieving favorable coordination for their intelligence production through personal liaison soon became too much for members of the Southwest Pacific Branch to handle. In addition to the multitude

of War Department and other governmental agencies involved, the branch was called upon to establish formal liaison with official representatives from the Philippine Commonwealth, Australian Military Mission and Netherlands Military Mission in Washington. This was believed essential in order to assure the free exchange of information with these Allied groups about progress of the war in the Pacific. During the latter part of 1943, however, MIS finally instituted reading panel procedures and from then on routine coordination could be observed through that convenient method for such agencies as ONI, OSS, OSRD, FEA, AAF and the various Army technical services. Nonetheless, personal liaison still had to be maintained at all levels with OPD and the principal production elements of MIS. *

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* Ibid., p. 5.

Research techniques of this Southwest Pacific Branch were designed to bring about the prompt filing of incoming information in accordance with the intelligence index guide, so that it would be readily available for subsequent consideration if and when required. Situation maps were also kept continuously posted for each operational area, thus providing a handy day to day reference for all concerned. Sources of information proved to be both voluminous and varied, as best expressed by the branch officials themselves in the following terms:

> In general, sources of information consisted of reports from Command headquarters, pictures, maps, gazetteers, journals, interviews, and various documents transmitted from such agencies as ONI, OSS, BEW, State Department and OWI. Of these, the most useful were the Terrain Studies compiled in SWPA, the Air Corps Intelligence Summaries forwarded weekly from SWPA, the MA and MO and various ONI reports forwarded from Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch areas. Extensive

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Information was obtained in the early stages from Australian journals, from newspapers and from such publications as the Pacific Islands monthly. Towards the latter part of the Branch's existence, aerial photographs of the entire Netherlands East Indies area and of the New Guinea and Bismarcks area were invaluable sources of information on Japanese developments. *

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* Ibid.

It seems apparent, therefore, that the core of intelligence production within MID (MIS) was basically a matter of pick and shovel research rather than one demanding more glamorous methods. This down to earth approach not only called for fully trained research personnel steeped in all aspects of their respective areas of assignment but also a considerable number of them. Although the Southwest Pacific Branch had not expanded nearly as rapidly as some of the larger European geographic branches, at the time of the June 1944 reorganization it was almost twice its original strength. Moreover, in support of operational plans for mounting the drive to seize Pacific islands along the direct route to Tokyo, it had been forced to organize a new Central Pacific Section. That the branch did produce an imposing array of basic military intelligence became manifest in light of its own report on dissemination procedures, as follows:

> Dissemination was provided via daily and monthly summaries of intelligence cabled to the Theater Commands; weekly Estimates of the Enemy Situation distributed to MIS; MIS Surveys published from time to time; area studies and spot reports submitted to OPD and JCS; distribution of pertinent information from PA, NID, G-2 Periodic Reports to various interested agencies in MIS, OPD and USMF as well as to other agencies in Washington. Among the outstanding studies made in the Branch were the Strategic Studies made of the Philippines area, Sumatra, Madang-Hansa-Gumata Area of New Guinea, Australian Port Studies, and numerous estimates dealing with Japanese movements and concentrations in the whole of the Southwest Pacific Area. *

* Ibid., p. 6.

By mid-summer 1944, the Southwest Pacific Branch of MIS had become duly recognized as the proper central repository for and major producer of military intelligence on its given area of responsibility. Besides, since the key personnel of the branch remained virtually unchanged, they were thoroughly competent to function in the role of experts with reference to their assigned duties. Even though the geographic system for producing military intelligence may have displayed some serious faults, it was plainly operating in a satisfactory manner at this lower level. To choose to upset it during such a crucial period of the war would appear to be almost unthinkable but that is exactly what happened. In June 1944, higher authority directed the establishment of a completely different system of military intelligence production, so the Southwest Pacific Branch ceased to exist. Its files were abruptly broken up and moved into a Central Intelligence Library, while its research analysts were transferred to new functional-type branches. Every possible effort was made to shift these highly trained personnel into units where their previous experience might be useful but this goal could only be partially attained. The immediate result was a period of utter confusion, with a complete MIS breakdown averted mainly through individual efforts on the part of the working members themselves. They realized what had to be done and simply went ahead and did it regardless of obstacles.

The newly adopted intelligence research organization for MIS was

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featured by seven functional branches specializing in Military, Topographical, Political, Economic, Sociological, Scientific and Who's Who matters, with a Supervisor of Research placed directly over them. There was also a parallel but separate group, under a Supervisor of Reports, charged with preparing intelligence reports for publication. In theory, these two groups were supposed to furnish needed information to the officer Specialists who were performing as experts for certain broad geographic areas. Actually, however, when this planned relationship failed to work out in a suitable manner, the Specialists had to undertake research and develop intelligence on their own. The entire production effort was controlled by a Director of Intelligence operating under the Chief, MIS. * Sharing the same top level with that Director

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* Director of Intelligence, MIS, from 4 Jun 44 to 1 Oct 45, was Col Alfred McCormack, Mr McCloy's pre-war law partner, who had received a temporary appointment as Col AUS effective 22 Jun 42, after serving for a brief period in the civilian capacity of Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. He was then assigned to MIS as Deputy Chief of the Special Branch. See: AG 201 McCormack, Alfred. DPRD TAG.

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were a Director of Administration and a Director of Information, the latter being called upon to supervise all collection activities and distribute incoming reports. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), General History of the Military Intelligence Service, Tab B, Chart, 23 Dec 44.

220

The largest of the seven functional research units in MIS was the Military Branch. Created on 6 June 1944, with Col. J. R. Lovell in charge, it was chiefly an outgrowth of the earlier Order of Battle Branch which had been established in September 1943. Consisting initially of Headquarters, European Order of Battle, Pacific Order of Battle and Military Research Sections, it proceeded to develop rapidly both in point of size and complexity. Since the existing Military Research Section was already deeply engaged in such diverse operations as the exploitation of captured documents and analysis of Japanese nameplates, this particular unit was shortly broken up into four new sections designated as Military Research, Air Industry, Pacific MIRS and German Military Document Sections. At the same time, its Cartographic and Documents Control Desks were transferred to the Headquarters Section. The residual Military Research Section was then able to concentrate upon preparing detailed foreign army studies from the following standpoints:

Organization
Manpower
Weapons and Equipment
Uniforms and Insignia
Fortifications and Defence
Tactics and Strategy
Logistics and Administration *

* Ibid., Military Research Section, series two, pt. 3, tab 8, sec. 5, pp. 1-3.

The Pacific Order of Battle Section of the Military Branch was held primarily responsible among all Allied agencies for producing intelligence concerned with ~~bearing upon~~ Japanese ground and air order of battle. In accomplishing

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this critical task, it was required to formulate periodic estimates of Japanese Army and Air Force strength and locations which were given a very wide distribution. Because the demands for such intelligence kept increasing steadily as the war against Japan expanded, it soon became the largest section of the branch.* In order to procure qualified

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* "MID Hist Sec II" (S), p. 108. By the end of the war, there were approximately 295 persons assigned to the Pacific Order of Battle Section.

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personnel for this specialized work, it was eventually found necessary to open a Pacific Order of Battle School. This training project turned out to be so successful that, during October 1944, its scope was broadened into a full-scale Far East Intelligence School. Five classes in all were completed at the two schools, with a total of 202 students graduating. Of these, 139 were retained for duty within MIS while the rest were released for assignment to other intelligence agencies.*

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* Ibid., pp. 191-92. Most of this special training took place at Camp Ritchie but with the Military Branch providing the instructors.

During April 1945, the Military Branch took direct charge of an "Intelligence Committee on Japanese Antiaircraft Defense," designed to intensify and integrate the production of intelligence bearing upon that important subject. This committee at first included only regular repre-

232

sentatives from the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence, the Director of Intelligence of the ASF and Assistant Chief of Staff of the AGF but the Director of Naval Intelligence, Coordinator of Research and Development in the Navy Department, and Director of the New Developments Division of the War Department, were later invited to participate and promptly chose to do so. As a result, effective 27 July 1945, the Japanese antiaircraft analysis units of the Army, Navy and Army Air Force were amalgamated into one single group, which was then authorized to work in the Pentagon under operational control of A-2, AAF. Known as ANFLAK, this joint group sought to determine the specific location, capabilities and performance of all Japanese ground antiaircraft units, a most urgent military intelligence requirement.*

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Activities of the Intelligence Committee on Japanese Ground Antiaircraft," series two, pt. 3, tab 8, pp. 1-5. Much of the technical research for ANFLAK was carried out at the Army Ground Force AAA School, Fort Bliss, Texas.

The Topographic Branch of MIS also developed from a functional unit that was already in existence. Even before the outbreak of World War II there had been a Geographic Section in MID and, although from time to time its name was changed either to the Topographic Branch or Map and Photo Branch, it continued to remain as a separate entity. Under the June 1944 reorganization, however, the previous Topographic Branch became mainly a research element, with its Map Service and Photo Intelligence and Interpretation Reports Section formed into a Map and Photo Branch under the Supervisor of Source Control. The principal mission of the

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new Topographic Branch was to prepare text and maps for the military geography chapters of the Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), while furnishing topographical studies and estimates as requested by the JIC or other committees of the JCS establishment. The Chief of the Topographic Branch, Col. Sidney P. Poole, further represented MID (MIS) on the Joint Topographical Subcommittee of JIC and the War Department on the United States Geographical Name Board. *

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* Ibid., Topographic Branch, series two, III, pt. 3, tab 4, pp. 6-7.

Organized into Cartographic, Terrain and Transportation Sections, the Topographic Branch was soon called upon to devote the bulk of its research attention to the Pacific area. Since the JANIS publications were not being produced at a fast enough rate to keep pace with actual operations in the war against Japan, a major effort along these lines was clearly indicated. From June 1944 to August 1945, JANIS studies were completed for China East Coast, China South Coast, Formosa, Hokkaido, Central and Northern Honshu, Southwest Japan, Kamchatka, Kurile Islands, Nansei Shoto, Philippines, Southeastern Siberia, Korea and Borneo. Similar studies were also well along in preparation at the time of the Japanese surrender covering Indo China, Manchuria, China North Coast, Sakhalin and Java-Timor. The information derived from these detailed surveys thus proved to be of great value to all departmental and theater planning agencies during the successful conduct of the closing phases of the Japanese war. * .

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* Ibid., p. 7

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The military intelligence officials found it extremely difficult to devise a satisfactory basis for utilizing their new Political and Economic Branches in connection with production. Because other agencies of the government still held a primary responsibility for research on foreign political and economic matters, MIS remained largely dependent upon outside sources in order to obtain needed information of that particular nature. It seemed easy enough to say the War Department was only interested in political and economic intelligence having military implications but when it came to actually delimiting these two vast fields through this nebulous criterion, serious confusion and duplication resulted. Under modern conditions political, economic and military considerations are much too closely interrelated to permit of any effective spearation along such simple lines.

It soon became apparent that the original idea of forming worldwide Political and Economic Branches within MIS would not work. Accordingly, in November 1944, an expedient was adopted which called for transferring the Far Eastern Section of the Political Branch to the Economic Branch and assigning the European unit of the Economic Branch to the Political Branch. There were then two mixed Political-Economic Branches operating as part of the research organization, one for Europe and the other for the Far East. In further compromising the pure theory of functional intelligence production, the subordinate elements of these new branches were established on a geographic basis. The principal effort of both branches finally narrowed down to performing required research on foreign political and economic factors so as to furnish the departmental planning agencies

UNCLASSIFIED

with adequate information for estimating enemy capabilities relative to industrial potential, significant political events, target data etc. Moreover, being so awkwardly placed in an organization sense, they consistently ran into major coordination difficulties. *

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* "[illegible] Hist Rpt II" (S), pp. 146-49.

The term "sociological" is also noticeably flexible and indeterminate but this seems to have been more of an advantage than a handicap to its use as a functional designation in the MIS production system. A wide variety of long-range research projects could thus be assigned to the Sociological Branch without violating generally accepted organizational standards. As a matter of fact there appears to be a definite need in any military intelligence agency for a separate unit of such type to handle the many miscellaneous research projects which may become necessary/desirable. While the new Sociological Branch was never very large, it did contribute a number of valuable studies on more or less unrelated subjects in furthering the over-all research effort. Operating under an elastic mission "to analyze and evaluate sociological developments of military import throughout the world," it was divided into four sections covering Japan, China and Southeast Asia, Germany and Russia, and Population and Manpower. Col. J. W. Coulter, MI Reserve, the branch chief, possessed an impressive academic background in human geography and had been serving on active duty within MIS (MIS) ever since June 1941. He was, therefore, ideally suited for this particular assignment because he could combine his professional qualifications with practical experience in the special problems of

military intelligence production. It was difficult enough during wartime to secure the services of eligible civilians trained in prominent sociological fields but almost impossible to find them with the added knowledge of military intelligence practices and procedures. *

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* "First MIS" (S), Sociological Branch, series two, III, pt. 3, tab 5, pp. 3-5.

In view of the broad extent of their assigned specialties, personnel of the MIS Sociological Branch were called upon to establish personal liaison with numerous officials in outside agencies who were occupied in kindred or comparable fields. A special effort was also needed to avoid duplication in the conduct of sociological research throughout the government, so frequent informal conferences were held with appropriate personnel from the State Department, OSS, FEA, National Research Council, Navy Department, Ethnogeographic Board and American Council of Learned Societies. Reports prepared by the branch were not only utilized within MID (MIS) itself but also distributed to several JCS committees, ONI and the State Department, normally by means of the regular JIC Weekly Summary but sometimes in the form of periodic intelligence bulletins. *

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* Ibid., p. 7.

The following list of selected projects serves to illustrate the widely varied scope of the intelligence studies which were produced by the Sociological Branch of MIS, over the period from June 1944 to April 1945:

1. Analysis of trends, backgrounds, attitudes etc.

Russia's attitude in the Far East and towards religion.
Regional background of recent disorders in Sinkiang.
Attitudes of the people of N.E.I. toward the Japanese and vice versa.
Attitudes of intellectuals and students within the Central Government area of China.
Burmese attitudes toward the Chinese, American and British Forces.

2. Psychological warfare analysis.

Organization and techniques of Chinese Communist psychological warfare.
Psychological warfare activity of Koreans functioning with the Chinese Communists.
Japanese propaganda pattern in China.

3. Reports on foreign civilian and military morale.

German civilian and military morale between 29 Dec 44 and 1 May 45 (series of twenty reports).
Relationship between the number of Allied casualties and German prisoners of war.

4. Manpower and population surveys.

Manpower estimates for Japan, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, N.E.I. and other Asiatic countries.
Estimate of future (to 1970) Russian population.
Survey of Japanese labor force as of 1945 (for JCS).

5. Miscellaneous studies.

Distinguishing physical characteristics of Chinese and Japanese (for 14th Air Force).
Revision of war criminal identification standards for the Japanese (requested by JAG).
Criticism of dramatic radio scripts with reference to ethnological accuracy (for I and E Branch, ASF).
Continuous study of effectiveness of Allied psychological warfare against Japan. *

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* Ibid., pp. 1-3. There was a Propaganda Branch in MID at this same time but, being primarily a policy group, its personnel were not considered capable of scientific research or analysis pertaining to that little understood subject.

Due to the fact that after the decision was first made to have a Sociological Branch in MIS it then took practically a whole year to provide the unit with a full complement of qualified personnel, the principal recommendation presented in its official history seems highly pertinent. It consisted of the pointed statement that: "several well-trained sociologists who have demonstrated their proficiency in long-range intelligence research should be included in any permanent intelligence organization of the War Department."*

* Ibid.

Since the operations of the Air Scientific Branch have already been discussed in detail under Technical (scientific) intelligence, it should suffice merely to add here that research regarding foreign developments along such lines appears to lend itself well to functional specialization in the production of military intelligence. This remains especially true for efforts to discover the possible adaptation by hostile or potentially hostile powers of latent technological advances to the art of waging war because an examination of that nature will usually require the services of acknowledged experts on the subject. While a carefully-selected military intelligence research specialist may become quite competent to evaluate much of the ordinary technical information at hand, his judgement can hardly be expected to carry the same weight as top-level scientific opinion within any single field of endeavor. Personnel of the Scientific Branch, therefore, habitually learned to rely upon outside advice when confronted with their more difficult intelligence production problems from the technological standpoint.

The seventh functional research unit formed in AIS during the June 1944 reorganization was the Who's Who Branch which was designed to evaluate and record "information on the background, sympathies and activities of personalities throughout the world of political, economic, military, sociological, scientific and subversive interest." * In effect, it was a horizontal functional element cutting directly across the lines of

* "Hist AIS" (S), Work Folder on History of Who's Who Branch, unnoted, p. 19.

responsibility allocated to the other six branches. If this had been done mainly for the purpose of attempting to centralize all the MIS biographic files, it might have constituted a logical move but the branch also acted as a full-scale research unit and even became directly involved in several other major phases of the intelligence process. The net result was a large measure of confusion and duplication of effort.

The traditional concept of Who's Who activity calls for providing ready access to factual data on the identity, background, activities, movements, religion, affiliations, sympathies etc. of key foreign personalities who may be of important interest to the military authorities. This type of data forms an essential adjunct to every aspect of intelligence research and furnishes the chief basis for valuable reports and studies concerning current events. Under normal conditions, who's who information remains entirely separate and distinct from the security files dealing with disloyalty, subversion or sabotage.

By January 1943, when the operational counterintelligence activities of MID (MIS) were transferred to ASF, the Counterintelligence Group of the departmental agency already held a very complete set of files relating to subversive personalities. Similarly, the Geographic Branches of the Intelligence Group had all been maintaining regular who's who files on persons of possible interest to their own areas of responsibility. Since foreign and domestic subversive matters often display a close relationship to each other, this divided arrangement was noticeably unsatisfactory. Effective 26 July 1944, therefore, right after the final dissolution of the Security Branch in MID (MIS), the new Who's Who Branch

not only inherited most of the existing counterintelligence files but also the additional function of reviewing security investigations on military personnel suspected of subversion or disloyalty. Although this assignment was chiefly one of convenience, it proceeded to involve the new branch in a number of operational counterintelligence activities which were abnormal to say the least. *

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* "MID Hist Sec II" (S), pp. 150-51 and 154.

The Who's Who Branch promptly grew into a very large unit. Organized on a geographic basis and operating its own reference library, it was split into four main sub-groups, designated as General, Special, Axis Agent and Review Sections. Of these, the General Section was the primary element and charged with developing the normal who's who data but a Special Section was also created because the branch was required to handle material obtained from very sensitive sources. This type of such material had to be kept separate in view of its high security classification. The Axis Agent Section was called upon to compile information and prepare studies covering enemy groups engaged in espionage, sabotage, smuggling or subversive activities, while the Review Section maintained the counterintelligence files and supervised all military disloyalty cases. The latter section further functioned as a security clearance service for the War Department, coordinated with the ONI, ASF, FBI, OPA and other associated agencies of the government engaged in such work. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Work Folder on History of Who's Who Branch, unnumbered pages under "Sections."

In summarizing, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the detailed production of military intelligence is a most intricate process. As such, it seems obvious that the process should not be tampered with to any important degree during periods of emergency and especially by officials who are unaware of its extensive ramifications. The urge to achieve a perfect solution to the difficult problem of functional separation, plus the fact that it necessarily takes a considerable number of qualified persons to accomplish the process, has always rendered the departmental intelligence agency fair game for all types of organizational experimentation. Almost every new ACofS G-2 has thus taken prompt and confident steps upon arrival to straighten the organization out according to his own personal observations but sooner or later has come to realize that the subject was actually much more complicated than he had ever thought. Even with the working level personnel coming to regarding this unfortunate habit as being more or less inevitable, the production of military intelligence has consistently suffered.

Nevertheless, two basic organizational questions appear to have been explicity answered by the experiences of World War II. In the first place just as long as the ACofS G-2 remains charged with providing required intelligence for the departmental and military high command, he cannot properly delegate any of his fundamental responsibilities bearing upon the production of that intelligence. This means it will not become feasible for him to separate his so-called general staff functions from those operational activities which form an integral part of the production process. Unless some kind of a paper organization is devised for covering

UNCLASSIFIED

it up, therefore, the departmental military intelligence agency must continue to comprise a comparatively large proportion of the total MIS strength. Although such a choice may not appeal to the administrative authorities, the only alternative would seem to be a corresponding decline in military intelligence production.

With reference to the difficult problem of internal organization, particularly the geographic vs functional approach to research specialization, it should now be accepted that a pure adaptation of either system will exhibit serious faults. Repeated experiments have amply demonstrated that each system holds certain inherent advantages and disadvantages over the other, with a carefully designed combination of both appearing to offer the best prospect of success. While ordinary intelligence research can be carried out more favorably under an area or geographic organization, various technical subjects must continue to demand functional treatment.

The departmental military intelligence agency was unquestionably reorganized too often during World War II. This proclivity not only caused a marked amount of confusion and duplication of effort in connection with the production process but also tended to slow down that process by increasing the number of organizational layers applicable thereto. Since the eventual production system imposed from above in the summer of 1944 was unsound, it probably would have been much better for all concerned if the system existing at the time of Pearl Harbor had remained essentially undisturbed. The intelligence authorities then could have devoted their entire energies to keeping it as simple as possible in the face of

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constant pressures stemming from the rapid wartime expansion. The military intelligence process can never thrive under a system of growing complexities because the coordination requirements will soon become so great that the right hand will not know what the left hand is doing. When this occurs the results may well prove to be disastrous.

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CHAPTER VIII

Counterintelligence Operations

In line with his accepted responsibility for providing necessary intelligence to the War Department and United States Army, the ACofS G-2, MID, has always been called upon to perform the opposite mission of preventing our own military information from falling into improper hands. This latter function naturally included required staff supervision over all counter-measures taken to detect espionage, sabotage or subversion aimed at any part of the military establishment. While the need for MID to explore the foreign aspects of such matters was duly recognized by higher authority, these same authorities kept insisting that military personnel should not become implicated in domestic counterintelligence unless the operations were plainly traceable either to the Army itself or to industrial plants engaged in defense production. Nevertheless, the Joint (Army-Navy) Board did prepare an extensive plan for censoring international communications to and from the United States in the event of war and the departmental intelligence officials participated actively in this significant security effort. *

* Although censorship is often regarded as being solely a counter-intelligence step, it also constitutes a fruitful source of information in connection with intelligence production. For example,

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see: H. R. Rept. 1229, 82d Cong., 2d sess., "The Unlawful Years," 30 Dec 51, p. 50. Described therein is an Office of Censorship intercept of ciphered messages written in invisible ink on letters between Mexico City and New York City concerning a conspiracy to free a Communist agent from prison.

The difficult problem of how best to protect personnel of the military establishment from subversion or potential subversion likewise soon came to the fore. Derived generally from a provision contained in the so-called Hatch Act of 2 August 1939, making it illegal to employ in any governmental capacity persons holding membership within a "political party or organization which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government," * the Army had adopted a

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* 53 Stat 1148, par 9A.

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firm policy of excluding Communists and Communist sympathizers entirely from its ranks. After passage of the Selective Training and Service Act on 16 September 1940, * however, this policy needed

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* 54 Stat 885.

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careful prompt reexamination in light of enforced induction into the military service. Hence, during June 1941, it was announced that pending a final determination in each individual case, "persons strongly suspected of membership in the Communist Party or who appeared to be

UNCLASSIFIED

consistent followers of the Communist Party line" would not be assigned on sensitive duty or granted an officer commission. * At the same time,

* See: Ltr (C), TAG, 6 Jun 41, AG 324.71 (2-25-41). 41-2, Sub: Assignment of Potentially Subversive Personnel. Ind, TAG.

instructions were issued covering the proper processing of discharges for subversive Civil Service personnel, * while correspondence was

* Ltr (C), TAG to all CO's, AG 230 (6-18-41) MC-E-M, 24 Jun 41, sub: Control of Subversive Civil Service Personnel. Ind, TAG.

initiated between the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and key G-2's in the field relative to the possibility of discharging subversive enlisted men under current Army regulations. *

* Ltr (C), G-2 WDGS to all G-2's Corps Areas and Depts, 25 Jun 41, MID 200.3, 25 Jun 41 (28 May 41). ASSI Rec Sec.

With this then representing the general military security situation just prior to Pearl Harbor, the sudden opening of the war found the Counter Intelligence Branch of MID divided into six main sections designed respectively to handle matters bearing upon Domestic Intelligence, Investigations, Plant Intelligence, Safeguarding Military Information, Special Assignments, and Corps of Military Police. It was not only a separate and distinct element established directly under the ACofS G-2, but also on the same level

as the corresponding Intelligence Branch.* On the other hand, it

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* "Annex to Organization Chart, General Staff (G-2)," 5 Dec 41, MID 321.19 G-2. ACSI Rec Sec. Chief of the CI Branch in MID on 7 Dec 41 was Lt Col (later Brig Gen) John T. Bissell. Censorship planning at that time was still being conducted by a small Information Control Branch under Maj (later Maj Gen) W. Preston Corderman.

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had recently lost several earlier functions through relinquishing its public information duties to the newly organized Bureau of Public Relations (BPR) and transferring a number of operational activities to the Office of the Provost Marshal General. Effective 1 January 1942, it also witnessed the favorable consummation of a major counterintelligence project for the United States Army in the development of a Counter Intelligence Corps from the former Corps of Intelligence Police. The ACofS G-2 could thus assume direct staff control over a suitable troop means for uncovering and investigating espionage, sabotage or subversion within the military establishment.

The most pressing military security problem right after Pearl Harbor was to achieve a satisfactory coordination of effort among the principal governmental agencies involved. The declaration of martial law in Hawaii, formation of Defense Commands on both coasts of the United States and imperative need to provide adequate protection for the Panama Canal had altered security conditions so that the current MID-ONI-FBI Delimitation Agreement was no longer

strictly applicable. General Lee, the acting Military Governor, therefore took immediate steps to ascertain Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's personal views regarding the effect of martial law on FBI jurisdiction within the Territory of Hawaii. The FBI Chief replied that he considered his agency was now relieved of its entire responsibility for conducting investigations of "espionage, sabotage and all other national defense operations" therein. He had already instructed the Special Agent in Charge in Honolulu to make available to the appropriate military authorities all information, data, and material at hand, while affording them the full benefit of experience and observations gained before the war declaration. Furthermore, this same Special Agent in Charge was not to start any new investigations or carry out additional investigative work which might be considered as impinging upon the national defense field. *

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* Ltr, Hoover to Lee (C), 1 Feb 42, MID 310.11 (5 Aug 41). ACSI Rec Sec. The JAG seems to have agreed in general with Mr. Hoover's interpretations of on this complicated subject, except for a belief that the FBI Chief should formally direct his Honolulu office to continue performing its usual duties under the designated Military Governor. See: Directive (C), G-2 WD to G-2's all Corps Areas and Departments and WD, 19 Feb 42, MID 310.11 (5 Aug 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

Despite this indication of willing cooperation between the FBI and military intelligence officials in Hawaii, there was still a considerable

UNCLASSIFIED

amount of uncertainty and friction with reference to the exact delineation of investigative responsibilities that should hold among the numerous departmental counterintelligence groups functioning throughout the western hemisphere. This was especially true on the west coast of the United States for security activities taking place in the Western Defense Command and Alaska. * Finally, effective 9 February 1942,

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* See: Ltr, G-2 WDC to Chief CI Branch, MID, 10 Jan 42, MID 323.3, 10 Jan 42 (20 Dec 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

General Lee, Admiral Wilkinson and Mr. Hoover executed a new Delimitation Agreement to replace the previous one of 28 June 1940. Although this latest agreement retained most of the basic features of its predecessor, it also chose to list three different situations under which a national security plan might be called upon to operate. These were during a "Period of Martial Law," "Periods of Predominant Military Interest Not Involving Martial Law" and "Periods of Normal Conditions." *

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* Agreement for Coordination of the FBI, ONI and MID (C), 9 Feb 42, MID 310.11 (5 Aug 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

Under this new agreement, where there was already martial law, as in Hawaii, the Military Commander admittedly possessed complete authority to coordinate all intelligence activities of governmental agencies and assign missions to them within the limits of their respective personnel and facilities. In areas prominent only as

potential theaters of operations, however, such as the west coast of the United States and Alaska, the Military Commander was now limited to requesting information from the three participating agencies "as he may desire and they may be able to furnish." Moreover, during periods of normal conditions, MID would continue to perform the following security missions:

1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories [espionage, counter espionage, subversion and sabotage] in the military establishment including civilian employ, military reserve and military control.

2. The investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the Philippine Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula and islands adjacent including Kodiak Island, the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and that part of the Alaskan Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Illiamna Bay northwest to the town of old Illiamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Illiamna to the Kvichak River to Kvichak Bay.

3. Informing FBI and ONI of any other important developments. *

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* Ibid. Note that FBI reserved primary investigative responsibility for the more populous regions of Alaska, and while MID was not given any specific mission in respect to uncovering Japanese espionage, counter espionage, subversion or sabotage. This latter function, long a bone of contention between ONI and FBI, was now accepted as being a joint responsibility for these two agencies to share.

Meanwhile there were other important developments occurring in connection with the overall military security effort. On 8 December 1941, the Secretary of War ordered into effect certain portions of

UNCLASSIFIED

the existing Army-Navy board plan for censoring international communications and shortly thereafter the President requested Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to assume temporary charge of all national censorship operations. *

* See: A Report on the Office of Censorship ("United States Government History Reports on War Administration," Series I [Washington, 1945], pp. 3-4.

The approved plan called for the Army to exercise censorship control over postal and landline communications under a civilian Director of Censorship but the War Department was far from ready to accomplish either of these difficult tasks except on a very small scale. Although MID had recently taken several useful steps in preparing for possible wartime censorship, its censorship section still consisted of only two officers. Nevertheless, a Basic Field Manual 30-25 (Counterintelligence), which presented detailed instructions for the initiation and conduct of military censorship, was in troop hands * and a modified

* Issued 15 Feb 40, this FM prescribed military censorship procedures largely as utilized by the AEF during WW I. The AEF, in turn, had copied most of these same procedures from the British. See: "Hist Mil Censorship" (C), p. 9.

form of military censorship was operating successfully for the American units stationed at bases leased from the British in March 1941. *

* Ibid., Appendix III and IV.

UNCLASSIFIED

The Army conducted a token showing of postal censorship at a number of selected post offices across the nation on 13 December 1941. Shortly afterwards, upon passage of the first War Powers Act, * the

* 55 Stat 838, [illegible].

President created an Office of Censorship and appointed Mr. Byron Price to be the Director of Censorship. The same Executive Order also formed a Censorship Policy Board, composed of the Postmaster General (Chairman), Vice President, Secretary of Treasury, Attorney General, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, plus the Directors of the Office of Government Reports and the Office of Facts and Figures, to advise Mr. Price on policy matters and provide for necessary coordination and integration of censorship activities among all interested agencies of the United States Government. * Several Army officers especially trained in

* EO 8985, 19 Dec 41. Following the establishment of OWI in Jun 42, the Director of OWI replaced the Directors of the Office of Government Reports and the Office of Facts and Figures on this policy board.

censorship work were then assigned to the Office of Censorship for full-time duty, including Col. (later Maj. Gen.) W. Preston Corderman who was promptly designated by Mr. Price as Chief Postal Censor. MID, therefore, soon became deeply embroiled in all phases of both the national and military censorship effort. *

* "Hist Mil Censorship" (C), p. 4.

254

all responsibilities relative to visa and passport control operations were likewise expanding at a rapid rate. This important security program, based upon a Presidential Proclamation dated 14 November 1941, *

* 55 Stat 1696.

was being administered by the Department of State and required War Department cooperation mainly in the form of detailing military representatives to serve on a wide variety of working committees. Theoretically most of the operational functions concerning this program had already been transferred from MID to the Office of the Provost Marshal General but because of shortages in personnel and funds available for such purpose, orders were not issued to implement the directed changes until 5 December 1941. Even then it was estimated that the MG Offices of the Corps Areas would not be ready to perform any travel control investigations for more than three months. * Thus, MID (MIS), not only

* File of Documents (S), "Org of G-2 MIS," MID 321.10 G-2, undated (19 Sep 18), tab CPI to G-2. ACSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as "MIS Documents" (S).

continued to process all travel control requests submitted to the War Department for clearance but also participated fully in the numerous inter-agency committees connected therewith. *

* Ibid., tab Visa and Passport Branch.

The PMG was similarly occupied at this same time in taking over

toward other than investigative functions [illegible], such as those pertaining to applications for civilian employment within the military establishment or in industrial facilities working on classified projects for the War Department. Since MID was the only departmental agency authorized to contact the FBI regarding Army security matters, it also remained actively involved. Besides, the ACofS G-2 [illegible] still had complete control of counterintelligence investigations showing any evidence of subversion or disloyalty and still retained the sole function of clearing all applicants for Army commission. With the CIC growing steadily and a CIC Section of the Counter Intelligence Group actually performing as CIC Headquarters, MID was now able to direct the accomplishment of security investigations of every type, even those of a most sensitive nature.

The War Department and Army reorganization of 9 March 1942, which created the MIS and formed Headquarters AGF, AAF and SOS (ASF), served to complicate the counterintelligence picture in many different ways. It soon became clearly apparent that the entire program stood in need of a thorough reexamination, especially from the standpoint of command responsibility and coordination procedures. A new basic War Department directive, therefore, on the subject of "Counterintelligence Activities," was prepared and issued to the major commands during June 1942. This directive not only announced that the MIS "will supervise all counterintelligence activities of the War Department" but also cautioned field commanders they would be held responsible for "counterintelligence coverage within their commands" to include taking

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the following instructions:

> establishment of a Counter Subversive system; transmission of information emanating from this source; preliminary investigation of complaints or suspicion of subversive activities; safeguarding of information which, if released, would be detrimental to the war effort; and reference of cases arising within these categories to Counter Intelligence Corps representatives for investigation. *

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* Ltr (C), TAG to major commanders, 14 Jun 42, AG 361 (6-12-42) MS-P-M, copy in; G-2 350.C92, 14 Jun 42 (f/w 6 Nov 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Under these new conditions the departmental intelligence authorities could still claim a high degree of direct control over counterintelligence activities at certain fixed stations in the zone of interior, such as schools, training commands, supply establishments etc., but this was no longer true for the more transient ground tactical or air commands. Commanders of the latter elements were thus instructed to forward prompt security reports to MIS simultaneously through both the intelligence and command channels of communication. Likewise, with reference to the extent of counterintelligence operations that should be carried out by the Headquarters of AGF, AAF, SOS (ASF) and major overseas commands, the War Department directive declared, as follows:

> d. The Commanding Generals of the Ground Forces, Air Forces and Services of Supply may establish and maintain a counterintelligence staff organization for the purpose of a liaison between their respective headquarters and the War Department Military Intelligence Service, and for such staff counterintelligence field inspections and other special operations as the Commanding Generals of the Ground Forces, Air Forces and Services of Supply may direct.
>
> e. Beyond the territorial limits of the United States commanders of Theaters of Operation, Base Commands, Defense Commands, Departments

and units of any type not under the control of the foregoing commanders, are responsible for counterintelligence security coverage within their units, and will prescribe methods of operation. They will keep the military intelligence Service, War Department, fully informed of conditions arising within their commands. *

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* Ibid.

In June 1942, the MIS Counterintelligence Group consisted of four main sub-groups representing, respectively, Administration, Domestic Intelligence, Safeguarding Military Information and Operations, with each of these sub-groups divided into several functional branches or sections. According to the newly-imposed concept, although the ACofS G-2, WDGS, remained charged with "policies concerning" military security matters, he was not supposed to exercise any direct supervision over the Counterintelligence Group of MIS. This proved to be a most impracticable arrangement because the principal officers of that group were not only members of policy making security committees but also acted regularly as departmental liaison and coordinating authorities with other counterintelligence agencies of the government. Hence, General Strong simply ignored the existing instructions and chose to maintain a close personal relationship with all key MIS officers occupied in security matters. Officially, however, an additional echelon of command had now been placed between the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and his Counterintelligence Group, in the person of the Chief, MIS.

Besides accomplishing customary administrative tasks for the Group Chief and functioning as an office of record, the Administrative Branch of the Counterintelligence Group had been given a number of

special arrangements not normal to operations of the other three branches. Personnel of this branch were thus often utilized by the Group Chief to assist in the preparation of counterintelligence summaries or estimates. *

* "MIS Documents" (S), tab cr1 to G-2.

There were also seven different sections or branches loosely grouped together under the broad designation of Domestic Intelligence for performing the following assigned tasks:

1. Subversive Agents Section - to maintain a card index file on subversive agents and thereby keep MIS abreast of the latest developments within that particular field, over which FBI has primary jurisdiction.

2. Research and Summary Section - to act as the official intermediary between MIS and other governmental agencies in determining the amount or kind of security information that should be furnished to each.

3. Counterintelligence Corps Section - to execute special security missions for the combat arms of the Army.

4. Visa and Passport Branch - to provide information from MIS files for guiding the State Department in the issuance of visas, passports, exit permits and other related travel instruments.

5. Investigative Review Section - to study reports of security investigations and submit recommendations regarding the final disposition of subversive or potentially subversive individuals under War Department control.

6. Evaluation Branch - to present, either periodically or upon

specific request, summaries and estimates of the counterintelligence situation, including such matters as fifth column activities and racial antagonism within the United States or possessions.

7. Plant Intelligence Branch - to prepare studies on counter-intelligence matters in connection with American war industry. Additionally, to process alien personnel security questionnaires and pass upon requests for permission to visit important war production plants. *

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* Ibid., Memo, Chief CIC to Chief MIS, 2 Jun 42.

Similarly, four main subordinate branches were currently assembled under the general heading of Safeguarding Military Information, as follows:

1. Censorship Branch - to prevent the passage of any military information of value to the enemy and evaluate intercepted information for appropriate dissemination.

2. Safeguarding Military Information - to establish policies and procedures designed to prohibit the enemy from obtaining information about our own forces.

3. Security Branch - to supervise the security of military information through physical means and educate all personnel in the importance of this special aspect of information protection.

4. Communications Branch - to handle matters bearing upon clandestine radio stations, interception measures, radio countermeasures, technical facilities for monitoring, development of security devices, Aircraft

"UNCLASSIFIED"

handling service, and identification or recognition methods. *

* Ibid.

As its name implies, the Operations (later Investigation) Branch of the Counterintelligence Group was primarily concerned with the actual conduct of security investigations. It not only executed, directed and coordinated all investigations of such type falling under the jurisdiction of MIS but also received reports of similar investigations performed in the field by Corps Area and Department counter-intelligence personnel. * During the first seven months of 1942, due

* Ibid.

to the rapid Army expansion and consequent tremendous increases in the military security program, the work load of this branch had doubled in total size. On 30 July 1942, therefore, the Group Chief found it necessary to submit an urgent plea to the Chief, MIS, for 100 additional clerks and stenographers. In justifying this extraordinary request, he called attention to the following investigative chores which were then presently facing his Operations Branch:

a. High priority request to clear 300 officers, enlisted men and civilian employees for duty in OPD.

b. Chief Signal Officer forwarding approximately 1000 names per week for clearance to attend Radar Schools.

c. Army Air Forces forwarding at least 1000 names per

UNCLASSIFIED

work for clearance to receive training on classified equipment, such as the beam sight.

d. AGO forwarding the names of all newly appointed officers, graduates of Officers' Training Schools and others at a rate of approximately 12,000 per month. With 25,000 names of newly commissioned officers still awaiting clearance, the branch is now accumulating an average of five new cases for every one it completes. *

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* Memo (Immediate Action), Bissell for Kroner, 30 Jul 42, MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 30 Jul 42 (24 Jan 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

By early 1943, it had thus already become manifest that the MID (MIS) counter-intelligence effort was in ~~prompt~~ need of a major overhaul and readjustment. The matter remained extremely complicated, however, because of the continuing indefinite status of MIS in relation to MID, as well as persistent pressures from higher authority for the departmental agency to relinquish all domestic intelligence activities and confine its counter-intelligence functions strictly to policy supervision. This latter pressure had recently already taken the form of a detailed survey made by Bureau of the Budget management personnel covering MIS operations, with particular reference to domestic intelligence and safeguarding military information. * The study had presently resulted in a number of conclusions and

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* See: Ltr (C), L. W. Hoelscher, Asst Chief, Div of Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget to Chief, MIS, 17 Oct 42, reproduced in "MIS Study, CI Group" (C), pt. II, MID 321.19 G-2 CI,

"UNCLASSIFIED"

25 Nov 42 (24 Jan 42). ACSI Rec Sec. This survey was accomplished under the personal direction of Mr. George F. Schoonmaker, Bureau of the Budget.

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recommendations which pointed toward the desirability of combining certain operational counterintelligence duties within MIS and transferring several others to outside agencies. *

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* See: "MIS Study, CI Group" (C), pts. I and II, MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 17 Oct 42 and 25 Nov 42 (24 Jan 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

The Chief of the Counterintelligence Group, MIS, not only registered a substantial exception to most of these Bureau of the Budget recommendations but also noted that they seemed to be "based almost entirely on considerations of procedure and economy and overlooked the principles and techniques of intelligence." * Notwithstanding, on 26 November 1942, the

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* Memo (C), Bissell for Kroner, 26 Nov 42, MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 26 Nov 42 (24 Jan 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

Deputy Chief of Staff forwarded a joint memorandum to the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and the FBI instructing them jointly as follows:

1. FBI to discontinue the use of MIS files in making future loyalty checks and deal directly with the FBI. Similarly, FBI is now authorized to receive any investigative reports from FBI which might assist in discovering plant subversives.

2. MIS to rely entirely on FBI summaries, special reports and personal contacts to satisfy that portion of the counterintelligence function previously obtained from individual FBI investigative reports.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

3. As to eliminate the receipt and filing of all FBI investigative reports which may fall under the following classifications:

a. Reports of subversive activities outside the United States.

b. Reports of subversive activities implicating a member of the military forces, a person in the employ of the military forces or an employee of the War Department.

4. Plant Intelligence Branch of the Counterintelligence Group to be abolished.

5. Present relationships between G-2 and FBI to remain unchanged, except for the direct MID - FBI communication as covered. *

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* Memo, Deputy CofS for ACofS G-2 and FBI (thru CI, SGS), 26 Nov 42, AGO 321.19 G-2 CI, 26 Nov 42 (24 Jan 42). ASGI Sec Sec.

In compliance with this [illegible] directive, General Strong ordered immediate abolishment of the Plant Intelligence Branch and assigned its residual research functions to the Evaluation Branch. Since the ramifications of the rest of the directive were so far reaching and even threatened to compromise the terms of the current MID-ONI-FBI Delimitations Agreement, which was originally based upon an Executive Order, he further felt constrained to inform the Deputy Chief of Staff along the following lines:

. . . With reference to paragraph 3 of your directive, it is to be noted that an exact and literal compliance will include discontinuance and filing of all FBI investigative reports now received from FBI on the following subjects:

a. Espionage.
b. Counter Espionage.
c. Counter Intelligence.
d. Sabotage.

UNCLASSIFIED

e. The activities of registered foreign agents and non-registered foreign agents.

f. Unethical conduct of military attaches or other accredited foreign personnel.

g. Subversive activities occurring on military reservations in which military personnel is not implicated.

h. Subversive activities involving destruction of War Department property by sabotage or other means.

i. Subversive activities resulting in interference with transportation of raw materials or the production and distribution of war material.

j. Subversive acts committed by civilians outside the military establishment which may affect adversely members of the military establishment.

k. Activities of individuals suspected of propaganda influencing military personnel under military control.

l. Investigative reports of a similar nature pertaining to subversive activities within the United States but not implicating members of the Army or employees of the War Department. *

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* Memo, Strong for Deputy CofS, 30 Nov 42, AGD 321.19 G-2 CI, 30 Nov 42 (24 Jan 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

While General Strong may have been inclined to overstate his case in this particular protest, it does seem plainly apparent that the departmental administrative authorities had not thought the matter out to a full conclusion before issuing their 26 November 1942 directive. That they were really more interested in saving personnel spaces than in giving careful consideration to the difficult functional problems of the ACofS G-2 also becomes evident in view of the following inadequate reply he received from them on 2 December:

UNCLASSIFIED

. . . 2. This directive will not be interpreted to authorize the continuation of present practices which involve the serializing and filing of a vast number of FBI individual investigative reports.

. . . 3. Questions on the procedure to be followed in transferring the files can be answered by referring to the contents of the MIS study prepared by the Bureau of the Budget and forwarded to G-2 under date of October 17, 1942.

By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff

O. L. NELSON
Colonel, General Staff
Asst. Sec., General Staff *

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* See: AGO 321.19 G-2 CI, 2 Dec 42 (24 Jan 42). ASGS Doc Sec. In later reporting on the results of this 26 Nov 42 directive, Gen Kroner estimated that it did achieve an initial economy of 8 officers and 59 civilians.

The irony is that at the very time the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office was trying so determinedly to reduce MID (MIS) domestic counter-intelligence activities, the agency was gathering added responsibilities within the same field from other sources. For example, during May 1942, the Deputy Chief of Staff, acting for the Secretary of War, authorized the ACofS G-2, [illegible] to form a Special Information Branch in MIS to monitor telephone conversations taking place at all War Department buildings. This not only called for the installation of a considerable amount of special switchboard equipment but also required a force of 10 officers, 53 enlisted women and 1 civilian in order to perform [illegible] monitor duty. With a total of 12,000 lines made available to them for surveillance, these personnel were soon averaging about 3,000 such misions per day and submitting as many as

SECRET

"UNCLASSIFIED"

"UNCLASSIFIED"

4,550 reports for a single month of activity. *

* See: "Special Information Branch" (S), MID G-2 Spec Inf Br, pt. 1. ACSI Rec Sec. Many of these telephone conversations had to be monitored in a foreign language.

Other instances of this marked trend toward MID (MIS) acquiring further counterintelligence responsibilities were, as follows:

1. In May 1942, there were four inter-departmental primary committees and five review committees operating under the Visa Division of the State Department, with MID (MIS) represented on each. Since plans were being made adopted to require all American seamen travelling to and from foreign ports to hold valid passports, the Passport Division of the Department of State appointed a new inter-departmental committee for the purpose of processing such applications. This meant the assignment of one more MID (MIS) officer on travel control duty. Likewise, when a Maritime Labor Committee composed of the Secretary of State, Attorney General and War Shipping Administrator became gravely disturbed over the alien seaman situation, especially in regard to their immigration status, jumping ship, deportation, etc., * it led to

* See: Memo, Chief Visa and Passport Br to Chief Counterintelligence Group, MIS, 5 May 42, MID 321.19 MIS CI, 5 May 42 (24 Jan 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

the creation of another interdepartmental committee, charged with "considering problems incident to the entry into the United States of all aliens and citizens brought by neutral or chartered vessels." Mr. Samuel Schofield was designated by the Attorney General to function as chairman and coordinator for this committee, with Lt. Col. O. D. Dorroh, Chief of the Visa and Passport Section of the Counter-intelligence Branch, MIS, named by the Secretary of War to represent the War Department on it. *

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* "MIS Documents" (S), ltr Sec War to Atty Gen, 17 Aug 42, tab Visa and Passport Branch. ACSI Rec Sec.

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2. Effective 2 June 1942, because of the ever-increasing demands for trained censorship officers, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, was granted permission to establish a Censorship School at Fort Washington, Md., under the direction of the Counterintelligence Group, MIS. It was then estimated that a minimum of fifteen additional officers would be needed for operating this new facility. *

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* Memo, Exec to Personnel Sect, MIS, 21 Aug 42, AGO 321.19 MIS CI, 21 Aug 42 (24 Jan 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

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3. During August 1942, when the United States and Japanese Governments entered into an exchange agreement to repatriate certain interned nationals, it became necessary for MID (MIS) to join with the State Department, ONI and FBI in screening all personnel slated pertaining thereto. *

"UNCLASSIFIED"

SECRET

* "MIS Documents" (S), tab Visa and Passport Branch, ACSI Rec Sec.

4. On 13 November 1942, the function of determining what war production information should be released to various governmental or non-governmental agencies, as well as maintaining uniform security standards for information of that nature, was transferred from the Bureau of Public Relations to MIS. A "Committee for Protection of Information" had been performing this counterintelligence task in the BPR since 11 July 1942. *

* Ibid., tab CPI to G-2.

It must not be presumed from the continuing drive by higher authority to reduce the MID (MIS) domestic security effort that the Counterintelligence Group was engaged solely in operational-type activities. As a matter of fact, one of the most difficult features of the entire affair lay in attempting to separate its so-called general staff functions from those which were considered to be operational. For example, the Evaluation Branch of the Counterintelligence Group was a true research unit and directly involved in the production of military intelligence both for departmental and Army use. Having been charged with maintaining "a comprehensive picture of the total subversive situation prevailing in the United States and territories wherein American troops are stationed," it not only prepared studies

"UNCLASSIFIED"

"UNCLASSIFIED"

on subversive elements but also disseminated [illegible] intelligence bearing upon that subject in the form of [illegible] reports, bulletins and summaries. To assist in accomplishing this mission, the Branch established close liaison with corresponding units in "G-2, FBI, Office of National Censorship, Department of Justice, Internal Revenue and Department of State" and constantly sought to acquire an intimate knowledge of the following "subversive or potentially subversive groups":

1. Nazi
2. Communist
3. Fascist
4. Japanese
5. Falange
6. Hungarian
7. Ukranian
8. White Russian
9. Vichy France
10. Korean
11. Bulgarian
12. Syrian
13. Domestic Fascist
14. Negro *

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* "MIS Documents" (S), tab Evaluation Branch, ASCI Rec Sec.

With AID (MIS) already in the process of being gradually divested of its domestic intelligence functions, there was a natural and parallel expansion of ASF operations within the same field. * When ASF (SOS)

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* Headquarters ASF had organized a Military Intelligence Section but, in respect to military security, it remained mostly concerned with checking on unit counterintelligence training. See: AID 020 ASF, 8 Jul 42 (9 Mar 42). DMB, WC. On the other hand, Headquarters ASF formed a large Counteringelligence Division under the ACofS G-2, which became increasingly active in such operations as the war progressed. See: Chart, Training and Intelligence Organizations Army Air Forces, 30 Nov 42, in Report of Intelligence

NR 270

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Conference at Camp Ritchie, Md., undated, G-2 Sec ASF Files, and Memo (C), Collir Staff to CofS (Attn: ACofS G-2), 26 Mar 43, 350.09 CI, 26 Mar 43 (14 Apr 42). DMB, TAG.

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was first created in March 1942, the ACofS G-2, which still retained direct control over military intelligence activities throughout the United States Army, so there appeared little need for an intelligence unit at Headquarters, ASF, except for a small group capable of handling local security matters. By April 1943, however, it was obvious that some sort of a central G-2 agency would be required to satisfy ASF responsibilities in connection with PMG, Service Command and National Guard Bureau domestic intelligence activities, as well as to take positive steps in meeting the growing demand for better coordination of the technical intelligence effort. Effective 20 April 1943, therefore, the Commanding General announced the establishment of a Security and Intelligence Division in Headquarters, ASF, and designated Col. James H. Roamer to be its Director. Shortly thereafter, the name of this new staff element was shortened to the Intelligence Division and it became organized into a Technical Intelligence Branch, Counter Intelligence Branch and Security Control Group. *

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* "Hist ASF" (S), ch. II, pp. 1-3. The Security Control Group was mainly an inspection unit used for internal security purposes.

Even though the Director of Intelligence, ASF, was now being held

responsible by his own commander for "military intelligence in the Army Service Forces," MID (ASF) continued to exercise a considerable degree of direct staff supervision over intelligence operations within the service commands, as well as the CIC personnel assigned thereto. *

* Ibid., ch. I, p. 4 and ch. II, p. 3.

Col. Leslie R. Forney, the newly designated Chief of the Counterintelligence Group, MIS, * however, soon embarked upon a program aimed at

* Col Forney assumed actual charge of the Counterintelligence Group on 29 Mar 43 but was not formally designated to be Group Chief until 20 Apr 43, the effective date of Col Bissell's departure.

curtailing several activities which he felt were either a duplication or might better be decentralized to some other agency of the military establishment. For example, arrangements were soon completed to transfer a highly trained group of CIC officers and enlisted men to the Manhattan Project without reserving any MID (MIS) control over them * and, early in July 1943, all operational security functions

* See: General Comments on Chapter II (S), attached to ltr from Col L. R. Forney, USA Ret to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist, 14 Oct 57. Author's file.

that would normally be executed by a service command for the Washington, D. C. area were shifted from MID to Headquarters, Military District of Washington (MDW). *

"UNCLASSIFIED"

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* See: MID 321.19, Wash. Field Office, 8-25 Jun 43 (8 Jun 43) and memo, 300.6, 7 Jul 43, Administrative Memos 1943. ACSI Rec Sec.

The politically involved question of controlling subversive or potentially subversive personnel, notably Communist Party members and consistent followers of the Communist Party line, kept plaguing the departmental security officials. * A fixed policy in this regard had been

* Although the true subversive nature of the international Communist conspiracy had long been understood by the military intelligence authorities, it was not until 19 Mar 43, that Communists were actually mentioned as such by name in official War Dept instructions. See: File, Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel, Tab "D" (C), G-2 000.24, Dec 44 (f/w 16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

announced on 19 May 1942, which not only emphasized the practice of assigning suspect enlisted men to elements other than the Army Air Forces, Signal Corps, Chemical Warfare Service, Armored Force, Tank Destroyer Command or Airborne Command but also formed special units within the service commands for transferring "potentially more dangerous individuals" and giving them duties "with no opportunity of effective subversion." * Likewise, in bending every possible effort to keep disloyal

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* One of these special units was the 620th Eng Gen Serv Co, constituted at Ft. Meade, So. Dakota, on 1 Nov 42 but subsequently moved to Camp Hale, Colo., [illegible] also served as an internment center for PW's. A disaffected member of this special Co named Dale Maple, of wealthy parents and a Harvard graduate, aided the successful escape of two German PW's from their nearby barracks and then joined them in fleeing to Mexico. Apprehended by the Mexican authorities and returned to U.S. control early in 1944, he was convicted of violating both the 58th and 81st AW's and sentenced to be hanged. Although his conviction was confirmed under Presidential review, the death sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. See: 201 Maple, Dale, Cent Rec Off, Ft. Holabird, Md.

personnel from holding commissions as officers, the following instructions were issued:

> When careful and complete investigation has established that a commissioned officer, whether on active duty or not, is so lacking in loyalty, character, integrity or discretion that for him to continue to hold a commission in the Army of the United States is considered a detriment to the National war effort, recommendation for his discharge will be forwarded immediately to the War Department. *

* Ltr (C), TAG to major commanders, 19 May 42, sub: Military Personnel Suspected of Disloyalty or Subversive Activity, AGO 014.311 (5-14-42) MC-B-M, copy in; CI File MID 200.3, 19 May 42 (28 May 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

274

"UNCLASSIFIED"

The list of elements to which potential subversives could not be assigned was shortly extended to include the Amphibious Corps, Ports of Embarkation, Staging Areas, Officer Candidate Schools and any unit or organization alerted for foreign service or service in Alaska. * The

* File (S), Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel, Tab "D" (C), G-2 000.24, Dec 44 (1/w 16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

problem of preventing Communists from gaining admittance to the Officer Candidate Schools, however, continued to pose serious difficulties because under the current system commissions were being granted at these schools automatically to all graduates and without any prior reference to MID (MIS) for security check. * Moreover, with the Party line having

* See: Memo (C), Lansdale to Crist, 14 Oct 42, MID 200.3, 14 Oct 42 (28 May 41). ACSI Rec Sec. Also being handled in this same automatic manner were the commissions awarded at Aviation Cadet Schools and certain others as directly approved by the Surgeon General for the Medical or Medical Administrative Corps.

undergone a convenient switch to provide for full cooperation with the Allied war effort right after the German invasion of Russia, more and more Communists and follow-travelers were seeking to qualify for entrance into such schools. As a matter of fact, the strict application of the adopted policy of segregating potential subversives had already been softened somewhat, even for non-commissioned officers, in an avowed

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"UNCLASSIFIED"

attempt to conserve manpower. *

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* Ltr (C), G-2 to DI's all Service Commands and ACofS G-2 WDC and Fourth Army, 10 Nov 42, MID 200.31, 10 Nov 42 (28 May 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

Outside pressures were now rapidly building up in all directions with reference to this sensitive subject. It was argued, for example, that the segregation policy had merely tended to relieve Communists from the hazards of combat duty and even encouraged the dissemination of Communist doctrine throughout the country. * Although the Chief of the Counter-

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* Memo (C), ACofS G-2 for ACofS G-3, 13 Feb 43, sub: Disposition of Communists, Enlisted Men, MID 200.3, 13 Feb 43 (28 May 41). ACSI Rec Sec. By this time about 100 Communists had been disposed of under the segregation policy, while it was estimated that not more than another 150 would be so-classified in the future.

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intelligence Group, MIS, still held that every effort should be made to minimize the number of Communists receiving commissions, he believed officers of such type who were already commissioned should "no longer be discharged except in aggravated cases." * On the other hand, early in

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* See: Memo (C), Bissell for Strong, 29 Jan 43, MID 200.3, 29 Jan 43 (28 May 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

April 1943, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, forwarded a SECRET directive through intelligence channels to the major commands reiterating among other things that

N 276

"persons proven to be, or suspected of being, Communists or adherents to the Communist Party Line will not be permitted to attend or to remain in Officer Candidate Schools." *

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* File (S), Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel, Tab "D", copy of Ltr ACofS G-2 to D/I's and ACofS G-2's all major commands, G-2 000.24, Dec 44 (f/w 16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

Despite the fact that the recipients of this new letter were cautioned to exercise extreme care in preserving its security and greatest discretion in carrying out its provisions, the Communist Party launched an immediate and violent propaganda campaign against Army counter-intelligence procedures. Spearheaded by the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade organization, this campaign took the form of heavy attacks in the so-called liberal press along with a flood of critical letters addressed to the White House, Cabinet, Congress, and high officials of the War Department. * Accordingly, Thus, some 40 cases concerning individuals of

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* History of the Communist Question in the Army, (S), initials L. R. F. (Col Formoy), undated 44, ACSI 000.24 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

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alleged subversive connections who had either been removed from Officer Candidate Schools or failed to receive a commission upon graduating therefrom were resubmitted to the Secretary of War's Personnel Board for the

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"UNCLASSIFIED"

stated purpose of determining whether or not any injustice had occurred. These cases were also subject to final review by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, acting in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of War. While the Personnel Board, under the chairmanship of former Chief of Staff General Hugh Drum, sustained all but one of these earlier actions, the final reviewing authority confirmed only 25 of them. *

* Hearings before the Special Committee on Subversive Influences in the Army of the Committee on Military Affairs, H. R. 79th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to H. Res 20, 18 Jul 45, p. 7.

In registering an emphatic dissent from a recent request for reconsideration forwarded to his Board by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, which recommended that three Communists should be granted Army commissions, General Craig seems to have summed up the entire matter in most expressive terms, as follows:

> This is one of a number of cases of individuals who have been denied commissions because of Communistic ideas, affiliations, or leanings. For twenty years or more the policy of the War Department, in time of peace, has been to prevent men of this character serving in the Armed Forces. Since the war they have been allowed to fight for the country through induction or enlistment. While they should be allowed to fight for the country that is not, of itself, any reason why they should be commissioned. It is a well known fact that men of this type cannot be trusted in many such respects, in spite of what they may profess at any particular time. They will deny Communistic affiliations when it suits their purpose, or even refrain from such affiliations when it suits their purpose or the orders of their leaders, thus advancing the general cause. This unreliability, if nothing else, is sufficient cause for excluding them from commissions in the officers' corps of the Army. It is further unwise to introduce into the Armed Forces as commissioned officers, men who are tainted with political ideas which are abhorrent to the vast majority of the citizens of the United States, whose whole-hearted allegiance to the United States is at least questionable, and whose methods are such as to resort to insidious and undercover operations to gain their ends. *

"UNCLASSIFIED"

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* File (S), Communists in the Army, Tab A (C), copy of Memo for the Deputy Chief of Staff, signed Malin Craig, 12 Aug 43, ACSI 000.2Wh, undated Mar 44 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec. Two of the three individuals involved in this particular refusal had served in Spain with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.

With the military security effort coming under increased pressures from all sides, the Deputy Chief of Staff, on 16 July 1943, directed the Inspector General, Maj. Gen. Virgil L. Peterson, to conduct a thorough investigation of the situation and make appropriate recommendations on:

> the existing organization, scope of activities, and operating procedures of the Directors of Intelligence of the Service Commands and their offices, including military personnel allocated by the Service Commands for such duty, counter intelligence corps police attached to the Service Commands by G-2, civilian employees allotted by the Service Commands, and civilian employees made available by allocation of funds by G-2; the relationship between the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff (Counterintelligence Branch) and the offices of the Directors of Intelligence of the Service Commands. *

* See: Memo (C), IG to Deputy CofS, 6 Nov 43, AGID 350.092, 6 Nov 43 (6 Nov 43). DMB, TAG.

Additional oral instructions were likewise given him on 11 August and 7 September 1943, for extending his investigation to cover:

> the investigative functions of the Provost Marshal General at Service Commands and the possible duplication and overlapping of the investigative functions with those made by the intelligence personnel allotted to the Service Commands; the C/S System; and the correlations of intelligence activities between the Directors of Intelligence of the Service Commands, those of the Army Air Force units and installations and Army Ground Force, and the Military Intelligence Division, G-2, WDGS. *

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"UNCLASSIFIED"

* Ibid.

In making this directed counterintelligence study, General Peterson concentrated upon examining the Investigation and Review, Situation, and CIC Branches of MID (MIS) in order to ascertain their strength, organization and command relationships with security personnel stationed at the service commands. * He found that the Investigation and Review Branch

* This distinct emphasis on CIC activities at the expense of other given phases of the investigation did not escape notice by the CIC officials at that time. See: Comments (C) on Chapters II and VIII, Part V, 10 Oct 57, Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, USAIB. Author's file.

currently consisted of 29 non-CIC officers and 30 civilians. Similarly, the CIC Branch, now located at Baltimore, but still furnishing a number of key personnel for the CIC Advanced Training School in Chicago, was composed of 64 CIC officers and 31 civilians. There were also 368 officers, 2,598 enlisted men and 770 civilians engaged in intelligence activities within the service commands, the majority of them being carried as War Department overhead. In his opinion, MID (MIS) was exercising a close control over most of these personnel in the performance of their assigned military security duties. *

* See Memo (C), IG to Deputy CofS, 6 Nov 43, MID 350.092, 6 Nov 43 (6 Nov 43). DMB, TAG. The CIC Branch of MIS, which was actually functioning as a CIC Headquarters, had been transferred to Baltimore early in Feb 43.

280

The Inspector General remained especially critical of the fact that such centralized direction of the counterintelligence effort within the zone of interior was in direct violation of basic command principles for the United States Army. He also felt that the countersubversive detection system as called for under TM 30-205 (C) infringed upon these same command principles, so the existing organization should be turned over to the individual commanders for use at their own discretion. Furthermore, he considered that both the PMG and CIC were conducting many unnecessary and unproductive security investigations, and including too much non-factual data under their final investigative reports. Derived from these several conclusions, therefore, he recommended a number of fundamental changes in counterintelligence procedures for the Zone of Interior, which were all promptly approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff without any prior reference to the ACofS G-2, WDGS.*

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* Ibid. According to the then Chief of the CI Group, only an incomplete copy of the IG's report was forwarded to MID after its approval. With much of the body of the report missing, there was still enough data remaining to indicate that the IG may have held a serious misconception of the real state of affairs in regard to G-2 control over service command counterintelligence operations. See: Specific Comments on Chapter II (S), attached to ltr from Col L. R. Forney, USA Ret to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist, 14 Oct 57. Author's file.

On 14 December 1943, new War Department orders on counterintelligence functions within the zone of interior were issued, generally as follows:

1. The ACofS G-2, WDGS, will continue to exercise general staff supervision over counterintelligence policies and activities throughout the military establishment.

2. Subject to the above and such other exceptions as may be made by appropriate WD authority, all functions and activities of the CIC within the Zone of Interior will become the responsibility of the Commanding General, ASF.

3. Investigative functions hitherto executed separately by the CIC and PMG will be consolidated into a single staff agency under each service command.

4. All CIC personnel attached or stationed in service commands but performing ASF activities, other than those selected by the ACofS G-2, WDGS, for advanced training or overseas duty, will be transferred from the CIC and assigned to the service command.

5. Civilian personnel presently assigned to MID (MIS) but located in service commands and performing ASF activities, will be transferred to the service command.

6. Military and civilian personnel of the Counterintelligence Group, MID(MIS), as mutually agreed upon between the ACofS G-2 and CG, ASF, will be transferred to the ASF. *

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* WD Cir 324, 14 Dec 43. The indicated changes were to become effective on 1 Jan 44.

282

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Under the new counterintelligence situation, CIC personnel could now be utilized, with certain specified exceptions, only in theaters of operations. Notwithstanding, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, was still held responsible for coordinating the procurement and shipment of CIC units for CIC duty, and the administration of CIC specialized training to be conducted at Camp Ritchie, Md.* His means for accomplishing these retained functions had been effectively removed, however, through the complete abolishment of b: the CIC Headquarters, which was in reality the CIC Section of the MIS Counterintelligence Branch, and CIC Staging Area at Camp Holabird (Baltimore), Md.* To make matters worse, the existing military security system was badly upset not only by the sudden rescission of TM 30-205 (Confidential) countersubversive instructions but also due to an utterly impractical provision of the approved IG study directing that, within available time and manpower limits, "all reports and attached memoranda of investigation made by the Counterintelligence Corps be reviewed, pertinent, verified information be extracted and the original and copies be recalled by the War Department and destroyed."*

* See: "CIC School Text, WW II," pp. 7-8.

* As actually implemented the entire CIC establishment at Camp Holabird, including an extensive training center, and the preparatory CIC School in Chicago were both eliminated.

* See: Memo (C), IG to Deputy CofS, 6 Nov 43, AGID 350.092, 6 Nov 43 (6 Nov 43). DRB, TAG.

283

The departmental intelligence agency was also born short of its traditional military censorship functions. This, in spite the fact that censorship operations were providing it with a reasonable amount of useful information, meant the agency remained actively involved in the procurement, training and assignment of censorship officers for the United States Army. By May 1943, it had become feasible to establish an "Officer Pool for Censorship Personnel" and thus give the entire censorship program a sorely needed degree of flexibility. Nevertheless, effective 21 March 1944, higher authority ordered the transfer of this officer pool to ASF, as well as the related function of handling censorship supplies. * For

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* Ltr, AG 320.21 (10 Mar 44) PO-M-F, 21 Mar 44, copy in; "Hist ASF" (S), Appendix 10.

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the time being, MID (MIS) was still permitted to receive information directly obtainable from censorship sources for assistance in producing intelligence but, on 25 July 1944, even this responsibility was shifted to ASF, along with all duties pertaining to the procurement, training, assignment and supply of CIC personnel. *

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* "Hist ASF" (S), ch. II, p. 6.

Prior to the imposed MID reorganization during the summer of 1944, therefore, which sought to form a truly separate MIS under a new ACofS G-2, (General Bissell), the departmental intelligence agency had already lost most of its military security functions. With MID limited solely to the execution of general staff type duties, the theory was that the

"UNCLASSIFIED"

ACofS G-2, (WDGS) could now perform his basic counterintelligence mission acting through a single security specialist within the G-2 Policy Staff. Hence, effective 3 June 1944, the Counterintelligence Group, MIS, was abolished and Colonel Forney, plus two officer assistants and two clerks, became Group III (Security) Policy Staff, MID. * For a brief period after this,

* See: MID Memo No 43-H, 3 Jun 44. ACSI Rec Sec.

there was a small Security Branch, MIS, placed under the Supervisor of Source Control to accomplish certain representation and liaison tasks *

* "Hist MIS" (S), War History of Source Control, Part III, p. 3. ACSI Rec Sec.

but, on 24 July 1944, when the final transfer of all counterintelligence functions to ASF was announced, the ACofS G-2, (WDGS) decided to move this group back into MID. Major considerations calling for such action at that particular time were then given, as follows:

a. Uncertainty as to the permanence of the decentralization which had been effected.
b. Need of an agency to handle unusual and important security matters which could not be handled at a lower level.
c. Need for an agency to perform a small number of security functions which had not been decentralized or transferred to other MIS branches on or before 24 July 1944. *

* "History of the Security Branch G-2" (C), MID 314.7, undated (30 Oct 42), pp. 1-2. ACSI Rec Sec.

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Thus, even though General Bissell and himself served on the War Department committee charged with reorganizing MID (MIS), it did not take him long as the ACofS G-2 to realize that some sort of a counter-intelligence unit was essential to the proper functioning of the departmental intelligence agency regardless of views expressed by higher authority. While the new Security Branch, MID, never included more than three officers and always worked in close conjunction with the G-2 Policy Staff, it promptly inherited a number of more or less operational security tasks along the following lines:

a. Assisting the ACofS G-2 in security matters of great delicacy, such as; investigating serious leaks of highly classified information, supervising from a security standpoint the movements of very important persons, handling the initial security aspects of Japanese balloon incidents, interviewing the captured German agents (Gimpel and Colepaugh), and maintaining liaison with the FBI relative to secret intelligence operations.

b. Screening reports of security violations discovered by the MID (MIS) telephone monitoring service and forwarding them to appropriate action agencies, normally Joint Security Control.

c. Establishing and enforcing a revitalized internal security system within MID (MIS) itself.

d. Determining whether or not War Department approval should be granted to requests for using technical methods of surveillance in certain investigative cases, as required by official orders. These methods

"UNCLASSIFIED"

might include the interception of mail under military control or the use of mechanical overhearing devices at military reservations.

e. Serving as G-2 members of the Old Security Advisory Board and the Secretary of War's Review Board, with the first named board having been formed to advise federal agencies other than the War and Navy Departments about security problems and the latter to review appeals submitted by War Department civilian employees discharged under Public Law 808, 77th Congress, for reasons of national security.

f. Processing miscellaneous counterintelligence matters, for example; individual loyalty cases referred to the ACofS G-2, (WDGS) clearing requests from the Census Bureau for authority to conduct surveys in areas of military interest and answering questions concerning the release of military information through the BPR. *

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* Ibid., pp. 2-7.

The need for having a small group of counterintelligence specialists readily available in MID was well illustrated by the sudden demand to dispose of so-called Japanese balloon incidents from the military security standpoint. In an effort to bolster homefront morale following the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo, the Japanese authorities had hit upon the idea of floating free balloons laden with high explosive and incendiary bombs against American territory. The original plan was to launch these balloons from submarines stationed offshore but, when this proved impracticable, they were released from Japan

"UNCLASSIFIED"

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proper. Some 9,000 balloons were eventually launched, with only a small percentage of them ever reaching the North American continent. They were first reported during November 1944 and naturally caused a considerable amount of speculation within intelligence circles as to their exact purpose. One popular theory was that they might be germ carriers in an opening of bacteriological warfare but another was they were being used to introduce Japanese agents into the United States.*

* "Hist MID, WW II" (S), pp. 242-43.

Following a hasty series of inter-departmental consultations, it was decided that the first step in combatting these Japanese missiles should be to request a voluntary censorship of all public news media. This would serve to deny the Japanese any accurate evaluation of their free balloon capabilities and minimize whatever propaganda value might accrue to them from the project. The Western Defense Command was then given the mission of taking appropriate defensive measures and collecting information on all located balloons. The FBI also carried out extensive investigations, while various scientific agencies of the government joined in examining the balloons to determine their technical characteristics. During December 1944, Maj. Ray V. Jones and 2d Lt. Charles H. Allison of the Scientific Branch, MIS, were ordered to devote their entire effort toward reporting on the balloon situation and it was not long before a total of 7 officers and 2 clerks were fully occupied in this particular type of work.*

* Ibid.

UNCLASSIFIED

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There were several narrow escapes from publicity leaks, occasioned mainly by items appearing in small local newspapers, but on the whole the voluntary censorship policy turned out to be notably successful. The news gradually did get around, however, so more positive countermeasures were indicated. A "word of mouth" campaign was adopted, based upon British methods recently devised to educate the public about the V-1 bombs without furnishing the Germans any specific information pertaining to landing areas or bomb damage. This supplementary system remained sufficient until six members of a single family were killed while tampering with an unexploded balloon bomb they had stumbled across in the Pacific Northwest, an event which forced the War Department to release a carefully guarded statement on the subject. Finally, when the Japanese discontinued launching their balloons in April 1945, the matter was slowly allowed to fade from the national scene, with no serious security breach having ever occurred. *

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* Ibid., pp. 243-44.

General Bissell replaced General Strong as the ACofS G-2 on 21 February 1944, just in time to become actively involved in the mounting dispute over the status of Communists and fellow-travelers within the United States Army, especially whether or not they ought to hold officer commissions. Accordingly, two months later, he addressed a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff which not only recommended continuance of the policy to exclude these personnel from sensitive duty assignment and attendance at Officer Candidate Schools but also asked for the discharge

"UNCLASSIFIED"

"UNCLASSIFIED"

under existing Army regulations of officers "who are proven to be members of the Communist Party or to have consistently followed the party line or otherwise indicated they have submitted themselves to the discipline of the Party." *

* Memo (S), ACofS G-2 for the Deputy CofS, 17 Apr 44, G-2 000.24, 17 Apr 44 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Nothing came of this initial attempt to classify Communists and fellow-travelers specifically as disaffected personnel but embarrassing questions in the matter kept pouring into MID from other military security agencies. * It was thus deemed advisable to submit a more detailed memo-

* See: Memo (C), Forney to Chief CI Div AAF, 27 Apr 44, MID 200.3, 27 Apr 44 (28 May 41) and Memo for the Record (S), signed L. R. Forney, 19 Jun 44, G-2 000.24, 19 Jun 44 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

randum on the subject to the Chief of Staff in the hope of securing more suitable authority for controlling them. This new memorandum, as originally drafted, took note of the fact that a decision made on 11 May 1944 by the Assistant Secretary of War in rejecting the removal of a veteran of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade from Officer Candidate School directly contradicted an 8 March 1944 decision in a practically parallel case. * Since

* See: Memo for the CofS (S), prepared during May 44 for Gen Bissell's signature, G-2 000.24, 1 May 44 (15 Apr 43), Tab B. ACSI Rec Sec.

290

"UNCLASSIFIED"

"UNCLASSIFIED"

MID had recently found that 81 officers, 5 WAC officers, 1151 enlisted men and 49 enlisted women were "so thoroughly imbued with the principles of communism as to constitute a danger to security," it appeared necessary to clarify their future military status. The belief was that enlisted men of such character should be retained in the service and given combat duty but the officers eliminated. It was recognized, however, that the latter step might not be presently currently expedient.*

* Ibid., p. 2. This bow to expediency was occasioned mostly by the fact that a heated political campaign aimed at gaining an unprecedented fourth term for President Roosevelt was already in full swing.

Before signing this proposed communication to the Chief of Staff, General Bissell chose to discuss it personally with Mr. McCloy. As a result, Colonel Forney received further instructions to prepare a detailed staff study on Communists in the Army which would seek a definite answer to the problem but recommend what was right rather than expedient. When this had been duly accomplished to General Bissell's satisfaction, the study was sent to Mr. McCloy for added comment prior to its consideration by the Chief of Staff. The Assistant Secretary of War then wrote a lengthy memorandum for that purpose but, on 10 June 1944, returned all the papers to the ACofS G-2, (WPG) and expressed a desire to talk over the matter again after General Bissell had read his contemplated remarks. Shortly thereafter, the ACofS G-2, (WPG) conferred with Colonel Forney about the study and made the following specific points:

a. The staff study was accurate and the action recommended was justified.

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"UNCLASSIFIED"

"UNCLASSIFIED"

b. It was inexpedient to raise the question at the present time due to the possibility of offending Russia and thus bringing about action on the part of that country unfavorable to the war effort.

c. It was inexpedient to risk publicity on this question in an election year.

d. There could be no retraction officially of the War Department's long standing attitude toward communism.

e. That some means had to be found to settle the question in the field that would not embarrass the War Department. *

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* Memo for the Record (S), signed L. R. Forney, 19 Jun 44, G-2 000.24, 19 Jun 44 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

In view of these conflicting factors as described by the ACofS G-2, Major General Colonel Forney suggested that the staff study should be quietly dropped and informal steps taken to prevent at least for the time being any Communist cases arising in the field which might embarrass the War Department. * With General Bissell approving this course of action, Colonel

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* Ibid.

Forney then proceeded to contact the principal intelligence officers of the three major commands and orally explain the newly adopted policy to them. Although this informal system did work out fairly well for a few months, by the latter part of November 1944 it was plainly apparent that the lower echelons were again becoming restive at the lack of support being provided by the War Department in their Communist security cases. * On 23 November 1944,

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* See: Intra-Office Memo (S), Chief Policy Staff to ACofS G-2, 16 Nov 44, MID 000.24, 16 Nov 44 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

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therefore, General Bissell decided to reopen the question with Mr. McCloy

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and to recommend the issuance of official orders for maintaining a "desired status in this matter." *

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* Memo (S), Bissell to McCloy, 23 Nov 44, sub: Communism in the Army, MID 000.24, 23 Nov 44 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Mr. McCloy agreed that it was now practicable to publish formal instructions to the Army on the subject of Communists but he remained dissatisfied with some of the wording contained in the letter submitted by the ACofS G-2 to accomplish this purpose. He wished to assure that the basic consideration for taking any security action was not the propriety of the individual's opinions but his loyalty to the United States, including a willingness to accept combat duty. * Hence, despite General

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* See: Memo (S), McCloy to ACofS G-2, 28 Nov 44, MID 000.24, 28 Nov 44 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Bissell's forceful argument that the War Department should conform to a decision of the Attorney General and regard Communism per se as constituting disaffection, * the instructions which were finally issued to the

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* See: Memo (S), Bissell for McCloy, 5 Dec 44, MID 000.24, 5 Dec 44 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Army on 30 December 1944, consisted mainly of the following statement written word for word by Mr. McCloy himself:

> The basic consideration is not the propriety of the individual's opinions, but his loyalty to the United States. Membership in, or strict adherence to the doctrines of, the Communist Party organization is evidence that the individual is subject to influences that may tend

UNCLASSIFIED

"UNCLASSIFIED"

to divide his loyalty. However, many good individuals are subject to conflicting influences. Such influences must be appraised in the light of the individual's entire record. No action will be taken under the reference letter that is predicated on membership in or adherence to the doctrines of the Communist Party unless there is a specific finding that the individual involved has a loyalty to the Communist Party as an organization which overrides his loyalty to the United States. No such finding should be based on the mere fact that the individual's views on various social questions have been the same as the views which the Communist Party may have advanced. Except in clear cases, no action should be taken against persons who are being trained for combat assignments and have demonstrated a high degree of ability to serve the United States in that manner, including a willingness to accept combat duty. *

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* See: Memo (S), McCloy for ACofS G-2, 23 Dec 44, AID 000.2&4, 23 Dec 44 (15 Apr 43), in comparison with par 2 b, Ltr (S), AG 014.311 (28 Dec 44) OB-S-B-M, 30 Dec 44, to all major commanders sub: Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel, copy in; CI File, G-2 200.3, 30 Dec 44 (28 May 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

The order specifying this more liberal War Department attitude toward Communists and fellow-travelers in the United States Army was classified SECRET but it soon leaked to the press. During the national uproar which followed, the entire matter came under close scrutiny by a House Committee on Military Affairs authorized to study progress of the war effort. On 22 February 1945, Maj. Gen. James A. Ulio, The Adjutant General, acknowledged existence of the new policy in a letter addressed to Representative George A. Dondero of Michigan. He claimed, however, that known or suspected Communist personnel had not proved to be any source of difficulty and were loyally supporting the war effort, so there seemed little justification for not using their services to the

"UNCLASSIFIED"

"UNCLASSIFIED"

utmost of individual capacities. * Both the Assistant Secretary of

* H. R. Rpt 839, 79th Cong., 1st sess., "Communist Activities Directed Toward United States Armed Forces," 29 Jun 45, p. 2.

War and the ACofS G-2, subsequently appeared before this same Congressional Committee in defending the position taken by the War Department. Although a preliminary report of the Committee as published early in July 1945 was extremely critical of that position, no important change occurred in it for the rest of the wartime period. *

* Ibid. and "History of the Communist Question in the Army" (S), initialled L. R. F., ACSI 000.24, undated 44 (15 Apr 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Thus, at the war's end, the ACofS G-2, not only had been deliberately divested of all his operational counterintelligence functions but also was no longer able to control the basic terms of Army security policies. Moreover, because the departmental military intelligence agency was unfavorably organized to collect, evaluate and disseminate domestic intelligence information, he could not properly execute his inherent mission of keeping the Chief of Staff fully informed on Army security matters. With it becoming increasingly clear to most of the departmental intelligence authorities that no effective dividing line could now be drawn between their foreign and domestic counterintelligence responsibilities, this imposed handicap held especially serious implications for the future.

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Nevertheless, it must be granted that a definite need had been shown early in the war for decentralizing the departmental counterintelligence effort within the zone of interior and permitting other staff groups or field agencies to undertake as many operational security tasks as possible. Neither could there be any convincing argument advanced against the generally accepted thesis that each individual commander should remain free to provide for the military security of his own command. The national security clearance program had rapidly developed into such a cumbersome and complicated process that the departmental intelligence officials could never hope to keep up with it under a system of centralized control. They were soon bogged down, therefore, in a bewildering array of individual security clearance procedures to the extent that they could seldom find time for performing counterintelligence duties of a more fundamental nature.

The principal trouble lay not so much in recognizing that a difficult functional problem did exist but more in the various courses of action which were adopted by higher authority to meet it. Since outside influences and personnel economy considerations were often allowed to carry an overriding weight in reaching major decisions on military security matters, it became practically impossible to develop an effectual system for protecting the Army from harmful subversion. Besides, back of the enforced curtailment of departmental counterintelligence operations as dictated by so many self-appointed experts holding no detailed intelligence background, lurked the readily perceptible outline of a Communist inspired drive aimed at eliminating all MIB (MIS) activity within the domestic intelligence field regardless of consequences. The combined result was a

departmental agency inadequately equipped to fulfill its essential counterintelligence responsibilities during most of World War II. With well organized subversive elements representing both an actual and potential danger to ultimate military success, this was certainly not the proper time to reduce MID (MIS) capabilities for exposing or blocking them, yet that is exactly what did take place.

"UNCLASSIFIED"

CHAPTER IX

TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS

The total military intelligence training problem falls essentially into three broad classes of activity. First and foremost is the basic responsibility for assuring that a suitable standard obtains in military intelligence practices and procedures throughout the United States Army. This has often been called combat or unit intelligence training, although neither term seems aptly descriptive. There is also the demanding task of training a wide variety of intelligence specialists for both headquarters and troop duty as required. Finally, the departmental intelligence agency must provide many of its own personnel with additional training, especially those slated for foreign assignment in military attache, observer or liaison offices.

The status of all three of these principal intelligence training activities was generally unsatisfactory prior to Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, the sudden arrival of the war not only accentuated the prevailing deficiencies but also introduced a multitude of new complications to the already inadequate training program. There was a definite need for fixing specific responsibilities in connection with the intelligence training effort and placing greater emphasis on it from every possible standpoint. Unfortunately, while this need was duly recognized by most of the authorities concerned, it necessarily took time to register any real improvement and the program continued to exhibit serious flaws over much of the wartime period.

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One of the chief difficulties encountered in connection with combat intelligence training was the question of delineating properly between the departmental intelligence and training authorities as to their respective responsibilities for directing it. This matter became even more involved after GHQ was organized in July 1940 and given the mission of "directing and supervising the training of the field forces of the Army stationed within the continental United States."* Several

* See: Nelson, op. cit., p. 324.

meetings were thus held among the appropriate officials in an attempt to achieve a better coordination of effort for all training matters and the ACofS G-3, WDGS, finally scheduled an Army-wide training conference to commence in Washington on 8 December 1941. During this conference the ACofS G-2, WDGS, hoped to work out a more effective intelligence training program but, when the Pearl Harbor attack intervened, it had to be cancelled. To make matters worse there was no central intelligence school in existence which could help train the numerous specialists that would surely be required under the new conditions of combat. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the Plans and Training Branch of MID was actually performing the following functions:

a. Coordination and supervision of all military intelligence activities within the Army.
b. Coordination of the G-2 contribution to mobilization and war plans.
c. Review of tables of organization, mobilization plans, war plans, and defense projects.

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c. Review of all regulations and manuals having a bearing on military intelligence.

e. Preparation of military intelligence manuals and MID extension courses. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Training Branch, p. 1.

Besides these various responsibilities allotted to the Plans and Training Branch, a Field Personnel Section had recently been formed in the Intelligence Branch for the stated purpose of providing "individual or group instruction for personnel with particular intelligence assignments, especially assignments at foreign stations." This section, however, only consisted of two officers and one civilian employee and soon became active in a number of duties not directly connected with training matters. * On the other hand, several promising developments had already

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* Ibid., Field Personnel Section, Intelligence Group, G-2, series 4, sec 4, p. 1. The name of this internal training unit was later changed to the Orientation and Instruction Section.

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taken place within the intelligence training field, such as the opening of a Japanese language school at the Presidio of San Francisco under the Fourth Army * and the initiation of instructional courses in camouflage

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* Ibid., Training Branch, p. 9.

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and aerial photograph interpretation at Fort Belvoir, Va. Effective 1 April 1941, the British War Office had also accepted four limited groups

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of United States Army officers for observing combat intelligence training methods currently in use by the British forces in England. * To meet the

* "History of Military Intelligence Training at Camp Ritchie" (S), 314.7, undated (30 Oct 42), pp. 1-4. ACSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as "Camp Ritchie Hist" (S). These observer groups were actually composed of an officer selected from each of the four organized American Armies.

immediate requirements of the war, therefore, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Charles Y. Banfill, Chief of the Plans and Training Branch, MID, considered that the following actions were plainly indicated:

a. Provision of an adequate machinery to train intelligence specialists, especially prisoner of war interrogators, language interpreters, order of battle teams, and personnel familiar with the problems of theaters of operations such as censorship, propaganda, public relations and intelligence liaison.

b. Close supervision of intelligence training being conducted within combat units. *

* "Hist MIS" (S), Training Branch, p. 1. It was further noted that maneuver observers had been describing intelligence training as "wholly inadequate" and "without any semblance of realism."

While these were manifestly two excellent goals to pursue, little progress could be achieved in either direction until after the sweeping War Department and Army reorganization of 9 March 1942. Upon their return from England, all four of the special observer groups had strongly recommended the adoption of a centralized training program for American

intelligence personnel but the only concrete result was the creation in January 1942, of a school for prisoner of war interrogators at Camp Blanding, Florida, under the IV Army Corps. * This, despite the fact

* This school held only one class, graduating a total of 25 officers. It was then moved to Camp Bullis, Tex., to operate under the Third Army and, in July 42, transferred to the recently activated Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Md.

that during the same month a Secretary of War survey revealed specialized intelligence training subjects as receiving almost no consideration at the numerous schools being conducted by the Chiefs of Arms and Services. *

* "Camp Ritchie Hist" (S), pp. 2-3.

It was obvious that prompt steps should be taken to restore a more favorable balance with reference to intelligence training but the MID authorities remained so engrossed in meeting other aspects of the war emergency that they continued to neglect this vital problem. Accordingly, GHQ (AGF) officials, therefore, rather than the MID authorities themselves, supplied the original impetus behind a drive to centralize specialist intelligence training within the United States Army.

On 4 January 1942, the Commanding General, GHQ, addressed a communication to the ACofS G-3, WDGS, pointing toward the critical need for training a large number of prisoner of war interrogators and recommending the establishment of a school for that particular purpose, located preferably

adjacent to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Although the WDGS on the whole concurred in principle with this proposal, the ACofS G-2, individually felt that the school might be expanded into an intelligence training center and include instruction in such closely related subjects as photo interpretation and combat intelligence. The GHQ authorities could not agree with an extension along these lines because of the acute shortage of officers for instructor duty and firm opinion that combat intelligence training, being a command function, should constitute the commander's prerogative for him to accomplish within his own unit schools. In view of this fundamental disagreement the matter was then permitted to lie dormant for several precious months. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Training Branch, p. 6.

Following the Army reorganization of March 1942, the Commanding General, AGF, decided to revive the question of a centralized school for military intelligence specialists. On 16 April 1942, he forwarded another proposal to the Chief of Staff, not only recommending the formation of a school to train prisoner of war interrogators, interpreters, and translators but also to place it directly under the ACofS G-2, WDGS. While General Strong was in favor of this type of school, he believed it should be run by the Coordinator of Information (COI), since that organization already had trained instructors available and the school could be started right without further delay. When this new proposition was circulated among the rest of the WDGS for comment, however, it received an abrupt nonconcurrence from G-1, G-3 and OPD on the grounds that the War

Department should retain full control over the school instead of turning it over to a civilian agency. *

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* Ibid., p. 7.

Faced with this solid WDGS dissent, the ACofS G-2 cancelled his proposal for a CoI-sponsored intelligence school and directed the MID (MIS) training officials to prepare a new staff study covering the entire subject. The resultant plan, which was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff on 26 May 1942, specified that the ACofS G-2, WDGS, would "operate a school for training interrogators of prisoners of war, interpreters, and translators at an exempted station and post, under the jurisdiction of the Chief, Military Intelligence Service." Hence, effective 19 June 1942, the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Md., was finally born. *

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* "Camp Ritchie Hist" (S), p. 11.

While these devious negotiations were going on relative to forming the MITC, a companion phase of the intelligence training program was progressing smoothly and without major complication. This had to do with MID (MIS) responsibilities in providing foreign language specialists for the United States Army. At first it was considered that ordinary foreign language instruction should be regarded in a separate light from the training of military interpreters and translators but the two efforts were so obviously intermixed they soon became merged into one. In contrast, because the work of a successful prisoner of war interrogator called for

"UNCLASSIFIED"

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much more than mere linguistic ability, that type of training gradually came to be recognized as an advanced specialty requiring additional instruction at the MITC.

As previously mentioned, a Japanese language school had been opened under Fourth Army auspices at Crissy Field, Presidio of San Francisco, on 1 November 1941. Pearl Harbor thus found it already giving special instruction in the Japanese language to a class of 60 selected military students, mostly of Japanese ancestry (Nisei). * Even then it was plainly

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* See: "The MISLS Album," G-2 314.7, 1946 (30 Oct 42), p. 9. ACSI Rec Sec.

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evident that the restricted Presidio facilities would prevent any further expansion of the program and fail to satisfy the increased needs for trained interpreter and translator teams in supporting a full scale war against Japan. Since plans were also being currently made to remove all citizens of Japanese descent from the entire west coast area, it seemed advisable to transfer the school to a different location. Authority was promptly obtained, therefore, to activate a Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) at Camp Savage, Minn., effective 25 May 1942. Utilizing instructors from the Presidio school as a ready nucleus, this MISLS then stood ready to commence operations by 1 June 1942, with Col. Kai E. Rasmussen, formerly of the Fourth Army intelligence staff, designated to as by its commandant. *

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* Ibid; "Hist MIS" (S), Training Branch, p. 9. The school was originally named the Military Intelligence Service Japanese

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Intelligence School but this awkward title was shortly replaced by the one indicated.

Meanwhile, the important problem of orientation training within MID (MIS) itself was receiving added emphasis. In theory, all agency personnel listed for foreign duty were now supposed to undergo an intensive instruction period of at least 30 days prior to their scheduled departure date. Although the prescribed course for these personnel could seldom be completely covered and of necessity varied considerably with the nature of their projected assignment, it normally included the following basic subjects:

War Department organization.

Detailed instruction in the provisions of SIRA (SIRIS) and Index Guide (BID).

Review of all intelligence field manuals, such as: Combat Intelligence (FM 30-5), Observation (FM 30-10), Examination of Enemy Personnel, Repatriates, Documents and Material (FM 30-15), Military Maps (FM 30-20), Role of Aerial Photography (FM 30-21), and Counterintelligence (FM 30-25).

Brief historical account of MI activities during World War I.

Geographic survey of country of assignment.

Safeguarding military information (AR 380-5).

Technique and practice in codes and ciphers.

Finance regulations.

Functions of ONI.

Principles of economic and psychological warfare.

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Special instruction, with regional emphasis, on enemy ground and air forces.

Basic photography, including the actual operation of standard Army cameras.

Language instruction to fit individual needs.

Health precautions and clothing and equipment required in area of assignment.

German order of battle course (six days).

General lectures.*

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Field Personnel Section, Intelligence Group, G-2, pp. 5-6. Capt (later Lt Col) Harvey V. Rohrer, MI Res, a former teacher at both the University of the Philippines and University of Michigan, acted as chief of this section from its inception until his untimely death on 30 Dec 43, when he was succeeded by Maj (later Lt Col) Marcus S. Goldman.

There were still two phases of this internal training program demanding further attention. The necessity for an officer assigned on military attache, observer or foreign liaison duty to become fittingly fluent in the language of his host country demanded a significant expansion in that type of instruction and there was no proper provision for developing Japanese or German order of battle experts. Such specialized language instruction could not be shifted to any ordinary training agency because of the wide variety of foreign languages called for in comparison with the small number of students involved. Moreover, the MISLS at Camp

SECRET

307

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Savage was primarily an oriental language school and even the larger American universities were unprepared to furnish the crash instruction required in most cases. Emergency situations could be met temporarily by signing individual contracts either with the British or Free organizations but this method was expensive and lacked official supervision.

During early 1942, with the matter of Western Hemisphere defense receiving more and more emphasis, the greatest need in MID (MIS) was for Spanish and Portuguese language instruction. Since the CIAA had recently established an Inter-American Training Center (IATC) in Washington, arrangements were completed to secure valuable assistance from that agency through having several of its Spanish and Portuguese instructors hold special language classes in MID (MIS). This convenient system lasted only until 30 June 1944, when the IATC was dissolved, but the program was then far enough advanced by then to carry it on under an allotment of funds obtained from the Director of Training, ASF. * At the same

* Ibid., pp. 20-21.

time, intensive individual instruction was continually called for in numerous other languages which could only be accomplished through the combined use of private tutor, phonograph record and language manual techniques. Hence, in addition to several small classes formed now and then for the purpose of learning basic or intermediate Arabic, German, French, Japanese, and Russian, phonograph records with accompanying manuals prepared by the Education Division of ASF were mostly utilized to teach the following noteworthy assortment of foreign languages and dialects:

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SECRET

	Algerian Arabic	Cantonese
	Egyptian Arabic	Danish
Eritrean	Eritrean Arabic	Chinese
	Iraqui Arabic	Dutch
	Libyan Arabic	Fante
	Moroccan Arabic	French
	Saudi Arabic	German
	Syrian Arabic	Greek
	Brazilian	Hindustani
	Bulgarian	Hova
	Burmese	Dutch-Malay
	Italian	Hungarian
	Japanese	Russian
	Melanesian Pidgin English	Serbo Croatian
	Norwegian	Spanish
	Persian	Swedish
	Portuguese	Thai (Siamese)
		Turkish *

* Ibid., pp. 23-24.

In connection with the ever-mounting need for order of battle experts, the Far Eastern and Central European Branches of the Intelligence Group had taken it upon themselves to train a few such specialists but this informal method could hardly served to scratch the surface of the huge requirements developing for them both in both for MID (MIS) and within the field. During November 1942, therefore, a German Order of Battle School was organized in MID, with Lt. Col. (later Col.) J. R. Lovell designated to be the commandant. Carrying an initial student body of only 23 officers, this school proceeded to grow so rapidly that in May 1943, it was transferred to Camp Ritchie. Some idea as to the broad scope of its adopted curriculum may be gained from the following list of subjects covered for the third and largest class, which graduated on 16 May 1943:

309

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Historical Background of Order of Battle
History and Development of the German Army
German Quasi and Semi-Military Organizations
Organization of the German Army
German Army Units
German Weapons and Equipment
German Tactics and Strategy
Numerical Analysis (Composition)
Order of Battle Intelligence Plan
Order of Battle Techniques
German Dispositions
German Personalities
Strength Estimation
Exploitation of Captured Documents
Sources of Information
German Naval and Air Order of Battle
Miscellaneous Subjects such as -
Security
German Symbols
German Abbreviations
German Military Terminology *

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* Ibid., Order of Battle Training, pt. 3, series two, sec. 11, tab 8, pp. 1-3.

Another phase of the specialist training program was also being strengthened at this same time by the MID counterintelligence authorities. With the demand for trained censorship officers increasing in leaps and bounds, it had become plainly evident that some sort of a censorship school would have to be established without further delay. Since there was no suitable place available for a separate facility of such type within the District of Columbia, an agreement was hastily reached to form a Military Censorship School at nearby Fort Washington, Md., in conjunction with an Adjutant General's School already functioning there. The advantages of this opportune arrangement were readily apparent, because in that the existing institution could provide supplies, mess

"UNCLASSIFIED"

and other administrative support for the new school, while personnel from the Censorship Branch of MID would still be able to exercise a close supervision over the censorship courses. *

* "Mist Mil Censorship" (C), p. 42.

Opening on 2 November 1942, the Military Censorship School was initially allocated a staff complement of 15 officers, including 5 principal and 4 alternate instructors, plus 8 enlisted men. The instructors were all selected from a group of officers recently released from duty within the national Office of Censorship. In view of the great need for field censorship officers, it was decided to limit the course to three weeks duration and concentrate mainly upon training officers for base censorship assignment. Twelve classes of this type were then held between the opening date and 10 February 1944, when the school was discontinued, thus to furnish a total of 1597 base censorship specialists. Additionally, during the summer of 1943, four two-week courses were undertaken for the special purpose of indoctrinating unit censorship personnel and each of these shorter courses graduated approximately 95 students. * The school obviously played an important

* Ibid., pp. 42-44.

part in the military intelligence training effort and one which probably could not have been accomplished any more satisfactorily under some other costlier arrangement.

MIC continued to be involved in a number of heated controversies

SECRET

"UNCLASSIFIED"

even after its delayed establishment. For example, when the MIS concept was first forced on MID during March 1942, the existing Plans and Training Branch became redesignated as the Training Branch and was assigned to MIS. Likewise, in forming the MITC three months later higher authority specifically ordered that it should be placed under jurisdiction of the Chief, MIS. Since the ACofS G-2, WDGS, still retained full responsibility for intelligence training policies and procedures, the new system failed to satisfy the realities of the situation. MITC was an operational agency and a part of MIS, but while its commandant also acted as the principal staff adviser to the ACofS G-2, WDGS, in all intelligence training matters. Although this anomaly might have worked out for a time on a personal basis, but it was not organizationally sound and the ACofS G-2, WDGS, patently needed an appropriate general staff group within MID proper to assist him in the performance of his assigned intelligence training mission.

One effort was made early in November 1942, to correct this deficiency by altering the dual status of the MIS Training Branch. Accordingly, its inherited geographic functions were transferred to a newly created Geographic Branch and the remaining personnel regrouped into a Training Liaison Section designed to operate under the Commandant MITC, who was given the added title of Assistant Chief of MIS for Training. Responsibilities devolving upon this MIS liaison section were then considered to be, as follows:

a. Supervision and coordination of military intelligence training.

b. Development of military intelligence doctrine.

c. Preparation and publication of training literature and training aids.

"UNCLASSIFIED"

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d. The review, prior to issuance, of tables of organization, regulations, and publications on the subject of military intelligence.

e. The training of intelligence specialists to include the operation of such schools and training centers as were authorized. *

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* "First MIS" (S), Training Branch, p. 5.

No better illustration could possibly be found than this particular assignment in bringing out the utter futility of attempting to separate so-called operational from general staff functions for military intelligence. Several of the listed duties fall clearly under a general staff classification while others seem to comprise a mixture of both but they were all grouped together and allocated to the Chief, MIS. Since MIS was supposed to be strictly an operating rather than a general staff agency, it is small wonder that General Strong chose to ignore the directed organization and to assume an active control over the MIS training group, especially as these same personnel were also supervising MISLS, coordinating intelligence training matters with the WDGS, ONI, OSS, AAF, AGF, ASF, and representing the ACofS G-2, WDGS, on a number of training policy committees of the JCS-establishment. By January 1944, when it had become fully apparent that the idea of giving the Commandant of MITC two hats to wear with reference to intelligence training was faulty, the Training Liaison Section was abolished and a regular Training Branch reconstituted. Conforming to current orders the new unit remained assigned to MIS but on paper only. Finally, during May 1944, under the reorganization aimed at reestablishing the MIS, this small Training Branch was

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"UNCLASSIFIED"

officially returned to MID. *

* Ibid., p. 6.

Selection of Camp Ritchie, Md., for the MITC site had been made with excellent judgment and forethought. It was not only comparatively close to its parent agencies in Washington but also presented almost ideal terrain conditions for field intelligence training. Although intended to serve merely as a tent camp for the Maryland National Guard, it did contain several permanent buildings and could be turned into a year-round facility with minimum delay. The school was officially activated on 19 June 1942, under a formal directive approved by the Secretary of War. At the same time, it received a general mission from the ACofS G-2, which, "to provide specialized intelligence training to qualified commissioned and enlisted personnel and to maintain a pool of intelligence personnel for task forces and other special assignments." *

* "Camp Ritchie Hist" (S), I, pp. 13-16.

The original plan had been for MITC to function essentially as a school for training "Interrogators of Prisoner of War, Interpreters and Translators" but this announced purpose was soon broadened to cover practically every other type of basic military intelligence training. It remained General Strong's fixed considered opinion that the school course should not only furnish detailed instruction in the technical aspects of specialized subjects but also include enough other intelligence instruction to produce well-rounded graduates. During October 1942,

therefore, based upon a recent ACofS G-2 policy directive, the MITC curriculum was expanded to give at least some degree of training for all students in such matters as terrain studies, signal communications, staff duties, counterintelligence within the theater, enemy armies, photo interpretation, and use of allied and enemy small arms.*

* "Hist MIS" (S), Training Branch, p. 7.

This marked extension of MITC courses promptly brought to the surface again the fundamental disagreement between the intelligence and training authorities over an exact delineation of their respective duties in connection with military intelligence training. As the designated training command for United States Army tactical elements, AGF felt that MITC was getting mixed up in training matters far beyond its proper concern but the MID (MIS) officials emphatically disagreed. On 3 April 1943, therefore, General McNair and General Strong found it necessary to confer personally regarding the matter and to decide that, even though the ACofS G-2, WDGS, still retained control over policy and supervision of military intelligence training, there should be a functional division between the MITC and AGF in connection with such training, along the following lines:

ACofS G-2, WDGS, should concentrate at the MITC all specialized military intelligence training to meet the needs of active theaters of operations.

CG, AGF, should concentrate on combat intelligence and counterintelligence training within its tactical units.*

* Ibid.

Under the terms of this carefully worded agreement and spurred by the enormous wartime increase in military intelligence operations, MITC

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proceeded to grow rapidly both in point of size and functional activity. Large scale construction was soon initiated at Camp Ritchie to improve the unfavorable housing, utilities and recreation situation. Similarly, a small airdrome was built for use in connection with aerial photography and other training courses, while a hangar was leased at the nearby Waynesboro Municipal Airport to station five aircraft assigned from the Air Technical Service Command. Authority was also obtained from the National Park Service to utilize the adjacent Catoctin Recreational Demonstration Area as an additional maneuver ground and from Pennsylvania State College to take over a former CCC camp at Gettysburg, later known as Camp Sharpe, to help relieve the housing shortage. * Thus, by the end of

* "Camp Ritchie Hist" (S), I, pp. 19-29.

the war, MITC was able to graduate "over 19,669" students in such varied categories as interrogators (German and Italian), interpreters (French, Russian and other languages), photo interpreters, order of battle experts, Counterintelligence Corps personnel, members of AGF Mobile Intelligence Training Units, terrain and signal intelligence specialists. *

* Ibid., pp. 52-53; "Hist MIS" (S), Training Branch, p. 9.

Most of the MITC graduates were derived from a series of 25 regular eight-week courses, with the students therein assigned to Camp Ritchie on permanent change of station under a quota system established for each major force (AGF, ASF and AAF) plus the CIC. * While the First Class was

* Although the AAF allocated a considerable number of students to

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attend the MITC, it also conducted an MF Intelligence School of its own at Harrisburg, Penna.

purposely restricted to only 30 officers, all subsequent classes included both officers and enlisted men in order to provide a flow of trained intelligence specialists for Army-wide use as required. Besides the regular courses, the school also held about 52 special classes conforming generally to the following pattern:

1. Special Classes, inaugurated during February 1943, offering short courses in aerial photograph interpretation for personnel detailed on temporary duty from the tactical elements.

2. Fifteen European Theater and seven Pacific Theater four-week Order of Battle Classes, commencing after that particular training function had been transferred from MID (MIS) to Camp Ritchie in May 1943.

3. A series of Division Classes extending from 11 November 1943 to 15 December 1944, for key intelligence personnel from twenty different Army divisions, as well as some U.S. Marine Corps and Allied military personnel.

4. Special Graduate Training Classes of varying duration, in the form of refresher courses on subjects covered by the regular course of instruction.

5. Two-week training courses held for a total of 1812 CIC personnel prior to October 1944, when MITC became responsible for all counterintelligence training.

6. Several small classes in special intelligence operations for a few selected officers and enlisted men from AGF. *

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* "Camp Ritchie Hist" (S), 1, pp. 52-53.

To accomplish its diverse training activities, MITC needed a large complement of personnel for instructional duty supplemented by a sizeable service group. The school proper was thus allotted an authorized strength of 127 officers and 1,151 enlisted men, who were all carried as War Department overhead. These totals covered not only the staff and faculty but also a Composite School Unit of 13 officers and 420 enlisted men, designed to function in the capacity of demonstration troops. The service group, which came from the Third Service Command, consisted of 24 officers and 245 enlisted men. *

* Ibid., pp. 33-34. The given totals are for both male and female military personnel.

MITC turned out to be much more than just a specialist training school and gradually tended to develop into a true military intelligence center. This, of course, had been the long-range intention of many of the departmental intelligence authorities concerned. In March 1944, therefore, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, chose to restate the full MITC mission in more explicit terms by issuing a new policy directive, as follows:

The Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) is charged with:

a. Operating at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and Camp Sharpe, Pennsylvania, a training center for the purpose of training for duty with U.S. field forces in theaters of operations intelligence specialists, as follows:

(1) Military Interpreters (Linguistic).

(2) Translators.
(3) Interrogators of Prisoners of War.
(4) Aerial Photo Interpreters.
(5) Order of Battle Specialists.

b. Providing additional courses in allied subjects that will qualify intelligence specialists in their duties as members of the intelligence team. . . . Among these subjects . . . are intelligence organization and procedure, counterintelligence as used in carrying out the field security mission, terrain intelligence, signal communication effecting intelligence, processing captured documents, and close combat and the minimum use of U. S., allied, and enemy small arms necessary in carrying out the intelligence mission.

c. Conducting courses in general intelligence to fit the needs of special groups.

d. Conducting courses in training intelligence personnel of Divisions.

e. Making available to subdivisions of MID individuals for special missions approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, as required.

f. Maintaining a complete up-to-date intelligence library, sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of MITC.

g. Conducting experiments to try out new methods of intelligence procedure and intelligence instruction technique which offer a basis for improvement.

h. Maintaining a pool of trained officers and enlisted personnel as prescribed by G-2. . . .

i. Maintaining personnel overhead and supplies sufficient to organize, equip and move to ports of embarkation individuals or units . . . when directed by the War Department.

j. Procuring, storing, issuing and shipping all investigative equipment and supplies for CIC personnel and maintaining necessary records in connection with operating the CIC depot; also storing and shipping CIC credentials and badges as directed by G-2. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Training Branch, Tab R.

Except for one major amendment, this policy statement then continued

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to comprise the basic MITC directive during the rest of the war period. The final alteration which did occur resulted from changes ordered by higher authority in the status of the CIC, effective 1 January 1944. After that date, with certain minor exceptions, CIC personnel could only be utilized within the theaters of operations, while all counterintelligence activities in the zone of the interior were transferred from MID to the Commanding General, ASF. When this new system failed to provide properly for centralized CIC training, MITC, on 29 August 1944, was additionally called upon to conduct "courses in C.I.C. training for the continental limited states and the theaters of operation." The Director of Intelligence, ASF, though, was still charged with the "procurement of qualified students" for such training. *

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* Ibid., Tab S.

During the same time that this MITC expansion had been taking place, the MID (MIS) language training program for the United States Army was displaying a parallel development. In May 1942, shortly after the post-Pearl Harbor move of MISLS from the Presidio of San Francisco to Camp Savage, Minnesota, it graduated an initial class of Japanese linguists composed of 12 officers and 117 enlisted men. Most of these graduates, as well as those of the succeeding regular classes, were Nisei but it soon became apparent that there was also an urgent need for a number of Caucasian officers possessing at least a workable knowledge of the Japanese language. Realizing that a course aimed at satisfying this type of requirement would have to be quite different from the normal

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MISLS courses and much more concentrated, arrangements were completed in October 1942, to establish an Intensive Japanese Language Course at the University of Michigan for military students who had already demonstrated either a slight knowledge of Japanese or some general linguistic ability. Under an authorized quota of 300 students per year, separate classes were started at this school in January and March 1943, each to extend over a 12 month period. This staggered schedule then continued until 1 December 1945, eventually to produce a total of 789 graduates for assignment throughout the Pacific theaters. *

* Ibid., p. 11.

Anticipating a similar need for Chinese linguists to serve in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater as translators, interpreters and military instructors, the departmental intelligence authorities also prepared plans during the latter part of 1942 to establish Army-sponsored Chinese Language Courses at Yale University and the University of California. The original idea was to open a series of classes at both schools in January 1943, with Yale graduating 10 officers each month and California 20 officers every six months. Before the first of these classes had finished, however, the Commanding General, CBI, cabled the War Department to describe an acute shortage of Chinese linguists within his theater and to request that he be furnished 28 officers and 25 enlisted men holding such qualifications per month until further notice. This sudden demand forced a wholesale revision in the existing school project, with Yale now asked to train 30 enlisted men and California 30 officers

each month, under a course of only four months' duration. The new program was thus able to provide a total of 750 qualified officer and enlisted Chinese linguists for assignment to the CBI Theater. *

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* Ibid., pp. 11-12.

In contrast to this Chinese language training, advance planning for a corresponding Russian program was not fully initiated. By September 1944, after it had become increasingly evident that American and Russian forces were about to meet in Central Europe, the ACofS G-2, directed MITC to start training one officer and 11 enlisted men who were on duty there as Russian linguists, in order to develop a nucleus of military intelligence, interpreter and translator teams for ETO. A hurried call was then sent out to procure from the Army at large some 200 additional personnel having a Russian language background for like training. During this drive, the MID (MIS) authorities soon discovered that they were in active competition with the A/F over these prospective students, so, on 4 October 1944, arrangements were made to combine the two independent efforts. Under this new accord, MID (MIS) agreed to train 84 A/F enlisted men in MITC as Russian interpreters and translators, commencing 21 October 1944, but the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Training took further official note that the A/F would need 75 more officers and 150 additional enlisted men of this same category in the very near future. *

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* Ibid., Tabs BB and CC.

It was already clearly evident that the demand for Russian language

specialists was much greater than the available supply. By November 1941, all three of the major Army commands were reporting a complete inability to meet even their minimum quotas for the procurement of such students. To help fill the immediate requirements, MID (MIS) was not only forced to lower its preliminary language fluency and physical standards but also request SWNCC to return 100 officers and enlisted men from ETO for the purpose of receiving refresher language training. Finally, in May 1945, belated steps were taken to establish Intensive Russian Language Classes for selected military personnel at Cornell University and the University of Indiana. While these two civilian institutions did succeed in graduating a total of 300 qualified Russian linguists, the over-all program continued to suffer because of repeated difficulties encountered in securing enough candidates to keep the courses open on a satisfactory basis. *

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* Ibid., p. 13.

Meanwhile, the MISLS at Camp Savage had been acquiring so many extra instructional duties that it could no longer be considered merely a Japanese language training school. In March 1944, therefore, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, felt it necessary to restate the full MISLS mission by issuing a new policy directive along the same lines as recently accomplished for MITC. Authority was also obtained to move the entire establishment to Fort Snelling, Minn. Minnesota, where added training facilities would be more conveniently available. Under its latest policy directive, MISLS was then charged with performing the following specific tasks:

a. Operate a Japanese Language School to furnish intelligence specialists for Interpreter-Interrogator-Translator teams or as individual linguists.

b. Maintain a radio section to train personnel in radio intercept, radio monitoring and voice broadcast for propaganda purposes.

c. Operate an Army Language School at the University of Michigan to give officers, warrant officers and enlisted men necessary preliminary instruction in the Japanese language before going to MISLS. Also, to present officer candidates with additional specialized language training to meet the qualifications for a commission in MIS.

d. Provice additional training to language specialists so they may become members of the intelligence team. Among the subjects regarded as contributing to this goal are; intelligence organization and procedure, counterintelligence utilized in carrying out the field security mission, signal communication effecting intelligence, processing captured documents, close combat, and the minimum use of U.S., allied and enemy small arms.

e. Conduct courses in specialized intelligence to fit the needs of special groups.

f. Cooperate with sister and allied services by holding certain courses to supplement the training of their intelligence personnel, when directed by G-2.

g. Make available to the subdivisions of MID, individuals approved by G-2 for special intelligence missions.

h. Develop a complete up-to-date intelligence library on all Pacific theaters sufficient to satisfy the minimum requirements of MISLS.

i. Conduct experiments in trying out new methods of intelligence procedure and intelligence instruction technique which promise to offer a basis for improvement.

j. Maintain a suitable pool of trained officers and enlisted men as prescribed by G-2. *

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* Ibid., p. 10 and Tab U.

With the specialist program now largely decentralized to AITC, AISLS, and the Orientation and Instruction Branch, it soon became apparent that it had been a mistake in the first place to assign the entire intelligence training function to AIS because the departmental requirements along such lines were often of a general staff rather than an operational nature. As a matter of fact, the ACofS G-2 had already assumed a considerable measure of authoritative control over the AIS training group to establish intelligence training policies and procedures for the Army. In May 1944, therefore, during a major AID reorganization, the Training Branch was finally taken away from AIS and returned to AID. The ACofS G-2 could then directly supervise the future progress of all intelligence training schools and centers without violating official orders, which was a much more satisfactory arrangement. *

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* Ibid., p. 6.

The main trouble with the MID (MIS) training program in World War II was that it tended to become centered too much upon the production of military intelligence specialists. This, of course, was an important problem and one which had to be promptly solved in view of the ever-mounting demand for these specialists. Nevertheless the ACofS G-2, WDGS, continued to remain charged with a number of other basic responsibilities pertaining to intelligence training, for example the "coordination and supervision of all military intelligence activities," "review of all regulations and training literature having a bearing on military intelligence," and "preparation of military intelligence manuals." After March 1942, when the training function first went to MIS, there was a noticeable inclination to neglect general staff supervision over the broad phases of intelligence training through the headquarters of the three major commands (AGF, ASF and AAF) and instead to concentrate more upon the production of military intelligence specialists.

One of the chief reasons for this indicated lack of balance in the departmental intelligence training effort was the fact that the authorized strength of the MID (MIS) Training Branch never exceeded four officers. This small group could barely take care of such day-to-day matters as estimating theater specialist requirements, procuring students for the various schools and assigning graduates therefrom, let alone seek to exercise any further general staff function within the intelligence training field. With AAF continually expressing the need for a service handbook on photo interpretation, the Training Branch even had to recall an officer from overseas to prepare it. Turning out to be the only

regular intelligence manual produced by MID (MIS) during the entire latter part of the war period, this publication was not completed until just before the end of hostilities. *

* Ibid., p. 3.

Another factor contributing to the shrinkage in intelligence training objectives stemmed from the attempt to have the Chief, MITC, act in the dual capacity of School Commandant and Training Chief for MID (MIS). The two positions were obviously incompatible and he could scarcely be expected to perform general staff type duties successfully for the ACofS G-2, WDGS, from his detached post at Camp Ritchie. In his role of principal training adviser for that authority he also should have enjoyed direct access to him instead of being called upon to function through the Chief, MIS. As he himself was primarily interested in specialist training, this phase of the intelligence training mission seemed bound to receive a disproportionate degree of emphasis at the expense of the others. Although the dual function theory was eventually abandoned in May 1944, by then most of the Army training programs were already progressing favorably in light of lessons learned from actual combat experience, so it probably would have been better if the experiment had never taken place at all. *

* "Hist MIS" (S), Training Branch, p. 16.

The persistent dispute between the departmental intelligence and training officials in regard to their respective duties for military intelligence training kept reappearing. While the conduct of intelligence

specialist training, tended to lend itself well to centralization, other important phases of the total function, such as combat or unit training, did not. Here the fundamental responsibilities of each individual commander had to be most carefully considered because both training and intelligence were acknowledged functions of command. After AGF, ASF, and AAF were formed and accorded specific training missions, they continued to insist that intelligence training was a command responsibility which might be better effected in the unit schools since intelligence personnel were "a part of the unit rather than a specialty themselves." * This was essentially

* Ibid., p. 14.

true but it also represented an oversimplification of the problem and often led to lack of uniformity in or ineffective supervision over Army intelligence training activities.

This particular aspect of the controversy came to a head early in 1944, right after the completion of an experimental course at MITC for key intelligence personnel of the 31st Division. The MID (MIS) training authorities wanted to give the same type of instruction to the rest of the divisions being readied for overseas duty but such plan was vigorously opposed by the Commanding General, AGF. A formal conference was then held with appropriate representatives from ACofS G-3, WDGS, ACofS G-2, WDGS, AGF and MITC in attendance. Although the subject was fully explored during this conference, a suitable agreement could not be reached and no further action was taken. The matter finally had to be settled at the highest level, with the ACofS G-3, WDGS, notifying the Commanding General, AGF, on

14 February 1944, that the following decision had been reached "by order of the Secretary of War":

1. The Special Intelligence Course held experimentally at the MTC, Camp Ritchie, from 11-24 November 1943, for an Infantry Division of the Army Ground Forces will be continued for other divisions of the Army Ground Forces prior to their movement overseas.

2. Future courses will be of four weeks duration. The subjects to be covered will be: foreign maps, enemy arms and equipment, enemy tactics, procedure in prisoner of war interrogation, use of specialized intelligence terms, interpretation of aerial photographs, counterintelligence, enemy order of battle, and staff procedure, plus additional subjects that may be considered necessary to meet the special needs of divisions. . . .

3. The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces will designate the divisions from which personnel will be drawn and will report to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS the date that the intelligence personnel of the designated divisions will be available to attend the Special Intelligence Course at Camp Ritchie. Intelligence personnel from each division, approximating twenty-five officers and fifty enlisted men will pursue the course. The personnel selected will include the Division G-2 and his assistant; each regimental, battalion, and other units S-2; the commanding officer and at least two other officers of the division reconnaissance troop and the key noncommissioned officers from these units and sections. . . . *

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* Ibid., Tabs FF and GG.

Thus, the military intelligence training effort during World War II was plainly marked by a series of functional disputes which not only served to handicap its peak performance but also tended to obscure many worthwhile gains that were really accomplished. Most certainly the basic design of this effort did reach a much higher level than ever before, with centralized training for intelligence specialists under direct MID control becoming generally accepted and tremendous strides made in the actual conduct of such training. Despite these

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significant shortcomings, however, several other phases of the departmental training mission suffered from neglect, notably the provision of proper representative general staff supervision over intelligence training throughout the Army and the timely issuance of intelligence manuals for troop use.

Even though the enforced imposition of an unworkable MIS concept upon AGO and establishment of three major commands holding separate training functions for the Army undoubtedly complicated the attainment of basic intelligence training objectives, it still remains clear that insufficient attempts were made to achieve some of them. Supported by pertinent lessons drawn from Pearl Harbor, the departmental intelligence authorities manifestly had all the weight of evidence on their side to overcome any opposition encountered and to assure that no aspect of intelligence training should be slighted in the least. Yet most of the officials intimately concerned with such training during World War II were in substantial agreement after it had ended that this was not the actual case. The exact line to follow in pursuing the vital goal of adequate intelligence training throughout the Army may have presented serious difficulties but the grave necessity for reaching that goal could never be questioned. Further steps were obviously needed in the direction of a better delineation of specific responsibilities for intelligence training among the numerous authorities and agencies involved, with the ACofS G-2, [illegible] participating more actively in the effort from the standpoint of providing an effective general staff supervision at all times.

CHAPTER X

HISTORICAL BRANCH

Derived mostly from a traditional responsibility for handling military information matters, the departmental intelligence agency had always been intimately concerned with the Army historical function. As early as 14 August 1903, when the Second (Military Information) Division formed a part of the original WDGS, it was called upon to "publish historical information and prepare from official records critical histories of important campaigns." * Even during the darkest days of its subsequent

* See: Memo OCS, 3 Feb 1904, AWC 639-22. Records of WDGS, National Archives.

period of imposed adversity, remnants of the Second Division in the form of a Committee on Military Information, War College Division, General Staff, remained charged with "the preparation from authentic sources of histories of important military events." * On the other hand, there was

* Maj R. H. Van Deman, "Historical Sketch," 2 Mar 1916, p. 18, AWC 639-113. Records of WDGS, National Archives.

no specific mention of the historical function in the mission given to the new Military Intelligence Section of the War College Division which was established shortly after the entrance of the United States into

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World War I. This seems readily understandable, though, because of the tremendous problems then facing the departmental authorities to rebuild from practically nothing a suitable agency for fulfilling the many intelligence requirements needed in support of a major military effort.

The absence of any proper historical program for the Army during World War I was soon plainly apparent. In December 1917, therefore, General Pershing recommended the creation of a special section at GHQ, AEF, to record important events taking place in Europe and further suggested that five officers with appropriate training plus two civilian historians should be assigned to his headquarters staff. Accordingly, an Operations Section was organized in the United States under Maj. Robert M. Johnston, to arrive in France by June 1918 and become designated as the Historical Section, AEF. A Historical Section, General Staff, Services of Supply, was also set up under Col. John W. Wright at Tours more or less on an independent basis, while many other overseas units started to prepare their own histories and collect material of historic value without receiving any official instructions to do so. *

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* Elizabeth B. Drewry, "Historical Units of Agencies of the First World War," Bulletins of the National Archives, No 4 (July 1942), pp. 69-71. Major Johnston, former Professor of Military History at Harvard University, had been conducting a personal crusade aimed at achieving fuller recognition of the true significance of military history in world affairs. See: Alexander Baltzly, "Robert Matteson Johnston and the Study of Military History," Military Affairs, XXI No 1 (May 1957), pp. 26-30.

"UNCLASSIFIED"

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A Historical Branch, War Plans Division, WDGS, was established in March 1918, under the direction of Lt. Col. Charles W. Weeks, consisting initially of 6 officers, 15 enlisted men and 5 civilians. At that particular time, the departmental military intelligence agency comprised a separate branch of the Executive Division of the General Staff and had no historical duties assigned to it. Similarly, on 26 August 1918, when General March finally authorized the creation of four coequal divisions of the WDGS with Military Intelligence as one of them, the Historical Branch continued to form a regular part of the War Plans Division.

The Historical Section, AEF, stayed in France after the Armistice until the summer of 1919, for the purpose of selecting documents considered to be of permanent historical value. Upon their arrival in the United States, these documents were turned over to custody of the Historical Branch, WD, although the corresponding GHQ and SOS records had already been sent directly to the Adjutant General. While the work of this Historical Branch under Brig. Gen. Oliver L. Spaulding was in reality just beginning, its authorized strength gradually became reduced from about 80 persons to only 3 officers and 11 others. Further-

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* Drowry, op. cit., p. 72.

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more, with reference to the primary function which should apply to that type of branch, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, on 4 August 1919, addressed a memorandum to General March declaring, as follows: 333

UNCLASSIFIED

The work of the Historical Section should in my judgment be limited to the collection, [illegible] and preservation of records and the preparation of such monographs as are purely military in character and are designated to be of use to the War Department. The War Department ought not to undertake the preparation, either by way of monograph or connected discourse, of a narrative history of the war. Such a history would be incomplete unless it undertook to discuss economic, political, and diplomatic questions, and the discussion of such questions by military men would necessarily be controversial, and many of the questions appropriate to be discussed in a narrative history would be impolitic and indiscreet for treatment by the War Department.

In a general way, it may be said that the writing of history is the interpretation of facts in accordance with a philosophy. Each historian has his own philosophy and his own method, and an official historian would be but one of many historians and yet his philosophy and method would be stamped with approval while the deductions perhaps equally sound, of other scholars from the same facts would not be so approved. As a branch of the Government, the duty of the War Department is merely to present facts; that is, present records and to make them available to historical writers generally so that each historian who so desires may put his own interpretation upon the facts, unembarrassed by the existence of an official interpretation. *

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* Copy in: Royce L. Thompson, "Establishment of the War Departments Historical Program for World War II," vol. II, Documentation. Gen Ref Off OCMH. Hereafter cited as "Thompson Text" for vol. I or "Thompson Documents" for vol. II.

This Baker dictum to the effect that the main effort of the Historical Branch should be centered upon collecting, indexing and preserving records, and the preparation of purely military monographs, rather than writing official war history, served to provide future policy guidance on this controversial subject for more than twenty years. Major events in connection with the conduct of that effort during the peacetime period were briefly thus turned out to be generally, as follows:

1. In 1921, the Historical Branch was reorganized as the Historical Section, Army War College, and its records were later transferred to the Adjutant General. Work of this section during the next seven years was then largely confined to obtaining documents from foreign sources and writing monographs about AEF operations. *

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* Leary, op. cit., p. 72.

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2. On 14 August 1929, the Historical Section received a new directive from the War Department specifying that it should cease writing monographs and concentrate more upon arranging records for the preparation of a documentary publication similar to the earlier Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. This change stemmed from a recent survey made by the War College Advisory Board on Archives of the World War which revealed that these records were widely scattered, often inaccessible, and in many cases rapidly deteriorating. *

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* Ibid.

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3. From 1929 to 1933, although carrying only a small staff of from 5 to 10 officers, the Historical Section managed to select and index approximately 100,000 documents out of a total of nearly 12 million examined. When these were added to the records originally brought back from France, they formed a collection of some 2,000,000 documents available for final evaluation and cataloging. The latest

estimate in regard to this effort was that the material dealing with AEF operations might be ready for publication by 1946. It was also believed that other parts of the proposed publication would probably include such matters as mobilization, services of supply, demobilization, military intelligence, relations with Allies, general statistics and lessons of the war. *

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* "Thompson Text," p. 9. The first volume of World War I documents was actually went to the Government Printing Office on 23 Apr 48.

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4. The Adjutant General issued A basic directive was issued by order of The Secretary of War to the Historical Section, dated 30 October 1939, announcing which announced that its primary mission was "to make research, collect, examine, arrange, index, collate, and prepare for publication ... accurate accounts of the participation of the military forces of the United States in the World War." The section would also be expected to collect and preserve historical records, maps and photographs not charged to other War Department agencies, prepare condensed unit histories, determine battle credits, and handle historical inquiries from within or without the military service. *

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* Copy in "Thompson Documents," p. 2.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, therefore, although the War Department lacked any appropriate historical program to be utilized in covering World War II operations, it did enjoy a small but experienced and capably led historical unit represented by the Historical Section, AGO. As early as

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11 December 1941, General Spaulding * submitted a letter to The Adjutant

* Having already served two four-year terms as Chief, Historical Section, AWC, Gen Spaulding was recalled to active duty in Oct 40 for the special purpose of completing the WW I documentary history by 30 June 46. See: File, History OCMH, Misc 314.7 HDSS, Tab 7, p. 3. Gen Ref Off OCMH.

General recommending redefinition of the mission for his section so it could apply to the current war and also stating that "no historical writing of any kind is contemplated." * Five months later, after this letter and

* Copy in: "Thompson Documents," p. 8.

a consequent plan to accomplish its main provisions had both been officially approved, he was then able to promulgate a detailed mission for the Historical Section, AWC, which included the "carding and analysis of historical documents dealing with the present war." * Meanwhile, effective

* Ibid., p. 17.

9 March 1942, the War Department had undergone a complete reorganization resulting in numerous functional changes within the WDGS and the establishment of an AGF, AAF and SOS (ASF) for the United States Army.

The new WDGS, as formed in March 1942, with only twelve general staff officers and a large but semi-independent MIS supporting them, was poorly designed to assume proper supervision over any expanded World War II historical program nor did the departmental intelligence authorities even intend

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for it to do so. There were too many more pressing problems at hand directly connected with the production of military intelligence in order to defeat the enemy. Nevertheless, general staff actions on historical matters were often still referred to the agency because of its previous historical functions and the fact that such activities were normally handled in the field by the local ACofS G-2's.

On 4 March 1942, President Roosevelt addressed a letter to the Honorable Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget, expressing personal interest in the steps being taken "to keep a current record of war administration" and suggesting the creation of a representative committee to cover that field in a more intensive manner. * An Advisory

* Ibid., p. 18.

Committee on Records of War Administration was thus duly appointed, with Dr. E. Pendleton Herring, Secretary of the School of Public Administration at Harvard University, named to be its Executive Secretary and Chief of Research Staff. * He was already engaged in conducting a Bureau of the

* Ibid., pp. 19-20.

Budget project designed to compile a history of administrative developments under the war program.

Acting upon the collorate advice of Lt. Col. Otto L. Nelson, a friend of his in the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office, War Department, Doctor Herring decided to write to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy for the purpose of voicing deep concern over "the preservation and creation of the records

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essential to a clear understanding of the major steps of the War Department administration" and to point out that "much would be gained by systematic direction from a central point." * This letter was then

* Ibid., p. 23. Dr. Herring had directed the doctoral dissertation on the WDGS, which Colonel Nelson prepared while stationed at Harvard University during 1940 as an Army student.

forwarded by Mr. McCloy's Executive Officer to the Chief of the Historical Section, AWC, along with a memorandum noting that the Assistant Secretary of War considered the proposal desirable and, if General Spaulding agreed, to submit his own ideas for doing the work. * The latter authority

* Ibid., p. 25.

promptly recommended issuance of instructions for the head of each bureau or other departmental office designated by the Secretary of War to appoint a Historical Officer, who would familiarize himself with the files of his own bureau or other available sources of information and prepare an administrative history outline subject to the approval, advice and coordination of the Historical Section, AWC. * The Adjutant General did issue

* Ibid., pp. 26-27.

such instructions to the Commanding Generals AGF, AAF and SOS (ASF) on 25 July 1942, with information copies distributed to all divisions of the WDGS. * As a result, Dr. Kent R. Greenfield, Chairman of the History

* Ibid., p. 28.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department at Johns Hopkins University, was commissioned an Army major and appointed to be the Historical Officer, AGF, while Col. Clarence B. Lober (later succeeded by Capt. Clanton W. Williams, former Professor of History at the University of Alabama) and Maj. John D. Millett, Associate Professor of Administration and Public Law, Columbia University, became respectively Historical Officers for the AAF and SOS (ASF). *

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* Bell I. Wiley, "Historical Program of the U.S. Army 1939 to Present," OCMH 1954, p. 13. Gen Ref Off OCMH. At the time of this appointment, Prof Millett was working in Washington with the National Resources Planning Board.

Emphasis on historical matters in World War II had so far rested almost entirely upon covering administrative events rather than actual military operations. Moreover, Secretary Baker's stringent policy of limiting War Department endeavors within the historical field essentially to collecting, indexing and preserving records instead of writing narrative history still remained in force. The aptness of this policy was seriously questioned during November 1942, when Major Greenfield forwarded a memorandum to the ACofS G-2, AGF, which concluded that the purpose and scope of the historical effort for military agencies should now be extended in two directions, namely; "outwards, to cover operations and upwards, to embrace the high command," with the military historian not only standing in need of authoritative records on organization and administration but also those pertaining to decisions, training and combat operations, the Army historical sections now ought to start writing tentative

"UNCLASSIFIED"

narratives, or what the British call "first narratives," about the activity of the command and any important phases thereof.*

* See: "Thompson Documents," pp. 34-42. Maj Greenfield wrote his significant memorandum after seeking guidance and counsel from the eminent historian, Dr. Douglas S. Freeman, in Richmond, Va.

During this same period, Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, ACofS G-2, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army (ETOUSA), addressed a letter to the ACofS G-2, WDGS, proposing that steps should be taken without further delay to commence the indexing and cataloging of historical documents. An earlier tour of duty as Executive Officer of the Army War College had convinced him that the preparation of World War I documents for subsequent publication was initiated much too late. He likewise called attention to the fact that both the British and Canadians "have historians now working on the operations of their forces in this country."* Since the ACofS G-2,

* Ibid., p. 52.

WDGS, did not then hold any primary jurisdiction over the military history function, General McClure's letter was forwarded to the Historical Section, AGC, for action. General Spaulding concurred whole-heartedly in the idea of setting up appropriate machinery at Headquarters ETOUSA to classify documents as a first step in their ultimate publication but he also felt that a similar system should be established for the other theaters.* Because all

* Ibid., pp. 53-54.

directives to the overseas theater commanders had to be cleared through OPD, WDGS, the eventual result was the preparation of a memorandum for the

Deputy Chief of Staff, signed by the AGO&A, OPD, on 16 January 1943, which recommended as follows:

1. That the Chief, Historical Section, AGO, prepare instructions for dissemination by The Adjutant General directing that the method of digesting and indexing historical documents proposed in his memorandum of December 11, 1942, subject "Historical Records in Theaters of Operations Overseas," be put into effect.

2. That these instructions include:

a. A brief discussion to remind all commanders of the importance of maintaining accurate records of their operations in order that the history of their commands may accurately reflect their accomplishments, that the contribution of each to the general effort may be adequately assessed, and that data for future military doctrine may be supplied.

b. A list of the type of documents which have been found of particular value in compiling the history of past operations.

c. The proposed technique by which important documents can be briefed, consolidated with those of higher echelons and finally forward to the Historical Section, AGO. A sample card for the guidance of all concerned should be included.

d. Appropriate instructions to Commanding Generals of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Services of Supply, Defense Commands and overseas forces, respectively, that a historical officer be designated in the headquarters of each appropriate echelon where, in addition to his other duties, he will be responsible for the preparation and forwarding of these card digests to the next higher echelon.

3. That these instructions be submitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, prior to publication. *

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* Ibid., pp. 63-64.

At this point, future development of the military history function in World War II broke sharply away from normal staff procedure and tended to become increasingly dependent upon personal pressures applied by the individuals directly concerned. When Colonel Nelson of the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office received this OPD-sponsored historical plan for study and recommendation, he soon concluded it would fall far short of furnishing the type of historical program needed. He thus prepared an entirely

"UNCLASSIFIED"

different memorandum on the subject for General McNarney to discuss with the Chief of Staff. Dated 20 February 1943, this new memorandum reiterated the fact that our past performance in the field of processing historical records had been notably unsatisfactory and recommended the immediate establishment of an adequate organization "comparable to that of the British" for compiling a history of United States military operations. Furthermore, with the Navy having recently commissioned "an outstanding historian from Harvard University" (Prof. Samuel E. Morison) to guide their historical program, it seemed most desirable for the Army to select a correspondingly prominent figure to head up its own project. This authority could then be instructed to organize a system of writing a history of our military operations so as to "provide a first narrative and a proper documentation of source material." *

* Ibid., pp. 65-66.

Since with neither General Marshall nor General McNarney were showing displaying any great interest in his new historical proposal, Colonel Nelson feared that it might fail by default. He turned, therefore, to the Assistant Secretary of War, hoping Mr. McCloy would take over and actively push the project. *

* Ltr, Nelson to Col. John H. Kemper, WDSS, 17 Mar 43, copy in ibid., pp. 102-105.

This move was promptly rewarding in that Mr. McCloy scheduled an informal meeting to discuss the matter on 23 April 1943, with Col. Ernest Dupuy, Acting Deputy Director of PWB; Lt. Col. John E. Bakeless, Maj. John O. Beaty and Maj. Charles H. Taylor of MIS; and Maj. Hoffman Nickerson

of civ, requested to attend in view of their previous historical backgrounds in civil life. They agreed generally that the Historical Section, AGO, had already established a sound basis for the collection of documentary material but considered the time had now come for either an individual historian or suitable historical group to be appointed in order to:

A. Commence the preparation work at once for a large-scale history which would be written later.
B. Produce the smaller studies on particular operations or aspects while the war was still in progress. *

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* "Thomson Text," pp. 66-67.

Although General Spaulding was apparently not invited to join in this exploratory meeting for devising a new historical program, he did discuss the subject personally with Mr. McCloy shortly afterwards and, on 27 April 1943, forwarded a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War presenting his particular views in the matter. He cautioned that any writing undertaken in support of the project should not be permitted to interfere with the archival work conducted by the Historical Section, AGO, and further recommended the appointment of Maj. Hoffman Nickerson to accomplish whatever writing tasks were actually adopted. He also wished to present one particular note of warning, which was not based upon theory but on his own experience going back to 1918, as follows:

> However carefully the historical machine may be set up, the Historian will be looked upon by the fighting man as more or less of a nuisance. The material that he may collect will be scrappy and not altogether satisfactory; and if he does not exercise great care and tact he will find that the work which he bases upon it will be unreliable. This does not mean that the writing cannot be done; only that the historical man must be selected with care, strongly backed up, and not hurried. *

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* "Thompson Documents," pp. 91-92.

The question of where the planned historical project should be placed within the departmental organization continued to remain unsettled. Colonel Nelson had mentioned this difficult problem in his memorandum for the Chief of Staff dated 20 February 1943 and, although not wishing to announce a definite choice at that time for any definite particular location, he felt the project ought to be given to MIS, OPD or the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. On the other hand, when the ACofS G-2, WDGS, was asked to comment upon a draft memorandum being prepared to implement the proposed program, General Strong agreed that it seemed meritorious but believed the resultant organization should not belong to a General Staff Division. Since the historical mission did not fall logically under the purview of MIS, he considered that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War would be a better agency for supervising the required work. *

* Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from Maj Gen George V. Strong, ACofS G-2, 15 April 1943, copy in ibid., p. 97.

Brig. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) A. C. Wedemeyer, Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, OPD, likewise had an opportunity to express himself on the same question. When Major Nickerson forwarded his memorandum to Mr. McCloy concerning the historical program, it came through this authoritative control group for Secretary comment and review. In readily accepting the thesis that a program of such nature should commence without delay, General Wedemeyer thought the historical writing would be more truly objective if the organization to accomplish it were set up directly under the Assistant

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Secretary of War. He further felt that it ought not to become affiliated either with AGO or OCS but the officers attached to historical duties should have free access to all of their files. While he regarded Major Nickerson as highly qualified to participate in the projected work, General Hedekyer held that a Regular Army officer who was already experienced in the AGO historical effort should be designated to head the new unit. *

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* Memorandum for Mr McCloy from Brig Gen A. C. Hedekyer, GSC, 26 Apr 43, copy in ibid., p. 83.

Four days later, in complete disregard of these studied recommendations, the Deputy Chief of Staff issued a directive to the ACofS G-3, WDGS, for him to establish within AGO the necessary organization to compile a military history of the Second World War and also perform the following specific functions:

a. The planning for and the supervision of the preparation and publication of first narrative of military operations.

b. The dissemination as a training aid of military information concerning current operations.

c. The determination of methods to be used for the accumulation of such documentary evidence as will be needed in the compilation of an official history of the war.

d. The establishment in the various theaters of the necessary personnel and organization to accomplish the collection and forwarding of the necessary historical data and the prescription of the methods, procedures, and levels at which the compilation of historical data will take place.

e. The coordination and supervision of the various agencies who are writing administrative histories of the World War activities of the various War Department agencies and commands.

f. The determination of functions, duties, and responsibilities of the Historical Section, Army War College. *

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* Memorandum for the ACofS G-3 signed by Lt Gen Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy C of S, 30 Apr 43, copy in ibid., pp. 95-6.

"UNCLASSIFIED"

With its heavy emphasis on supervisory responsibilities, much of this directive would patently call for operational activities. Yet the new historical section was deliberately placed in MID instead of MIS by the very same authorities who were behind the persistent drive aimed at concentrating all operational functions under the latter service and transforming MID into a purely a general staff agency. This marked inconsistency had apparently failed to impress these authorities to any great extent because, according to Colonel Nelson, the decision favoring MID was made "largely as the lesser of several evils." There had been little disposition to turn the new unit over to the Historical Section, AWC, and Mr. McCloy remained extremely anxious for the history to avoid any semblance of propaganda slant, which might possibly happen if it was written by a some public relations group or a sub-element of OPD. Besides, the established policy was not to pile additional functions onto the ACofS, OPD, as he already held more duties than any one person could properly manage. *

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* See: Ltr, Nelson to Col John M. Kemper, 17 Mar 47, copy in ibid., pp. 102-05.

Action on the military history directive to the ACofS G-2 (WDGS) from the Deputy Chief of Staff was taken in MID by Lt. Col. (later Col.) John M. Kemper, the Assistant Executive. * After discussing the subject with

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* Col Kemper, a Regular Army officer and USMA graduate (1935), had received a Master of Arts degree in history from Columbia University in 1942. He was promoted to Temporary Col, on 13 Sep 44.

UNCLASSIFIED

General Strong, who was still determined not to take on the historical function and even expressed a hope that he might get the order changed, Colonel Kreger decided to talk personally to Colonel Nelson about it. They were in full agreement that a firm decision regarding just what history or histories should be written was long overdue. This same deficiency also pointed toward the appointment of an advisory committee of experienced historians to assist in arriving at the best possible answer to the problem. Provision for such a committee, therefore, was included among the several recommendations forwarded by Colonel Nelson to Mr. McCloy in May 1943. Colonel Nelson likewise considered that the head of the new section ought to be some outstanding civilian, with no military experience necessary but above all an able administrator. Finally, on 13 May 1943, after several more communications had passed back and forth between them, he was able to confirm an arbitrary policy agreement with Mr. McCloy in the matter, as follows:

> 1. G-2 will be directed to proceed with the carrying out of the directive establishing a Historical Section in G-2.
> 2. The historical section will be established in G-2 and if not entirely satisfactory will be transferred.
> 3. The Historical Section will report directly to the Assistant Secretary of War for instructions although it will be administratively and organizationally a part of G-2.
> 4. Colonel T. D. Stamps, Professor of Military History, West Point, will be ordered to Washington and temporary duty for the purpose of assisting in getting the historical organization under way. The Planning Committee will include Professor Pendleton Herring of Harvard University. I will bring him to your office so that you may meet and appraise him.
> 5. The Planning Committee will interview Colonel North (OPD Current Section), Colonel Lalor (officer in charge of AAF administrative historical project), Major Millett (officer in charge of ASF administrative project), and Major K. R. Greenfield (officer in charge of AGF administrative historical project). *

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* Memorandum for Mr. McCloy initialled O.L.N., sub: History of the

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Second World War, 13 May 43, copy in "Thompson Documents," p. 101.

Despite the fact that these fundamental decisions on the new historical section had already been reached directly between Mr. McCloy and Colonel Nelson, a representative conference was scheduled in the former's office for 19 May 1943, to be attended by:

Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, ACofS G-2.
Brig. Gen. Oliver L. Spaulding, Chief, Historical Section, AWC.
Col. Otto L. Nelson Jr., Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff.
Col. Livingston Watrous, Special Services Division.
Col. Thomas North, Chief, Current Section, OPD.
Col. Thomas D. Stamps, Professor of Military Art and Civil Engineering, USMA
Lt. Col. John H. Kemper, Assistant Executive Officer, G-2
Maj. K. R. Greenfield, Chief, History Section, AGF.
Maj. J. D. Millett, Chief, History Section, ASF.
Maj. C. W. Williams, History Section, AAF.
Dr. E. Pendleton Herring, Professor, Harvard University. *

* "Thompson Text," p. 95.

During this important meeting it was decided that a permanent advisory committee, composed of three military and three civilian members, should be constituted in order to plan a favorable program for compiling the military history of World War II. General Spaulding, Colonel Stamps and Lieutenant Colonel Kemper (Secretary) were promptly designated by Mr. McCloy to function as military members of the committee and he further instructed them to receive recommendations from the other conferees concerning its civilian membership for subsequent submission to him along with their own. At the same time, a working subcommittee consisting of Colonel North and Majors Greenfield, Millett and Williams, was appointed for the purpose of rendering necessary assistance to the parent committee. *

* Ibid., p. 96.

On 24 May 1943, Mr. McCloy selected President James P. Baxter of Williams College, Dr. E. Pendleton Herring of Harvard University and Prof. Henry Steel Commager of Columbia University, to represent the civilian membership in a "Planning Committee of the Military History of the Second World War." * The full committee then proceeded to devote

* See: "Thompson Documents," p. 113. President Baxter and Dr Herring were included among the three names nominated by the military members of the committee but Prof Commager was chosen by Mr McCloy over Prof E. M. Earle of Princeton without any reason given.

practically an entire month acquiring as much information as possible from a series of visits, meetings and interviews bearing upon historical matters. By 26 June 1943, it could thus prepare a comprehensive report for submission to the Assistant Secretary of War through the ACofS G-2, WDGS, which not only recommended the immediate establishment of a Historical Branch in MID to accomplish certain indicated historical objectives but also the creation of a new civilian position of Chief Historian to operate under a Military Branch Chief holding the rank of brigadier general. Attached to the report proper was a recommendation for the appointment of Mr. Henry F. Pringle, Professor of Journalism at Columbia University to fill this Chief Historian post and a brief presentation of opposing views to the committee findings submitted by General Spaulding, as follows:

UNCLASSIFIED

(a) The Committee report proposes to set up an entirely new agency for writing the history of the current war, [illegible] the possibilities of economy and efficiency to be found by the use of the historical section, Army War College—an agency which has had use of continuous existence since World War I, and possesses highly trained personnel. This agency could be utilized for the new task, without interfering with its current functions.

(b) The Committee suggests as the chief civilian historical officer a man whose record shows him to be a prolific and apparently competent biographer, historian, and literary man; but it shows no trace of activity or interest in military history or military affairs in general. *

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* Ibid., pp. 135-141.

Unheeding this minority protest from General Spaulding, Mr. McCloy approved the advisory committee report in full except for stating a desire to interview Mr. Pringle personally before agreeing upon his appointment and to be consulted about the selection of the "general officer who is to act as chief of the branch." A memorandum to this effect, dated 7 July 1943, was then dispatched from the Deputy Chief of Staff's Office to the ACofS G-2, WDGS, accompanied by instructions to go ahead and designate an officer as chief of the branch but to submit a separate communication on the question of general officer grade for him. Furthermore, it was officially accepted that the ACofS G-2, WDGS, would request additional personnel and office space for the new unit when the need developed. * The fact soon became apparent, though, that in view of the

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* "Thompson Text," pp. 110-111.

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war demands, neither a brigadier general of the type envisaged by Mr. McCloy and Colonel Nelson nor even a suitable colonel due for promotion

SECRET

4 ,351

UNCLASSIFIED

in the near future would be available for the historical treatment. Because of this complication, General Strong reported and secured approval to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Kreger the Chief of the Historical Branch, G-2, effective 15 July 1943. *

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* "Reagan Documents," p. 142. This G-2 request for Col Kreger's appointment was approved "by order of the Secretary of War" under Col Nelson's signature, along with an added remark "...oud - Deputy Chief of Staff OLR."

Formation of the Historical Branch, G-2, was announced throughout MID (HIS) on 20 July 1943, * but not to the Army at large until two weeks later.

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* MID G-2 Memo No. 66, 20 July 43, for all Groups, Units and Branches, copy in ibid., p. 143.

A detailed WD AGO Memorandum was then published under the title of "Military History of the Second World War" and given widest distribution. It named the members of the Advisory Committee and described their official mission, mentioned the new Chief Historian position, and assigned specific responsibilities to the Historical Branch, as follows:

> 1. There has been established in the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, the Historical Branch, G-2, whose functions are to plan and supervise the compilation of the military history of the Second World War to include--
>
> a. Responsibility for the preparation and publication of the following objectives, and such other objectives as may be recommended and approved at later dates:
>
> (1) Operational monographs.--These are to be narrative accounts of individual military operations against the enemy.

(2) Theater and overseas histories.—These narratives will include not only the material covered in the operational narratives, but all pertinent Army activities and the activity of all cooperating forces.
(3) Administrative histories.
(4) A general war history.
(5) An official history.
(6) Publication of documents.

b. Determination of methods, and responsibility for their execution, to be used for the accumulation of such documentary evidence as will be needed in the compilation of an official history of the war.

c. Establishment in the various theaters of the necessary personnel and organization to accomplish the collection and forwarding of the necessary historical data and the prescription of the methods, procedures, and levels at which the compilation of historical data will take place.

d. Coordination and supervision of the various agencies who are writing administrative and technical histories of the Second World War activities of the various War Department agencies and commands, including the War Department General Staff.

e. Determination of functions, duties, and responsibilities of the Historical Section, Army War College.

f. Consultation with the Advisory Committee on matters as enumerated in paragraph 3 and such other matters as may be desirable.

g. Final editing and approval of all historical manuscripts prepared for publication by all agencies of the War Department. *

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* WD AGO Memo No. W345-21-43, 3 Aug 43, copy in ibid., pp.147-47a.

The most urgent problem was now to procure qualified personnel for staffing the Historical Branch and to fill the Chief Historian post. The latter position was still vacant because the original nominee, Dr. Henry F. Pringle, had maintained that the civilian historian should hold a superior or at least equal authority over the military head of the branch in professional matters. * This view remained unacceptable to Colonel Kemper

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* Ltr, Pringle to Baxter, 16 Jul 43, copy in ibid., pp. 150-51.

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and he was backed up by Dr. Baxter, Chairman of the Advisory Committee. *

* See "Thompson Text," p. 120.

Eventually, on 18 November 1943, after all concerned had registered their substantial agreement, the appointment went to Dr. Walter Livingston Wright, Near East historian and former president of Roberts College in Istanbul, who was currently serving as a consultant with the Library of Congress. * In

* Ibid., p. 123.

the meantime, Colonel Kemper had arranged for the transfer of Maj. (later Col.) Charles H. Taylor from the Dissemination Branch, MID, to the MID Historical Branch to become his second in command, * while other experienced

* Maj Taylor had been a distinguished medieval historian at Harvard. See: Wiley, op. cit., pp. 22 and 37.

historians or needed specialists were gradually acquired from a variety of different sources.

The initial writing project assigned to the new branch came from the Special Services Division, ASF, on or about 1 August 1943. The Orientation and Publications Section, Information Branch, of that division, under Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen. U.S.A. Res.) Sam L. A. Marshall, had inherited the task of preparing a series of "Current History Pamphlets" based upon an idea expressed by the Chief of Staff that simple accounts explaining actions which they had participated in should be made available to sick or wounded personnel convalescing at Zone of Interior hospitals. With work on this project running into a seemingly endless chain of difficulties in ASF, the entire function was removed to the MID Historical Branch where it became known as the American Forces in Action (AFA) series. Steps were then promptly taken to procure qualified personnel for handling such a project, including

"UNCLASSIFIED"

the transfer from ASF of Lieutenant Colonel Marshall himself. * At the

* See: File, History OCMH, Misc 314.7 [illegible], Tab 5, pp. 14-17. Gen Ref Off OCMH Lt Col Marshall, a World War I combat veteran and former military analyst on the editorial staff of the Detroit News, is credited with having developed a new system of interviewing participants en masse for historical purposes during rest periods right after conclusion of the battle. See: Wiley, op. cit., pp. 41-43.

same time, Capt. Roy Lamson, Jr. was obtained from the Bureau of Public Relations to help write the first monograph scheduled for publication by the MID Historical Branch, entitled To Bizerte with the II Corps. *

* See: Wiley, op. cit., p. 46. This narrative was published in Feb 44, with the Historical Section, AWC, furnishing required maps and the Signal Corps and Engineer Boards providing photographs and terrain models for it.

Under the terms of its basic directive the Historical Branch was called upon to perform a number of record keeping activities, especially those connected with accumulating documentary evidence to compile an official war history. On the other hand, existing regulations designated The Adjutant General as official archivist for the United States Army. Important conflict between these two departmental agencies in ~~processing~~ handling historical documents was fortunately avoided through the transfer of Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Jesse S. Douglas, an ex-member of the National Archives staff, from the AGO Records Branch to MID, effective 20 August

1943. He not only believed it was better for the Army historical and archival functions to remain divided but also that an attempt should be made to separate the operational from administrative war records because future historians would want both. The main thing was that they should know where the records were actually located and then have full access to them. Nevertheless, the Historical Branch stood in obvious need of an appropriate reference library to manage and preserve all source material it might hold either in temporary or permanent custody. *

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* File, History OCMH, misc 314.7 HHSS, Tab 5, pp. 23-25. Gen Ref Off Copy

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The Historical Branch was also responsible for establishing "necessary personnel and organization" within the theaters to forward historical data and, for prescribing procedures to cover the compilation of such data. With this and other field problems in mind, Colonel Kemper decided to accompany the Kiska invasion force during Aleutian operations commencing August 1943. Upon his return therefrom early in October, he recommended the assignment of historical officers within each combat theater, to function under the direct supervision and control of the AGFS G-2, WDGS, for securing information to supplement the inadequate records currently being forwarded. In commenting on this MID proposal, however, OPD contended that the theaters ought to be permitted to organize their own historical programs rather than forced to adopt such a centralized system. The eventual result was a program of training historical teams in Washington for overseas assignment, supplemented by a series of visits to key theaters on the part of the

branch officials aimed at insuring more favorable coordination in historical matters between AGO and the field. That positive measures in this respect were needed becomes plainly apparent from a detailed survey completed by Dr. George W. Auxier of the Historical Branch on 1 January 1944, summarizing as follows:

a. There are 293 full-time and 197 part-time officers, enlisted men and civilians now working in 28 separate historical sections to produce a projected 80 volumes relating to WD and Army activities in WW II, with 63 of the full-time personnel stationed overseas. This does not include any scheduled volumes by the Historical Branch, AGO, or Historical Sections within the theaters, nor monographs prepared for separate publication but which may later be incorporated in works already planned.

b. Historical programs are presently well under way at Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces (including most of the technical services), and Army Air Forces (including various AAF installations in the U.S.). Programs of some sort have also been established overseas in ETO, North Africa, South and Southwest Pacific Areas, Central Pacific, and the Alaskan Defense Command. *

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* Memo, George W. Auxier for Chief Hist Br G-2, 1 Jan 44, AGO 314.7. Gen Ref Off GCMH.

Although still encountering great difficulty in the procurement of qualified personnel to fill its professional positions, the AGO Historical Branch kept right on expanding both in strength and activity. Hence, by mid-May

357

"UNCLASSIFIED"

1944, it carried an actual strength of 9 officers and 11 civilians organized into five different sections charged respectively with executing functions relating to liaison and policy, editorial, cartographic, records, analysis, and chronology, plus a small research and writing group placed directly under the Chief Historian. This organization existed mostly on paper, as all the personnel were considered available to pitch in and do whatever appeared necessary at the moment regardless of their formal assignment. A second AFA pamphlet called the Papuan Campaign was thus soon published, while three others; Guadalcanal, Volturno and The Winter Line, reached an advanced stage of preparation within the theaters. * Two

* The AFA series finally included a total of 14 paper-bound volumes.

popular-style narratives covering the Attu and Kwajalein campaigns were edited by the branch for publication in the Infantry Journal during October 1944 and, the following month, a Salerno monograph, which had been written in the Mediterranean Theater by the Fifth Army Historical Section, was similarly edited and published. * On the other hand, the branch was alre commencing to display a marked propensity for gathering projects that were only slightly related to its assigned mission, such as developing a war chronology, cooperating actively with the American Council on Education in studying the implications for civilian education of wartime military training, and writing an orientation pamphlet about the Pentagon Building. *

* Wiley, op. cit., pp. 47-48, 68, 72-74.

* Ibid., pp. 69-72, 76-77. Mr. McCloy had suggested in Feb 44 that the

UNCLASSIFIED

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Branch consider developing a history of [illegible] participation in the war. This spurred a study of the general problem which, in turn, resulted merely in a declaration that pertinent material should be collected for such history and further action [illegible] later. See: File, History OCMH, Misc 314.7 HHCS, Tab 9, p. 77. Gen Ref Off Copy.

In December 1943, Colonel Kemper personally escorted the first historical team organized for theater duty to North Africa and additional teams were then sent out shortly afterwards, not only to the same theater but also to the Central Pacific and ETO. These initial teams were normally assigned to higher headquarters for the express purpose of preparing pamphlets in the AFA series. By April 1944, though, it had become clearly evident that there was an important need for regulated historical activity at the lower levels of command. Since the Bureau of Public Relations (B-R) was currently faced with a similar problem of gaining suitable news coverage below theater headquarters, the War Department established an Information and Historical Service "to increase the flow of certain types of information concerning the front line activities of ground units." Composed of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments that were each headed by a Public Relations Officer (PRO) in the grade of colonel and controlling a variable number of Assignment Units located within subordinate command echelons, this service included both public relations and historical personnel.* As a marriage of convenience between two entirely different functions, it was fraught with potential trouble but

* See: WD Memo W220-44, 18 Apr 44.

359

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

actually appears to have worked out in a satisfactory manner for all concerned. *

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* Wiley, op. cit., pp. 60-62.

One major attempt was made late in 1944 and early 1945 to increase direct HHD supervision over the Army historical effort. Accordingly, instructions were issued during September 1944, requiring historical sections of the principal commands both at home and abroad to submit bi-monthly reports to the Historical Branch about their respective activities. With Colonel Kerper journeying to Europe some three months later in the hope of improving a faltering ETO historical program, he was also able to complete arrangements for having Col. S. L. A. Marshall to be appointed to be the Deputy Theater Historian and promised a free hand to take whatever corrective action might become necessary. Other key officers of the Historical Branch were then called upon to pay extended visits to the field in furthering an intensive drive aimed at achieving greater progress and better coordination for the military history mission. *

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* Ibid., pp. 77-81.

When Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Allen F. Clark, Jr., replaced Colonel Kerper as Chief of the Historical Branch, HHD, effective 24 February 1945, * he found histori-

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* See: Memo, AG-A, ID WDGS, 26 Feb 45, HHD 300.6 (1 Jun 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

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cal activities in some of the areas continuing to lag and the ETO

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situation still very discouraging. Moreover, because the problem of obtaining qualified personnel to accomplish historical tasks was even more and more difficult, the branch was mostly concentrating mostly upon training historical teams for service within the theaters of operations. *

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* Riley, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

The sudden arrival of VE Day during May 1945, had little immediate effect on the regular activities of the Historical Branch but it did give rise to a new historical project which was commonly referred to as the Shuster Mission. Based upon a suggestion offered by Dr. Troyer Anderson, historian in the Office of the Under Secretary of War, that a group of experts should be sent to Europe to interrogate German prisoners of war for historical purposes, the ACofS G-2 was asked to recommend personnel for such a group and to draft its directive. A mission headed by Dr. George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College, and including Dr. John Brown Mason of Stanford, Dr. Frank D. Graham of Princeton, Lt. Col. Oron J. Hale of the Historical Branch, Lt. Col. J. J. Scanlon of ASF, and Maj. Kenneth Heckler, formerly of the Historical Section, ASF, was then appointed and instructed to depart for Europe early in July 1945, in order to obtain information on all aspects of the Nazi regime "not known to be a matter of record." * Although the results of this particular endeavor were [illegible]

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* See Memo (C), ACofS G-2 to Chief Hist Br, 31 May 45, in folder "Interrogation Project - Shuster," (no file number) Gen Ref Off OCMH.

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disappointing, * it did serve to point unmistakably toward the importance

* Post Report, Colonel Clark, "Historical Division G-2, 1945-46," (no file number). Gen Ref Off OCMH. Hereafter cited as "Clark Report."

of utilizing enemy sources of information in writing war history, so that a more comprehensive program of holding interviews with German commanders could be set up later under the Historical Section, EUCOM. *

* Wiley, op. cit., p. 85.

Another noteworthy post-VE Day historical activity stemmed from an attempt by Colonel Clark to start work on a European volume for the "popular history" mentioned in the branch directive of August 1943. Early in May 1945, he selected Mr. Sewell T. Tyng, who had "previously written an excellent summary of the Ardenne Campaign (No 1) and shown great facility for handling high level material in such a way as to retain maximum reader interest," to become its author. Even though Mr. Tyng agreed to undertake this writing project at no profit to himself, it soon ran into serious difficulty with OPD refusing to allow him full access to their classified records. When Mr. McCloy finally settled this crucial matter to the complete satisfaction of the Historical Branch, Mr. Tyng was authorized to make an extended tour of the European battlefields commencing on or about 1 August 1945. Shortly after his return, however, he fell gravely ill and died in May 1946. Since the popular history project could show no substantial progress for almost a year,

"UNCLASSIFIED"

it was then "suspended" and never reinstituted. *

* "Clark Report," pp. 13-14. The file, History Unit, misc 314.7 HiSS, Tab 9, pp. 14-16. General Staff Conf.

The cessation of European hostilities quite naturally caused a huge increase in the number of historical manuscripts flowing into HID for official review. This, added to the fact that the volume of historical documents and records forwarded from the field kept growing in leaps and bounds, promptly created a personnel crisis for the Historical Branch. There were just not enough people available to cope with the ever-mounting work load, especially for the Records Analysis, Editorial, and Administrative Sections. The only practical solution seemed to lie in securing more personnel but efforts to do this were consistently blocked by a War Department Manpower Board directive that had been issued late in June 1945, reducing the authorized strength of the Historical Branch from 56 to 46 persons. VJ Day, therefore, found Colonel Clark leaning heavily on his convenient privilege of direct communication with higher authority to promote advocate support a determined campaign for restoring or at least minimizing this announced cut. Furthermore, it had now become obvious to him that "we would have to get out from under G-2 as soon after the end of the war as possible" or else further inevitable decreases in strength "would put the Historical Division completely out of commission." *

* "Clark Report," pp. 16-17.

World War II thus ended with the Army historical function still

UNCLASSIFIED"

assigned to the departmental intelligence agency and could, under increased pressures from several different directions. Although the ASofS G-2, WDGS, in April 1943, had demonstrated a ready willingness to continue general staff supervision over the function, he also strongly recommended against placing the actual historical writing project within either AGO or AIS. In making this particular recommendation he received full support from the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, OPD, and Chief of the Historical Section, AGO, but was overruled through an agreement on the subject reached directly between the Assistant Secretary of War and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff. As a result, the wartime historical project tended to develop essentially into a personal vehicle controlled by a small group of enthusiasts, both military and civilian, centered about the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Under these circumstances, additional difficulties bearing upon functional responsibility were plainly predictable.

UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER XI

COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES

With the preparation for and actual conduct of modern warfare growing so rapidly in complexity, military intelligence operations have naturally tended to become more and more complicated intricate along parallel lines. This fact was clearly plainly apparent during World War I, when for the first time the problem of achieving a suitable coordination of effort in connection with American intelligence activities threatened to assume almost overwhelming proportions. Although the problem had been duly recognized even then by most of the authorities concerned, it was not satisfactorily solved and continued to pose a number of difficult questions for the future. Unfortunately, under the restricted intelligence operations of the succeeding peacetime period, these questions remained largely unanswered and the sudden arrival of World War II found both the Army and the United States Government on the whole markedly unprepared to cope with them.

In respect to the departmental military intelligence agency, this difficult coordination problem seems all-embracing. Effective steps must not only be taken to assure an adequate coordination of effort for its own internal organization but also for every other agency being dealt with, whether American or foreign, governmental or nongovernmental, military or civilian, etc. Moreover, since outside liaison may result either in acquiring or releasing information, it consistently

UNCLASSIFIED

bear upon such basic intelligence functions as collection, dissemination and security. The entire agency is thus soon involved and one of the chief questions finally becomes how best to coordinate the extensive coordination effort itself in the hope of reducing duplication and confusion to a minimum.

There are a number of standard procedures which customarily serve to promote better coordination among military intelligence agencies. For example, the establishment of many different types of representative committees, formation of group reading panels and consultations held between individual researchers on the working level. Another common method is by means of regularly designated liaison officers, who may be exchanged on a full time duty basis or simply pay periodic visits to outside agencies whenever the occasion demands. While this formal system is normally both flexible and productive, it often develops into a very expensive proposition from the personnel standpoint and requires the strictest possible supervision in order to counteract that unfavorable characteristic. As a matter of fact, it can even create serious coordination problems of its own if the liaison officers concerned are not capable of effecting a complete and accurate distribution of the information they have obtained from their assigned sources. Such an ability demands detailed knowledge of every aspect of the military intelligence process but officers possessing those qualifications are always hard to come by scarce and especially so during any period of emergency.

Before the outbreak of the war MID had been utilizing all ordinary methods in attempting to attain a satisfactory coordination with associated

UNCLASSIFIED

intelligence agencies, although on a relatively simple scale. The Military Attache Section of the Administrative Branch was directing this effort in foreign countries through its control over American military attache, mission, and observer personnel stationed overseas, while the Foreign Liaison Section of the same branch was performing a companion function in Washington by maintaining official contact with all foreign officers diplomatically accredited to the United States Government. MID was also appropriately represented on many interdepartmental and inter-allied committees designed specifically to coordinate military intelligence activities of various categories but its formal liaison system remained quite small, being limited to a Contact Section of three officers functioning under the Intelligence Branch. The duties of these officers were merely described on the current organization chart as "to make contact with State, ONI, etc., for military information." *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Intelligence Group, pt. 2, series 3, sec. 4, Washington Liaison Branch, p. 1 and Tab A. ACSI Rec Sec. The three officers assigned at this time to the Contact Section were: Col Harry F. Cunningham, Inf; Maj M. P. Goodfellow, MI, and Maj O. J. Sands, FA.

As the war progressed and intelligence operations of the United States Government kept expanding in every conceivable direction, the problems of coordination soon commenced to show definite signs of becoming practically insurmountable. This was not only due to the size or extent of these operations alone but also because the national

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UNCLASSIFIED

administration had chosen to establish such a bewildering array of special wartime agencies, with most of them enjoying independent authority and all engaged in some form of information gathering activity. Although these new agencies could provide a potentially valuable source of information for MID, they also multiplied the coordination requirements tremendously and even caused a great deal of duplication of effort among themselves.

The military intelligence authorities of the War Department were apparently aware of this ever-mounting coordination problem but other than granting several strength increases to the established liaison offices, * they failed to take any effectual steps in meeting it. The

* In Mar 42, the Foreign Liaison Section of the Air Staff was absorbed by a Foreign Liaison Branch of the newly-created MIS.

net result was that each MID (MIS) unit involved in processing information proceeded to initiate direct liaison with whatever outside agencies gave promise of contributing to their own individual specialties. This same general pattern likewise held true for the release of information to these agencies and interviews with military or civilian officials returning from trips abroad, since there were no authoritative coordinating procedures in force to govern intelligence activities of that nature. *

* "Hist MIS" (S), Washington Liaison Branch, pp. 2-3.

The first MID (MIS) unit to undertake a more suitable centralization of its contacts with outside agencies after Pearl Harbor was the Counter-Intelligence Group. On 17 January 1942, this group issued a memorandum

to fifteen other agencies of the government stating that, while there was no desire to handicap or prevent the release of personnel security information, "it had been deemed expedient to establish a systematic means of providing necessary data to interested parties." They were asked, therefore, to forward to the Executive Officer of the Counterintelligence Group a "written request signed by their duly authorized representatives" when seeking information of that type. This memorandum was addressed to the following collaborative agencies:

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Naval Intelligence
Intelligence Unit, Bureau of Internal Revenue
U.S. Secret Service
State Department
U.S. Civil Service Commission
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
Metropolitan Police Department
Office of Emergency Management
Department of Commerce
Director of Personnel, Office of Emergency Management
National Defense Research Commission
Post Office Department
Selective Service
Economic Defense Board *

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* See: Memo (C), Chief of Research and Summary Branch for Lt Col W. A. Holbrook, 30 Mar 42, MID 321.19 G-2 CI Group, 30 Mar 42 (24 Jan 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

With the Counterintelligence Group having thus started to formalize its liaison system in this manner, no corresponding development occurred within the Intelligence Group until the latter part of 1942. At that time, positive steps were taken to improve the situation [illegible]

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the dissemination of technical intelligence and the collection of information from military officials returning from trips abroad, as follows:

1. During the winter of 1942, the Dissemination Branch of the Intelligence Group, sponsored a series of conferences attended by representatives from ASF, AAF, AGF and the technical services in order to consider ways and means for improving the distribution of incoming intelligence material. As a result, authority was secured to set up a "Report Center" in MIS, where appropriate personnel could request copies of reports if desired. Although this center was the actual forerunner of the later Reading Panel, it did not turn out to be very successful in itself because of frequent security obstacles encountered and limitations placed upon its authorized scope. *

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* "Hist MIS," (S), Information Group, pt. 3, series 3, Reading Panel Branch, pp. 2-3.

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2. On 12 December 1942, in accordance with an approved memorandum from the ACofS G-2, the Adjutant General directed the Commanding Generals of AAF, AGF and ASF to have selected officers report to MIS for questioning upon their return to Washington from duty in theaters of operations. After a regular Interview Section had been established in MIS to accomplish such interviews, this proved to be a successful move in the direction of increasing intelligence coverage and simplifying the collection effort within that important field. It still failed, however, to assure a favorable coordination for similar interviews with returning civilian officials,

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newspaper or radio correspondents, businessmen, refugees, missionaries, etc. *

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* Ibid., Washington Liaison Branch, pp. 3-4 and Tabs J. K. and L.

During early 1943, due mainly to complications stemming from the newly-imposed MIS concept, the departmental intelligence agency was in a constant state of flux. The necessity for further centralizing collection procedures was fully realized but every proposal advanced on that controversial subject ran into strong opposition because the production personnel were loath to have their established liaison practices curtailed and objected strenuously to any plan which might threaten to restrict their direct contacts with outside agencies. While the existing system undoubtedly had served to foster a close working relationship between associated intelligence groups, it also encouraged duplication of effort and even found many of the MID (MIS) units actively competing against each other. * Besides, moreover,

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* "MID Hist WW II" (S), p. 84.

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it lacked an inherent capacity for uncovering or exploiting new information sources. On the other hand, the steady evolution of the JCS (CCS) Committee structure was helping measurably to improve coordination in intelligence matters among MID (MIS), ONI and other governmental agencies, especially at the policy level.

In recognizing the dire necessity for some sort of a specialized unit to stimulate the development of new information sources, MIS had recently created a new Collection Branch and, more for convenience than logic, placed it under the Dissemination Group. This mistake was rectified on 25 January

UNCLASSIFIED

1943, when the Dissemination Group was broken up and its component parts distributed throughout the Intelligence Group. The Collection Branch of the Intelligence Group was then charged with executing the following principal mission:

To supervise, coordinate and direct the collection of information for military use through:
Military Attaches, Military Observers, Military Missions.
Branch Offices, MIS.
Government Establishments.
All Non-military Organizations and Individuals.
Special Agents and Services directly employed.
Interviews of military and civilian personnel.
Analysis of Foreign Press.
All other means available. *

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Washington Liaison Branch, Tab S.

Holding an authorized strength of 24 officers and 18 civilians, this new Collection Branch was initially organized into a Headquarters plus six subordinate sections designated as; Foreign, U.S., Contact and Liaison, Interview, Foreign Press, and Special Service. * It not only grew rapidly

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* Ibid. Chief of this Collection Branch was Col (later Brig Gen) George S. Smith, GSC.

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in point of size and activity but also proceeded to absorb the hitherto independent Military Attache (Field Service) Branch. During August 1943, after a most confusing succession of MIS reorganizations and consequent shifts in title, it finally received the status of an independent Collection Group. At that particular time, it was composed of a Foreign Branch and a Domestic Branch, with these two major elements being divided into a combination of functional and geographic sections, as follows:

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Foreign Branch

Mission Section
[illegible] Section
American Theater Section (including Canada)
European Theater Section (including Africa and Middle East)
Pacific Theater Section

Domestic Branch

Interview Section
Branch Office Section
District of Columbia Section *

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* Ibid., Tab X. See also: "MIS Hist" (S), Foreign Branch, p. 28.

In their persistent attempts to centralize the MID (MIS) collection effort the departmental authorities had now produced a jumbled organization which stood badly in need of better coordination measures even within itself. By 18 November 1943, the vertical collection unit was found to be cutting directly across such normal command or administrative functions as personnel procurement and assignment, maintenance of military attache and field office records, and the establishment and control of American military missions in foreign countries. It was also evaluating and disseminating intelligence in connection with making foreign press surveys, while its own liaison activities continued to remain inadequately defined. There was, for example, a separate War Department Liaison Section to maintain permanent liaison with "FBI, ONI and other governmental agencies" but a regular Contact Section "to obtain information for the War Department from sources in Washington." * At the same time, the

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* "Hist MIS" (S), Washington Liaison Branch, p. 6 and Tab 2.

UNCLASSIFIED

departmental Foreign Liaison Office was still operating as an independent branch of MIS. The entire matter of MIS (MIS) liaison with outside agencies obviously required further study in [illegible] to achieve a more effective centralization.

Serving well to illustrate the many different facets of this difficult liaison problem was an effort made by the Chief of the Contact Section, MIS, on 15 December 1943, to rearrange the various assignments for his limited personnel and thereby gain greater efficiency, as follows:

Geographic and Scientific - Capt. Hudson
- Ethnogeographic Board
- National Research Council
- American Council of Learned Societies
- National Academy of Sciences
- "M" Project

Technical - Capt. Spencer
- Office of Scientific Research and Development
- National Inventors Council

Legal and Administrative - Capt. Spencer
- Justice
  - Economic Warfare Sections: Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
- Commerce

Maritime - Lt. Col. King
- Maritime Commission
- War Shipping Administration
- Coast Guard

Interview - Lt. Col. Beaty
- Office of War Information
- Lend-Lease

Photograph - Lt. Link
- Photographic Liaison
- Bureau Public Relations
- AAF Photographic Library

General - Capt. Spencer (Temporary)
- Treasury
- Agriculture
- Interior
- Tariff Commission

374

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Special
Censorship - Maj. Le Vay
Federal Communications Commission - Maj. Le Vay
War Production Board - Lt. Col. Kan
Office Strategic Services - Dr. Children
State - Maj. Miller and Capt. Ferris
JICA and Navy - Maj. Schuster *

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* Ibid., Tab AA.

A list was being circulated within the War Department in February 1944, showing a total of some 150 different liaison functions being currently performed by officers of the MIS organization. At the same time, the Chief of the North American Branch felt it necessary to observe officially that "there were too many people running too many contacts for successful work." Since it was apparent that there would soon be a complete overhaul of the whole MID (MIS) structure, no immediate steps were taken to remedy this unsatisfactory situation. Eventually, however, as part of the reorganization plan of 24 April 1944, a Washington Liaison Branch (WLB) was informally activated and gradually fitted into the new MID (MIS) intelligence production system so as to come under the Supervisor of Source Control. It then consisted only of Domestic Liaison, Interview, Foreign Liaison and Miami Liaison Sections but, on 24 July 1944, after MID (MIS) had lost its so-called operational counterintelligence functions, a Security Liaison Section was added. Similarly, effective 25 September 1944, the New York Branch Contact and Liaison Office reverted to its direct control. *

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* Ibid., pp. 7-8 and Tab LD.

"UNCLASSIFIED"

Because the development of this MIB represented the ultimate solution reached by the departmental intelligence authorities during World War II to centralize the MID (MIS) liaison effort, it seems desirable to examine its organization and activities in considerable detail. Such an examination should not only provide valuable information for the future but also serve once more to emphasize the enormity of the coordination problem. It first ought to be noted, though, that the MIB (MIS) reorganization of April 1944 further resulted in the establishment of a regular Reading Panel Branch under the Supervisor of Source Control. Since a facility of that type had long been needed, it quickly developed into an important means for effecting the proper distribution of intelligence reports from the field. The branch operated a Visiting General Panel and Visiting Technical Panel, wherein accredited representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Intelligence Division of Army Service Forces and all technical services could participate in either or both as appropriate. It finally reached a peak strength of 12 officers and 12 civilians, and, by V-J Day, had managed to process a grand total of 197,650 numbered reports, along with numerous other documents which for various reasons could not be given any serial designation. *

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* Hist MIS (S), Reading Panel Branch, pp. 3-6.

As originally formed, the MIB enjoyed an authorized strength of 50 officers, 46 civilians, 1 warrant officer and 10 enlisted men but 13 vacancies continued to remain unfilled among the several different officer and civilian categories. * Lt. Col. (later Col.) Ernest W. Gibson, from

370

"UNCLASSIFIED"

the Far East Branch, MIS, was designated to be the first Chief of WLB although he acted in that capacity only until 5 December 1944, when he was succeeded by Col. H. H. Hole. On 10 January 1945, Colonel Hole was in turn replaced by Col. Ralph E. Doty, who then functioned for the rest of the wartime period. * The actual strength of the Branch does not

* Ibid., Washington Liaison Branch, p. 10.

appear to have ever been materially increased, probably because personnel procurement continued to present such a difficult problem.

The Domestic Liaison Section of WLB resulted from a merger of the previously separate War Department Liaison and Contact Groups. It was primarily a collection unit and called upon to maintain liaison "with all informational producing governmental agencies and components of the War and Navy Departments in Washington for the purpose of obtaining information of interest to MIS." In order to promote internal coordination, its personnel were carefully instructed to ascertain beforehand what information might be wanted by the other MIS branches and to keep these branches fully posted on the capabilities of outside agencies for furnishing the desired material. * This precaution [illegible] serves well

* Ibid., Inf. re Washington Liaison Branch, p. 1 and Tab 1.

to illustrate the basic weakness of any centralized liaison system, in that each officer assigned thereto must not only become an expert in a wide variety of different intelligence fields but also be constantly on the alert to anticipate the demands of the production specialists whenever the occasion should arise.

377

"UNCLASSIFIED"

The Domestic Liaison Section was granted an initial allotment of 21 officers and 8 civilians but by June 1944, 4 of the officer positions still remained vacant. * Utilizing this small group of personnel in

* Ibid., p. 1.

cooperation with regularly assigned liaison officers from other MIS units, it sought to maintain more or less continual contact with key agencies of the government according to established procedures described generally, as follows:

a. Department of State - Two officers and three civilians from WLB share an office in the State Department with corresponding representatives from ONI, OSS and FBI. The Chief Cable Clerk brings to this office such cables as his own authorities have determined outside agencies should see. These cables are first paraphrased and then, along with whatever other reports or documents have been acquired, promptly distributed by WLB personnel to MIS units they feel have a specific need for them. A daily summary of selected high-level State Department cables is likewise prepared for restricted dissemination among appropriate MID (MIS) officials.

b. Department of Treasury - Contact is regularly maintained with the Foreign Funds Control of the Treasury Department, as that office is held responsible for carrying out various governmental economic and financial warfare programs. Liaison is also accomplished with the Bureau of Customs on export control matters and the Division of Monetary Research which analyzes the flow of capital funds into or out of the United States.

c. Navy Department - Since ONI and COMINCH both constitute principal sources of information for MIS, one field grade officer from WLB occupies

a permanent desk within the Navy Department to deal almost exclusively with ONI. Liaison officers from the Special Reports Branch and Military Branch of MIS also function in like manner for CominCh.

d. War Department - Continuous liaison is observed with ASF, AGF and AAF, as well as with all Defense Commands and War Department staff elements. These activities yield a large amount of detailed information for MIS mostly along the following lines:

ASF - Technical and foreign positive intelligence.

AAF - Air photos and terrain information.

AGF - Reports from combat observers, captured documents and prisoner of war interrogations.

CAD, PRB etc. - Special observer reports.

e. Department of Justice - Three branches of this department are of particular interest to MIS, namely; the War Division, FBI, and Immigration and Naturalization Office. The War Division, in its handling of foreign cartel matters and acting as a counsel for the Alien Property Custodian, is visited periodically by WLB personnel, while an officer from the Security Branch maintains close liaison with both the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Office.

f. Post Office Department - One WLB officer contacts the International Postal Service and Division of War Activities in this department, the latter division having been charged with preventing the use of mails to interfere with the national war effort and the finger-printing of aliens.

g. Department of Interior - Visits are often made to the Mineral Economic Studies and War Activities Bureaus of this department because

these two groups prepare valuable surveys on foreign mineral and petroleum production.

h. Department of Agriculture - With the War Food Administration, Bureau of Agriculture Economics and Office of Foreign Agriculture Relations providing a fruitful source of information for MIS, they are visited periodically by an officer from WLB.

i. Department of Commerce - The Bureau of Census, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, and Coast and Geodetic Survey, all furnish essential data to MIS, so they are visited periodically by a WLB officer.

j. Department of Labor - The Bureau of Labor Statistics is visited from time to time by a WLB officer in order to obtain needed information on labor matters.

k. Library of Congress - This agency has developed a very comprehensive research section, with its agents located in every corner of the world able to purchase foreign books, newspapers and magazines which are of significant interest to MIS. At present one WLB officer pays periodic visits to the library but this is not sufficient to provide an adequate liaison for such a potentially fertile information source.

l. Federal Communications Commission - Operating monitor stations throughout the United States and possessions, this commission not only intercepts information of important use to the War Department but also records and analyzes many foreign broadcasts. Although all requests for obtaining information from the FCC must be processed through WLB, they are actually acted upon by a liaison officer furnished from another branch of MIS.

380

"UNCLASSIFIED"

[illegible]

[illegible] institutions and individuals, it is visited by [illegible] at irregular intervals.

n. United States Maritime Commission - Visited periodically in connection with acquiring needed information on such subjects as ocean routes, foreign shipping terminals and the transfer of vessels from U.S. to alien registry.

o. United States Tariff Commission - Visited periodically in order to procure studies covering a wide variety of technical and economic matters.

p. National Academy of Sciences - Visited from time to time for information concerning investigations or experiments in the field of science and art.

q. Pan American Union - Since this organization prepares and distributes monthly bulletins on Latin American affairs, it remains of considerable interest to MIS.

r. Foreign Economic Administration - This agency forms a major source of information for military use and the War Department has already established a permanent liaison group of four officers with necessary secretarial assistance at its main offices. MIS is now in the process of taking over this entire group for assignment to the Domestic Liaison Section. Additionally, an officer from the Special Areas Branch of MIS will continue to collect economic intelligence from the Bureau of Areas in FEA.

UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible]

[illegible]

t. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs - [illegible] center for information bearing upon [illegible] and cultural activities within the Western Hemisphere, this agency is not only visited regularly by WLB personnel but also forwards routine reports to MIS through WLB on an automatic basis.

u. Office of War Information - With psychological warfare playing such a vital role in the national war effort, WLB furnishes two field officers for collaboration with the Chief of the Propaganda Branch of MIS, who, in turn, acts as G-2 Liaison Officer to OWI. The key unit for MIS in OWI is the Overseas Operations Branch, which keeps a central file giving the location of intelligence "materials" supplemented by a most useful audit [illegible] up-to the reliability of foreign intelligence sources.

v. War Shipping Administration - Representing the United States Government on all inter-allied shipping committees, this agency gathers a great deal of information pertaining to foreign ports, warehouses, terminal facilities, etc., and is often visited by an officer from WLB.

w. Petroleum Administration for War - Of special interest to MIS in view of its wide knowledge about foreign petroleum affairs.

x. Office of Strategic Services - One officer from WLB serves full time as the MIS Liaison Officer with OSS.

"UNCLASSIFIED"

* Ibid., Washington Liaison Branch, Tab DD.

It thus seems plainly apparent that the mission assigned to the Domestic Liaison Section of WLB was a most difficult one to perform. Although there was a tremendous amount of pertinent information available for MID (MIS) available in outside Washington agencies, the problem of first narrowing it down and then properly distributing it among selected recipients soon became almost insuperable. Since the WLB was also handicapped by a grievous lack of qualified personnel, the Domestic Liaison Section could barely scratch the surface in exploiting its numerous but potentially valuable information sources. It certainly would have been much better from the coordination standpoint if the national administration had not chosen to create so many special wartime agencies over and above the regularly established departments of the United States Government. On the other hand, it must be freely admitted that the military intelligence authorities did not make any concerted attempt to centralize or simplify their inter-agency liaison effort until they were forced to do so of necessity during mid-1944. The problem was there from the start but remained badly neglected throughout much of the wartime period.

The Interview Section of WLB was mainly an outgrowth of the system already developed for questioning military and civilian personnel upon their return from overseas, as set forth in the AGO directive of 12 December 1942. It only carried an authorized strength of two officers and one civilian assistant, so its principal function was to hold more or less exploratory talks with likely informants and then, if indicated,

"UNCLASSIFIED"

arrange for subsequent interviews under a much wider MIS attendance. This activity required close cooperation between the section chief and such diverse elements as Headquarters ASF, AGF, and AAF; numerous outside governmental agencies; Intelligence Office, Walter Reed General Hospital; Foreign Branch of MIS, and civilian news establishments having correspondents stationed abroad. *

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* Ibid., Tab DD, Interview Section.

The Foreign Liaison Section of WLB consisted solely of the existing departmental Foreign Liaison Office. It was, still, called upon to maintain official contact with all military representatives of foreign governments accredited to the United States and to exercise general supervision over arrangements for the reception and processing of foreign military personnel arriving in the country. Derived from the provisions of a basic AGO memorandum dated 17 March 1937, this same directive remained in effect for the entire war period. During April 1944, because these foreign liaison duties had grown so extensively, the section was granted an authorized strength of 13 officers and 21 civilians. Even then the size and number of Allied military missions in Washington kept right on increasing, while the volume of official visits to the United States by foreign military personnel continued to mount as the war progressed. The Foreign Liaison Section was able, therefore, to collect an impressive amount of valuable information for MID (MIS) from its many different contacts. In this connection, the following groups were found to be the most productive:

French Military and Naval Missions
British Army and Air Staffs
British Air Commission
Royal Air Force Delegation
British Central Scientific Office
British Supply Council in North America
Canadian Army and Air Staffs
New Zealand Military and Air Missions
Australian Military and Air Missions
Chinese Missions
Soviet Purchasing Commission
Netherlands Military and Purchasing Commissions
Brazilian Missions and various Latin-American Purchasing Missions
Diplomatic personnel of governments (i.e., Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal) *

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* Ibid., Foreign Liaison Section.

The Miami Liaison Section of WLB was actually the former Miami Branch Office of MID. It had seemed a logical step in centralizing the departmental liaison effort to place this established office directly under the supervision of its counterpart in Washington, especially as it was still held responsible for taking care of all foreign military personnel arriving or departing from the United States via the Miami port of entry and paying suitable military honors to visiting civilian dignitaries of foreign governments under similar circumstances. Thus, by the summer of 1944, the Miami Office had already developed into a miniature WLB with well organized interview, domestic liaison and foreign liaison sections of its own. Moreover, in line with its broader branch functions, it soon became had become deeply involved in a number of other intelligence activities, such as security, censorship, visa and passport control, and undercover operations. For this reason it not only carried an authorized strength of 15 officers, 1 warrant officer, 8 civilians and 18 enlisted personnel but also received

additional personnel and administrative support from the Fourth Service Command. *

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* Ibid., Miami Branch Office and Inf re Washington Liaison Branch, Tab 5.

One of the announced goals of the June 1944 reorganization of MID (MIS) had been to divest the ACofS G-2, WDGS, of all his operational counterintelligence functions. In attempting to implement this imposed program, however, it was soon discovered that there were several residual security functions which could not be transferred from the departmental military intelligence agency under authoritative agreements with outside agencies. Since many of these functions called for inter-agency liaison and it was not feasible at that time to reestablish any kind of a Security Group in MID, decision was made to form a Security Liaison Section within the WLB for that special purpose. This was accomplished on 24 July 1944, with the new section then given a lengthy but very carefully worded mission, as follows:

a. To maintain, for security purposes only, an adequate liaison with the following civilian agencies of the Government (1) to insure the full and free exchange of useful information and (2) when authorized, to cooperate to the limit of its jurisdiction with any or all of such agencies in the enforcement of measures designed to preserve the security of the military establishment at home and abroad, to wit:

(1) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2) Counterintelligence desks of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
(3) United States Coast Guard.
(4) United States Immigration Service.
(5) United States Customs Service.
(6) Visa Division, Department of State.
(7) Passport Division, Department of State.
(8) Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, D/S.
(9) Special War Problems Division, Department of State.
(10) Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice.
(11) American Red Cross.

386

b. To maintain close and effective liaison between the War Department and Office of Censorship for the following, among other, purposes:

(1) To keep Office of Censorship informed with respect to pertinent War Department policies.

(2) To make timely recommendations to Office of Censorship regarding dispositions to be made of intercepted communications, films etc., in the interests of national security.

(3) To pass on requests originating with military personnel for permission to make international telephone calls.

(4) To receive from Customs Service (which acts as agent for Censorship at all ports of entry in the United States) all documents, films, maps, etc., having a specific value to the War Department in the prosecution of the war, which are seized by Customs from incoming travelers; and to transmit all such items to the appropriate agency of the War Department.

(5) To detect and bring to the attention of the appropriate theater commander all attempted evasions of military censorship on the part of military personnel stationed overseas.

c. To discharge MID's responsibility, in co-operation with other appropriate War Department agencies, for the Army's security indoctrination program . . .

d. To maintain an adequate liaison with the Office of War Information for the purpose of discharging MID's responsibility in connection with the civilian Security of War Information program currently conducted under the supervision of the Office of War Information with the co-operation of the War Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . *

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* Ibid., Inf re Washington Liaison Branch, Tab 3.

In justifying the assignment of these particular stated tasks to the new Security Liaison Section, it was further explained that the section chief would be frequently required to meet in conference with ranking officials of outside governmental agencies so as "to assist in the drafting and coordination of regulations, to discuss questions of jurisdiction and policy, to expedite the handling of special assignments, and to agree upon the details of future cooperative projects." Similarly, he would

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often find it necessary "to secure information from, transmit information to, and enlist the aid of, the various Service Commands (through ASF) and the several overseas theaters, and to act in close cooperation with other interested agencies of the War Department." It was then finally pointed out that the section would have to continue furnishing one representative for each of the three Interdepartmental Visa Committees and single Interdepartmental Passport Committee supervised by the State Department, plus a Repatriation Committee which included members detailed from the FBI, ONI and Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department of Justice. *

* Ibid., Washington Liaison Branch, Tab DD, Security Liaison Section.

It thus becomes clearly evident that due to difficulties being encountered in complying with impracticable directives received from higher authority on counterintelligence activities, the Security Liaison Section of WLB was in reality much more than just an ordinary liaison unit. As a matter of fact, because of security considerations and since activities of that such nature always demand a large amount of specialization, it had never been found possible to achieve any truly satisfactory centralization of liaison effort within the counterintelligence field. Nevertheless, this feat was attempted for the rest of the wartime period by the Security Liaison Section, with while carrying a total authorized strength of only 10 officers and 8 civilian employees. *

* Ibid. Chief of the Security Liaison Section at this time was Lt Col (later Col) O. D. Dorroh.

388

A final addition to the WLB took place on 25 September 1944, when the Contact and Liaison Office of the New York Branch came under its direct control. This office was abolished three months later, however, so it hardly had time to enter into the full departmental liaison picture. With reference to the manner in which this over-all effort actually operated, Col. E. W. Gibson, the first chief of WLB, subsequently had occasion to express himself, as follows:

> The greatest weakness that I observed in the Liaison Branch was the failure of the Research Unit of the Intelligence Group, of which I was later Chief, to properly use the Liaison Officers. I found that Research became too much bound to their desks to properly explore avenues of information reported by Liaison Officers. Likewise, I found jealousies existed between Government Agencies and even between different parts of the Intelligence Services, seriously handicapping Intelligence Liaison work. The failure to have Liaison Officers qualified to handle top secret material was a grave mistake. I found entirely too much over-emphasis of secrecy, and entirely too much distrust of their own officer personnel for Military Intelligence Service to be as efficient as it might have been. *

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* Ibid., p. 11.

It must be realized that this central liaison system designed to deal with certain outside agencies comprised just one phase of the total intelligence coordination effort. MID (MIS) was also furnishing key personnel on a large number of representative committees formed from the combined (Allied) or joint (American) standpoint, as well as for a multitude of inter-governmental and intra-Army committees covering all aspects of intelligence operations. * Besides, each individual unit

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* See: Federal Records of World War II (Washington, 1951), II Military Agencies, p. 101.

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388 389

UNCLASSIFIED

engaged in processing information for the departmental agency was maintaining an intimate contact with other associated groups working on related subjects. To illustrate the immense scope of this informal type of liaison, witness the coordination requirements that were being observed by the Electronics Section, Scientific Branch, MIS, during the latter part of the wartime period, as follows:

Within MIS -

Pacific Order of Battle Section, Military Branch
Air Subsection, Pacific Order of Battle Section, Military Branch
Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section, Military Branch, Camp Ritchie, Maryland
Logistics and Administration Desk, Military Research Section, Military Branch
Weapons and Equipment Desk, Military Research Section, Military Branch
Fortifications Desk, Military Research Section, Military Branch
Electronics and Light Equipment Desk, Economic Branch
Who's Who Branch
Photo Interpretation Unit, Office of Director of Intelligence
Captured Personnel and Materiel Branch
Map and Photo Branch
Military Intelligence Photo Interpretation
AISOS Mission, Foreign Liaison Branch
Special Branch
Japanese Military Reports Branch
Topographic Branch
Japanese Specialist (pertaining to Japanese free balloon developments)

Outside MIS -

Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War
Electronics Division, Analysis Branch, A-2
Office of Air Communications Officer
Materiel and Services, AAF
Intelligence Branch, ASF
Communications Coordination Branch, Plans and Operations Division, OC Sig O
Intelligence Branch, OC Sig O
Engineering and Technical Service Branch, OC Sig O
Operational Research Section, OC Sig O
Radar Branch, AGF
Editor, Radar Magazine, ACO, AAF

390

OP-25-3C Electronics Intelligence, Chief of Naval Operations
OP-20 Communications Division, Chief of Naval Operations
OP-16-PT Technical Intelligence, Office of Naval Intelligence
OP-20-F-4 CNO (Editors of CIC Magazine)
Naval Research Laboratory
U.S. Naval Photographic Intelligence Center
Technical Air Intelligence Center
Army-Navy Flak Intelligence Group
Office of Strategic Services
Office of Scientific Research and Development
Joint Security Control
Western Defense Command
Eastern Defense Command
New Developments Division, WDSS
Operations Division, WDGS
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Military Attache, Canada
Military Attache, Mexico

Representation on -
Radar and Countermeasures Committees of the Joint and Combined Communications Boards
Joint Electronics Information Agency of the Joint Communications Board (reading panel) *

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* Derived from various histories and projects (S) of the Scientific Branch, MIS. ACSI Rec Sec.

The problem of attaining a suitable coordination of effort for MID (MIS) activities had now reached truly overwhelming proportions. Although this critical development may not have been primarily the fault of the intelligence officials themselves, they did contribute materially to it by demonstrating a habitual inclination to reorganize the agency at the expense of seeking further simplification. As a matter of fact, it cannot even be charged directly against the departmental authorities who twice attempted to force unrealistic intelligence systems upon MID (MIS) from above. The problem actually stemmed largely from a growing pattern of involution

taking place both within the top military command and the United States Government itself.

It might be argued that the huge increase in number of intelligence groups functioning throughout the government during World War II merely represented a healthy acceptance of the fact that each commander or policy making official should possess sufficient information upon which to base his necessary decisions. On the other hand, the same expansion also seems to point unmistakably in the direction of a top-heavy bureaucracy becoming so entangled in a web of coordinating procedures as to fall eventually of its own weight. Most certainly any continued tendency toward adding echelons to the already overburdened military organization for command or creating new staff elements within the departmental structure must soon serve to multiply coordination requirements to an intolerable degree. With staffs admittedly always breeding bigger staffs, this can only lead to greater costs in resources and a waste of precious time. It thus behooves all concerned to resist such pressures in every possible way, while constantly striving to simplify existing organizations rather than permit them to grow more and more complicated as they progress. For military intelligence, the key problem has definitely become how best to accomplish a proper coordination of effort in the face of an ever-mounting organizational complexity.

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CHAPTER XII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The most striking feature of the departmental military intelligence operations during World War II was their tremendous growth in volume, scope and complexity. This was much more than merely a by-product of technical progress in the conduct of modern warfare but stemmed rather from a belated recognition on the part of the national authorities as to the vital role that intelligence must play in reaching essential command decisions. An insatiable demand for expertly evaluated information of every conceivable nature was thus created, not only within the military establishment itself but also throughout the United States Government. Consequently, there were many more agencies involved in intelligence activities than ever before, with a total coverage extending far beyond any previous American experience in such matters.

While the Pearl Harbor disaster did serve to emphasize the dire necessity for producing suitable intelligence to protect our own national interest, this fact had already gained a favorable measure of appreciation even before that memorable event. As a result, several significant increases were granted in support of military intelligence operations prior to 7 December 1941 and MID was not completely unprepared to undergo its abrupt wartime expansion. Nevertheless, the problems actually confronting the departmental authorities right after Pearl Harbor were both desperate and prodigious. There was

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little time for anticipatory planning or careful deliberation, so, based upon an existing organization, the agency proceeded to grow rapidly in all possible directions. Since funds were amply available, the immediate problem then lay in procuring enough qualified personnel to handle properly the many different intelligence tasks which came to be presented.

Under the exigencies of a vast Army expansion, there were, of course, not nearly enough Regular Army officers to go around. Although the departmental intelligence agency managed to secure a fair share of these extremely scarce personnel in the beginning, it was soon forced to rely upon an increasing number of MI Reserve and newly-commissioned officers for sustaining its extensive effort. Unfortunately, the MI Reserve program had not been developed in any satisfactory manner to provide the numerous and varied intelligence specialists that were needed for wartime WDGS duty, while experienced civilian researchers remained practically unobtainable. There was also no training center at hand to utilize, in helping to satisfy the enormous demands for field intelligence personnel and the departmental administrative authorities were already in the midst of preparing a major reorganization for the War Department and United States Army which would seriously upset MID plans for the future. To make matters worse, the health of the recently assigned ACofS G-2, WDGS, was rapidly failing, so there could be no continuity of command for the agency until the arrival of General Strong in May 1942.

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Among the more critical and pressing problems facing the departmental military intelligence officials during the early post-Pearl Harbor period were the following:

1. To redesign the military intelligence production process so as to fulfill the requirements of a multiple-front global war, rather than along the more limited lines envisaged under existing mobilization plans.

2. To extend current intelligence coverage in conformation with deepening national concern over the security of the Panama Canal and status of Western Hemisphere defense.

3. To establish a more intimate intelligence relationship on a cooperative basis between the United States Army and Navy, both in Washington and the field.

4. To take positive steps to emphasize air intelligence matters.

5. To negotiate new procedures for integrating American and Allied intelligence operations and agree upon specific responsibilities pertaining thereto.

6. To participate actively in the prompt evolution of the JCS and CCS committee structures from the military intelligence standpoint.

7. To represent the War Department effectively in connection with the wartime expansion of intelligence or related activities being conducted by other branches of the United States Government, such as visa and passport control, censorship, psychological warfare, plant security, etc.

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8. To place the Army technical intelligence effort on a fitting combat basis and promote the formation of expert groups to evaluate enemy progress in adopting latest scientific techniques to modern warfare.

9. To develop additional counterintelligence measures as called for by a rapidly expanding United States Army and ~~companion~~ national personnel security program.

10. To guide the favorable growth of a ~~newly-established~~ new Counter Intelligence Corps for the United States Army.

11. To formulate effective policies covering all aspects of military intelligence training.

12. To render necessary support to the Army communications intelligence effort, so it could stay fully abreast of all technical advances being made within that productive field.

13. To maintain appropriate liaison with outside agencies showing any promise of contributing information of value to military intelligence production.

14. To work constantly toward simplifying and standardizing coordination practices for military intelligence, not only within the departmental agency itself but also throughout the United States Army.

Many of these post-Pearl Harbor problems were duly recognized by the ~~departmental~~ military intelligence officials and they undertook right

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away to cope with them. On the other hand, some major problems were not properly perceived, and others continued to remain either ~~totally~~ notably postponed or neglected. Although the indicated remedial actions for these latter problems all appeared to fall plainly under the assigned intelligence mission, several of them were controversial enough to portend serious clashes with other major staff elements before an acceptable solution might be reached. The dark cloud of reorganization imposed from above provided a further handicap, as it was backed by influential administrative officials who felt that the departmental intelligence agency was too large and ought to be strictly limited in its performance to general staff type functions. At the same time, certain departmental executive authorities held strong personal views on the subject of intelligence and were anxious to have their pet theories put into actual practice. In weighing the detailed performance of the military intelligence officials, therefore, these various external factors must be most carefully considered.

Because first things had to come first, little real progress was made in solving basic military intelligence problems during the brief period falling between 7 December 1941 and the important Army reorganization of 9 March 1942. The departmental intelligence officials, like everyone else, were kept so busy adjusting to the new war conditions and precipitate Army expansion that only immediate problems could claim very close attention. Even then, however, a number of noteworthy steps were taken which did tend to set a definite pattern for the future, as follows:

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1. General Miles, accompanied by key officers from the Latin American Section of the Intelligence Group, MID, was ordered to visit Panama and other strategic countries in Central and South America for the specific purpose of recommending additional intelligence measures to increase the security of the Panama Canal and strengthen Western Hemisphere defense.

2. While a joint Intelligence Committee had been authorized prior to Pearl Harbor under the Joint (Army-Navy) Board, it was not yet operational on 7 December 1941. Commencing to function without further delay, it was shortly adopted by the JCS as comprising a Joint Intelligence Survey Committee (JISC).

3. The ACofS G-2, WDGS, not only promptly initiated a sizable expansion of the American military attache and observer system but also placed added emphasis on air intelligence matters in connection therewith.

4. Effective procedures were soon devised at the working level to assure the appropriate exchange of information between MID and British intelligence officers stationed in Washington. These same procedures were then accepted by the CCS as forming a Combined Intelligence Survey Committee (CISC).

5. MID assisted in the development of and provided Army representation on a new Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) for the JCS. This authoritative committee, which held its first regular meeting on 5 March 1942, also constituted the American side of a Combined

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Intelligence Committee (CIC) within the CCS organization.

6. MID continued to meet the growing commitments called for by an Inter-Departmental Visa Review Committee functioning under State Department direction that had been announced in November 1941.

7. After inaugurating military censorship and making a token show of national postal consorship, MID was able to furnish an invaluable nucleus of trained Army censorship officers to the civilian Director of Censorship for his use in conducting wartime censorship throughout the United States.

8. In coordination with ONI and FBI, MID continued to exercise general staff supervision over the development of personnel security practices for industrial plants engaged in classified war production.

9. The ACofS G-2, WDGS, executed a formal agreement with ONI and FBI to govern changes in investigative responsibilities resulting from the establishment of martial law in Hawaii and other restrictions of that same type which might arise if the war zone became extended.

10. After securing an immediate post-Pearl Harbor increase doubling the authorized strength of the Corps of Intelligence Police, MID successfully superintended the creation of a Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to replace that existing organization.

11. A school for prisoner of war interrogators was established at Camp Blanding, Fla., under the IV Army Corps, while MID gave full support to a Japanese Language School already operating at the Presidio of San Francisco under Fourth Army control.

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12. Through a small Special Study Group (SSG) organized just before Pearl Harbor, MID played a significant role in the early psychological warfare operations of the United States Government and appointment of a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) under the JCS.

It thus seems plainly apparent that even though the MID officials were faced with a discouraging array of difficult tasks during the first few months of World War II, they did manage to embark upon a progressive program pointing favorably toward the future. The chief areas of neglect would seem to lie within the difficult fields of technical intelligence and military intelligence training. Both of these activities stood in obvious need of more emphatic positive general staff supervision in order to achieve a better coordination of effort but they were on the whole permitted to drift. The fact that aggressive action in either field would undoubtedly encounter strenuous resistance from other interested staff elements may have been a reason for this delay but can hardly provide a satisfactory excuse.

The March 1942 reorganization, which originally forced an MIS concept on MID, might well have had much more serious results than it actually did. There was at first a great deal of confusion caused by marked contradictions in assigned missions, as well as the usual inability to distinguish between so-called general staff and operational functions, but the new system gradually came to be regarded more or less in the light of a paper organization. This held especially true

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after General Strong became the ACofS G-2, WDGS, in May 1942. Besides, in their zeal to reduce the total strength of the War Department General Staff largely at the expense of military intelligence, the departmental administrative authorities failed to insist at any time upon a physical separation of MIS from MID. This was most fortunate indeed because a directive of that particular nature could have proved disastrous.

The departmental agency underwent its greatest wartime expansion during General Strong's tour of duty as the ACofS G-2, WDGS, from 5 May 1942 to 21 February ~~February~~ 1944. Due to his forceful character and previous experience in key WDGS positions, he not only enjoyed considerable independence of action in performing the military intelligence mission but also sufficient prestige to insure a careful consideration of his numerous and far-reaching proposals. A succession of progressive steps were ~~thus~~ taken under his personal direction, which were all designed to satisfy important intelligence needs of the day, as follows:

1. Completed transfer of the Japanese Language Schools (MISLS) from the Presidio of San Francisco to Camp Savage, Minn., while expanding its curriculum and establishing a subsidiary Army Language School at the University of Michigan.

2. Created a practically independent American Intelligence Command (AIC) at Miami Beach, Fla., thus contributing measurably to security of the Panama Canal and Western Hemisphere defense.

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4. Based upon instructions from the Secretary of War, arrangements for MID representation on an Inter-Departmental committee appointed to study problems incident to the entry of aliens and citizens brought into the United States either by neutral or disarmed vessels. Additionally, despite adverse pressures from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, rendered full support to a national travel control program being supervised by the State Department in compliance with a Presidential proclamation issued shortly before Pearl Harbor.

5. Formed a Special Information Branch within MIS to monitor telephone conversations at all War Department buildings.

6. Secured from the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) the loan of several Spanish and Portuguese language instructors to assist in training military intelligence personnel who were scheduled for field assignment. Likewise, extended other phases of the MID (MIS) foreign language training program to accomplish this same purpose.

7. Obtained appropriate authority to activate a Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Md., which then proceeded to grow rapidly both in point of size and functional responsibility.

8. Following the establishment of a national Office of War Information (OWI) during June 1942, cooperated closely with that agency by providing War Department membership on its Security Advisory Board and even eventually transferred a number of top personnel from the MID (PWB) Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) to the Overseas Branch of OWI.

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8. Furnished Army representation on the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) when it was reorganized and Colonel Donovan, the ~~newly~~ appointed Chief of OSS, designated to be its Chairman. After the JPWC was abolished on 23 December 1942, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, succeeded in forcing OSS to deemphasize its activities within the general intelligence field but, in turn, had to dissolve the PWB of MID(MIS). Approximately one year later, against his considered recommendation that the Army psychological warfare effort should be taken over by OPD, this PWB was reestablished in MID with a noticeably broadened mission.

9. Activated a Prisoner of War Interrogation Center at Fort Hunt, Va., to serve ports of entry on the east coast and, shortly thereafter established a similar center near Tracy, Calif., for the west coast, with these two installations ultimately coming under direct command of the Chief, MIS.

10. Organized a Prisoner of War Branch in MIS, later renamed the Captured Personnel and Materials Branch (CPM), to handle prisoner of war intelligence matters and to process all reports received from PW interrogation sources. During September 1942, this same branch was further directed to undertake the development of a large-scale MIS-X program dealing with means and methods for escape or evasion by American military personnel.

11. Opened MID (MIS) field offices at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, and Recife, Brasil, in order to improve the production of intelligence bearing upon security of the Panama Canal and Western Hemisphere defense.

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12. Executed a special agreement with the Army Air Forces and Office of the Chief of Engineers to clarify procedures in utilizing photographic material of military intelligence interest, thereby paving the way for the Map and Photo Branch of MID (MIS) to build up an extensive Aerial Photograph Catalog of the World and a large Photo Interpretation Library. A First Photo Procurement Detachment was also organized in support of the latter project, to operate with the British Air Ministry at Medmenham, England.

13. Joined with the State Department, ONI and FBI in screening all personnel slates submitted for the exchange of interned nationals between the United States and Japanese Governments.

14. Participated actively in the formation and subsequent growth of Joint Security Control (JSC) under the JCS, this committee being held responsible for coordinating the entire counterintelligence and deception effort of the armed forces over most of the wartime period.

15. Established a Military Censorship School at Fort Washington, Md., to be administered in close conjunction with an existing Adjutant General's School but otherwise controlled by MID (MIS). Also, because of the constantly mounting need for trained censorship officers in the field, created a Military Censorship Officers Candidate School (OCS) and an Officer Pool for Censorship Personnel to provide greater flexibility for the military censorship program.

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16. Encouraged the favorable growth of a Japanese nameplate analysis project that had been originated by Royal Australian Air Force personnel assigned to Headquarters, Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.

17. Held a series of conferences with British intelligence officials in London to contrive a more efficient system for exploiting captured documents and improving enemy order of battle estimates. Then, derived from agreements reached during these conferences, organized a combined Military Intelligence Research Section (MIRS) with branches in Washington and London to accomplish these twin purposes.

18. Formed a German Order of Battle School in MIS, which was later transferred to the MITC, and established a new Order of Battle Branch to facilitate the production of that important class of military intelligence.

19. Took over from the Bureau of Public Relations (BPR) the task of maintaining uniform security standards for the release of information on American war production to governmental and non-governmental agencies standing in need of it.

20. Signed a formal pact with ONI and FBI designed to limit the operational intelligence activities of American military attaches serving at posts within the Western Hemisphere.

21. Supported the development of special observer teams made up of personnel from the technical services, to collect samples of and data on enemy equipment held by field intelligence agencies.

22. Inaugurated a Report Center System in MIS to effect a more satisfactory distribution of technical intelligence reports received

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by the departmental agency.

23. Arranged with Headquarters, AAF, AGF and ASF to insure that selected officers would report to MID (MIS) for personal interview immediately following their return from visits or duty abroad.

24. Reached an official agreement with General Eisenhower's Headquarters to organize a Joint Army-Navy Collection Agency (JICA) in North Africa and thus counteract an observed tendency of the theater intelligence units to neglect War and Navy Department technical intelligence requirements. A total of four such field collection agencies were then formed in different combat theaters, to be eventually adopted by the JCS.

25. Established Army-sponsored Chinese Language Courses at Yale University and the University of California in order to furnish badly needed Chinese linguists for the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater.

26. Attempted to centralize the collection and liaison effort of the departmental agency by creating an all-inclusive Collection Branch in MIS.

27. Recommended the appointment of several JIC subcommittees to assist in coordinating the joint intelligence effort. Included among these subcommittees were the important Topographic Subcommittee and the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board that was charged with preparing the valuable Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS).

28. When it became apparent that the New Orleans Branch Office was not being productive, transferred it to the Southern Defense Command.

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29. Pursued a determined policy aimed at excluding suspected subversives from any assignment on sensitive duty and preventing Communists or "fellow-travelers" from gaining Army commissions, which policy came under ever-increasing outside pressure as the war progressed.

30. Conferred personally with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, so as to reach a firm agreement regarding their respective staff responsibilities in the conduct of Army intelligence training.

31. Despite his expressed opinion that the Army historical mission did not properly belong under the ACofS G-2, WDGS, received a fully written directive from the Deputy Chief of Staff to establish an organization within MID suitable for compiling a military history of the Second World War.

32. Formed an Electronics Section, Special Branch, MIS, for the specific purpose of producing required intelligence on enemy electronic devices and radar counter-measures.

33. Established a separate Collection Branch, MIS, in seeking to find additional sources of information and further expanded the military attache system not only to increase current coverage but also to emphasize the collection of air intelligence.

34. Aided directly in the preparation of a new JIC charter calling for closer liaison between that top intelligence committee committee and other principal agencies of the JCS, particularly the Joint Staff Planners (JPS). This charter also served to change the name of the working-level JISC to the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) and install it on a much sounder basis.

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35. Detailed a highly trained group of CIC personnel to help preserve the security of the MANHATTAN Project and voluntarily turned over to Headquarters, Military District of Washington (MDW) a number of operational counterintelligence functions previously performed by the Counter Intelligence Group of MID (MIS).

36. Organized a special collection net to obtain information about enemy experiments within the related fields of bacteriological and biological warfare. Subsequently detailed an officer from MID (MIS) to transmit available intelligence to the Chief of the New Developments Division, WD, on enemy progress in rocket development and chemical, bacteriological or biological warfare.

37. With important assistance from both the Director of Scientific Research and Development and the Director of the MANHATTAN Project, succeeded in forming an ALSOS Mission which, as the first American field collection agency of a purely scientific nature, performed most creditably during the Allied invasion of Western Europe.

38. Registered a heated protest but to no avail when the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff announced its far-reaching decision to decentralize all Zone of Interior counterintelligence activities to the Provost Marshal General and transfer the entire CIC Section of MID (MIS) to Headquarters, ASF.

39. Provided the chairman for and supplied the bulk of information to a CROSSBOW Committee appointed by the Secretary of War to evaluate German secret weapons reportedly emplaced along the Channel Coast and to

recommend immediate counter-measures against them.

40. Opened a series of Division Classes at the MITC to give extra instruction to designated intelligence personnel from Army divisions scheduled for early overseas movement, as well as to certain U. S. Marine Corps and Allied officers on an individual basis.

41. Reestablished a small Training Branch in MID (MIS) to handle intelligence training matters, instead of continuing to utilize the Commandant, MITC, in a dual capacity for that purpose.

This detailed record of substantial accomplishments over a difficult wartime period of less than two years seems imposing to say the least. Under the energetic leadership of General Strong, therefore, the departmental intelligence agency had not only expanded in all customary directions but also embarked upon a number of exceptional projects which gave every indication of prompt and profitable success. Although the establishment of MISLS, MITC, PW Interrogation Centers, Military Censorship School, Report Center System, Order of Battle Branch, MIRS London and Washington, etc., were important steps in furthering the regular intelligence effort, such matters as creating a separate intelligence command (AIC) in Florida, organizing field offices in Panama and Brazil, rendering full support to the Japanese nameplate analysis project, forming the first JICA in North Africa, initiating Army language courses at civilian universities, devising a special system for collecting information on chemical, bacteriological or biological warfare, inaugurating the MIS-X program, sponsoring the CROSSBOW Committee and ALSOS Mission, were all

essentially revolutionary in character. Furthermore, many of these latter achievements, and those which were among the most productive, had to be carried out in the face of strenuous opposition coming both from inside and outside of MID (MIS) itself.

Nevertheless, there were several less salutary tendencies observable during this same period which appear to warrant special mention. For one thing, the agency remained in almost a continuous state of reorganization. The factors involved in this upsetting habit were multifold but stemmed mainly from General Strong's natural desire to have the agency organized according to his own personal views rather than based upon orders from above, coupled with a huge expansion in functional activity caused by such varied considerations as taking on new projects, rapid growth of the CCS and JCS committee structures, increased intelligence operations throughout the United States Government, and mounting requirements in support of Allied offensives within the combat areas. These complications should have pointed unmistakably toward the necessity for shedding operational counterintelligence responsibilities, simplifying coordination procedures and centralizing the departmental liaison effort but decisive action along any of those lines was noticeably absent. On the whole, however, the performance of MID (MIS) over this trying wartime period must certainly be regarded as outstanding, despite the fact that higher authorities were merely awaiting General Strong's departure in order to alter the entire system he had so painstakingly brought about.

The second enforced reorganization of MID (MIS), ~~as~~ completed in June 1944, was both poorly conceived and badly timed. Coming as it did right in the midst of the initial phases of the Normandy invasion, only a supreme effort on the part of a few veteran personnel managed to stave off a complete breakdown. Although the agency had probably reached the point where a resurvey of internal practices and procedures was needed, this was not the proper moment to prescribe a totally different processing system and especially one devised by officials who possessed no real military intelligence background. Many of the more ambitious provisions of that system proved to be unworkable while others were simply followed because they represented orders from higher authority. Even the new ACofS G-2, WDGS, himself, who had been a member of the Reorganization Committee responsible for the imposed system, was soon forced to compromise in a number of important instances with its basic concept.

Progress in military intelligence did not, of course, come to any actual halt as the result of reemphasizing the MIS separation and altering its processing system. Even though these measures generated a considerable amount of early confusion, many of the handicaps stemming from them were gradually overcome through mutual agreement or internal adjustment. Moreover, by the summer of 1944, most of the major problems concerning functional responsibility had already been settled and MID (MIS) relationships with Allied, theater and other associated intelligence groups were established on a comparatively satisfactory basis.

As a result of that, some of the changes called for under the new organization were long overdue and experiences gained in meeting earlier difficulties could now be put to practical use. During General Stilwell's writing, therefore, which extended from February 1944 to August 1945, the departmental agency continued to expand, and the more significant military intelligence events of this closing period are generally, as follows:

11. A representative committee was appointed in MID (MIS) to revise the Standing Instructions for Military Intelligence Service (SIMIS). This action eventually led to the issuance of a separate Basic Intelligence Directive (BID), which was intended to serve as a principal guide for all reporting from the field during the rest of the wartime period.

12. JCS approved an operational plan, prepared under the direction of MID, to accomplish the "mapping and photographing of Japan and approaches thereto," with MID designated as the responsible agency for carrying it out.

13. The ADC/S G-2, WDGS, addressed a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff, which not only recommended the continuance of policies excluding Communists and fellow-travelers from assignment on sensitive duty and attendance at Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) but also asked for permission to discharge under current Army regulations

officers
were proven to be members of the Communist Party or to have consistently followed the Party line or otherwise indicated they have submitted themselves to Party discipline."

4. The War Department established a combined Information and Historical Service, in order "to increase the flow of certain types of information concerning the front line activities of ground units."

5. Following a rather disappointing preliminary initial tour of duty in southern Italy, the AISOS Mission was reorganized on a more permanent basis and Dr. Samuel A. Goudsmit named to become its first Scientific Chief. At the same time, an ALSOS Advisory Committee was created with Col. C. P. Nicholas of MID appointed to act as Chairman.

6. The recently established Training Branch was transferred from MIS to MID where it could function under direct ACofS G-2, WDGS, control.

7. Except for a Communications Branch, the entire American Intelligence Command (AIC) was returned to Washington from the Miami Beach area and its personnel distributed among appropriate MID (MIS) units.

8. A Washington Liaison Branch (WLB), MIS, was organized for the express purpose of seeking a better coordination of the departmental intelligence effort with outside governmental agencies.

9. A broadly inclusive Scientific Branch, MIS, was formed to concentrate mainly upon evaluating Japanese progress in adopting latest scientific techniques for commitment in the Pacific War.

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10. The Special Branch, MIS, was abolished in the interest of achieving a more favorable integration of information obtained from communications intelligence activities with information gained from other sources. Likewise, a centralized Intelligence Library was set up for more efficient use by all MID (MIS) research elements.

11. A regular Reading Panel Branch was established in MIS, to operate both a Visiting General Panel and Visiting Technical Panel, wherein authorized representatives from ONI, AAF, ASF and the various technical services could note reports received within the departmental intelligence agency and secure copies of them if desired.

12. The San Francisco Branch Office was closed, with its remaining personnel and functions turned over to the Ninth Service Command.

13. JCS having assigned primary responsibility for the Japanese nameplate analysis project to the ACofS G-2, WDGS, it was promptly established as an Air Industry Section of MIS.

14. A small Security Branch was reconstituted in MID but it soon developed mostly into a catch-all unit to perform more or less unrelated counterintelligence tasks for the ACofS G-2, WDGS.

15. The Military Intelligence Language School (MISLS) was moved from Camp Savage to Fort Snelling, Minn., where better instructional facilities were available.

16. The Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) became officially charged with the conduct of all CIC training.

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17. A Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section (PACMIRS) was organized on a combined American-British basis at Camp Ritchie, Md., to translate and study captured Japanese documents.

18. MID (MIS) fostered the formation of a War Department Intelligence Collection Committee (WDICC), which was subsequently accepted by the JCS as being the proper primary agency for coordinating all governmental collection requirements connected with military intelligence operations.

19. Upon the creation of a Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS) in London to process all requests for information from the advancing Allied forces in Western Europe, JCS appointed a Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC) in Washington to work with it. All regular members of the JIC were represented on this TIIC, as well as the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), War Production Board (WPB), and Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD).

20. Two officers from the Scientific Branch of MIS, were ordered to devote their full time to handling reports on so-called Japanese balloon incidents, while the MID security officials became actively involved in a national program aimed at preventing any information about these incidents from leaking back to Japan.

21. New contracts were signed with the University of California and Yale University to continue Chinese language classes for selected military students and similar contracts were later executed with the University of Indiana and Cornell University to start Russian language classes.

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22. Secret instructions were issued, personally written by the Assistant Secretary of War, which not only had the effect of liberalizing the War Department attitude toward Communists and fellow-travelers within the Army but also soon came under severe Congressional criticism.

23. The New York Branch Office was closed, with its residual personnel and functions transferred to the Second Service Command.

24. MID sponsored the formation of an intra-departmental "Intelligence Committee on Japanese Anti-aircraft Defense" that was shortly joined on a cooperative basis by ONI and soon became known as ANFLAK. Under operational control of A-2 AAF, ANFLAK was formally charged with the vital intelligence task of "estimating Japanese anti-aircraft capabilities and locating Japanese anti-aircraft units" in support of the Pacific War.

25. The earlier TIIC was replaced by a Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) designed to supervise a needed program for exploiting technical knowledge held by Axis scientists and technicians currently available in occupied territory. All regular members of the JIC were represented on this new committee, plus the Departments of Treasury, Justice and Commerce, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, WPB and OSRD.

26. With a recent War Department Manpower Board directive having reduced the authorized strength of the G-2 Historical Branch from 56 to 46 persons, the branch chief remained determined to restore or

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minimize this announced cut and take whatever steps he could to have the departmental historical function completely removed from MID.

27. Dr. John Leet, an eminent Harvard seismologist and a former resident of Japan, was appointed to be the scientific intelligence consultant at Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC).

The full picture thus becomes increasingly clear. Although the path of the departmental military intelligence agency was often far from smooth, it did manage to satisfy most of the War Department and Army needs throughout the emergency. There were plainly three principal stages of development, with the first falling between the war's opening date and the major Army reorganization of March 1942. During these early months, the intelligence officials, like everyone else, remained chiefly occupied in overcoming their immediate problems, guiding a rapid wartime expansion and procuring enough qualified personnel to sustain an ever-widening functional effort. Because of General Miles' abrupt relief and General Lee's unfortunate breakdown in health, the agency could enjoy no real continuity of executive direction but was still able to initiate a number of significant steps looking favorably toward the future.

The second phase of development for the departmental agency, more or less coinciding with General Strong's tour of duty as the ACofS G-2, WDGS, extended from March 1942 to June 1944 when a radically different intelligence processing system was imposed on it from above. This

proved to be its most consequential period of noteworthy accomplishments, despite the fact that it had to operate under an impractical MID-MIS separation concept which was forced upon the agency as part of a drive aimed primarily at reducing the overall size of the WDGS. The establishment of Headquarters AGF, AAF and SOS (ASF) also served to complicate matters, especially in regard to the assignment of specific staff responsibilities for supervising intelligence training throughout the Army. General Strong, however, followed a policy of simply ignoring the worst features of the directed MID-MIS separation and eventually managed to straighten out many of the problems regarding inter-staff coordination. On the other hand, the departmental agency was plagued by a succession of internal reorganizations and its officials displayed a stubborn tendency to oppose any helpful proper decentralization of operational functions within the heavily overburdened counterintelligence field.

The final phase in development for the departmental agency covered the period from June 1944 right up to the end of hostilities. It started off with the untimely installation of a new intelligence processing system and certain other organizational changes, based in a large measure upon preconceived ideas on the subject held by higher authorities who were insufficiently aware of its many ramifications. Nevertheless, since some of the ordered changes were actually past due and a majority of the more controversial intelligence questions had previously been settled during General Strong's tenure

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of office, the agency first succeeded in weathering an initial spell of utter confusion and then forged ahead to register further impressive gains. A natural shift of emphasis to the Pacific War occurred right after VE Day, even though important military intelligence operations were still required in Western Europe to support the Allied occupation.

It must not be presumed from the numerous and varied accomplishments as listed, that the record of MID (MIS) in World War II merely comprised a series of unqualified successes. Many mistakes were certainly made and several indicated actions were either postponed or neglected. For example, it should have been clearly apparent to the departmental authorities that intelligence training would demand major attention right after Pearl Harbor in view of the scheduled Army mobilization and consequent need for intelligence specialists of every type. Yet this particular aspect of the military intelligence mission, which was an accepted general staff function, continued to suffer for a number of precious months at the expense of other less critical activities. The GHQ (AGP) training officials finally had to supply the original impetus behind a move to establish the MITC, while combat intelligence training often remained ineffectively supervised and inadequately coordinated. Even when a training program along more satisfactory lines eventually did get underway, it was inclined to concentrate too much upon the production of intelligence specialists and to disregard the preparation of up-to-date instructional material for use by the Army at large.

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Another notable defect in wartime intelligence performance was failure on the part of the departmental authorities to profit from their pre-Pearl Harbor experience and take positive steps without delay to integrate information obtained from communications intelligence sources into the regular processing system. A serious conflict between security regulations and the appropriate dissemination of Magic-derived information had formed such an obvious link in the chain of circumstances surrounding the Pearl Harbor disaster that solving this important problem should have received the very highest priority. No real changes in existing procedures appeared for that purpose, though, until during the June 1944 reorganization, when the responsible intelligence officials were literally forced to disband their Special Information Branch and distribute its key researchers among other MIS elements engaged in intelligence production. This was most assuredly a move in the direction of added efficiency and, furthermore, there is no indication that security was ever compromised in the least because of it.

Shortcomings of a similar nature were exhibited through the failure to establish a formal reading panel system in MIS before the summer of 1944 and to anticipate that a large-scale demand for trained Russian linguists would develop during the closing phases of the European War. There was also a seemingly inexcusable delay in seeking to achieve better coordination of effort for the complex technical intelligence program, which was allowed to grow up more or less on an individual basis

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under the Army technical services. A great deal of duplication of work was likewise observable between the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and A-2, AAF, in respect to research activities, well illustrated by the fact that personnel of the MID (MIS) Air Unit later reported their assigned mission was never accurately defined for them. Finally, despite the many changes resulting from combat conditions, standing instructions to cover operational procedures for MID (MIS) remained generally unrevised until after the ingoing reorganization of June 1944.

Since the progress of the departmental intelligence agency during World War II was so beset by controversy and functional conflict, it should provide a most fertile field for deriving lessons applicable to the future. The following detailed conclusions, therefore, based upon the cumulative evidence of MID (MIS) wartime experiences extending from Pearl Harbor to VJ Day, appear to qualify under this particular category. Although some of them may seem to be more significant than others, they all represent matters of distinct importance to the Army intelligence effort.

1. It is not possible to draw a sharp dividing line between so-called general staff and operational type functions with reference relative to the departmental military intelligence mission.

2. Because the ACofS G-2, WDGS, is called upon not only to act in the capacity of a principal general staff officer but also as a major military commander, he cannot be properly divested of his basic administrative responsibilities which are a direct function of command.

3. The departmental intelligence agency must remain a large organization under any conditions and will thus continue to present a

prime target for drives aimed at reducing the total size of the WDGS. Although a division of the agency to assist in this purpose might become desirable on paper, it should be recognized as being just that. An actual physical separation of any of its major processing elements from the others would surely pose a fatal handicap to the effective production of military intelligence.

4. With reference to whether or not it is better to adopt a geographic or functional approach to intelligence research, there are certain advantages and disadvantages inherent in each system. Hence, a carefully devised combination of both appears to offer the best promise of success. Organizational consistency within the intelligence agency itself, while still conforming to the associated departmental operations and planning element, is most important. It should also be realized that trained intelligence researchers are always extremely difficult to procure and because of their high degree of specialization they cannot be easily shifted around during any reorganization.

5. The departmental military intelligence agency will always have to process an enormous amount of information that may well turn out to be completely worthless but the only persons capable of reaching this considered conclusion are the individual researchers who are steeped in the particular subject or area involved.

6. Experimenting with the established intelligence production system, especially during wartime, is not the province of outside officials possessing an incomplete background on the difficult complexities of the subject or remaining unaware of alternative solutions

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which
previously tried and found wanting.

7. Anticipatory inter-agency planning is vital to the satisfactory performance of military intelligence during the early stages of an emergency, particularly for such activities as censorship, travel control, psychological warfare, special operations, security investigations, etc. Likewise, preliminary discussions or arrangements pointing toward possible wartime collaboration among Allied intelligence organizations will often pay huge future dividends.

8. Centralized training for intelligence specialists will be required during any period of military expansion but this fact should not lead the departmental authorities to neglect their fundamental mission of supervising the conduct of intelligence training throughout the Army at large. In this connection, respective intelligence training responsibilities for the ACofS G-2, WDGS, ACofS G-3, WDGS, and major training commands must be accurately defined so as to avoid the serious handicap of functional conflict.

9. Since it controls such a large field organization, the departmental intelligence agency will normally have to develop an extensive internal training program of its own. This can best be accomplished when the program is placed directly under the ACofS G-2, WDGS, himself, instead of through some intervening commander.

10. The desirability of opening branch offices or creating separate intelligence commands is still a controversial question. Nevertheless, it seems apparent that even though these installations often do require comparatively expensive commitments in personnel or fund

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resources, circumstances may arise during wartime which render such considerations of secondary importance. Lack of available office space in Washington, situations calling for the exploitation of information nearer its source and a greatly increased foreign liaison effort, are examples of reasons that might favor this type of decentralization.

11. Because many military security activities are not only highly sensitive but also often based upon Executive Orders or formal interdepartmental agreements, it usually becomes impracticable to effect any widespread functional decentralization in the counter-intelligence field. On the other hand, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, should take positive steps to relieve the departmental agency of all counter-intelligence operations that can be better performed by other staff sections or lower headquarters. Likewise, he should not jeopardize in any manner the accepted responsibility of each individual commander to provide for military security within his own unit.

12. While the joint and combined committee structure as developed during World War II did furnish an important means for achieving a favorable coordination of effort in military intelligence operations, it also constituted a severe personnel drain against the participating agencies. By forcing proposed actions to proceed through several successive layers of representative committees before they could gain final approval, the system also tended to place serious obstacles in the way of operations with a time factor of overriding interest.

13. The auspicious use of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Survey (JANIS) publications in the closing months of the Pacific War indicates the desirability of maintaining a regular global program along similar lines during peacetime.

14. With psychological warfare now forming a normal part of modern warfare, its methods extend far beyond such elementary practices as distributing propaganda leaflets, surrender passes, counterfeit money, etc. to enemy troops. Although this fact was only belatedly recognized by the military authorities during World War II, it seems clear that these military authorities ought to hold an effective measure of control over the national psychological warfare effort in any period of emergency. Precise official definitions of the key terms "psychological warfare" and "propaganda" should also be promptly agreed upon by all concerned so that the field may become effectively delimited.

15. Since most aspects of psychological warfare require some form of operational activity, primary general staff responsibility for supervising that function should rest with an operations and planning division instead of the departmental intelligence agency. The latter agency, however, must stand ready at all times to furnish needed advice on expected enemy reactions thereto and will thus continue to remain intimately involved in the psychological warfare effort.

16. The American military attache and observer system should be redesigned and enlarged immediately following the outbreak of war, particularly for the strategic neutral countries. Also,

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because the Military Attache or formally accredited Military Observer is the senior diplomatic representative of the United States Army within his host country, he will be regularly called upon to perform many different tasks in addition to those which are solely connected solely with intelligence production. The Military Attache Office, therefore, cannot be regarded as just another field collection agency and removed from direct ACofS G-2, WDGS, control. Moreover, suitable agreement should be promptly reached on the precise exact relationship to apply between the American Military Attache and his Chief of Diplomatic Mission, and any other Military Commanders or Chiefs of Military Missions stationed in within the same general area.

17. There is a natural tendency for theater intelligence units to concentrate more upon fulfilling their own local intelligence needs than those of the departmental agencies back in Washington. This problem was largely overcome during World War II through forming joint intelligence collection units within each of the combat theaters in order to represent properly the departmental viewpoint, especially on technical intelligence matters.

18. It remains essential for the American intelligence effort to keep fully abreast of advances made by other nations in adapting the latest scientific developments to the art of waging war. Because military personnel assigned on scientific intelligence duty cannot be expected to enjoy possess sufficient knowledge for evaluating this type of progress within

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all the higher technical fields, it becomes necessary to establish representative committees or teams to accomplish such purpose. Fortunately, the ALSOS Mission and other similar scientific groups created during World War II plainly demonstrated the fact that selected civilian scientists can operate successfully with military personnel in the field even under combat conditions.

19. In seeking to arrive at a perfect organization for the departmental intelligence agency, the authorities concerned should understand that the feat has been tried many times before and often with adverse results. Accordingly, hence, it may be better to retain an existing organization with a few possible defects than to upset it with frequent or experimental reorganizations.

20. The classification of information items under such functional designations as military, political, economic, sociological, etc., is not a satisfactory basis for correlating intelligence research as these wide fields of endeavor are always now so completely intermixed.

21. Foreign press material can contribute measurably to the departmental military intelligence effort and detailed arrangements should be completed during peacetime to facilitate the procurement of such material in the event of war.

22. Since the ACofS G-2, WDGS, will ordinarily be called upon to have an effective system for interrogating prisoners of war ready when they start to arrive in the United States from theaters of operations,

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he must anticipate this eventuality and direct the training of appropriate ~~prisoner of war~~ PW interrogation specialists well beforehand.

23. Even though the function of devising means and methods for escape or evasion by American military personnel involves mostly operational matters, it should be assigned to the ACofS G-2, WDGS, in view of its extreme sensitivity and ~~close~~ intimate relationship to enemy countermeasures.

24. In deriving information from captured documents, the departmental intelligence agency should remain chiefly concerned with their long range exploitation because the time factor will ordinarily require that higher field headquarters exploit them from a short range standpoint.

25. The ACofS G-2, WDGS, should make every possible effort to limit map and photo intelligence activities within the departmental agency only to those connected with establishing policies or coordination procedures for ~~the~~ use by operations involved many other groups concerned.

26. The departmental intelligence officials cannot rely entirely upon representative teams from the technical services to evaluate captured weapons or equipment for them because these personnel will usually accomplish this task in light of the individual needs of their own agencies rather than from any broad military intelligence viewpoint.

27. It remains essential for the ACofS G-2, WDGS, to take positive steps to insure that information acquired through communications intelligence operations is appropriately integrated with all other informa-

tion available on the same subject. He must also constantly guard against ~~A~~ any tendency to regard security restrictions aimed at protecting the communications intelligence source from being considered of greater importance than effective ~~use~~ utilization of the information itself.

28. A central file of standard Who's Who data will furnish a valuable adjunct to the intelligence research system but it should always be kept separate and distinct from the companion files devoted to personnel security information.

29. The Army should be permitted to control the basic terms of its own security policies, free from outside pressures, in order to protect ~~against~~ properly sabotage or subversion. At the same time, the fact must be fully recognized by all concerned that domestic and foreign subversive activities are ~~very~~ often very closely interrelated.

30. Since the security of military information function comprises a regular part of the ACofS G-2, WDGS, mission, the departmental intelligence agency should hold some measure of authoritative review over Army public relations activities but not undertake in any way to conduct them.

31. Although executing the departmental counterintelligence function may well require a considerable amount of operational activity, it will further include true research in connection with preparing bulletins, reports, surveys, summaries, estimates etc., on the current counterintelligence situation.

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32. In line with his traditional responsibility for handling military information matters, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, can logically be called upon to exercise general staff supervision over the development of an Army historical program. There is no valid reason, however, why the departmental intelligence agency should be charged with actually compiling war history or cataloging historical documents.

33. While it remains plainly desirable to achieve a certain degree of centralization for departmental intelligence liaison with other agencies, extreme care must be taken to prevent the adopted system from growing so large and unwieldy that it may end up in creating serious coordination difficulties of its own.

34. Intelligence activities, along with most other military operations, have now become so complex that the principal problem now appears to be how best to attain a satisfactory coordination of effort in order for the right hand to know what the left hand is doing. This development points directly toward the grave necessity for the departmental authorities striving at all times to keep the intelligence organization as simple as possible and thereby reduce coordination demands to an absolute minimum.

That these numerous and varied conclusions derived from MID (MIS) experiences in World War II should be of significant value to the future seems manifest, especially as they are based primarily upon evidence submitted by the participating officials themselves. The most important lesson of all, though, would appear to stem from General Strong's thesis, as expressed in June 1942, ~~when he was trying~~

when he was trying unsuccessfully to get the MIS concept abolished, that subordinates should be given a definite mission to perform plus whatever means are at hand to help accomplish it and then be allowed to organize these means in accordance with their own considered judgment. This, of course, has always been an acknowledged precept of command but it was repeatedly violated by higher authority during World War II for the departmental military intelligence agency.

Just as long as the ACofS G-2, WDGS, remains charged with the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence for the War Department and United States Army, his agency will continue to be a comparatively large one and have to engage in a number of operational-type activities. While this may not present an ideal situation from the standpoint of administrative nicety, it is called for by the fact that the ACofS G-2, WDGS, functions both as a principal general staff officer and military commander of an extensive field organization designed to render him necessary assistance in accomplishing his assigned mission. With no other major staff group capable of performing any suitable combination of these two different tasks, either the basic mission must be changed or the inconvenient size of the intelligence agency accepted. The cake cannot be had and eaten, too.

In final summation, therefore, it may be fairly adjudged that the departmental military intelligence agency during World War II eventually did manage to overcome the difficult handicaps of a sudden switch

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from peacetime to combat conditions and a series of unwarranted interferences imposed from above, in order to satisfy on the whole the multiple intelligence requirements of the War Department and United States Army. An ever-increasing trend toward greater complexity for intelligence operations, however, as witnessed over the same period, served to contribute a most disturbing note bearing upon their future development. If this dangerous drift is permitted to remain unchecked the results can well turn out to be disastrous, not only for the departmental intelligence effort but also with reference to the entire conduct of national defense. After all, the intelligence organization merely reflects in general the military command structure itself.

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